



victory briefs

Resolved: In response to the current crisis, a government should prioritize the humanitarian needs of refugees over its national interest.

November 2015 PF Brief*

*Published by Victory Briefs, PO Box 803338 #40503, Chicago, IL 60680-3338. Edited by Jake Nebel, Chris Theis, and Abraham Fraifeld. Written by Matthew Feng, Abraham Fraifeld, Caterine Lindsay, Austin Hopkins, and Arjun Rao. Evidence cut by authors. For customer support, please email help@victorybriefs.com or call 330.333.2283.

Contents

1	Topic Analysis by Matthew Feng	12
1.1	Opening Words	12
1.2	Background	12
1.3	Framing	14
1.4	Affirmative Arguments	15
1.4.1	The General Strategy	16
1.4.2	The Specific Strategy	17
1.5	Negative Arguments	19
1.5.1	Equally Important	20
1.5.2	National Threat	20
1.6	Final Words	20
2	Topic Analysis by Catherine Lindsay	21
2.1	Opening Words	21
2.2	Wording	21
2.2.1	Affirmative Ground	21
2.2.2	Negative Ground	24
2.3	Affirmative Arguments	25
2.4	Negative Arguments	27
2.5	Final Thoughts	28
3	Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins	29
3.1	Argument Guide 1: Short term prioritization of refugees benefits national interest in the long term	29
3.1.1	Long term economic impacts	29
	How refugees can benefit the German Economy	29
	How this is topical	33
3.2	Argument Guide 2: Specific Governmental Responses	39
3.2.1	Saudi Arabia	39

Contents

3.2.2 United States 43
 Why we shouldn't eliminate or shorten the screening process 45

3.3 Argument Guide 3: The Nature of Borders 50
 Introductory note 50
 Citizenship is arbitrary / Individuals have equal worth 51
 Refugees ought to have their needs met first 53

3.3.1 The Right to Refuse 53
 Other ways to help 53
 Weakens the Social Contract 54

3.3.2 Defense of Philosophical Justification 56
 Response to Social Contract 56
 Response to a Lack of Practicality 56
 Dangers of right to refuse refugees (general) 57

3.4 Argument Guide 4: System Overload 58
 Initial Optimism opens the floodgates 59
 Migrants begin to overwhelm the institutions of Europe's largest economy 61
 As Predicted, things are only going to get worse 62
 The Situation in Germany is awful now 63
 Additional Evidence 65
 Final thoughts 67

4 Cards cut by Abraham Fraifeld 68

5 Pro 69

5.1 State Obligations 69
 5.1.1 Cosmopolitan Egalitarianism 69
 5.1.2 Alternate Moral Theories - Utilitarianism, Deontology 72
 5.1.3 International Law 76

5.2 Benefits of Accepting Refugees 78
 5.2.1 Economic 78
 5.2.2 Security 79

5.3 Alternate Ways to Help Refugees 83
 5.3.1 Aid and Funding the UN 83
 5.3.2 Humanitarian Intervention 85

6 Con 87

6.1 State Morality 87

Contents

6.2	Specific Policies Have Problems	89
6.2.1	Settling Refugees	89
6.2.2	Aid	92
6.2.3	Offensive Humanitarian Intervention	96
6.2.4	Negotiated Settlements and Ceasefires	98
7	AT: Pro	100
7.0.1	AT: Borders are arbitrary	100
7.0.2	AT: International Law Framework	101
7.0.3	AT: Economic Benefits of Refugee Acceptance	102
7.0.4	AT: Governments should intervene in conflicts prone to create refugee outflows for humanitarian reasons	103
8	AT: Con	105
8.0.1	AT: Governments' obligation is to the national interest	105
8.0.2	AT: Settling refugees will lead to more civil war	107
8.0.3	AT: Aid Undermines Economies	108
8.0.4	AT: Humanitarian intervention fails	110
9	Cards cut by Arjun Rao	112
10	Affirmative Arguments	113
10.1	The detriment of forced migration	113
10.1.1	Trafficking	113
	Misha Glenny of the New York Times	113
	Fazzina for the UN Refugee Agency	113
10.1.2	Human Rights Violations	114
	Liz Miller in Human Rights and Human Welfare	114
	Miller in Human Rights and Human Welfare	115
10.1.3	The underclass of labor	115
	Dr. Benedetta Berti of the INSS	115
	John Burnett and David Whyte for the University of Liverpool	116
	Burnett and White for the University of Liverpool	116
10.1.4	Impacts on the host country	117
	Dr. Benedetta Berti of the INSS	117

Contents

10.2 AT: Detriment of forced migration 117

 10.2.1 Refugee camps create a false sense of security 117

 Imogen Foulkes of the BBC 117

 UN Refugee Agency 118

 Stanford Medical School 118

10.3 Responsibility to host refugees 119

 10.3.1 UN Member states have a responsibility to protect refugees, at least in the short term 119

 Jastram and Achiron of the UNCHR 119

 10.3.2 In large part, foreign countries caused the conflicts that displace millions. It is their responsibility to provide a safe haven to the innocent 120

 Steve Hilton in the New York Times 120

 10.3.3 International Law dictates that countries should not force refugees to return to their home country during conflict 120

 Catherine Phuong of the University of Newcastle 120

 10.3.4 Countries haven't upheld their obligations 121

 Amnesty International 121

10.4 A Responsibility to host 121

 10.4.1 Countries have an obligation first to their citizens. Their citizens give up rights to be part of a government that protects them. If the refugees pose a threat to the security of these citizens, the government does not have an obligation to host them. 121

 Steven Heyman in the Duke Law Journal 121

10.5 Reductions in terrorism 122

 10.5.1 Removing refugees from conflict zones reduces the chance that they are radicalized 122

 Anne Speckhard of the New York Times 122

 10.5.2 Empowering refugees allows them to escape radical groups 123

 Khalid Koser of the Brookings Institution 123

 Asylum Access Annual Report 123

 10.5.3 Harboring deserted refugees is critical to reducing terrorism 124

 Khalid Koser of the Brookings Institution 124

 10.5.4 Providing adequate education near camps helps reduce terrorism 125

 Francisco Martin-Rayó for the Harvard Belfer Center 125

Contents

10.6 AT: Reductions in Terrorism 125

 10.6.1 Refugee camps are breeding grounds for instability and terrorism 125

 World Bank's World Development Report 125

 10.6.2 Extremism is what pushed these people out of their country, until we
 solve for the root of the problem we can't really reduce terrorism 126

 Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times 126

10.7 Economic benefits of hosting refugees 126

 10.7.1 Stimulating local economies 126

 Karen Jacobsen in the Journal of Modern African Studies 126

 Jacobsen in the Journal of Modern African Studies 127

 The UN Refugee Agency 127

 10.7.2 Attracting foreign aid 128

 Karen Jacobsen in the Journal of Modern African Studies 128

 The UN Refugee Agency 128

10.8 AT: Economic benefits 128

 10.8.1 Increased costs to impoverished citizens 128

 The UN Refugee Agency 128

 10.8.2 Increased aid hurts locals 129

 Assandé Adom for Economics Research International 129

10.9 Governments are capable of responding effectively 130

 10.9.1 Western governments took in many refugees during the Indonesian con-
 flicts in the 20th century, now they refuse to 130

 Christopher Phillips of the London School of Economics 130

 Ben Rawlence of the New York Times 130

 10.9.2 The impact of the refugees on the host country depends on the actions of
 the host 131

 David Becker of Illinios State University 131

10.10 AT: Governments are capable of responding 131

 10.10.1 A lot of host countries can't afford the scarce resource situation 131

 The UN Refugee Agency 131

 10.10.2 The cost of hosting refugees is immense 132

 Refworld of the United Nations 132

 Refworld of the UN 132

Contents

10.11 Prioritization 132

 10.11.1 Prioritizing the humanitarian needs of refugees in the short term pre-
 vents long term harms 133

 Stanford Medical School 133

 10.11.2 In the long term, the economic impact of refugees will be positive 133

 Simon Nixon of the Wall Street Journal 133

10.12 AT: Prioritization of refugee interests has long term benefits 134

 10.12.1 In the areas where refugees are concentrated, focusing on refugees will
 entrench already existing local problems 134

 Refworld of the United Nations 134

 10.12.2 We must prioritize solving the root of the problem 134

 John Mearsheimer for the National Interest 134

11 Negative Arguments 135

 11.1 Economic harms of accomodating migrants 135

 11.1.1 Increases to food and housing costs 135

 Yusuf Akgündüz for the Institute for the Study of Labor 135

 Akgündüz for the Institute for the Study of Labor 135

 Patricia Ongpin in the Forces Migration Review 136

 Yasser Abdih and Carolin Geginat on the IMF 136

 Abdih and Geginat of IMF 137

 Anne Kamau of the Brookings Institute 137

 11.1.2 Impacts on Education 138

 Razan Nasser and Steven Symansky for USAID 138

 11.2 AT:Economic harms 138

 11.2.1 The harms are offset by benefits to local economies 138

 World Bank’s World Development Report 138

 11.2.2 History shows that the overall economic impact is positive 139

 Andrew Soergel for U.S. News 139

 11.2.3 Refugee influxes can protect against economic shocks of nearby conflicts 139

 Massimiliano Cali an Samia Sekkarie of the Brookings Institute 139

 11.3 Harms to Security 140

 11.3.1 Security forces are displaced 140

 Razan Nasser and Steven Symansky for USAID 140

 Patricia Ongpin of Syracuse University 141

Contents

11.3.2 Safety of locals 141
Inge Brees of the International Relations and Security Network 141

11.3.3 Transnational Security 142
World Bank’s World Development Report 142

11.3.4 Trafficking 142
Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times 142

11.4 AT: Harms to security 143

11.4.1 Prioritization of the needs of refugees would solve this problem 143
Karen Jacobsen of Tufts University 143
Jacobsen of Tufts University 144
U.S. Department of State 144

11.4.2 Security harms are usually isolated 145
World Bank’s World Development Report 145

11.4.3 Accomodating refugees serves to hinder extremism 145
Anne Speckhard of the New York Times 145

12 Pro Cards cut by Rebecca Kuang 146

12.1 Status Quo 146

12.1.1 Hundreds of thousands of refugees are fleeing violence in Syria,
Afghanistan, Eritrea, and other countries. 146

12.1.2 The international community has done a terrible job aiding refugees. . . 146

12.1.3 Persian Gulf countries have done very little to resettle refugees. 147

12.1.4 Germany has pushed for other EU members to do more, but has met
resistance. 147

12.2 Economy 148

12.2.1 Welcoming refugees would benefit the host country’s economic
objectives—Canada is proof. 148

12.3 Germany 148

12.3.1 Germany’s cannot shoulder the full burden—other EU countries must act. 148

12.4 Gulf States 149

12.4.1 Gulf states need to do more to share the burden. 149

12.5 International Treaties 149

12.5.1 The 1951 Refugee Convention obligates states to take in refugees. 149

12.5.2 142 states have signed on to the Refugee Convention. 150

12.5.3 States are also bound the principle of non-refoulement to grant asylum
to refugees if they are fleeing violence. 150

Contents

12.6 Principle of Mutual Aid 151
12.6.1 Countries are bound by the principle of mutual aid to help refugees. . . . 151
12.7 Syria 151
12.7.1 The Syrian conflict has led to the world's worst ongoing humanitarian and refugee crisis. 151
12.7.2 Syria is facing the worst humanitarian disaster since the end of the Cold War. 152
12.7.3 The crisis is only going to get worse. 153
12.7.4 Root causes of violence in Syria are unlikely to disappear soon—Syrian refugees desperately need help. 153
12.7.5 The United States has a moral obligation to admit more Syrian refugees. . 154
12.7.6 Soft power—if the United States increases the number of Syrian refugees accepted, it would send a signal about its concern worldwide. 154
12.7.7 Other countries have reached a tipping point- the US must step in and help. 155
12.7.8 The US is obligated to step in—the crisis was caused by the failure of US policy in the Middle East. 155
12.8 Women and Girls 156
12.8.1 Millions of Syrian women need assistance and access to reproductive health services. 156
12.8.2 Without foreign assistance, women and girls will not have access to the health care they need. 156
12.8.3 This crisis calls for expedited registration of refugees. 157
12.9 AT Diplomacy with Assad 158
12.9.1 Negotiations—even the recent negotiations between Merkel and Assad- won't go anywhere. 158
12.9.2 Even if Assad formed an alliance, he would barely provide any help. . . . 159
12.10 AT Gulf States 159
12.10.1 Migrants cannot go to Gulf States- they must flee to Europe to have future prospects. 159
12.11 AT Hungary 160
12.11.1 Hungary has clamped down the border on the rising tide of refugees. . . 160
12.11.2 Refugees don't want to stay in Hungary. 160
12.11.3 Migrants would rather go to Greece or Germany. 161
12.12 AT Military Intervention 162
12.12.1 Military intervention would make the conflict worse. 162

Contents

12.13 AT Terrorism 162
 12.13.1 Refugee cases are carefully vetted and screened. 162

13 Con Cards cut by Rebecca Kuang 164

13.1 Population Age 164
 Refugees from Syria could solve Europe’s aging problem. 164
 13.1.1 The countries with the lowest quotas now would benefit most from ac-
 cepting immigrants. 165

13.2 Instability 165
 13.2.1 European countries face social conflict and instability from the strain of
 an influx of refugees. 165

13.3 Moral Priorities 166
 13.3.1 States have unique moral obligations to their own citizens. 166
 13.3.2 Closed borders are necessary for trust and democratic culture. 167

13.4 Polls 167
 13.4.1 Americans do not feel obligated for the US to take in refugees. 167

13.5 Stability 168
 13.5.1 A massive influx of refugees causes social instability. 168

13.6 Terrorism 168
 13.6.1 Refugee resettlement allows ISIS and other militant fighters to infiltrate
 the country. 168
 13.6.2 Resettling Syrian refugees in the US would be extremely dangerous. . . . 169
 13.6.3 Terrorist operatives will exploit the refugee resettlement program—
 empirically proven. 169
 13.6.4 US screening systems are too vulnerable and lack intelligence sources. . . 170

13.7 Unsustainable Solution 170
 13.7.1 Syrians do not want to be in Europe- the only sustainable solution is the
 resolve the war in Syria. 170
 13.7.2 Millions would rather not have to relocate to the west. 171
 13.7.3 Refugees want to be able to go back to Syria—the focus should be on
 making Syria safe, not resettling refugees. 171
 13.7.4 Defeating ISIL should be the focus instead. 172

13.8 Welfare 172
 13.8.1 Taking in the influx of refugees would hugely strain Europe’s welfare sys-
 tems. 172

Contents

13.9 AT Freedom of Movement 173
 13.9.1 There is no universal human right to freedom of movement and residence. 173
 13.9.2 The presumption of free movement can be overridden. 173
13.10 AT Germany 174
 13.10.1 Germany has created a policy quagmire that has made the situation worse. 174
13.11 AT Gulf States 175
 13.11.1 Gulf States have no obligation to take in refugees- it would cause instability and feed into ISIS' appeal. 175
13.12 AT International Law 175
 13.12.1 No such treaty exists- efforts to establish a right to territorial asylum have failed miserably. 175
 13.12.2 There is no binding moral obligation to admit refugees- it is only a humanitarian act. 176
13.13 AT Monetary Aid 176
 13.13.1 Monetary aid and food aid won't work. 176
13.14 AT Moral Obligation 177
 13.14.1 A failure to act is not a moral violation. 177
13.15 AT Refugee Convention 178
 13.15.1 The 1951 Refugee Convention is too vague to establish an obligation. . . 178
13.16 AT Resettlement 178
 13.16.1 Resettlement is not a long-term solution. 178
 13.16.2 Resettlement programs can create instability. 179
13.17 AT Quota System 180
 13.17.1 The quota system is doomed to fail. 180

1 Topic Analysis by Matthew Feng

Matthew Feng competed for Plano West Senior High School in Plano, Texas. In Public Forum, he reached the final round of the Harvard Round Robin and also placed in the top six at the NSDA National Tournament. He also had competitive success in Extemporaneous Speaking, competing in the final rounds at St. Mark's, the University of Texas, and the ETOC. Upon graduating, he taught at the University of Texas National Institute in Forensics, National Debate Forum, and Victory Briefs Institute. He currently attends Duke University, where he plans to pursue studies in both economics and political science.

1.1 Opening Words

In contrast to the September and October topic that required debaters to look 150 years into the past for some relevant information, the November resolution will shine a light on a very fresh set of events with respect to the ongoing refugee crisis around the Mediterranean. Indeed, many will find themselves cutting evidence minutes before rounds because the situation will continue to unfold in the coming months. For competitors to find success, it will be imperative to learn across a variety of fields ranging from governmental policy to international law, but above all, understanding the dynamics that are shaping the conflicts from which the refugees are escaping will help determine their unique circumstances. We will start the topic analysis by first looking to the conflicts that persist across the Middle East and North Africa before framing the resolution and finally discussing some arguments on both sides. As was the case with the September-October topic, it is important to tread carefully when referring to the refugees within debate rounds – they are people with stories and should not be mistaken for numbers to win a ballot.

1.2 Background

The Syrian conflict has been a source for much political instability across the Middle East and North Africa, which is what this author believes to be the heart of the question embedded in the

resolution (justification provided in the framing section). Thus far, the violence has exacerbated problems across the region. The Council on Foreign Relations briefs us on the conflict and its dynamics:¹

Thus far, the Obama administration has ruled out the possibility of using U.S. airstrikes to target Assad or sending U.S. ground troops to the region as part of the campaign against the Islamic State. Yet ongoing violence could create a safe haven for other extremist groups active in Syria, such as the al-Qaeda affiliated Nusra Front and Hezbollah. Deep sectarian divisions within Syria, regional power rivalries, and spillover into neighboring states make a resolution to the Syrian conflict all the more distant.

The resulting spillover indeed has conflagrated tensions in neighboring countries like Iraq and Lebanon² while also overwhelming the systems of Jordan, among others.³ Despite the inability for neighbors like Jordan to host so many refugees, we have observed that developed countries like the United States have been reticent at best in responding to the needs of refugees, citing national security concerns. Molly O'Toole of Defense One outlines:⁴

The United States, which accepts more refugees per year than any other country, has all but closed its door to the millions of Syrians who are part of the world's largest refugee crisis since World War II. A recent decision to admit more Syrian refugees this year opened that door a crack, but the Obama administration insists that national security concerns constrain it from going further. Yet officials at more than a dozen agencies could not point to any specific or credible case, data, or intelligence assessment indicating that Syrian refugees pose a threat. The officials generally funnelled questions to the Department of Homeland Security. "Certain groups have openly stated they will attempt to exploit the current situation with respect to large numbers of migrants seeking asylum in Europe and refugee resettlement," said a DHS official, who spoke on condition of anonymity because department leaders would not authorize anyone to speak on the record about the threat assessment of Syrian refugees. "We must balance a very real threat with the potential propaganda value here."

¹"Civil War in Syria." Council on Foreign Relations. Web. 10 Oct. 2015.

²Young, William, et al. "Spillover from the Conflict in Syria." RAND Corporation, 2014. Web. 10 Oct. 2015. http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR609/RAND_RR609.pdf

³"Syria refugees: UN warns of extreme poverty in Jordan." British Broadcasting Company, 14 Jan. 2015. Web. 10 Oct. 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30815084>

⁴O'Toole, Molly. "How Fear Slammed America's Door on Syrian Refugees." Defense One, 07 Oct. 2015. Web. 11 Oct. 2015. <http://www.defenseone.com/politics/2015/10/how-fear-slammed-americas-door-syrian-refugees/122618/>

At the time of writing this topic analysis, Russia remains on a trajectory of escalating its involvement in the Syrian conflict.^{5 6} Thus, it is imperative to continue monitoring the changing landscape in Syria and across the region in order to successfully argue about policy priorities since one day will differ greatly from the next.

1.3 Framing

The background is also a good starting point for framing the resolution and its parameters. The clause that refers to the ‘current crisis’ is relatively ambiguous (as is the rest of the resolution). Given the relative context of the resolution in the grand scheme of things along with the implicit knowledge of what the other topic choice was, it is safe to proceed with an interpretation that pertains to the crisis stemming from Syria and spreading outward. That being said, it would also be smart to have responses prepared, other than topicality, should Negative teams encounter Affirmative arguments that deal with other kinds of ‘current’ crises (climate, for instance) that create refugee populations. Affirmative teams should not feel the need to be cute or squirrely in order to win rounds; rather, the arguments that follow in that section should be soundproof.

The idea of prioritizing one goal or objective over another is an equally interesting proposition. Typically, resolutions like this one will break down to where the Affirmative has to prove a clear and distinct reason to prioritize A over B whereas the Negative can win by either proving that B should precede A or that A and B cannot be distinct from each other and that each must occur simultaneously with the other.

While we have discussed strategic items to frame, we should also explore definitional objects that are worth framing. The first distinction is that of a refugee. For this, we will turn to the United Nations as a pretty objective account of what defines the international phenomenon of forced migration. Many people, for many reasons, are displaced from their homes, but they fall under a category known as IDPs, or internally displaced persons. Francis Deng, UN Representative of the Secretary General on IDPs contextualizes:⁷

The international community is confronted with the monumental task of ensuring protection for persons forcibly uprooted from their homes by violent conflicts, gross

⁵“Positions harden.” *The Economist*, 12 Sep. 2015. Web. 10 Oct. 2015. <http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21664155-hopes-diplomatic-progress-aimed-ending-war-go-reverse-positions>

⁶“The Syrian conflict: Russia vs the West?” *Al Jazeera*, 11 Oct. 2015. Web. 11 Oct. 2015. <http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/talktojazeera/2015/10/syrian-conflict-russia-west-151011081552603.html>

⁷Deng, Francis. “Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement.” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Sep. 2004. Web. 10 Oct. 2015. <http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Projects/idp/GPEnglish.pdf>

violations of human rights and other traumatic events, but who remain within the borders of their own countries. Nearly always they suffer from severe deprivation, hardship and discrimination. It is to meet this challenge that the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement were developed.

The clause ‘who remain within the borders of their own countries’ is an important one to note. It can help Negative teams deal with weirder Affirmative arguments and it also deepens our understanding of what a refugee is. In contrast to an IDP, the UN also clearly delineates what a refugee is:⁸

The 1951 Convention consolidates previous international instruments relating to refugees and provides the most comprehensive codification of the rights of refugees at the international level. In contrast to earlier international refugee instruments, which applied to specific groups of refugees, the 1951 Convention endorses a single definition of the term “refugee” in Article 1. The emphasis of this definition is on the protection of persons from political or other forms of persecution. A refugee, according to the Convention, is someone who is unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion.

Beyond the defining noun in the resolution, the other terms will be further explored in the side-specific sections. The terms ‘humanitarian needs’ and ‘national interests’ are fairly intuitive and should be generally accepted, but it is worth creating nuanced understandings of both, side-dependent, in order to garner an advantage.

1.4 Affirmative Arguments

The Affirmative side of the topic will delve into two different methods for winning debates. The first strategy will be geared towards proving why refugees’ humanitarian needs should be prioritized over national interests in all circumstances while the second avenue will argue something quite different – framing the round in terms of governments that cannot operate with both in mind. Neither approach is strictly better or preferred because there are risks and rewards to each that will be discussed, but the takeaway is that the resolution can be interpreted in quite a few different ways.

⁸“Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.” United Nations Refugee Agency, Dec. 2010. Web. 10 Oct. 2015. <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf>

1.4.1 The General Strategy

At first glance, the Affirmative seems to be at a significant disadvantage (for reasons to be discussed in the Negative part of the paper), but in reality, there are many practical reasons for why Affirmative teams should feel confident when debating the topic. Affirmative teams should look to paint a picture of realistic outcomes by arguing that unchecked migration will occur with or without government support. Without government support, refugees have had to rely on smugglers thus far, but this has had negative ramifications for the migrants. The Sabra Ayres, correspondent at Al Jazeera, explains:⁹

Nearly all the estimated 440,000 refugees who have crossed into Europe this year from Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea and other countries have paid a smuggler for part or all of their arduous journeys. Globally, refugee smuggling is big business. According to the Migrants' Files, a collective research project, people have paid smugglers a cumulative 16 billion euros, or \$18 billion, to get to Europe over the last 15 years. Human rights groups have warned that governments should do more to root out smuggling operations, as stories of refugees drowning after paying smugglers thousands of dollars to get their families across the Mediterranean Sea in rubber dinghies have drawn international attention. So far this year, an estimated 3,000 people have died while being smuggled from Greece to Turkey.

After establishing the inherency associated with smuggling of refugees, the Affirmative can feasibly argue that the comparison is not between inviting individuals to flock toward European nations and not but rather between legally sanctioning what would be inevitable and turning a blind eye to illegal activities that impose considerable costs onto the refugees.

A second advantage to government-sponsored migration is that of expediency. The analysis that Affirmative teams should do here is to make clear that a disregard for the humanitarian needs of refugees does not mean that their migration will not happen, which is similar to the work done to garner the first advantage. Instead and in addition to illegal smuggling, teams should turn toward the idea that even those who want to gain legal entry into these countries often have to wait substantial amounts of times in locations that are likely dangerous and a threat to their lives. Somini Sengupta and Anne Barnard with the New York Times quantify:¹⁰

⁹Ayres, Sabra. "In a struggling Balkan economy, smuggling is good business." Al Jazeera America, 10 Oct. 2015. Web. 11 Oct. 2015. <http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2015/10/10/in-a-struggling-balkan-economy-smuggling-is-good-business.html>

¹⁰Sengupta, Somini and Barnard, Anne. "Refugees, Stuck in Grinding U.S. Process, Wait and Hope." New York Times, 11 Oct. 2015. Web. 11 Oct. 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/world/middleeast/refugees-stuck-in-grinding-us-process-wait-and-hope.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-column-region®ion=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=0

It is United States policy to accept the most vulnerable of those fleeing war and persecution abroad — torture victims, widows with children, and religious or sexual minorities, like Adnan, who face heightened risks. But the White House is under intense scrutiny to ensure that terrorists do not slip in with refugees, so the process for vetting and admitting refugees takes up to two years, requiring several rounds of background checks across a network of intelligence agencies, plus a face-to-face interview to check if an applicant has a valid refugee claim. At least 18,000 Syrians and 55,000 Iraqis are in the pipeline, having been vetted by the United Nations and now waiting to have their cases examined by the United States — Adnan among them. About half are children.

There are a number of other reasons that teams should look into, but these two should be expected to be standard and should also serve as a springboard for inspiration.

1.4.2 The Specific Strategy

While we discussed a slate of reasons for any country to act in a manner that affirms the resolution in the last section, here we will delve into a riskier strategy, one that is framework-reliant (the risk) but perhaps more compelling if own (the reward).

The framework relies on painting a picture of the resolution only being a question of those countries that have conflicting interests. To put it another way, if prioritizing humanitarian needs over national interests does not actually do anything (i.e. if my choice to pursue one over the other does not actually mean I cannot pursue the other), then affirming or negating the resolution does not apply to that country. The only situation in which the resolution is necessarily relevant is for those countries in which there is some inherent tradeoff associated with prioritizing one over the other. This can be furthered by the fact that many Negative teams can feasibly argue that humanitarian needs and national interests often overlap, so Affirmative debaters should seize the opportunity to demonstrate that those countries cannot truly prioritize one over another. Instead, examining cases of countries that are actively involved in the Syrian conflict can perhaps create a clearer dichotomy – one between meeting the humanitarian needs of refugees and furthering its national interests in a conflict that creates the need for civilians to escape.

Here, we can look to a country like Russia. As was discussed briefly in the background section, Russia continues to escalate its military involvement in Syria, which is implicitly mutually exclusive with the humanitarian needs of refugees because a government cannot be both the problem and solution. Fred Weir, correspondent at the Christian Science Monitor reports:¹¹

¹¹Weir, Fred. “Russia as safe zone for Syrian refugees? It’s not as odd as you’d think.” Christian Science Monitor,

As Europe struggles to handle the inundation of Syrian refugees in recent weeks, Moscow has so far looked on with a touch of *schadenfreude*. While Russia is allied to Syria – and has the resources to accommodate many of its people – so far the Kremlin shows little recognition that the migration crisis is a common problem that should be solved collectively. But as Russia’s military involvement in Syria escalates, a debate is stirring over its obligations to Syria’s beleaguered ethnic and religious minorities. There is growing pressure to repatriate at least some of Syria’s 100,000 strong Circassian community, who were brutally expelled from Czarist Russia 150 years ago, but who regard Russia’s north Caucasus region as their historic homeland. And even for those Syrians not looking to their ancestral lands, Russia offers another opportunity: a far more circuitous, but possibly much safer, route to Europe – by bicycle over the border with Norway. Either factor could bring the Syrian refugee problem to Russia’s doorstep, without regard to Moscow’s wishes. “So far Russia makes it very hard for Muslim refugees to come; it puts a lot of bureaucratic obstacles in their path. But this needs to change,” says Maxim Shevchenko, a well-known Russian journalist and member of the Kremlin’s presidential council on human rights. “In the present situation, where minorities in Syria are threatened with genocide at the hands of IS, Russia has the ability and the responsibility to do something about it.”

Perhaps as important as the dichotomous choice between facilitating the migration process for refugees and fueling a conflict that is the initial problem, another idea that Weir presents is one of Russia being a viable route to take on a migrant’s path into Western Europe. This then fulfills all parts of the framework that would be established at the beginning because it also demonstrates that Russia is able to viably choose to meet the humanitarian needs of refugees.

Additionally, the problem is not one of permanent residence. Instead, it can be reasonably argued that temporary protection would suffice, especially in lieu of the existing support for any party in the conflict. Indeed, military solutions are simply making the problem worse for civilians. Researchers at the Berlin Social Science Center in conjunction with The Syria Campaign find a number of startling numbers:¹²

Contrary to what you might read in the papers, it’s not the media-grabbing brutality of Isis that most people are fleeing from. It’s the much larger scale, state organised violence of the Assad regime that is driving most people from their homes. 70%

16 Sep. 2015. Web. 10 Oct. 2015. <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2015/0916/Russia-as-safe-zone-for-Syrian-refugees-It-s-not-as-odd-as-you-d-think>

¹²“Care about refugees? Listen to them.” The Syria Campaign, 09 Oct. 2015. Web. 10 Oct. 2015. <https://diary.thesyriacampaign.org/what-refugees-think/>

are fleeing the violence of the Assad regime and its allies (32% Isis, 18% Free Syrian Army, 17% Al Nusra, 8% Kurdish forces).

All armed groups have been involved in detention and disappearances in Syria, but none to the extent of Bashar al-Assad's government, as thousands of leaked images of torture in state prisons prove. 86% say kidnapping or arrest was a threat to their personal safety. 77% of them fear it from the Assad regime, 42% Isis, 18% Al Nusra, 13% Free Syrian Army and 8% Kurdish forces.

It might seem that the people struggling in boats across perilous waters or jumping over barbed wire fences really want to be in Europe. But they don't. Syrians want to go home to the country they know and love. The problem is with the violence raging they can't. Only 8% said they'd want to stay in Europe indefinitely.

While Russia and others are asking countries to unite with Assad to fight Isis, it's important to note that the majority of Syrian refugees will not go back while he remains in power. Syria needs peace and an end to dictatorship. 52% said that Bashar al-Assad would need to leave power before they would return home.

The vast majority of refugees said they feared Assad's barrel bombs – the improvised metal barrels packed with explosive and scrap metal that government helicopters drop from miles up in the sky onto civilian neighbourhoods. These barrel bombs and other aerial attacks are the number one killer of civilians in Syria – the barrels alone have killed more than 2,000 children since the UN banned them in 2014. They routinely destroy hospitals, schools and homes. Syrians living under the barrel bombs find it difficult to forget the terror, even once they have fled to safety. To stop the refugees pouring over Syria's borders we have to stop the bombs. More aid isn't the answer. 73% said barrel bombs were a threat to their personal safety. 58% said a no-fly zone would help more stay in Syria, only 24% said the same for increased aid.

Thus, it becomes even more clear that the problem is not one that will be permanently opposing national interests (even if the Negative is right) but instead one that is temporary, contingent on national interests not being pursued or furthered.

1.5 Negative Arguments

The Negative side of the debate probably has a slight advantage because of the way the status quo works. In general, the Negative can approach the resolution in two ways. One proves that na-

tional interests entail prioritizing both at the same time while the second one deals with showing national security harms of meeting the humanitarian needs of refugees.

1.5.1 Equally Important

The rationale here is simple. Teams should muck up the definitional debate to argue that the humanitarian needs of refugees fall in line with the national interests of governments, and in doing so, many teams can expect a pretty straightforward win right off the bat. This would generally be because the inability to prioritize one over the other constitutes a Negative ballot. Thus, many teams can easily take the arguments presented by the Affirmative team as true but explain them to be important for national interests of the government in question which then creates doubt as to why one action or objective must come before another.

1.5.2 National Threat

Here, debaters should research more deeply matters pertaining to the Syrian conflict. While we are led to believe that one side of the civil war is clearly preferred to another, in reality extremist organizations (like Jabhat al-Nusra) have infiltrated the moderate ranks¹³ which is a large reason why the Pentagon has ceased its training missions of the Syrian moderates.¹⁴ Thus, as we discussed in the background, it is plausible to think that extremists could slip through the folds of a less stringent background check process should the Affirmative truly win. Basically the Negative should make clear that providing for the humanitarian needs of refugees entails a truly expedient process, but that swiftness in acting compromises necessary and important security processes.

1.6 Final Words

This is an interesting resolution with a multitude of approaches for both sides. By no means does this topic analysis do the entire scope of the resolution justice, but it hopefully does provide some starting points to begin searches and arguments. As was mentioned in the opening words, it is important that we realize the plight of these refugees and recognize them as people, not figures. Winning in debate may be good, but enriching our lives with knowledge worth learning is even better.

¹³Caferella, Jennifer. "Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria." Institute for the Study of War, Dec. 2014. Web. 10 Oct. 2015. <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/JN%20Final.pdf>

¹⁴Shear, Michael, et al. "Obama Administration Ends Effort to Train Syrians to Combat ISIS." New York Times, 10 Oct. 2015. Web. 10 Oct. 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/world/middleeast/pentagon-program-islamic-state-syria.html>

2 Topic Analysis by Catherine Lindsay

Cali Lindsay competed for the Ransom Everglades School of Miami, Florida for three years. She consistently competed through the out rounds of national circuit tournaments. Cali won both the Crestian Round Robin and the Crestian Invitational, as well as placing in the top four of Bronx Science's New York Invitational. She now studies at Amherst College, where she intends to study Law, Jurisprudence, and Social Thought.

2.1 Opening Words

Though the September/October debate topic broke sharply with topics in preceding years, the November topic very much follows in its footsteps. Similarly to the prior topic, November's resolution is fraught with vague wording. Frankly, rounds on this topic can very easily slide into games of semantics. I urge debaters to avoid this early; remember the importance of not only defining the round to emphasize a certain strategy, but to hit home why this particular definition is uniquely important. In other words, weigh. A second similarity is the very real possibility of coming across as valuing the quality of life of one group of people over another. Remember, perception is important. Particularly at local tournaments, a judge, consciously or not, votes off what sounds good.

2.2 Wording

2.2.1 Affirmative Ground

The immediate reaction to this resolution is that the NSDA wanted to be vague. There's no other explanation. Nearly every word in the resolution can be defined infinitely. Luckily, the vagueness serves the aff in some areas and the neg in others. Each side should exploit this.

2 Topic Analysis by Catherine Lindsay

To begin, “current crisis,” while ostentatiously referring the crisis in Syria, could technically refer to any topical crisis. This gives the aff ground to find the most obscure or overlooked civil war or disaster and build a case off it.

Returning debaters may be most familiar, for instance, with the current crisis in the Central African Republic. The conflict was hotly debated on the January 2015 topic, “Resolved: United Nations peacekeepers should have the power to engage in offensive operations.” The CAR’s difficulties have not ended, however. As AllAfrica reports:¹

New arrivals from the CAR capital, Bangui, are currently being registered by DRC authorities in the nearby Congolese city of Zongo. The majority will move to the refugee camp of Mole close-by. Refugees said they had difficulties to flee Bangui because of barricades erected in the city. The refugees said they fled to escape fighting between Seleka rebels and anti-Balaka militants. Some of the new arrivals say that their houses have been burnt down. The overall number of registered Central African refugees in DRC stands well above 100,000.

The highly volatile situation in the country, and particularly the violence in Bangui, could result in a further increase in numbers of refugees moving into DRC in coming days.

This particular example doesn’t give much in the way of originality, as an experienced neg team would simply crack open their back files for answers to CAR. That could work for the affirmative, however. Frequently, when teams hear buzzwords that remind them of prior topics, they forget their current strategies, and indiscriminately read through old blocks. That is to say, while an older neg team may have plenty of answers to what the UN should do in the CAR, they will have very few to what “a government” should do about the CAR’s refugees. This trip-up could work in the case of several other countries, notably the Ukraine. The United States’ relationship with Russia in regards to the Ukraine has been a past topic as well, debated at the 2014 National Tournament. The crisis has hardly subsided since. Newsweek writes:²

Russia responded by resorting to war. It officially annexed Crimea, and then de facto invaded portions of eastern Ukraine. Eighteen months later, entire villages and cities have been destroyed, almost 8,000 lives have been lost and another 30,000 have been wounded. More than 1.5 million internal refugees have been displaced.

¹AllAfrica, Oct. 2015. Web. 8 Oct. 2015. <http://allafrica.com/stories/201510071623.html>

²Kozak, Ihor. “Have We Forgotten the Invasion of Ukraine and the Occupation of Crimea?” Newsweek. IBT Media, Oct. 2015. Web. 8 Oct. 2015. <http://www.newsweek.com/have-we-forgotten-invasion-ukraine-and-occupation-crimea-381180>

Yet Russia's war in Ukraine no longer dominates the international headlines. The Minsk II agreement brought about a suspension of major conflict. Many in the West now trumpet an apparently successful round of talks between Ukraine and Russia on October 2 in Paris. From the ground, however, there's little evidence of an enduring ceasefire, much less peace. Along the stretch of the frontlines that I visited over a five-day period, starting in Mariupol and moving north, the Ukrainian side remains under attack.

While the likelihood of building an advocacy around a crisis so obscure it has never been debated is slim, that doesn't negate the power of limiting the round to a very specific country. The negative cannot have a deep understanding of every contemporary international crisis. The affirmative can, conversely, learn tons about one or two different ones. That knowledge inherently serves as an advantage. As a note, though: I'd recommend not using Palestinian refugees. Israel-Palestine is a very contentious crisis, and it's impossible to know the background of the judge in the back of the room.

Moreover, this limiting of "crisis" works nicely with the NSDA's choice of "a government" in place of "the United States." Though public forum frequently (and arguably, foolishly) defaults to a US-centric gaze when there's no given actor, that's unnecessary on this topic. The wording gives pro teams the opportunity to pick a valid, if not necessarily thoroughly researched on the con's side, actor. Recently, for example, Hungary has come under fire for an abysmal reception of Syrian refugees. As noted in CNN,³

Many Syrian refugees are reluctant to register an asylum application in Hungary. Having traveled north through the Balkans, those arriving on the country's border with Serbia have had police greet them, and they've been forced to wait, sometimes for days, in holding areas and transit camps, where conditions are said to be poor.

Something to be weary of—this allows an easy overview on the con's part. A simple answer to all advocacies on this topic will be to prefer the UN, or a number of other international humanitarian groups. Debaters on the pro must be ready for that, as it subsumes all of their impacts.

Another raised-flag for pro teams is the word "should." Should, sometimes but not always used as a synonym for "ought" in the debate world, almost always trips up debaters. Be careful not to allow a round to boil down to this word. On the affirmative, it behooves teams to separate morality from reality in terms of "should." An interesting way to think of this would be in terms of legal

³Martinez, Michael. "Syrian refugees: Which countries welcome them, which ones don't." CNN. Turner Broadcasting System, Oct. 2015. Web. 8 Oct. 2015. <http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/09/world/welcome-syrian-refugees-countries/>

positivism, a school of legal theory. Legal positivism, particularly after clarifications made by pioneering scholar H.L.A Hart, necessitates the differentiation between “is” and “ought” (in this case, should) in the law. Hart argues that the status quo (“is”) cannot be seen through a moral view. But, he claims, the legislature should strive to close the gap between what is and what should be (the latter is based off morality). The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy summarizes it a little more comprehensively:⁴

Although Hart introduces the rule of recognition through a speculative anthropology of how it might emerge in response to certain deficiencies in a customary social order, he is not committed to the view that law is a cultural achievement. To the contrary, the idea that legal order is always a good thing, and that societies without it are deficient, is a familiar element of many anti-positivist views, beginning with Henry Maine’s criticism of Austin on the ground that his theory would not apply to certain Indian villages. The objection embraces the error it seeks to avoid. It imperially assumes that it is always a bad thing to lack law, and then makes a dazzling inference from ought to is: if it is good to have law, then each society must have it, and the concept of law must be adjusted to show that it does. If one thinks that law is a many splendored thing, one will be tempted by a very wide concept of law, for it would seem improper to charge others with missing out. Positivism simply releases the harness. Law is a distinctive form of political order, not a moral achievement, and whether it is necessary or even useful depends entirely on its content and context. Societies without law may be perfectly adapted to their environments, missing nothing.

This separation is vital. It allows the pro team to circumvent any con assertions that a prerequisite for a government having the obligation to do something, it must be possible. Hart’s analysis boils down to the morally correct, if implausible, option to always be the goal—a “should.”

2.2.2 Negative Ground

Where the affirmative has the advantage of “current crisis,” the negative has near full reign with what “national interest” means. The negative gets to define what loop the affirmative has to jump through in order to be true, as it were. There are two main ways to deal with this, and these strategies may be used simultaneously.

The first, and more common, strategy would be to tap into social contract theory. Specifically, I might add, Locke’s social contract (meaning don’t confuse the nuances between Locke, Hobbe,

⁴“Legal Positivism,” Jan. 2003. Web. 8 Oct. 2015. <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-positivism/>

and Rousseau, which many teams do to their detriment). This frames most con arguments quite nicely, as Locke boils down to saying that the power of the government is derived from the protection of and promotion of well-being for the citizenry.

The second, potentially more difficult strategy, would be to couple a focus on the national interest with the phrase “prioritize over.” The way the NSDA worded the resolution, the affirmative has to concede short-term harms to citizens that helping refugees would bring. This is because the resolution is inherently a trade off; to affirm it is to affirm a trade-off. The neg should respond by separating the short-term from the long-term. That way, the con team can use social contract theory to frame the short-term harms that the pro has to concede. More interestingly (and more complexly), the con could use the phrase “prioritize over” to subsume pro impacts in the long-run. If, in the long-run, benefits to citizens of helping refugees outweigh the harms, a government is not prioritizing the humanitarian needs of refugees. The government would solely be looking to its own national interest as a motivator. That being said, I strongly believe con teams should only use this move if they are in front of an experienced or “flow” judge, feel they are losing their short-term arguments or that the long-term impacts the pro has put forth are just too big, and are extremely confident in their ability to explain the reasoning.

2.3 Affirmative Arguments

Under a moral framing of the word “should,” the pro team would only need to prove a moral duty. Obviously, there is the argument that the United States in particular has an obligation to help those who need it. That being said, arguments that are significantly more persuasive are those where governments essentially owe refugees something. In reference to the western world, that frequently involves interference resulting in the crisis the refugees are fleeing in the first place. This is especially true in the case of Syria and the United States. Per Seymour M. Hersh’s Pulitzer-winning article, “The Redirection”.⁵

To undermine Iran, which is predominantly Shiite, the Bush Administration has decided, in effect, to reconfigure its priorities in the Middle East. In Lebanon, the Administration has cooperated with Saudi Arabia’s government, which is Sunni, in clandestine operations that are intended to weaken Hezbollah, the Shiite organization that is backed by Iran. The U.S. has also taken part in clandestine operations aimed at Iran and its ally Syria. A by-product of these activities has been the bolstering of Sunni extremist groups that espouse a militant vision of Islam and are hostile

⁵Hersh, Seymour M. “The Redirection.” *The New Yorker*. Conde Nast. March 2007. Web. 7 Oct. 2015. <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/03/05/the-redirection>

to America and sympathetic to Al Qaeda.

Hersh would report: Jumblatt then told me that he had met with Vice-President Cheney in Washington last fall to discuss, among other issues, the possibility of undermining Assad. He and his colleagues advised Cheney that, if the United States does try to move against Syria, members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood would be “the ones to talk to,” Jumblatt said. The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, a branch of a radical Sunni movement founded in Egypt in 1928, engaged in more than a decade of violent opposition to the regime of Hafez Assad, Bashir’s father. In 1982, the Brotherhood took control of the city of Hama; Assad bombarded the city for a week, killing between six thousand and twenty thousand people. Membership in the Brotherhood is punishable by death in Syria. The Brotherhood is also an avowed enemy of the U.S. and of Israel. Nevertheless, Jumblatt said, “We told Cheney that the basic link between Iran and Lebanon is Syria—and to weaken Iran you need to open the door to effective Syrian opposition.”

In the pro world, this inherently means the U.S. should prioritize refugees. A great case, however, will be able to win under both the pro and the con’s suggested frameworks. The con will most certainly attempt to turn “should” into a matter of plausibility. The best way to win despite this burden is to prove that it’s happening in the status quo. One of the problems with the aforementioned strategy of picking a more obscure refugee situation/choice for “government” is that, when trying to win under both frameworks, the crisis/country combination needs to be the same. More clearly, the government that has the moral obligation to help A refugees cannot help the pro win under their own framework cannot be helping B refugees to answer con’s framework. To stay consistent with that, I’ve looked to US interference with Syrian refugees. Most recently,⁶

President Barack Obama has called for the US to prepare to accept “at least” 10,000 Syrian refugees next year, according to a White House spokesman. That number is significantly higher than the 1,500 Syrians that have been permitted to re-settle in the US since the start of the conflict. The 10,000 figure is still much lower than the 340,000 asylum seekers who arrived in Europe this year. Since the beginning of the conflict the US has given \$4bn (\$2.6bn) in aid. The increase in accepting refugees displays a “significant scaling up” of US commitment to accept people from conflict zones and help provide for their needs,” White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest said. US Congress would have to make a “significant financial commitment” in order to allow for additional 10,000 refugees to the US, Mr Earnest said.

⁶“US plans to accept 10,000 Syrian refugees next year.” BBC. Sept. 2015. Web. 8 Oct. 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-34215920>

Something to keep in mind as the affirmative is that, despite temptation to impact back to citizens of the non-refugee country, that would not affirm the resolution. Con teams will argue the pro cannot benefit the host country. Creative pro teams will build comprehensive answers to this framework. But if they lose it, the most a pro can truly do is turn arguments the con puts forth—the con can't subsume those, as it would mean dropping their own original impacts. More likely would be the pro spending a solid two and a half minutes during rebuttal mitigating harms.

2.4 Negative Arguments

There are two main options in terms of portraying helping refugees as nonsense. The first is to, with the previously discussed framework, looking at how refugee assistance would impact the local economy or political scene. Though the economy is an easy vehicle for harms, political capital may be a more interesting one. Using loss of political capital as a link into harms for citizens, along with a strong, complementary observation on “national interest,” the neg can change the course of the entire debate. For instance, by emphasizing the Obama administration's loss of political capital in supporting Syrian refugees, a con team could link into a pressing domestic issue that would consequently suffer. Most dramatically, the issue of gun control would require a ton of political capital to push through. This is evident on CNN's coverage of recent shootings:⁷

Nowhere is the gulf between Barack Obama's once intoxicating calls for change and entrenched political reality wider than on gun control. After yet another gun massacre followed his inability to enact even modest gun control during his administration, the graying president spent Thursday and Friday railing against gridlocked politics and the power of the gun lobby. And as he beseeched the American people to act, it seemed that even the man who once preached “we are the change we seek” had begun to lose faith in the capacity of politics to bend the curve towards reform. “This is not something I can do by myself,” Obama said in an emotional White House appearance Thursday evening after nine people died in a shooting at a community college in Oregon.

The only caveat to that is this strategy cannot consist solely of cherry-picked issues. To implement this well, the con should research past refugee crises and the political capital decision calculus that went into whether or not assistance should be doled out. Otherwise, it would be easy for a pro team to duck the harms by noting that they're irrelevant to their (probably very specific) advocacy.

⁷Collinson, Stephen. “Obama's change crusade hits reality on guns.” CNN. Oct. 2015. Web. 7 Oct. 2015. <http://www.cnn.com/2015/10/02/politics/obama-gun-control-oregon-shooting/>

An easier way to avoid a combination of general and specific components to a harm would be to focus on potential international harms. That way, the harms could be applicable to citizens regardless of the pro's advocacies. A growing concern amongst intelligence is who exactly the refugees may be. US News and World Reports writes,⁸

The refugee crisis in Syria that has forced more than 4 million people to flee the chaos there and has displaced even more internally now provides a prime opportunity for the Islamic State group to attack Western targets, the top U.S. spy said Wednesday. "It's a disaster of biblical proportions," Director of National Intelligence James Clapper said, while speaking at the Intelligence and National Security Summit in Washington, D.C. The intelligence community has long expressed concerns about the Islamic State group's ability to deploy operatives worldwide, or to inspire so-called lone wolf attackers through the extremist network's hard-line belief system. The massive flow of people out of the Middle East now provides an opportunity for the group, also known as ISIS or ISIL, to disperse fighters on a larger scale, Clapper said. The U.S. has an aggressive program for vetting refugees as they enter the country, Clapper said. But he expressed concerns about the ability of European nations to do the same.

Syria especially works as an international impact. While ISIS certainly relates to Syria and threatens the remainder of the world, Syria acts as an intermediary between eastern and western politics in many ways. Another interesting perspective to examine would be how western Europe and the United States harboring so many refugees affects their respective relationships with Russia. International arguments work well on this topic because they're so versatile— and that's important when pro has as much ground as it does.

2.5 Final Thoughts

Mechanically, this topic works very similarly to the last. However, where the last topic required background knowledge of U.S. history and domestic policy, this one is significantly more broad. Researching at least the basics of as many crises as possible will never hurt. Ultimately, debate is about education, after all.

⁸Shinkman, Paul D. "Clapper: Syrian Refugee Crisis a Prime Opportunity for ISIS Attack" U.S. News & World Report. Sept. 2015. Web. 7 Oct. 2015. <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/09/dni-james-clapper-syrian-refugee-crisis-a-prime-opportunity-for-isis-attack>

3 Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins

Austin debated for four years at Trinity Prep (FL). Austin served as team captain his senior year. During his debate career, he reached the octafinals at Tournament of Champions, broke at several bid qualifying tournaments, and qualified to NSDA nationals and CFL nationals.

3.1 Argument Guide 1: Short term prioritization of refugees benefits national interest in the long term

The premise of this argument is that if a government prioritizes the humanitarian needs of the refugees in response to the *current* crisis, then later their national interests will be benefited in some fashion. This argument makes it easy to favorably compare impacts especially if con impacts are similar.

3.1.1 Long term economic impacts

Germany is a good example of a country that serves to benefit in the long term from the influx of refugees, especially since refugees can fill the specific gaps related to Germany's labor shortage.

How refugees can benefit the German Economy

Although Germany's unemployment rate is not zero, they currently have a significant labor shortage.¹

But the influx also provides opportunities for the German economy. Despite the official unemployment figure of almost 2.8 million, the business community urgently

¹Markus Dettmer, Rx for Prosperity: German Companies See Refugees as Opportunity, Spiegel, August 27, 2015 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugees-are-an-opportunity-for-the-german-economy-a-1050102.html>

3 *Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins*

needs workers. And every refugee or migrant who finds work becomes less of a drain on the public coffers. The German economy is dependent on immigration, both from Europe as well as people entering the country due to asylum rights in Germany. With the German population shrinking, businesses are unable to fill many jobs, and specialized workers are increasingly rare. This trend will only be exacerbated in the coming years. It's a development that jeopardizes the country's future prosperity.

The labor shortage applies to a variety of fields. ²

Germany needs more than just highly qualified academics. It also needs trained individuals with moderate to minimal qualifications. About a million jobs have been created for foreigners in the last four years in fields requiring no formal training: supporting staff in nursing care, restaurants and agriculture. The number of unfilled positions is constantly rising and was close to 600,000 in July.

Moreover, without new workers, the number of people who can work won't be high enough to support the German economy, which will hurt long term growth. ³

The hairdressing business isn't the only industry with a shortage of qualified workers. There are currently close to 46 million people of working age in Germany, who are theoretically capable of working. Without immigration, that number will decline to less than 29 million in about 30 years. Even if the retirement age were raised to 70 and the number of women and men in the workforce were equal, the total workforce would only increase by 4.4 million people.

A smaller workforce translates into fewer people paying into the pension fund and health insurance systems, fewer people consuming and producing goods, and fewer people paying taxes to pay for expenses like schools and road construction. Fewer people also translates into a reduced potential for growth and less affluence.

Other countries in the European Union will face similar problems, so immigration from those countries will slow down. As a result, Germany will have to increasingly rely on immigration as a labor source for non-European countries. Refugees fit the bill. ⁴

²Markus Dettmer, Rx for Prosperity: German Companies See Refugees as Opportunity, Spiegel, August 27, 2015 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugees-are-an-opportunity-for-the-german-economy-a-1050102.html>

³Markus Dettmer, Rx for Prosperity: German Companies See Refugees as Opportunity, Spiegel, August 27, 2015 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugees-are-an-opportunity-for-the-german-economy-a-1050102.html>

⁴Markus Dettmer, Rx for Prosperity: German Companies See Refugees as Opportunity, Spiegel, August 27, 2015 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugees-are-an-opportunity-for-the-german-economy-a-1050102.html>

3 *Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins*

Germany will be unable to fulfill its needs through the European labor market, which allows the free movement of workers within the EU, alone. For now, most immigrants still come from European Union countries, and numbers have been especially high in recent years because of the EU's eastward expansion and the economic crisis in Southern Europe. But this situation will not continue forever.

"As the crisis-ridden countries see their economies recover, immigration from EU countries will decline in the medium term," says Schneider. In addition, all European countries are suffering from the German ailment, namely that their populations are shrinking and aging. Economist Schneider predicts that the average annual number of immigrants from EU countries will decline to 70,000 by 2050. "This is why we will be even more dependent on people from third countries immigrating to Germany for work in the future, people who now come to Germany primarily as refugees," says Schneider.

Companies are already hiring refugees, which verifies the existence of the shortage.⁵

To combat the shortage of skilled personnel, companies and trade associations are urging policymakers to at least better utilize the potential of refugees and migrants living in Germany. Daimler was the first major corporation to appeal to lawmakers to allow refugees to begin working after one month in the country.

However, a number of obstacles prevent the migrant workers from gaining useful employment in a timely fashion. Changing governmental policy to be more favorable towards refugees can help Germany exploit this opportunity.⁶

"It's a waste of valuable time for asylum-seekers to be condemned to idleness during their asylum proceedings," says Ingo Kramer. The president of the Confederation of German Employers' Associations (BDA) says that rules should be changed so that asylum-seekers and migrants not threatened with immediate deportation are given faster access to the labor market.

The lack of German language skills is the biggest obstacle for refugees and migrants in the labor market. But in order to learn German in a government-subsidized inte-

⁵Markus Dettmer, Rx for Prosperity: German Companies See Refugees as Opportunity, Spiegel, August 27, 2015 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugees-are-an-opportunity-for-the-german-economy-a-1050102.html>

⁶Markus Dettmer, Rx for Prosperity: German Companies See Refugees as Opportunity, Spiegel, August 27, 2015 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugees-are-an-opportunity-for-the-german-economy-a-1050102.html>

3 *Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins*

gration course, they are generally required to have proper residency status. Asylum-seekers and refugees not facing deportation have the right to seek advice in a job center and be placed in the labor market, but they have no access to integration courses. This, in turn, prevents job centers from successfully placing them in the job market – in what becomes a vicious circle.

Residency permits can cause the economic gains to be realized.⁷

Many companies are desperate to find trainees and qualified staff, while some refugees have qualifications that are dearly needed. This potential needs to be exploited to a much larger extent. Therefore it is necessary to bridge the gap between the path of asylum and labour migration. Up until now a shift to labour migration, a 'lane change' so to say, has not been possible. As soon as an application for asylum has been submitted, it is no longer possible to obtain a residence permit on the grounds of work. This particularly applies to people from the Western Balkan states, who make up the majority of the applicants. If they have relevant qualifications, they should be offered the possibility of a work visa so as to be employed in branches in which qualified staff are needed. Consequently, the possibility of qualified migration should be made known in the countries of origin.

Vocational education is also a factor of paramount importance for the integration of young refugees. No less than a quarter of asylum seekers are aged between 16 and 25. The Association of German Chambers of Commerce and Industry (DIHK) favours more than ever the rule protecting refugees who are likely to be granted long-term residency from deportation until they have completed the full time of their professional training, which lasts for three years, followed by two years of practice (the so-called '3+2' rule). A specific residence permit should be issued to this aim. Apprentices and companies need legal and planning security. Motivated young people and committed companies should not be hampered in their endeavour. In July, when Germany revised its residency laws to allow local authorities to grant residency permits in some circumstances, the government could have seized this opportunity to provide such security in the framework of the reform of the right of residence, but it failed to do so. Now, it is left to the federal states to ensure that the relevant offices would at least apply the existing rules and regulations to the benefit of young refugees.

⁷Eric Schweitzer , Germany's Refugee Influx is Both a Challenge and an Opportunity, Newsweek, August 27, 2015
<http://europe.newsweek.com/germanys-refugee-influx-both-challenge-opportunity-332106>

How this is topical

You may think that all of these plans for residency permits and vocational training would be great for the economy, but wouldn't represent a prioritization of humanitarian needs over national interest. However, because of the unique situation for refugees and the conditions in even the best refugee camps, it can be established that in this specific case, permanent housing and even jobs are part of their humanitarian needs. This is especially true since refugees are unlikely to be able to return to their home countries any time soon, if at all.

Adequate shelter outside of the refugee camps in Germany is a humanitarian need now because of overcrowding and the resulting violence and sexual assault.⁸

There have been other violent outbreaks at hostels in Ellwangen in the state of Baden-Württemberg, Suhl in Thuringia, Bramsche in Lower Saxony, Trier in Rhineland-Palatinate, Heidenau in Saxony, as well as in Dresden and Leipzig. Indeed, an explosive mood is developing in many of the refugee camps across Germany, most of which have become overcrowded. Police situation reports from across the country describe a growing propensity to violence in the hostels.

"That results in the reception facilities becoming even fuller and the pressure even greater," says Marei Pelzer of the human rights organization Pro Asyl. The potential for aggressive behavior, she says, grows when refugees begin to realize that such reception facilities are the end of the road for their asylum hopes. In Calden, for example, some of those involved in the brawl had just learned that they wouldn't be allowed to stay," says a woman who works in the cafeteria. "They were, of course, correspondingly excitable."

An additional problem has been the apparently growing number of sexual assaults targeting women and children in the refugee shelters. The number of attacks is constantly climbing, according to the federal government's commissioner for abuse, Johannes-Wilhelm Rörig. The perpetrators, he says, aren't just male migrants, but also guards and volunteers.

As early as mid-August, aid groups were reporting "numerous rapes" in the reception facility in Giessen, in the state of Hesse. Since then, such reports have accumulated across the country. Single women no longer feel safe showering or going to the toilet

⁸Matthias Bartsch, Markus Deggerich, Horand Knaup, Ann-Katrin Müller, Conny Neumann, Barbara Schmid, Fidelius Schmid, Wolf Wiedmann-Schmidt and Steffen Winter, *Close Quarters: Asylum Shelters in Germany Struggle with Violence*, Spiegel, October 6, 2015 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/asylum-shelters-in-germany-struggle-with-refugee-violence-a-1056393.html>

3 Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins

at night, according to the reports. Hesse Interior Minister Peter Beuth has confirmed that police are aware of four sexual assaults in the Giessen camp and added that the number in Hesse is “in the area of the low double digits.”

Additionally, refugee shelters are frequently attacked by German nationals.⁹

German authorities have recorded more than 490 attacks on asylum seeker shelters across the country so far this year - more than double the number of attacks for the whole of last year. “We are seeing a massive rise in xenophobic attacks against asylum seekers,” German Interior Minister Thomas de Maiziere told newspapers of the Funke media group. “This is a disgrace for Germany.” “I find this growth in the number of people who are using violence, alarming,” De Maiziere said, adding that hate mail, insults and foul language were fuelling the violence.

The above pieces of evidence provide a link to topicality because it shows that true housing is a humanitarian need, meaning that it is aff ground to argue for this kind of job placement and specifically lifting the difficulties.

A secondary link to topicality is that when refugees have jobs, they are less prone to this violence. So, although a job may not appear to be a human need on first thought, in the case of people who otherwise live in overcrowded and dangerous facilities can be argued that it is. At the very least, you can argue that helping refugees gain jobs is a form of prioritization because it helps improve their humanitarian needs.

This is further substantiated by the October 6 Spiegel article, which shows the problem of monotony with the refugees.¹⁰

Following day after day of monotony and emptiness with nothing meaningful to do, and restless nights in overcrowded tents or halls, it often doesn't take much to trigger a full-fledged conflict. Aid workers report that the disputes are often triggered banal, daily realities like the shared use of toilets and showers. Most often, they are the product of people having to wait in long lines for food. In one reception center in the city of Trier, though, all it took to spark a fight was for a team of Syrian refugees to score a goal against a team from Albania during a football game in July. It took 70 police officers to stop the mass brawl that ensued.

⁹No Author, Protesters, police clash at refugee homes in Germany, Deutsche Welle, October 10, 2015 <http://www.dw.com/en/protesters-police-clash-at-refugee-homes-in-germany/a-18774176>

¹⁰Matthias Bartsch, Markus Deggerich, Horand Knaup, Ann-Katrin Müller, Conny Neumann, Barbara Schmid, Fidelius Schmid, Wolf Wiedmann-Schmidt and Steffen Winter, Close Quarters: Asylum Shelters in Germany Struggle with Violence, Spiegel, October 6, 2015 <http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/asylum-shelters-in-germany-struggle-with-refugee-violence-a-1056393.html>

Additionally, shelter itself is fairly clearly a humanitarian need, so you could justify it on those grounds.

The Wall Street Journal provides a succinct summary of the entire economic argument, and generalizes it to most of Europe. This can also be used for weighing because it is a carded argument about the economic benefits outweighing in the long term. ¹¹

On one thing, almost all economists agree: In the long term, the refugee crisis ought to be unambiguously positive for the European economy. Over time, the new arrivals should play an important role in addressing Europe's alarming demographic trends, improving the ratio of workers to those who are economically inactive, a ratio that is falling in many countries.

Essentially, the argument is that by prioritizing the humanitarian needs of refugees, even at a short term monetary cost, a government can gain economic benefits because it will cause refugees to gain employment. This argument is topical because shelter is a human need and because even in the most developed and socially conscious countries (like Germany), refugee shelters have horrible conditions.

Here, I'll outline a few potential responses from the con.

Answer to there will be a long term benefit

In Jordan, the harms have outweighed the benefits ¹²

Hosting Syrians has cost the economy around JD5.8 billion up to the end of 2013 while aggregate benefits of some HD4.1 were received. The study suggests that the accrued aggregate losses in 2012-2014 exceed JD1.7 billion

The persistence of the Syrian crisis shows that it will not be solved in the short term, with continuing impacts on the socio-economic situation of the country projected in the medium and long terms for at least, the researcher believes, the next five to 10 years.

Furthermore, Jordan's experience can show how a host country's resources can be drained (in this case, literally) by refugees. Syrian refugees contributed to a massive water shortage ¹³

¹¹Simon Nixon, Politics Hold Sway in Economic Impact of Europe's Refugee Crisis, Wall Street Journal, September 23, 2015 <http://www.wsj.com/articles/politics-hold-sway-in-economic-impact-of-europes-refugee-crisis-1443034512>

¹²Dr. Khalid Al Wanzi, The Socio-Economic Implications of Syrian Refugees on Jordan - A Cost Benefit Framework, April, 2014, http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_37808-544-2-30.pdf?140522145513

¹³Keith Proctor, Refugee Crisis Draining Jordan's Water Resources, Atlantic Council, March 21, 2014, <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/refugee-crisis-draining-jordan-s-water-resources>

Throughout the north, this is an era of desperation. In some places, Syrians have doubled the local population. Mafrq City is emblematic: once home to 70,000 Jordanians, today it is packed with an additional 90,000 refugees. Water shortages have spiked. Hospitals and schools don't have enough water to meet sanitation standards. Mosques cannot perform the necessary daily ablutions. Pipelines are running dry, particularly in the hot summers. Sometimes weeks elapse before a drop comes out of the tap.

Overall, historically, in the long term, developing countries have been harmed by influxes of refugees. This outweighs because more refugees end up in those countries than developed ones.

14

The highest refugee concentrations are in some of the poorest countries in the world. A large number of such movements are into Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The presence of refugees compounds the already prevailing economic, environmental, social and, at times, political difficulties in these countries. Often such countries are confronted by a combination of all four of these factors. Nearly always their impact is substantial. Moreover, in many refugee situations, problems are aggravated when refugees are a substantial proportion of the local, if not national population. For example, in Nepal, in the district of Jhapa, 90,000 refugees represent over 13 per cent of the local population; in Ngara, in the United Republic of Tanzania, the recent refugee influxes meant that the local population was outnumbered by a ratio of approximately 4: 1; i.e. there were some 700,000 refugees among a local population of 186,000. In Malawi, a refugee influx which began in 1986, had led, by 1993, to one million Mozambican refugees in the country, some 10 per cent of the national population. The presence of refugees, and demands on the already severely strained economy, services and infrastructure add to the extreme hardship affecting the local populations. In many instances, refugees become an added impediment to, or risk jeopardizing, the development efforts of the host country. Their negative aspects may be felt long after a refugee problem is solved; for example, the damage to environment is a process and does not end with the repatriation of refugees. While the international emergency aid in response to such an emergency does have some positive effects on the host society, this hardly compensates for the negative consequences of such large concentrations of refugees.

Now, I will go over some responses that the pro can use to defend against these attacks.

¹⁴Standing Committee, Social and economic impact of large refugee populations on host developing countries, The UN Refugee Agency, January 6 1997, <http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68d0e10.html>

Answer to developing Countries Can't Handle Refugees

A con team may argue, as I did above, that while the economic benefits can be realized by a developed and advanced country like Germany, a developing country might not realize the same benefits. However, Lebanon and Turkey provide a good examples of how developing countries (or, at least, less developed than Germany, one of the strongest economies in the world) can benefit as well

The Brookings Institute gives the example of Lebanon, hardly a fully developed country as one that has recently benefited economically from refugees, showing how the benefits can apply to a variety of countries, not just developed ones.¹⁵

So assume you are in a country that has taken in a quarter, or even 2.6 percent, of your population as refugees fleeing war and prosecution. Would your economy collapse? Last time we checked, that was not quite the case. The Lebanese economy has been growing beyond expectations over the past two years, with the World Bank estimating 2.5 percent growth in real terms this year, the country's highest growth rate since 2010. That is remarkable considering the hugely negative spillovers of the Syrian war on Lebanon in terms of armed conflict, and tourism and investments declining markedly, especially from Gulf countries. This economic resilience in the face of large inflows of refugees has been the case for Jordan (which has taken 630,000 Syrian refugees or around 10 percent of its population) and Turkey as well, with both economies growing consistently throughout the refugees' inflow.

In fact, the inflow of refugees has arguably helped the Lebanese economy withstand the negative effect of its neighbor's civil war. Refugees have been an important source of demand for locally produced services in Lebanon, funded from own savings and labor income, from remittances of relatives abroad and from international aid. In a recent World Bank report we estimate that an additional 1 percent increase in Syrian refugees increases Lebanese service exports by 1.5 percent. And the UNHCR and U.N. Development Program estimate a similar economy-wide impact from the \$800 million that the U.N. spends annually on Syrian refugees in Lebanon. These effects are not unique to Syrian refugees. Burundian and Rwandan refugees fleeing war in the 1990s have generated net economic gains for their Tanzanian host communities.

AT: Refugees Take Jobs of Natives

¹⁵Massimiliano Cali and Samia Sekkarie, Much ado about nothing? The economic impact of refugee 'invasions', The Brookings Institute, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/future-development/posts/2015/09/16-economic-impact-refugees-cali>

First, this argument presupposes that somehow natives are more entitled to jobs than refugees, even though there's no reason for that because citizenship is arbitrary.

Second, using Turkey as an example, while the displacement effect may have occurred in the absolute sense, on net there was either no impact or a small benefit (it's difficult to definitively determine) ¹⁶

While the fear of economic collapse does not withstand serious scrutiny, a more founded concern may be that not everyone in the host economy will benefit from a large influx of refugees. A lot more refugees competing for jobs can reduce employment opportunities and/or wages for the host community's residents. Again, a closer look at the data dispels most of these fears. Recent research finds that while Syrian refugees in Turkey—the majority of whom have no formal work permits—have displaced unskilled informal and part-time workers, they have also generated more formal non-agricultural jobs and an increase in average wages for Turkish workers. In addition, many of the displaced workers have gone back to school and may well increase their wages once they return to the labor market. This picture is also consistent with the Jordanian case, where unemployment has not increased in areas where Syrians have resettled, as Syrian workers have tended to find employment in low-skill sectors that Jordanians typically avoid. And this evidence is consistent with that on the net impact of migrants on host countries' labor markets, which is typically small and if anything positive on average.

Answer to Prioritizing refugees is too expensive

While this is not a direct response to the economic argument, it does tie into similar impacts so it may be important to keep this in mind. Couple this response with weighing and the other benefits and it should be effective.

Turkey has provided some of the most comprehensive (and expensive) refugee services and have not been economically hurt by it. ¹⁷

The most persistent economic worriers would probably point to the fiscal burden of ensuring EU-style living standards to a large number of refugees. The experience of Turkey comes in handy once again. Turkey has provided free access to health

¹⁶Massimiliano Cali and Samia Sekkarie, Much ado about nothing? The economic impact of refugee 'invasions', The Brookings Institute, September 21 2015, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/future-development/posts/2015/09/16-economic-impact-refugees-cali>

¹⁷Massimiliano Cali and Samia Sekkarie, Much ado about nothing? The economic impact of refugee 'invasions', The Brookings Institute, September 21 2015, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/future-development/posts/2015/09/16-economic-impact-refugees-cali>

care and education to all registered refugees and has built camps that have become a “model for the perfect refugee camp.” To provide these services the Turkish government has spent nearly 5.37 billion euros since the refugees first began arriving, entirely funded through its own fiscal resources. While this is undoubtedly a lot of money, there is no indication that this spending has jeopardized the country’s fiscal sustainability. This should be even more the case for the EU, whose economy is 23 times larger than Turkey’s. Moreover if allowed to work, newly arrived migrants can increase their net fiscal contribution to the host economy.

3.2 Argument Guide 2: Specific Governmental Responses

This argument is predicated on a very literal interpretation of the resolution. Since the resolution specifically says “a government,” then pro could argue that if they prove that one singular government should prioritize the humanitarian needs of refugees over its national interests, then the resolution is true which is sufficient to affirm.

However, even without that interpretation, these arguments can be useful. In some cases, arguments related to Saudi Arabia can be applied to other wealthy Gulf States like Qatar (which is pronounced like something between a cross between “cutter” and “gutter” - there is no equivalent sound to the opening consonant in English).

The specific countries that I have singled out have been Saudi Arabia and the United States. Both are very wealthy countries that have had rather lackluster responses to the refugee crisis, especially in terms of actual resettlement. Therefore, a pro team can argue that these are the perfect countries to prioritize humanitarian needs over national interest because they can afford to do so and have the capability to help refugees by doing so.

3.2.1 Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia has facilities that are usually only used for pilgrims on hajj, which only spans a few days per year. Clearly, if they prioritized the humanitarian needs of refugees over their own national interests, they would repurpose these facilities to provide for the refugees. Compared to most refugee camps, these would be almost luxury in terms of their amenities. ¹⁸

¹⁸Kellan Howell, Saudi Arabia has 100,000 air-conditioned tents sitting empty, still won't take Syrian refugees, The Washington Times, September 15 2015, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/15/saudi-arabia-has-100000-air-conditioned-tents-sitt/>

3 *Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins*

As Saudi Arabia faces mounting criticism for refusing to take in any of the millions of Syrians fleeing conflict in their homeland, it was revealed this weekend that the country has over 100,000 empty, air-conditioned tents that could house up to 3 million refugees.

The tents, located roughly 2,150 miles from Syria in the city of Mina, are only used a few days a year to house pilgrims on their way to Mecca for the hajj, the news station TeleSUR reported.

The huge tents are also fireproof and equipped with kitchen and bathroom facilities.

But while Europe struggles to find space to take in the millions of asylum seekers making the perilous journey there, Saudi Arabia has been largely unresponsive to the crisis.

This is corroborated by an article from Quartz ¹⁹

The Gulf states must do more. The most sensible course would be to route large numbers of the refugees in Jordan into Saudi Arabia, through their long common border. (Saudi Arabia and Kuwait also share borders with Iraq, but given the violence in that country, safe routes may be hard to come by.) The job of sheltering them can then be divided equitably between the oil-rich states. Refugees from Egypt and Lebanon can be shipped to ports along the Arabian Peninsula.

The region has the capacity to quickly build housing for the refugees. The giant construction companies that have built the gleaming towers of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Riyadh should be contracted to create shelters for the influx. Saudi Arabia has plenty of expertise at managing large numbers of arrivals: It receives an annual surge of millions of Hajj pilgrims to Mecca. There's no reason all this knowhow can't be put to humanitarian use.

AT: Saudi Arabia Response has been bad

Saudi Arabia has taken in refugees, they have just given them such good care that they don't call them "refugees." ²⁰

¹⁹Bobby Ghosh, Hey, Saudi Arabia: Here's what you can do to help the Syrian refugees, Quartz, August 31 2015, <http://qz.com/491751/hey-saudi-arabia-heres-what-you-can-do-to-help-the-syrian-refugees/>

²⁰Yara Bayoumy, Saudi Arabia defends aid effort towards Syria after criticism on refugees, Reuters, September 11 2015, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/09/11/uk-europe-migrants-saudi-idUKKCN0RB2EN20150911>

3 Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins

The Saudi Press Agency (SPA) on Friday cited an official source in the foreign ministry as saying the kingdom wanted to make clear its role in helping refugee in light of charges it was doing nothing.

The official said it was “important to clarify these efforts with facts and numbers in response to media reports, which included false and misleading accusations about the kingdom”.

The source said Saudi Arabia had received nearly 2.5 million Syrians since the conflict erupted.

“Saudi Arabia was keen to not deal with them as refugees, or to put them in refugee camps, to preserve their dignity and safety, and gave them complete freedom of movement.”

“Saudi Arabia gave whoever chose to stay in the kingdom, which are in the hundreds of thousands, proper residency ... with all the rights that are included like free health care and engaging in the workforce and education.”

The kingdom has also provided about \$700m in humanitarian aid to Syrians and had set up clinics in various refugee camps, the statement by the SPA said.

The official source said more than 100,000 Syrian students were receiving free education in the kingdom.

The country has also provided humanitarian aid to countries hosting Syrian refugees and through international relief organisations.

Saudi Arabia has helped refugees, but they just haven't been publicized because their culture has a taboo against publicizing humanitarian efforts ²¹

Another reason is the traditional Arab taboo against boasting about one's charitable efforts. Riyadh's Sept. 11 announcement said, “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does not intend to speak about its efforts to support Syrian brothers and sisters during their distress.” It is poor form in Arab culture to praise what is essentially a humanitarian obligation.

²¹Barn Kayaoglu, Why the Gulf Isn't to Blame for the Syrian Refugee Crisis, US News, September 16 2015, <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/16/why-the-gulf-isnt-to-blame-for-the-syrian-refugee-crisis>

Also, Saudi Arabia culturally would rather label refugees as “guests,” which distorts the numbers

22

Another problem is that Gulf countries are not signatories to the Geneva Convention on the status of refugees. When Syrians come into Saudi Arabia or the UAE, they are not officially registered as “refugees” but as “guests” or “workers.” Treating refugees as “guests” carries an element of prestige for the host country. The government of Turkey, party to the 1951 convention, also has preferred to call the Syrians who fled there “guests” or “visitors” to show its domestic supporters and the international community that it was wealthy enough to provide assistance without outside interference.

Saudi Arabia has issued over 100,000 residency permits, which has given numerous rights and services to the incoming migrants. ²³

“However, it sees the importance of clarifying these efforts in response to false and misleading media reports about the kingdom,” the unnamed official said.

Saudi Arabia “made it a point not to deal with them as refugees” but had issued residency permits to 100,000 Syrians who wished to stay in the kingdom, the official said.

“With that came the right to free education, healthcare and employment according to a royal decree in 2012 that also states that Syrian students visiting the kingdom be admitted in public schools,” the official added.

Now I will go over how to respond to these arguments that the Saudi response has been sufficient

AT: Saudi Arabian Response has been good

Real reason why they aren’t labeled as “refugees” is because the time of their immigration is unknown, so it is impossible to determine if they immigrated as a result of conflict.

24

²²Barin Kayaoglu, Why the Gulf Isn’t to Blame for the Syrian Refugee Crisis, US News, September 16 2015, <http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2015/09/16/why-the-gulf-isnt-to-blame-for-the-syrian-refugee-crisis>

²³No Author, Saudi Arabia says criticism of Syria refugee response ‘false and misleading,’ The Guardian, September 11 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/12/saudi-arabia-says-reports-of-its-syrian-refugee-response-false-and-misleading>

²⁴Kellan Howell, Saudi Arabia has 100,000 air-conditioned tents sitting empty, still won’t take Syrian refugees, The Washington Times, September 15 2015, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/15/saudi-arabia-has-100000-air-conditioned-tents-sitt/>

3 Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins

According to the to the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there are about 500,000 Syrians living in Saudi Arabia, but they are not classified as asylum seekers and it is not known when they arrived in the country.

Other reports indicate that Saudi Arabia has not taken in any new refugees, along with Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates.

Also, they haven't signed U.N. Convention on Refugees, which would standardize treatment of refugees

25

No Gulf country has signed the U.N. Convention on Refugees, an accord standardizing the level of treatment of people fleeing to new countries.

3.2.2 United States

Note that it is important to pay attention to the arguments related to the United States because those are the arguments that many judges will find most important and interesting. On very broad and potentially international topics, some judges will prefer a more US based discussion. The pieces of evidence that follow detail the United States' current response to the refugee crisis. While the United States has donated a significant amount of money to humanitarian causes

First, the United States has an incredibly detailed background check for refugees who want to enter the country. While this does have some advantages because of improved security, it causes massive delays²⁶

It is United States policy to accept the most vulnerable of those fleeing war and persecution abroad — torture victims, widows with children, and religious or sexual minorities, like Adnan, who face heightened risks. But the White House is under intense scrutiny to ensure that terrorists do not slip in with refugees, so the process for vetting and admitting refugees takes up to two years, requiring several rounds of background checks across a network of intelligence agencies, plus a face-to-face interview to check if an applicant has a valid refugee claim.

²⁵Kellan Howell, Saudi Arabia has 100,000 air-conditioned tents sitting empty, still won't take Syrian refugees, The Washington Times, September 15 2015, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/sep/15/saudi-arabia-has-100000-air-conditioned-tents-sitt/>

²⁶Somini Sengupta and Anne Barnard, Refugees, Stuck in Grinding U.S. Process, Wait and Hope, The New York Times, October 10 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/11/world/middleeast/refugees-stuck-in-grinding-us-process-wait-and-hope.html>

3 *Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins*

At least 18,000 Syrians and 55,000 Iraqis are in the pipeline, having been vetted by the United Nations and now waiting to have their cases examined by the United States — Adnan among them. About half are children.

Additionally, American action is frequently to put those refugees who circumvent the lengthy process into detention center, in sharp contrast to what European countries (who the US often tells to accept more refugees, even though their resettlement dwarfs that of the United States) do. Moreover, detaining these refugees violates both US and international policies ²⁷

The U.S. government must stop locking in detention centers refugees and asylees arriving daily at the U.S.-Mexico border. Their plight is no different than the scores of refugees and asylees arriving in Europe. All want freedom from harm and danger. If Americans care how refugees and asylees are greeted in Europe, the nation also must be adamant about how these global citizens are welcomed on U.S. soil.

In 2014, tens of thousands of Central American children and families arrived seeking protection in the U.S. They were unwelcomed by the Obama administration, which housed them in private, for-profit detention centers. In fact, the government built two new detention centers and increased the nation's capacity to imprison asylum-seeking families from 85 to almost 4,000 families.

Regardless of whether refugees have been vetted before arriving in the U.S., or whether they arrive with no documentation or prior vetting, the asylum process makes clear that both means are equal in the eyes of the law. Both the Central Americans arriving at the U.S.-Mexico border and the Syrians arriving in Europe have claims for protection, have not been previously vetted, and have in many cases traveled with false documents via smugglers to get them to their destination. Both groups have suffered on the journey and both, under national law and international agreement, have a right to have their claims for protection heard without penalty or being returned to the homes they fled.

Current US response has been extremely limited in terms of resettlement. ²⁸

Responding to the millions of Syrians who have fled their war-ravaged country in search of sanctuary, the Obama administration said Thursday that it would look to

²⁷Gradye Parsons, Commentary | U.S. can do better for refugees, *The Courier-Journal*, September 18 2015, <http://www.courier-journal.com/story/opinion/2015/09/18/commentary-us-can-do-better-refugees/72391314/>

²⁸The LA Times Editorial Board, Editorial 10,000 Syrian refugees isn't enough — the U.S. should admit more, *Los Angeles Times*, September 11 2015, <http://www.latimes.com/opinion/editorials/la-ed-0911-syria-20150911-story.html>

3 *Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins*

resettle “at least 10,000” Syrian refugees in the United States by the end of September 2016. The U.S. has taken in about 1,500 Syrians over the last 12 months, so the increase to 10,000 may seem significant. But it’s not, and refugee advocates rightly dismissed it as woefully inadequate given the scale of the humanitarian crisis.

Since the Syrian war began more than four years ago with a crackdown on political protesters tied to the Arab Spring movement, more than 11 million Syrians — half the nation’s population — have been forced from their homes. Most remain in the country, but 4 million have fled, landing primarily in Lebanon, Jordan and Turkey. Hundreds of thousands have been making their way to Europe, creating a heartbreaking spectacle and a crisis of politics and will. The U.S. has donated \$4 billion — far more than any other country — to refugee agencies and host governments to help support the displaced. Though the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reports that member nations have only met about 35% of its requested budget to deal with the crisis, the U.S. government’s generosity should be acknowledged.

But the nation’s, and the world’s, responsibility to aid so many people in such terribly dire straits requires that more be done, including allowing a higher number of Syrian refugees to resettle here under a long-standing humanitarian program that would give them permission to work upon their arrival and to seek citizenship after five years.

Why we shouldn’t eliminate or shorten the screening process

If a pro team is arguing that the United States should increase resettlement of refugees, then the con can potentially put them in a so-called “double bind” where the pro team is forced to choose for advocating for two negative effects.

In this case, the con team should argue that the only way that resettlement can increase is if security regulations are relaxed. However, if the con team proves that relaxed security regulations will create terrorism, then they can weigh that against any benefits to the refugees. This will put the pro team in a double bind because they will have to concede that either

1. Their plan won’t work because the restrictions will cause too many delays, in which case the pro team loses any offense from this argument
2. They allow terrorist into the country, which is obviously a huge impact for the negative.

All this is predicated on two assumptions. First, that the delays prevent quick refugee resettlement.

3 *Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins*

Evidence for this assumption may be provided by the pro, if not, it can be found above. Second, that there is a significant security risk, which is what I will focus on establishing below.

Seth G. Jones of the think tank The Rand Corporation outlines the significant security threat that the US and other western countries could face from Syria and Iraq, two countries that have produced millions of the refugees in the current crisis. ²⁹

Indeed, there have been a growing number of attacks and plots across the West tied either formally or informally to Syria and Iraq. These include attacks in Garland, Texas, in May 2015; Copenhagen, Denmark, in February 2015; Paris, France, in January 2015; Sydney, Australia, in December 2014; Ottawa, Canada, in October 2014; and Brussels, Belgium, in May 2014. More broadly, there were over 20 terrorist plots in the West either directed or provoked by extremist groups in Syria between October 2013 and January 2015. Da'ish has been linked directly or indirectly to plots in such countries as France, Australia, Belgium, Libya, Tunisia, and the United States.

There is also significant concern among America's European allies about the threat from Syria and Iraq. For instance, more than 600 British extremists have traveled to Syria and Iraq. ¹¹ Many have joined Da'ish. "We know that terrorists based in Syria harbor the same ambitions towards the UK—trying to direct attacks against our country, and exhorting extremists here to act independently," said MI5 director-general Andrew Parker in a January speech. ¹² Similar to the United States, the British face a complex threat, with more extremists than MI5 and the Metropolitan Police Service's Counter Terrorism Command, or SO15, can cover at any one time. Despite these challenges, MI5 and the police remain aggressive. In England and Wales, there has been a 35-percent increase in terrorist-related arrests since 2011. And more than 140 individuals have been convicted for terrorism-related offenses since 2010. ¹³

The British are not alone. Counterterrorism agencies across Europe and North America are under tremendous pressure to prevent terrorist attacks. French authorities report that nearly 1,400 French citizens have gone to Syria—or tried to go. French authorities arrested 91 persons suspected of extremist activity in 2012—and another 143 persons in 2013. ¹⁴

He further argues that the current climate fosters an even higher risk of terrorism than usual,

²⁹Seth G. Jones, *The Terrorism Threat to the United States and Implications for Refugees*, RAND Corporation, June 25 2015, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20150624/103655/HHRG-114-HM05-Wstate-JonesS-20150624.pdf>

which is why the United States should be extra cautious.³⁰

But risks associated with refugees from Syria may be higher today for several reasons. First, Syria and neighboring Iraq have the highest numbers of foreign fighters on any modern jihadist battlefield, and there has already been an exodus of some fighters to the West. Second, several groups in the region like Da'ish have planned to put operatives in the West, particularly in Europe, by having them seek political refugee status. Da'ish has also been active in some refugee camps in Syria. Third, the U.S. Intelligence Community's understanding of extremists in Syria is worse than in many other jihadist battlefields, such as Iraq and Afghanistan, because of more limited intelligence collection capabilities.

Individual terrorists and terrorist groups have multiple options to attack the U.S. homeland. First, they can inspire and encourage locals to conduct attacks through magazines like *Dabiq* (published by Da'ish) and *Inspire* (published by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula). Second, they can infiltrate members into the United States from overseas to conduct attacks or recruit operatives from U.S. communities. Third, they can target aircraft or vessels coming into the United States. In 2010, for example, al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula attempted to target cargo planes using plastic explosives hidden in printer cartridges.

Refugees have occasionally been involved in the first two types of plots. Perhaps the best-known case involved Waad Ramadan and Alwan Mohanad Shareef Hammadi, who were arrested on federal terrorism charges in 2009 in Bowling Green, Kentucky. They had been granted refugee status despite their insurgent activities in Iraq and their role in attacking U.S. troops. The Bowling Green arrests led to numerous changes in how the United States processed refugees and asylum-seekers. The process had been haphazard, partly because there were so many refugees and asylum-seekers—including from Iraq—being processed through the system. But there were also challenges because the data were not well organized across the U.S. government.

He also provides an extensive list of the exact attacks and planned attacks which have involved refugees in the full article, but I have omitted this.

Finally, he recommends policy implications. He argues for increased security, which would go above and beyond the con's call of duty so to speak because it shows how the US should prioritize

³⁰Seth G. Jones, *The Terrorism Threat to the United States and Implications for Refugees*, RAND Corporation, June 25 2015, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20150624/103655/HHRG-114-HM05-Wstate-JonesS-20150624.pdf>

3 *Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins*

national interests over the humanitarian needs of refugees, which is more extensive than what the con actually needs to prove. Regardless, it is a very important and useful piece of evidence.³¹

Because of these concerns, the United States should reassess its refugee program and make sure it safeguards national security. As already noted, a number of changes were implemented after the Bowling Green arrests. It is worth examining whether there needs to be enhanced screening and data collection for applicants, such as

- additional background checks and other screening protocols in place at the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation for screening refugee applicants—including Syrian applicants—through the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP).
- improved data management of potentially concerning refugees. Some of the mistakes in the past were not due to screening errors, but rather caused by poor data management. Information on terrorist links never made it to the right databases.
- an enhanced U.S. Intelligence Community role in implementing heightened measures to vet potential refugees from countries of concern, including Syria. Some of this has already occurred through such programs as the National Counterterrorism Center's Kingfisher Expansion program.
- enhanced re-screening procedures for refugees who have entered the United States
- better engagement with Visa Waiver Program countries out of concern that refugees from Syria, Iraq, or other high-risk countries could be resettled there and then enter the United States with a lower level of scrutiny
- additional authorities to hold data collected in refugee camps.

Additionally, even with the screen mechanisms, the U.S. still may not be safe, which is what the Bowling Green case mentioned previously is referring to³²

³¹Seth G. Jones, *The Terrorism Threat to the United States and Implications for Refugees*, RAND Corporation, June 25 2015, <http://docs.house.gov/meetings/HM/HM05/20150624/103655/HHRG-114-HM05-Wstate-JonesS-20150624.pdf>

³²James Gordon Meek, Cindy Galli, Brian Ross, *Exclusive: US May Have Let 'Dozens' of Terrorists Into Country As Refugees*, ABC News, November 20 2013, <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/al-qaeda-kentucky-us-dozens-terrorists-country-refugees/story?id=20931131>

Several dozen suspected terrorist bombmakers, including some believed to have targeted American troops, may have mistakenly been allowed to move to the United States as war refugees, according to FBI agents investigating the remnants of roadside bombs recovered from Iraq and Afghanistan.

The discovery in 2009 of two al Qaeda-Iraq terrorists living as refugees in Bowling Green, Kentucky – who later admitted in court that they'd attacked U.S. soldiers in Iraq – prompted the bureau to assign hundreds of specialists to an around-the-clock effort aimed at checking its archive of 100,000 improvised explosive devices collected in the war zones, known as IEDs, for other suspected terrorists' fingerprints.

AT: Refugees are terrorists

You must avoid running this response if you advocate that the US should hasten the resettlement of refugees by decreasing scrutiny because it is predicated on that scrutiny being eliminated. However, if you have another form of prioritization that you are arguing, you can run this response. You could also run this argument as the con as part of a response and by coupling it with the idea that eliminating restrictions will open up the US to terrorists. ³³

Refugees are subject to more scrutiny and background checks than any other group admitted to the United States. That comes to us from a State Department spokesperson not authorized to speak on the record.

That screening includes health checks, repeated biometric verification of identity, several layers of biographical and background screening, and in-person interviews. Multiple agencies are involved in the process, including the FBI's Terrorist Screening Center, the State Department, the Department of Homeland Security, the National Counterterrorism Center and the Department of Defense. And all of this happens before a refugee's application for resettlement is ever approved or rejected and long before a refugee enters the United States.

A safer response (and one that can be used with any solvency mechanism) is the idea that the U.S. letting in more refugees will improve security on the whole. CNN, citing Michael Gabaudan, president of Refugees International explains ³⁴

The United States also stands to gain from helping Syrian refugees, Gabaudan said.

³³Janell Ross, Suspicious of Syrian refugees coming to the U.S.? Here's a reality check., The Washington Post, October 2 2015, <https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2015/10/02/donald-trump-has-his-suspicions-about-syrian-refugees-they-are-unfounded-heres-why/>

³⁴Holly Yan, Refugee crisis: Pressure builds for U.S. to welcome more Syrians, CNN, September 9 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/09/politics/us-syrian-refugees-pressure/>

3 *Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins*

“I would argue there is another obligation beyond a moral obligation to help refugees – and to help particularly those who are in Turkey, in Lebanon and in Jordan,” he said.

“These countries are allies of the U.S. We have a moral obligation to look after the refugees, but we also have an interest in the security of these countries, and that the refugees in these countries do not lead to some destabilization. And that’s another factor why we should move further in providing assistance.”

Additionally, the US has the funds and precedent to generally do more regarding refugees ³⁵

The world is experiencing the largest refugee population since World War II. Yet the portion of the U.S. budget going to help refugees has remained flat-lined. The entire U.S. foreign assistance budget makes up less than 1% of the federal budget and is stretched thin across a range of life-changing programs addressing issues including maternal and child health, water and sanitation development, vaccines, medicines and disease prevention, farming assistance, and children’s education. Only about an estimated 12% of the foreign assistance budget goes to humanitarian support for refugees caught in the crosshairs of war. The U.S. can do better.

After the fall of Saigon, President Gerald Ford set up an interagency task force that in one year resettled 130,000 Vietnamese refugees. In response to news reports that women and children were dying on overcrowded boats, President Carter made refugee resettlement a priority. These weren’t popular decisions, but these presidents showed moral leadership.

3.3 **Argument Guide 3: The Nature of Borders**

Introductory note

First, this guide in particular is meant to be a starting point for various different ways of considering the comparison between obligations, not a complete framework or contention. There are many different ethical perspectives that you can take, and this guide is meant to give a taste of how some competing philosophical perspectives may interact.

When comparing the nature of humanitarian needs and national interests, in most cases, humanitarian needs are more fundamental than national interests because humanitarian needs are

³⁵Anne Speckhard, Taking in Refugees Is Not a Risk to National Security, Time Magazine, Sept. 9 2015, <http://time.com/4024473/taking-in-refugees-is-not-a-risk-to-national-security/>

generally the basic needs for survival (food, water, shelter, ect.) while national interests are more broad and encompass benefits beyond the basic needs.

Therefore, a pro team may be able to argue that any government should prioritize humanitarian needs of anyone over its own national interest if they can prove that borders and citizenship are arbitrary or that people have equal worth. From that premise, they can argue that the most needy should be prioritized, and if borders and/or citizenship don't matter then there is no reason for a country to prefer its own citizens' interests over those of refugees (assuming the refugees are more needy).

This argument, therefore, relies on two main premises.

1. People have equal worth
2. The most needy ought to have their basic needs met

And these imply that refugees should have their humanitarian needs met first.

Citizenship is arbitrary / Individuals have equal worth

Professor Joseph Carens argues that borders are entirely arbitrary and morally wrong³⁶

In many ways, citizenship in Western democracies is the modern equivalent of feudal class privilege—an inherited status that greatly enhances one's life chances. To be born a citizen of a rich state in Europe or North America is like being born into the nobility (even though many of us belong to the lesser nobility). To be born a citizen of a poor country in Asia or Africa is like being born into the peasantry in the Middle Ages (even if there are a few rich peasants and some peasants manage to gain entry to the nobility). Like feudal birthright privileges, contemporary social arrangements not only grant great advantages on the basis of birth but also entrench these advantages by legally restricting mobility, making it extremely difficult for those born into a socially disadvantaged position to overcome that disadvantage, no matter how talented they are or how hard they work. Like feudal practices, these contemporary social arrangements are hard to justify when one thinks about them closely.

Moreover, he argues that the fairly uncontroversial assumption of equal human worth implies that borders should be open³⁷

³⁶Joseph Carens, Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, June 5 2015, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery/joseph-h-carens/case-for-open-borders>

³⁷Joseph Carens, Professor of Political Science at the University of Toronto, June 5 2015, <https://www.opendemocracy.net/beyondslavery/joseph-h-carens/case-for-open-borders>

3 *Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins*

The analogy I have just drawn with feudalism is designed to give readers pause about the conventional view that restrictions on immigration by democratic states are normally justified. Now let me outline the positive case for open borders. I start from three basic interrelated assumptions. First, there is no natural social order. The institutions and practices that govern human beings are ones that human beings have created and can change, at least in principle. Second, in evaluating the moral status of alternative forms of political and social organisation, we must start from the premise that all human beings are of equal moral worth. Third, restrictions on the freedom of human beings require a moral justification. These three assumptions are not just my views. They undergird the claim to moral legitimacy of every contemporary democratic regime.

The assumption that all human beings are of equal moral worth does not mean that no legal distinctions can be drawn among different groups of people, nor does the requirement that restrictions on freedom be justified mean that coercion is never defensible. But these two assumptions, together with the assumption that the social order is not naturally given, mean that we have to give reasons for our institutions and practices and that those reasons must take a certain form. It is never enough to justify a set of social arrangements governing human beings by saying that these arrangements are good for us, whoever the 'us' may be, without regard for others. We have to appeal to principles and arguments that take everyone's interests into account or that explain why the social arrangements are reasonable and fair to everyone who is subject to them.

Given these three assumptions there is at least a *prima facie* case that borders should be open, for, again, three interrelated reasons. First, state control over immigration limits freedom of movement. The right to go where you want is an important human freedom in itself. It is precisely this freedom, and all that this freedom makes possible, that is taken away by imprisonment. Freedom of movement is also a prerequisite to many other freedoms. If people are to be free to live their lives as they choose, so long as this does not interfere with the legitimate claims of others, they have to be free to move where they want. Thus freedom of movement contributes to individual autonomy both directly and indirectly. Open borders would enhance this freedom.

Refugees ought to have their needs met first

Peter Singer is a very prominent philosopher and one of the few who actually follows strictly what he preaches (he is vegetarian and donates a significant portion of his income to charity every year for example). He argues that since refugees have more fundamental interests than almost every citizen, that theirs should be prioritized. Indeed, this ties in well with the specific topic because the topic restricts us to talking about the humanitarian needs, which are by definition the most fundamental.³⁸

The current orthodoxy rests on vague and usually unargued assumptions about the community's right to determine its membership. A consequentialist would hold, instead, that immigration policy should be based squarely on the interests of all those affected. Where the interests of different parties conflict, we should be giving equal consideration to all interests, which would mean that more pressing or more fundamental interests take precedence over less fundamental interests. The first step in applying the principle of equal consideration of interests is to identify those whose interests are affected. The first and most obvious group is the refugees themselves. Their most pressing and fundamental interests are clearly at stake. Life in a refugee camp offers little prospect of anything more than a bare subsistence, and sometimes hardly even that.

3.3.1 The Right to Refuse

There are a few ways to establish the right for a government to refuse refugees

Other ways to help

One way is to argue that even if governments have some level of obligation to foreigners, that doesn't necessarily imply that they have to let them immigrate. If there are other ways to help, those can fulfill that obligation³⁹

More recently, however, some have come to question this line of thinking. Few suggest that a state has no duties to imperiled foreigners, but theorists increasingly question whether a state's duty to assist refugees must come in the form of admitting them.

³⁸Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy at Princeton, *Practical Ethics, 2nd Edition*, 1993, <http://emilkirkegaard.dk/en/wp-content/uploads/Peter-Singer-Practical-Ethics-2nd-edition.pdf>

³⁹Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, "Immigration", Mar 23, 2015, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/immigration/>

Consider the Kurds in Northern Iraq, for instance. Given the abuses they suffered under Saddam Hussein's rule, many would argue they should qualify as refugees. One way to offer assistance would have been to provide them refuge in various foreign countries. But as history shows, this was not the only way to help. Another option was to protect the Kurds where they lived, by securing a safe-haven fortified by a no-fly zone in Northern Iraq. (A third possible option might be for rich countries to pay poorer countries to admit the refugees.) Of course, for a variety of reasons, countries might prefer not to intervene in the affairs of a foreign state, but the important point is the more general lesson that, even if we take for granted that stable, wealthy countries can have stringent duties to refugees, it does not follow that these duties must be paid in the currency of open borders.

Weakens the Social Contract

The social contract is basically the idea that people give up certain rights to have a better standard of living provided by the government to which they give up those rights. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy explains the basics (go to the full page to read more)⁴⁰

The idea of the social contract goes back, in a recognizably modern form, to Thomas Hobbes; it was developed in different ways by John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Immanuel Kant. After Kant the idea largely fell into disrepute until it was resurrected by John Rawls. It is now at the heart of the work of a number of moral and political philosophers. The basic idea seems simple: in some way, the agreement (or consent) of all individuals subject to collectively enforced social arrangements shows that those arrangements have some normative property (they are legitimate, just, obligating, etc.). Even this vague basic idea, though, is anything but simple, and even this abstract rendering is objectionable in many ways. To explicate the idea of the social contract we analyze contractual approaches into five variables: (1) the nature of the contractual act; (2) the parties to the act; (3) what the parties are agreeing to; (4) the reasoning that leads to the agreement; (5) what the agreement is supposed to show.

The social contract theories of Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau all stressed that the justification of the state depends on showing that everyone would, in some way, consent to it. By relying on consent, social contract theory seemed to suppose a voluntarist

⁴⁰Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Contemporary Approaches to the Social Contract, December 20 2011, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/contractarianism-contemporary/>

3 *Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins*

conception of political justice and obligation: what is just depends on what people choose to agree to—what they will. Only in Kant (1797) does it become clear that consent is not fundamental to a social contract view: we have a duty to agree to act according to the idea of the “original contract.” Rawls’s revival of social contract theory in *A Theory of Justice* did not base obligations on consent, though the apparatus of an “original agreement” persisted as a way to help solve the problem of justification. As the question of public justification takes center stage (we might say as contractualist liberalism becomes justificatory liberalism), it becomes clear that posing the problem of justification in terms of a deliberative or a bargaining problem is a heuristic: the real issue is “the problem of justification”—what principles can be justified to all reasonable citizens or persons.

The closest physical manifestation of this philosophical change has already begun to materialize in Denmark, where citizens of the country (which highly values social programs) view the social contract as being eroded by refugee relocation.⁴¹

Others say many Danes will view the new population of refugees through the prism of past immigration experience that was widely judged to be a failure. What will trigger an anti-immigrant reaction faster than anything, they say, is a perceived danger to the Danish “social contract” that trades a high, equitable standard of living for work and high taxes.

“Denmark is a small country of 5 million people, it is homogeneous and fiercely egalitarian,” says Peter Nedergaard, a professor of political science at the University of Copenhagen. “The Danish people are very proud of a system that has delivered one of the lowest inequality quotients in the world, but now they fear it could be under threat.”

Professor Nedergaard says it’s a mistake to view the rising Danish People’s Party as simply racist or anti-immigrant. “They’re not,” he says. Instead, “It’s a working-class party of people who fear that immigrants won’t learn Danish, won’t be able to get a job, and so will weaken the social contract,” he says.

The risk, he says, is that as more refugees come to Denmark, “People are going to be tempted to think, ‘We’ve come a long way in reducing the underclass, and now suddenly we see new people coming, and making up a new underclass.’”

⁴¹Howard LaFranchi, *In egalitarian Denmark, tide of refugees challenges ‘social contract’*, *The Christian Science Monitor*, October 8 2015, <http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Europe/2015/1008/In-egalitarian-Denmark-tide-of-refugees-challenges-social-contract>

In Allerød, Johansen worries that if the wave of refugees continues and the Danish people are asked to do too much, the “welcome” of towns like his could change to “stay out.”

“With the refugee crisis in Europe, there is no reason to think the numbers we are called on to take here in Allerød will go down in the coming years,” the mayor says. “The concern is that we won’t have the time and space to do a good job of this integration, and then what happens to this new attitude we’re seeing today?”

This is, of course, tied into the notion that governments (especially ones which provide extensive social services) have limited resources and can’t handle an increase in population from refugees.

3.3.2 Defense of Philosophical Justification

Response to Social Contract

A new social contract is forged between the refugee and the host country ⁴²

The basic fact is that the refugee is a very special sort of immigrant - one who, by the nature of his situation has, incurred particularly pressing responsibilities and obligations. These ultimately root in a social contract of sorts, an implicit agreement between the refugee and the nation and society that gives him refuge. A personalized social contract is in operation through a tacit and, as it were, hypothetical bargain: “You take me in; I will bend my efforts to ensure that you will be better off for my presence.”

You could also apply your arguments about how place of birth is arbitrary - this implies that the social contract is also arbitrary.

Response to a Lack of Practicality

The spirit of the argument is such that countries could set aside pieces of land that are for the refugees instead of the status quo in which refugees are often stuck in camps with poor conditions.

⁴³

⁴²Nicholas Rescher, *Moral Obligation and the Refugee*, *Public Affairs Quarterly* Volume 6, Issue 1, January 1992, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40435794>

⁴³Pieter Cleppe, *Free havens as a solution to the refugee crisis*, April 23 2015, <http://www.cleppe0.blogspot.be/2015/04/free-havens-as-solution-to-refugee.html>

A preferable solution could be to create “Free havens”: a refugee zone but then one with stable rule of law, protection and opportunities for economic investment, where refugees can actually build up a life and aren’t condemned to wasting their precious time.

This has been tried, but only very occasionally, although with extraordinary success. Most prominently in the last century, it was applied in Hong Kong, effectively a refugee zone, governed by the British rule of law, welcoming millions of Chinese wanting to flee war, totalitarian rule and turmoil in mainland China. Refugee camps at best offer refugees safety, but Hong Kong offered those Chinese refugees something which even the best refugee camps can’t offer: the opportunity to develop yourself.

Refugees, broadly defined as people fleeing from both war and economic misery, aren’t asking for a lot. They want a better life. Not necessarily a whole of a lot better. Only slightly better, if nothing else is possible. Refugees don’t only want shelter. They want to be able to develop themselves. Why would they need to wait before their country returns to the better or before wealthier countries decide they’re willing to welcome them?

Dangers of right to refuse refugees (general)

The logic behind philosophical arguments that justify discouraging or banning the arrival of refugees justifies atrocities, like the mass and unnecessary deaths of refugees. The response to the disaster in the Mediterranean that killed 900 confirms this effect ⁴⁴

Today the Guardian reports that Britain – along with its EU partners – is backing the withdrawal of search and rescue support from the Mediterranean. According to a statement from Foreign Office minister Lady Anelay: “We do not support planned search and rescue operations in the Mediterranean”. She added that the government believes there is “an unintended ‘pull factor,’ encouraging more migrants to attempt the dangerous sea crossing and thereby leading to more tragic and unnecessary deaths”.

Let’s spend a moment interrogating the government’s position on this issue. And this is the British Government’s position, remember. This is our Government’s position.

⁴⁴Dan Hodges, Drown an immigrant to save an immigrant: why is the Government borrowing policy from the BNP?, The Telegraph, October 28 2015, <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/11192208/Drown-an-immigrant-to-save-an-immigrant-why-is-the-Government-borrowing-policy-from-the-BNP.html>

Our Government's argument is – and this is literally the logic of Lady Anelay's statement – “We understand that by withdrawing this rescue cover we will be leaving innocent children, women and men to drown who we would otherwise have saved. But eventually word will get around the war-torn communities of Syria and Libya and the other unstable nations of the region that we are indeed leaving innocent children, women and men to drown. And when it does, they will think twice about making the journey. And so eventually, over time, more lives will be saved.”

This is what happens. This is where the death spiral into a political bidding war on immigration leads us. To a position where in 2014 the British Government – our Government – is saying that we should stand aside and watch asylum seekers drown.

Moreover, similar logic and assumption of the right to refuse refugees causes them to be caught at sea, stateless and with few supplies. A CNN report discusses such an occurrence ⁴⁵

The plight of the Rohingya currently abandoned at sea is exacerbated by the presence of Bangladeshi economic migrants in their midst. While many, including the UNHCR, see the Rohingya as legitimate refugees fleeing persecution, the Southeast Asian nations refusing to allow the ships cite the presence of economic migrants as a reason to refuse them refuge.

Matthew Smith of Fortify Rights, a non-profit human rights organization based in Southeast Asia, says Southeast Asian governments have the wherewithal to track and find them, but simply don't want to.

“Governments in the region are playing human ping-pong, pushing boats back out to sea while claiming to crackdown on human trafficking,” he said. “All governments have a responsibility to protect survivors of trafficking and asylum seekers. No government can credibly claim to be combating trafficking while simultaneously creating a ready pool of desperate and insecure people at sea.”

3.4 **Argument Guide 4: System Overload**

Since the resolution only specifies a singular government, it is possible for a con team to argue that the singular nature of only one government prioritizing the needs of refugees will cause harms. The

⁴⁵Euan McKirdy and Saima Mohsin, Lost at sea, unwanted: The plight of Myanmar's Rohingya 'boat people', CNN, May 19 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/19/asia/rohingya-refugee-ships-explainer/>

3 Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins

pro can't legitimately escape this interpretation because arguing for anything beyond "a government" (one country) would be beyond the scope of the topic.

This argument is not entirely based on that premise, but it does follow from it.

Basically, con will argue that in the event a country successfully prioritizes refugees, that country will be so overwhelmed that it will be more harmful than a world in which refugees were spread out among countries that weren't prioritizing their needs. This argument is especially believable since potential refugees lack communication networks, so whichever country is the easiest to get to will likely be the one chosen, regardless of conditions. Additionally, countries like the U.S. and others frequently look for any excuse to siphon off refugees to others, so whichever singular government made refugees a priority would likely be targeted by that siphoning.

Moving on, this argument again uses Germany as an example but paints it in a negative light. The theme is that Germany was initially optimistic about its capabilities to deal with refugees but the past few months has come to a stark realization of the negative consequences. To maintain this argument, it will be important to find increasingly *recent* sources about Germany's struggles.

With that in mind, let's examine the evidence. Pay close attention to the dates - they are critical to the argument!

Initial Optimism opens the floodgates

Germany is initially hopeful about how its acceptance of refugees can repair its image in the international sphere and help people ⁴⁶

German Chancellor Angela Merkel opened her traditional summer press conference Monday by noting that – while the suffering is real and the stories are too often tragic – there are positives Germans can take from the refugee crisis now engulfing her nation and all of Europe.

Last week, the forecast was as many as 800,000 this year. This weekend, two state governors said they were preparing for 1 million asylum seekers by the end of 2015.

"If so many people brave such hardship to come here, this is a sign of approval for us," Merkel said. "The world sees Germany as a country of hope and of chances. That hasn't always been the case."

⁴⁶Matthew Schofield, Merkel: Refugee flood means 'world sees Germany as country of hope', McClatchy DC, August 31 2015, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article32922531.html>

3 Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins

However, even at such an early stage, it was clear that Germany could not bear the entire load ⁴⁷

But Germany has changed. In this crisis, Germany has taken in more refugees than other European nations. But even with the continent's most powerful economy, Germany cannot deal with the crisis alone. "The countries of Europe have to share the responsibility of caring for asylum seekers," Merkel said. "After all, universal civil rights were a founding element of the European Union. If Europe fails to cope with this refugee crisis, it will no longer be the Europe we cherish."

Germany leads by example and accepts tons of refugees ⁴⁸

Observers call it part of the burdens of becoming the de facto leader of Europe. Berlin has already been called on to lead the 28-nation European Union through the tribulations of the Greek debt crisis as well as its standoff with Russia over Ukraine - occasionally with less-than-stellar results.

But on the issue of refugees, Germany is, from a humanitarian point of view, leading by example. Last month, Germany unilaterally waived its right to deport Syrians back to the first EU nation they enter, effectively agreeing to let most of those who were able to make it there stay. That has been backed up by an 87 per cent acceptance rate of Syrians who apply for asylum in Germany.

"The fundamental right to asylum does not have a limitation," German Chancellor Angela Merkel said. "As a strong, economically healthy country, we have the strength to do what is necessary."

However, even this early, there were warning signs that a storm of trouble was brewing ⁴⁹

The surge of new arrivals is indeed stoking broad concerns about how and whether the newcomers - who include many conservative Muslims - will adapt to the liberal norms. Language classes, social support and other forms of aid - a single refugee in Munich, for instance, gets about €350 (HK\$3,000) a month in addition to housing - are set to cost Germany many millions. To cover those costs, the ruling coalition decided yesterday to make an additional €6 billion in public funds available next year.

⁴⁷Matthew Schofield, Merkel: Refugee flood means 'world sees Germany as country of hope', McClatchy DC, August 31 2015, <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/news/nation-world/world/article32922531.html>

⁴⁸No Author, Why Germany is opening its doors to the flood of refugees, South China Morning Post, September 8 2015, <http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1856081/why-germany-opening-its-doors-flood-refugees>

⁴⁹No Author, Why Germany is opening its doors to the flood of refugees, South China Morning Post, September 8 2015, <http://www.scmp.com/news/world/article/1856081/why-germany-opening-its-doors-flood-refugees>

That generally accepting message is getting out, with some nations, including Hungary, blaming German generosity for enticing more and more refugees to make risky trips from the Middle East, Africa and Asia into Europe. Indeed, the refugees stopped on a train by the Hungarians over the past two days shouted out chants of “Germany, Germany, let us go to Germany”.

Migrants begin to overwhelm the institutions of Europe’s largest economy

Long wait times create nightmarish bureaucratic situations ⁵⁰

Outside the main refugee processing center in Berlin, for instance, asylum seekers are caught in a bureaucratic hell. Dozens are camping out on cold sidewalks — some for weeks — as they wait for their numbers to flash on a screen inside to secure temporary housing. But each day, it’s a crapshoot. At closing time on a recent afternoon, hundreds of asylum seekers were left empty-handed, including Ahmed Hamadich, 27, who walked toward his blanket for another night outdoors.

Beyond the bureaucracy, social institutions are being overwhelmed ⁵¹

Germany is trying to distribute refugees to its states, cities and towns based largely on population and tax revenue. The city of Berlin, for instance, is set to receive more than 5 percent of all those coming and is attempting to manage the arrival of more than 9,000 asylum seekers in just the past three weeks. Shelters are so full that some of the refugees are receiving vouchers for private hostels.

But volunteer aid workers say the city is so behind on payments that many hostels are no longer accepting the vouchers. A city spokeswoman said that she could neither confirm nor deny the problem but that the city is trying to make good on its payments as soon as possible.

? The national and local governments are racing to hire thousands of new police officers and bureaucrats to manage refugees. Schools, meanwhile, are desperately looking for new teachers to help with an estimated 300,000 new students. Irina Wissmann, principal at Berlin’s An der

⁵⁰Anthony Faiola, Souad Mekhennet and Stephanie Kirchner, Some refugees in Germany get Zumba classes, but others sleep on the streets, Washington Post, September 29 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/some-refugees-in-germany-get-zumba-classes-but-others-sleep-on-the-streets/2015/09/29/f2bf3b66-5af6-11e5-8475-781cc9851652_story.html

⁵¹Anthony Faiola, Souad Mekhennet and Stephanie Kirchner, Some refugees in Germany get Zumba classes, but others sleep on the streets, Washington Post, September 29 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/some-refugees-in-germany-get-zumba-classes-but-others-sleep-on-the-streets/2015/09/29/f2bf3b66-5af6-11e5-8475-781cc9851652_story.html

Bäke Elementary School, said none of the 300 qualified instructors provided to her in a list by city officials were available to work. She said that with 20 new refugee students already and double that number expected by year's end, she is afraid of surging class sizes as well as issues with traumatized children.

“This is going to be very difficult,” she said.

These problems have already only occurred in the short term, the long term will only be more difficult ⁵²

“The state has clearly nothing under control here,” said Leila El-Abcah, a volunteer with Moabit Helps, a refugee aid group in central Berlin. In the evenings, she is trying to guide some refugees on the streets to the private homes of people willing to offer them shelter for the night. “If it weren't for the many volunteers,” she said, “nothing would work, everything would collapse.”

German officials said that they are trying their best to deal with an extraordinary situation and that it's a miracle that they have managed to aid and house hundreds of thousands of asylum seekers so quickly. In an interview with The Washington Post last week, Interior Minister Thomas de Maizière said Germany is managing, “but with difficulties.” He noted that the country had to roll out a huge operation to shelter asylum seekers “within weeks.”

But a bigger problem is how to shelter refugees long term. One Berlin district is considering a proposal to install refugees in empty stores. The liberal district of Friedrichshain-Kreuzberg, home to some of the city's hottest nightclubs, is contemplating the seizure of empty apartments from real estate speculators to accommodate asylum seekers.

As Predicted, things are only going to get worse

Remember the premise that as one country prioritizes refugees, then more and more refugees will flock there. This has been confirmed by Germany's experience, in which estimates of refugee arrivals have only increased. Since they're struggling with the number they have now, all of these

⁵²Anthony Faiola, Souad Mekhennet and Stephanie Kirchner, Some refugees in Germany get Zumba classes, but others sleep on the streets, Washington Post, September 29 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/some-refugees-in-germany-get-zumba-classes-but-others-sleep-on-the-streets/2015/09/29/f2bf3b66-5af6-11e5-8475-781cc9851652_story.html

problems will be exacerbated in the medium and possibly long term ⁵³

German authorities expect up to 1.5 million asylum seekers to arrive in Germany this year, the Bild daily said in a report to be published on Monday, up from a previous estimate of 800,000 to 1 million.

Germany's top-selling newspaper cited an internal forecast from authorities that it said had been classed as confidential.

Many of the hundreds of thousands of people pouring into Europe to escape conflicts and poverty in the Middle East, Africa and beyond have said they are heading to Germany, Europe's largest economy.

Bild said the German authorities were concerned about the risk of a "breakdown of provisions" and that they were already struggling to procure enough living containers and sanitary facilities for the new arrivals.

"Migratory pressures will increase further. We now expect seven to ten thousand illegal border crossings every day in the fourth quarter," Bild cited the report as saying.

"This high number of asylum seekers runs the risk of becoming an extreme burden for the states and municipalities," the report said.

The authorities' report also cited concerns that those who are granted asylum will bring their families over to Germany too, Bild said.

Given family structures in the Middle East, this would mean each individual from that region who is granted asylum bringing an average of four to eight family members over to Germany in due course, Bild quoted the report as saying.

The Situation in Germany is awful now

The country continues to get increasingly overwhelmed ⁵⁴

When Germany announced in August that it would waive United Nations rules and allow Syrian migrants to apply for asylum regardless of how they got there, officials

⁵³Axel Schmidt, Germany now expects up to 1.5 million migrants in 2015: newspaper, Reuters, October 1 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/04/us-europe-migrants-germany-numbers-idUSKCN0RY0UY20151004>

⁵⁴Amy X. Wang, Germany's Refugee Crisis Is Getting Worse, The Atlantic, October 4 2015, <http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/germany-refugee-migrant-crisis/408877/>

3 *Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins*

knew to expect a flood of people. Hopeful families were already surging into the country from all over the Middle East, an area crippled by social strife and political chaos. Authorities predicted the arrival of more than 800,000 refugees to the country by the end of 2015, and they tried to prepare accordingly.

But Germany is now sagging under the weight. Its cities and towns cannot easily accommodate all the refugees. An official from the Berlin Refugee Council called the issue an “organizational problem” rather than a financial one: Authorities don’t have the resources—or the time—to quickly provide registration, funds, secure accommodation, health services, and identification to all the refugees, 200,000 of whom arrived in September alone.

German police and politicians are frustrated. Exhausted migrants who traveled hundreds of miles to escape civil war only to be held in weeks-long waiting lines are even more so. And adding to Germany’s existing logistical problems now is another: The impending arrival of a freezing, harsh winter.

It’s gotten to be so bad that one migrant interviewed wished that he had stayed in Syria. That’s pretty bad ⁵⁵

“I wish I’d stayed in Syria and not come here,” Hesham said through an interpreter. “I dreamed Germany would be better but it’s so bad. We’ve been sleeping in the cold. Now my baby is sick.”

As the numbers have risen, registering the newcomers in a timely fashion has become virtually impossible.

At the center in Berlin, asylum seekers, some of whom are sleeping outside, say they have been waiting as long as 25 days to register. With winter looming, the same frustrating delays are occurring in other cities across Germany.

“The biggest problem at the moment is the initial registration of people and providing them with the basics – that’s not working well in an awful lot of places,” said Rebecca Kilian-Mason, who runs a project in Munich that informs migrants about the asylum process in Germany.

⁵⁵Michelle Martin, Germany faces logistical nightmare as refugee inflows hit record, Reuters, October 4 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/04/us-europe-migrants-germany-logistics-ins-idUSKCN0RY0E420151004>

Winter is coming - in a literal and figurative sense things are only going to get worse ⁵⁶

They must find winter-proof accommodation, provide asylum seekers with funds to survive, treat health problems, identify migrants with no documents and weed out those who falsely claim to be Syrian because the German government has made clear that those fleeing the civil war there will be allowed to stay.

Then there is the challenge of sending back the tens of thousands of migrants who are not granted asylum and tracking down those who have not applied in the first place.

Frank-Juergen Weise, head of the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), estimates there are around 290,000 people in Germany who have not been registered.

In a country known for its order and efficiency, the influx is turning into a logistical nightmare – for police and politicians as well as the refugees.

Additional Evidence

Germany doesn't even accept every refugee, perhaps that indicates that to truly prioritize the humanitarian needs of refugees over national interests a country would have to create an even more extreme version of Germany's policies ⁵⁷

Germany is ground zero in Europe's migrant crisis, a nation set to receive up to 1 million asylum seekers this year, far more than any other country in the region. Yet, like Hassan, after risking their lives by land and sea to reach the continent's economic powerhouse, about one in every two asylum seekers is initially rejected. It has made asylum a numbers game. In Germany, 86 percent of Syrians are being granted some form of refugee status, as are 82 percent of Iraqis and 80 percent of Eritreans. Only 30 percent of Afghans are making the cut. For those coming from Kosovo and Albania, the acceptance rate stands at almost zero.

It should be pretty clear that if the top economic power of Europe is struggling with the refugees, then any other country would likely face similar difficulties, so this example should be applicable

⁵⁶Michelle Martin, Germany faces logistical nightmare as refugee inflows hit record, Reuters, October 4 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/10/04/us-europe-migrants-germany-logistics-insidUSKCN0RY0E420151004>

⁵⁷Anthony Faiola, After hard journeys to Europe, who gets to stay?, Washington Post, September 20 2015, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/after-hard-journeys-to-europe-who-gets-to-stay/2015/09/20/583ded9c-5aee-11e5-8475-781cc9851652_story.html

3 *Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins*

to any other country pro brings up. However, in developing countries, even ones that are just stops en route to Germany, there is immense struggle. Take Croatia as an example ⁵⁸

Croatia threatened to close its border with Serbia on Thursday as migrants fled from overwhelmed police, trekked through fields and tried to steal into Slovenia by train in a desperate march westwards that is sowing discord and recrimination in Europe.

Croatia said it may have to use the army to stop thousands of migrants criss-crossing the Western Balkans in their quest for sanctuary in the wealthy 28-nation bloc. It shuttled some to reception centers near Zagreb, but many simply slipped the net of overwhelmed authorities and set off for the Slovenian border, just 30 kilometers (19 miles) from the Croatian capital.

Greece as a stopping route has faced similar problems ⁵⁹

It was supposed to be the first step on their journey to Western Europe. But now thousands of migrants are mired in despair, anger and frustration on the scenic Greek island of Lesbos.

After perilous sea voyages from neighboring Turkey, they have been stranded here for days, some for nearly two weeks, running out of money and desperate to get to mainland Greece and continue their route.

The island of some 100,000 residents has been transformed by the sudden new population of some 20,000 refugees and migrants, mostly from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan — and the strain is pushing everyone to the limit.

Fights break out among the migrants as they wait in long lines for hours in the summer heat and humidity, after days without showers. Families, sleeping on the streets, wander the seaside promenade of Mytilene, Lesbos' capital, asking at the swanky cafes and restaurants to use their bathrooms or charge phones. The small police force, overwhelmed by the numbers, charges in at any sign of trouble, beating crowds with batons to break them up.

“We escaped from ruin to be met with more ruin here,” said Mohammed Salama, a 45-year-old Syrian. He fled the Damascus suburbs where fighting has raged for years,

⁵⁸Maja Zuvela, Croatia overwhelmed by flood of migrants, EU calls summit, Reuters, September 17 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/17/us-europe-migrants-idUSKCN0RD0P420150917>

⁵⁹Hamza Hendawi, On an overwhelmed Greek island, nerves fray among stranded migrants, police and residents Associated Press, September 7 2015, <http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2015/09/07/greek-island-overwhelmed-by-stranded-migrants-despair>

3 *Argument Guides by Austin Hopkins*

seeking a refuge so he can bring his four daughters and pregnant wife who remained behind.

“I did not come here to make money,” he said Sunday. “I came here so I can later bring my children and have them live in safety.”

Final thoughts

If you're looking for more extensions or responses, look through the evidence in my first argument guide. It interacts well with this narrative. However, it is too soon to cut meaningful responses because the German crisis hasn't had time for any solutions to be proposed.

Remember, the ultimate story that this argument tries to tell is the following: even a well equipped country will be overwhelmed if it is the only one to prioritize refugees' needs and it uses Germany as a great example of this.

What will be key to both defending and responding to this argument will be recent evidence, so be sure to keep your files up to date come November!

4 Cards cut by Abraham Fraifeld

Abraham Fraifeld competed for Trinity Prep in Winter Park for four years. Over the course of his career, he accumulated 12 TOC bids and advanced to five final rounds. He currently coaches Trinity Prep and attends Georgetown University.

5 Pro

5.1 State Obligations

5.1.1 Cosmopolitan Egalitarianism

Rawlsian philosophy has been interpreted to apply on a global stage. Under this system of morality, capable countries should help the world's least well off. Kirtzman-Amir and Spijkerboer specifically apply this thinking to asylum seekers and refugees

Tally Kirtzman-Amir [Assistant Professor of International Law at The Academic Center of Law and Business, Israel] and Thomas Spijkerboer [Professor of Migration Law at VU University, Amsterdam], "On the Morality and Legality of Borders: Border Policies and Asylum Seekers," *Harvard Human Rights Journal* (2013) Vol. 26, pp. 1-38, <http://harvardhrj.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/V26-Amir-Spijkerboer.pdf>

The roots of cosmopolitan egalitarianism can be traced back to the writings of John Rawls, who argues that just social institutions are formed in an "original position" characterized by the fact that their decisions are made in "a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just."⁴⁴ According to Rawls, parties should be situated behind "the veil of ignorance," unaware of their own traits, yet aware of the basic characteristics of society and culture, so that they would be informed enough, yet not biased by self-interest, when deciding which option is more just.⁴⁵ Rawls claims that these conditions will guarantee just resolutions as they screen out all the morally arbitrary elements from the decision-making process, and he explains which principles of justice will prevail.⁴⁶ This notion of justice, if applied internationally,⁴⁷ can serve as the basis for claiming that because nationality is a morally arbitrary trait, states have the same compelling duty towards non-citizens as they have towards their own citizens. This theoretical paradigm can also serve as the basis for a claim for open borders and cosmopolitan egalitarianism. According to some cosmopolitan scholars, Rawls' perception of states as "self-contained" is wrong.⁴⁸ States interact in many

significant ways, especially through economics and commerce. If states are not perceived as “self-contained,” there is some justification for believing in an international, Rawlsian, original position. From this derives a claim that national boundaries have no moral significance, that everyone should be included in the hypothetical original position—behind the veil of ignorance—and their nationality should be disregarded.⁴⁹

More on Rawls as his work relates to global state ethics

Michael Blake [Professor of Philosophy at the University of Washington] and Patrick Taylor Smith [Post-Doctoral Fellow at the Stanford Center for Ethics in Society], “International Distributive Justice”, *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2015), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2015/entries/international-justice>

Many initial commentators on Rawls’s work argued that the proper interpretation of Rawls’s principles was one in which the difference principle was applied at the global level. These authors are often referred to as “cosmopolitans”; this term, however, is often less than illuminating (see the accompanying entry on cosmopolitanism for more detail.) We will instead refer to these authors as Left Institutionalists, for reasons we hope will become clear. Left Institutionalists agree on the following conclusion: that Rawls’s own limitation of his two principles of justice to the circumstances of a domestic society was a morally illegitimate constraint on his theory, so that a consistent liberalism taking off from Rawls’s arguments must apply its liberal principles at the global level—and, therefore, the well-being of the worst-off representative member of the global society, rather than the domestic, ought to be our starting-point for the justification of inequality. In this way, liberalism is made coherent once again; rather than seeking some arbitrary fact to serve as a limitation on the liberal theory of justice, the cosmopolitans argue that we ought to live up to the globalism inherent in liberalism’s self-understanding.

Nationality meets Rawls’ criteria for an inequality generating characteristic that deserves correcting

Thomas Pogge [Professor of Philosophy at Yale University]. 1989. *Realizing Rawls*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 247.

One main reason Rawls gives for taking the basic structure as the primary moral subject is that institutional inequalities, at least insofar as they are based upon natural or social contingencies, are inescapable and present from birth. They deeply

shape our character and interests, goals and aspirations, even talents and abilities (BSS V; TJ 7, 259). Thus they affect our lives much more profoundly and call more urgently for moral reflection than inequalities arising from what individuals choose to do (including participation in associations such as firms, churches, or universities) and how their activities happen to turn out. Nationality is just one further deep contingency (like genetic endowment, race, gender, and social class), one more potential basis of institutional inequalities that are inescapable and present from birth. Within Rawls's conception, there is no reason to treat this case differently from the others. And so it would seem that we can justify our global institutional order only if we can show that the institutional inequalities it produces tend to optimize (against the backdrop of feasible alternative global regimes) the worst social position. (Pogge 1989, 247.)

Political cosmopolitanism is based on the notions that entitlements are arbitrary

Alyssa Bernstein [Professor of Philosophy at Ohio University] "Political Cosmopolitanism," *Encyclopedia of Global Justice* (2012), http://www.philosophy.ohiou.edu/PDF/EGJ_Political%20Cosmopolitanism_Vol-2.pdf

Tan (2004) argues that since commitment to equal respect and concern generates John Rawls's two principles of domestic social justice (Rawls 1971), and since everyone is entitled to equal respect and concern (all individuals worldwide, not only citizens within bounded groups), therefore Rawls's two principles of domestic social justice apply globally: a just global scheme of institutions would be regulated by Rawls's difference principle and would ensure global equality of opportunity. Caney (2010) says that the best argument in favor of his own version of cosmopolitanism, which he calls "humanity-centered," starts from the widely shared, strong conviction that persons should not fare worse in life because of "morally arbitrary characteristics," examples of which include, he says, their ethnicity, class, or religion; and that distributive justice should be blind to such features. From this conviction, Caney infers that persons should not face worse opportunities because of nationality or citizenship. Therefore, he rejects what he calls the "interdependence-based" version of cosmopolitanism propounded by Moellendorf. Caney contends that Moellendorf's arguments about national boundaries show not only that they are morally arbitrary but also that the boundaries of economic systems are equally so. If one's place of birth is morally arbitrary as Moellendorf says, then surely, Caney declares, one's birth into one scheme of economic institutions rather than another is also arbitrary and thus also should not affect one's life prospects. To ascribe differential entitlements to

people because they are members of different economic systems is, he says, to penalize some for morally arbitrary reasons. Being a member of any particular system or scheme is “just one further deep contingency,” says Caney, who credits this phrase to Pogge.

Cosmopolitanism dictates that we care for refugees as much as citizens

Alex Tabarrok [Professor of Economics at George Mason University], “The Case for Getting Rid of Borders - Completely,” *The Atlantic*, October 10, 2015. <http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/get-rid-borders-completely/409501/>

What moral theory justifies using wire, wall, and weapon to prevent people from moving to opportunity? What moral theory justifies using tools of exclusion to prevent people from exercising their right to vote with their feet? No standard moral framework, be it utilitarian, libertarian, egalitarian, Rawlsian, Christian, or any other well-developed perspective, regards people from foreign lands as less entitled to exercise their rights—or as inherently possessing less moral worth—than people lucky to have been born in the right place at the right time. Nationalism, of course, discounts the rights, interests, and moral value of “the Other, but this disposition is inconsistent with our fundamental moral teachings and beliefs.

5.1.2 Alternate Moral Theories - Utilitarianism, Deontology

Despite bitter disagreements on fundamental premises, Kantian and Utilitarian philosophy both arguably support the pro. Prioritizing refugees’ humanitarian needs treats refugees as ends in themselves¹, while also minimizing suffering.

Don MacNiven [Late Professor of Philosophy at York University]. *Creative morality*. London: Routledge (2014). Online resource. <https://goo.gl/I4Dtei>

The systems, as indicated before, also have major moral differences. The first principle of liberal utilitarianism is the principle of social utility: you ought to do that act which will maximize happiness/minimize suffering. The morality of an action is determined by its social utility. The first principle of conservative Kantianism is the principle of respect for persons: always treat persons as ends in themselves and never merely as means. Social utility can never be an overriding consideration because we cannot use anyone merely as a means to someone else’s well-being. Another

¹instead of treating their needs as instrumental to achieving national interest like the con might try to advocate by co-opting the pro’s advocacy

significant moral difference between traditions is that for the utilitarian a good end always justifies the means, while for the Kantian ends, however good, cannot justify means which violate the respect for persons. The utilitarians believe in expediency for trying to bring about the best result for everyone. The Kantians accept the Pauline principle of never doing evil in order to achieve good. They believe in fairness and impartiality. Principles like honesty and truthfulness express fundamental obligations for the Kantian which cannot be waived simply for convenience. These philosophical and moral differences, among others, are crucial for deciding the way the student's dilemma will be resolved. Let's look at a utilitarian response to the dilemma first, then go on to a Kantian response.

States should minimize suffering. Any theory that conflicts with the state goal of minimization of suffering fails to respect the principle that people are equal

Peter Singer [Professor of Philosophy at Princeton University]. "Practical Ethics," Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 1993, pp. 13-14

The universal aspect of ethics, I suggest, does provide a persuasive, although not conclusive, reason for taking a broadly utilitarian position. My reason for suggesting this is as follows. In accepting that ethical judgments must be made from a universal point of view, I am accepting that my own interests cannot, simply because they are my interests, count more than the interests of anyone else. Thus my very natural concern that my own interests be looked after must, when I think ethically, be extended to the interests of others. Now, imagine that I am trying to decide between two possible courses of action – perhaps whether to eat all the fruits I have collected myself, or to share them with others. Imagine, too, that I am deciding in a complete ethical vacuum, that I know nothing of any ethical considerations – I am, we might say, in a pre-ethical stage of thinking. How would I make up my mind? One thing that would be still relevant would be how the possible courses of action will affect my interests. Indeed, if we define 'interests' broadly enough, so that we count anything people desire as in their interests (unless it is incompatible with another desire or desires), then it would seem that at this pre-ethical stage, only one's own interests can be relevant to the decision. Suppose I then begin to think ethically, to the extent of recognizing that my own interests cannot count for more, simply because they are my own, than the interests of others. In place of my own interests, I now have to take into account the interests of all those affected by my decision. This requires me to weigh up all these interests and adopt the course of action most likely to maximize the interests of those affected.

Refugees suffer

Zenep Tufekci [Assistant Professor at the University of North Carolina], “The Plight of Refugees, the Shame of the World,” *New York Times*. August 13 2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/14/opinion/zeynep-tufekci-the-plight-of-child-refugees.html?_r=0

The world is facing the biggest refugee crisis since World War II, a staggering 60 million people displaced from their homes, four million from Syria alone. World leaders have abdicated their responsibility for this unlucky population, around half of whom are children. The situation is sadly reminiscent of that of refugees fleeing the destruction of World War II and the Nazi onslaught. Then, too, most governments turned their backs, and millions who were trapped perished. We are mired in a set of myopic, stingy and cruel policies. The few global institutions dedicated to supporting this population are starved of resources as governments either haven't funded them or have reneged on their pledges of funds. Wealthy and powerful nations aren't doing their part; the United States, for example, has taken fewer than 1,000 refugees from Syria. Zeynep Tufekci The Internet, technology, politics and society. Volkswagen and the Era of Cheating Software SEP 23 The Virginia Shooter Wanted Fame. Let's Not Give It to Him. AUG 27 Why 'Smart' Objects May Be a Dumb Idea AUG 10 How Hope Returned to Turkey JUN 9 Mark Zuckerberg, Let Me Pay for Facebook JUN 4 See More » The World Food Program was recently forced to cut its monthly food allocation to refugee families in Lebanon to \$13.50 per month, down from \$27 in January. In Iraq, the United Nations announced that a “paralyzing” funding shortfall was causing it to shutter health care services, directly affecting a million people. That means that hundreds of thousands of children will not be vaccinated against polio and measles — a terrifying development risking the resurgence of these diseases in the already devastated region. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees calculates that 750,000 Syrian children in neighboring countries are out of school simply for lack of money. One result has been a huge rise in child labor, with girls in their early teens (or even younger) being married off.

This topic is sensitive, and often debaters lose touch with the human side of suffering. The following excerpt from a poem describes refugees' plight.

Warsan Shire, “No One Leaves Home,” *Tikkun*, <http://www.tikkun.org/nextgen/24686>

no one leaves home unless home is the mouth of a shark
you only run for the border
when you see the whole city running as well

your neighbors running faster than you
breath bloody in their throats
the boy you

went to school with who kissed you dizzy behind the old tin factory is holding a gun bigger than his body you only leave home when home won't let you stay.

no one leaves home unless home chases you fire under feet hot blood in your belly it's not something you ever thought of doing until the blade burnt threats into your neck and even then you carried the anthem under your breath only tearing up your passport in an airport toilets sobbing as each mouthful of paper made it clear that you wouldn't be going back.

you have to understand, that no one puts their children in a boat unless the water is safer than the land no one burns their palms under trains beneath carriages no one spends days and nights in the stomach of a truck feeding on newspaper unless the miles travelled means something more than journey. no one crawls under fences no one wants to be beaten pitied

no one chooses refugee camps or strip searches where your body is left aching or prison, because prison is safer than a city of fire and one prison guard in the night is better than a truckload of men who look like your father no one could take it no one could stomach it no one skin would be tough enough

Human rights law and theory is grounded in the Kantian principle of respecting humans as ends in themselves, not as a means to achieving national interest

Andrew Fagan [Philosophy Professor at the University of Essex], "Human Rights," Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy. no date. <http://www.iep.utm.edu/hum-rts/>.

Many of the central themes first expressed within Kant's moral philosophy remain highly prominent in contemporary philosophical justifications of human rights. Foremost amongst these are the ideals of equality and the moral autonomy of rational human beings. Kant bestows upon contemporary human rights' theory the ideal of a potentially universal community of rational individuals autonomously determining the moral principles for securing the conditions for equality and autonomy. Kant provides a means for justifying human rights as the basis for self-determination grounded within the authority of human reason. Kant's moral philosophy is based upon an appeal to the formal principles of ethics, rather than, for example, an appeal to a concept of substantive human goods. For Kant, the determination of any such goods can only proceed from a correct determination of the formal properties of human reason and thus do not provide the ultimate means for determining the correct ends, or object, of human reason. Kant's moral

philosophy begins with an attempt to correctly identify those principles of reasoning that can be applied equally to all rational persons, irrespective of their own specific desires or partial interests. In this way, Kant attaches a condition of universality to the correct identification of moral principles. For him, the basis of moral reasoning must rest upon a condition that all rational individuals are bound to assent to. Doing the right thing is thus not determined by acting in pursuit of one's own interests or desires, but acting in accordance with a maxim which all rational individuals are bound to accept. Kant terms this the categorical imperative, which he formulates in the following terms, 'act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.' (1948:84). Kant argues that this basic condition of universality in determining the moral principles for governing human relations is a necessary expression of the moral autonomy and fundamental equality of all rational individuals. The categorical imperative is self-imposed by morally autonomous and formally equal rational persons. It provides the basis for determining the scope and form of those laws which morally autonomous and equally rational individuals will institute in order to secure these very same conditions. For Kant, the capacity for the exercise of reason is the distinguishing characteristic of humanity and the basis for justifying human dignity. As the distinguishing characteristic of humanity, formulating the principles of the exercise of reason must necessarily satisfy a test of universality; they must be capable of being universally recognized by all equally rational agents. Hence, Kant's formulation of the categorical imperative. Kant's moral philosophy is notoriously abstract and resists easy comprehension. Though often overlooked in accounts of the historical development of human rights, his contribution to human rights has been profound. Kant provides a formulation of fundamental moral principles that, though exceedingly formal and abstract, are based upon the twin ideals of equality and moral autonomy. Human rights are rights we give to ourselves, so to speak, as autonomous and formally equal beings. For Kant, any such rights originate in the formal properties of human reason, and not the will of some super-human being.

5.1.3 International Law

International Law of non-refoulement requires countries to not turn away refugees

Tally Kirtzman-Amir [Assistant Professor of International Law at The Academic Center of Law and Business, Israel] and Thomas Spijkerboer [Professor of Migration Law at VU University, Amsterdam], "On the Morality and Legality of Borders: Border Policies and Asylum

Seekers,” *Harvard Human Rights Journal* (2013) Vol. 26, pp. 1-38, <http://harvardhrj.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/V26-Amir-Spijkerboer.pdf>

We mentioned above that one moral justification of a duty of non-rejection at the border is the belief that this duty derives from the right to seek asylum.⁵³ How does this translate into a legal duty? The most important legal duty imposed on states in relation to the right to seek asylum is the duty of non-refoulement. ⁵⁴ The first issue to be addressed, therefore, is when the prohibition of refoulement applies. Does it apply only to those whom the authorities have recognized as refugees? This position initially seems plausible, as Article 33 of the Refugee Convention prohibits the return of persons to a country where they have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or membership of a particular social group—in other words, it prohibits the return of refugees.⁵⁵ Claiming, however, that the prohibition of refoulement applies only to recognized refugees would make that prohibition ineffective. It would allow a state to return to the country of origin a person who would have been recognized as a refugee if his or her asylum application had been examined. Such an action would be a misuse of the state’s coercive power.⁵⁶ For this reason, there is consensus, both in international doctrine and in international state practice, that the prohibition of refoulement applies regardless of whether people have been formally recognized as refugees.⁵⁷ Recognition as a refugee does not make a person a refugee, but instead declares her to be one.⁵⁸ Consequently, people who invoke the prohibition of refoulement are protected against return until further notice; we will address the words “until further notice” later on.

The Geneva Convention protects against refoulment in cases of political crisis

Pauline Kleingeld, “Kant’s Cosmopolitan Law: World Citizenship for Global Order,” *Kantian Review* (1998). 2, p. 72-90, http://www.rug.nl/research/portal/files/3188820/Kants_cosmopolitan_law.pdf

Traditionally, individuals appear as the subjects of rights in international law only in so far as they are citizens of states, that is, in virtue of their nationality. In the case of disputes, individuals must appeal for protection to a national legal order (either their own or a foreign one), without having access to transnational levels of appeals. Moreover, states were granted sovereignty and - as also laid down in the Charter of the United Nations - freedom from interference with their internal affairs. This gave state sovereigns a pretext, if not authorization, to deal with their subjects as they saw fit. But in this century, in part in reaction to vast abuses of this principle, the status of individuals in international law has been strengthened. As Alfred Verdross

and Bruno Simma put it: The newest developments in international law have broken up the absolute subjection of people to the state. Not only does [he content of an ever growing number of treaties in international law serve the interests of individual humans or certain groups, but individuals are also being elevated immediately to bearers of rights under international law, and they are put in a position to assert these rights at the level of international law themselves.¹⁰ These new rights are not tied to a particular nationality on the part of the individual. The improved legal status of refugees can serve as an example. Central to the treaties resulting from the 1951 Geneva convention²¹ is the prohibition against refusing or deporting refugees if that endangers them for reasons of their religion, race, political views, or membership in a certain social group. It does not apply to endangerment in the form of hunger and poverty or disease, nor does it extend to a positive right to receive asylum; one can request asylum, but the decision is still left to the sovereign states. Nevertheless, persons endangered for any of the reasons first mentioned are legally protected regardless of their nationality.

5.2 Benefits of Accepting Refugees

A note: The fact that there are benefits to refugee acceptance does not mean that countries should prioritize their humanitarian needs for that reason. Importantly, affirmative teams could argue that a government should prioritize refugees' humanitarian needs now so that in the long run, they can reap the benefits of a more diverse workforce and a more favorable security environment. Negative teams will try to argue that this affirmative advocacy is tantamount to prioritizing national interest. This is incorrect. Instead, it works towards national interest in the long run by prioritizing refugees' humanitarian needs in the short run.

5.2.1 Economic

Free migration (whether by refugee outflows, or via ordinary movement) is arguably one of the most effective anti-poverty initiatives in existence

Alex Taborrok [Professor of Economics at George Mason University], "The Case for Getting Rid of Borders - Completely," *The Atlantic*, October 10, 2015. <http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/10/get-rid-borders-completely/409501/>

Wage differences are a revealing metric of border discrimination. When a worker from a poorer country moves to a richer one, her wages might double, triple, or rise

even tenfold. These extreme wage differences reflect restrictions as stifling as the laws that separated white and black South Africans at the height of Apartheid. Geographical differences in wages also signal opportunity—for financially empowering the migrants, of course, but also for increasing total world output. On the other side of discrimination lies untapped potential. Economists have estimated that a world of open borders would double world GDP.

History demonstrates that refugee inflows positively affect recipient economies

Masimalino Cali and Samia Sekkarie, “Much ado about nothing? The economic impact of refugee ‘invasions’”, *Brookings Institution*, September 16, 2015. <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/future-development/posts/2015/09/16-economic-impact-refugees-cali>

In fact, the inflow of refugees has arguably helped the Lebanese economy withstand the negative effect of its neighbor’s civil war. Refugees have been an important source of demand for locally produced services in Lebanon, funded from own savings and labor income, from remittances of relatives abroad and from international aid. In a recent World Bank report we estimate that an additional 1 percent increase in Syrian refugees increases Lebanese service exports by 1.5 percent. And the UNHCR and U.N. Development Program estimate a similar economy-wide impact from the \$800 million that the U.N. spends annually on Syrian refugees in Lebanon. These effects are not unique to Syrian refugees. Burundian and Rwandan refugees fleeing war in the 1990s have generated net economic gains for their Tanzanian host communities.

5.2.2 Security

Poor humanitarian conditions allow disease to spread. Countries that prioritize national interests can neglect serious threats to the population. Example from Afghanistan

Syed Abidi, Syed Ali, and Farwa Ali [Professors of Biomedical Sciences at Aga Khan University in Karachi], Farida Shah [Nursing and Midwifery at Aga Khan University in Kabul], and Farhat Abbas [Professor in the Department of Surgery at Aga Khan University in Karachi], “Burden of Communicable Disease among the Native and Repatriating Afghans”, *PLoS Pathlog* 8:10: e1002926, October 24, 2012. <http://www.plospathogens.org/article/fetchObject.action?uri=info:doi/10.1371/journal.ppat.1002926>

Owing to the capricious political and economic conditions of Afghanistan during the past few decades, the burden of communicable disease, especially bloodborne and sexually transmitted infections, has been steadily mounting in this population. Afghan refugees who sought asylum and settled in foreign countries encountered

many a barrier to standard health care, which led to the establishment of several epidemics in the refugee population as well. In recent years, repatriation of these refugees back to their homeland has raised new concerns about control and prevention of potential epidemics in the returning and indigenous Afghan populations. Mixing of existing infections, as well as of risk behaviors and practices, in the two populations, if left unattended, can lead to unforeseen, uncontrollable outcomes. In 2002, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) initiated efforts for repatriation of Afghan refugees to their native country. Since early 2002, more than 5 million Afghan refugees have been repatriated from both Pakistan and Iran back to their native country. In 2007, more than 350,000 refugees were repatriated from Pakistan. Afghanistan's economic sustenance has been dependent on aid from the United States, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the World Food Program, and numerous other non-governmental organizations [1]. While Afghanistan struggles to cover all its deficits, devising settlement and support plans for internally displaced peoples (which, according to UNHCR, were 235,833 in 2009) and returning refugees would be too much to ask [2]. At this point, managing the massive influx of repatriates and arranging for their accommodation in urban and rural settings would be an insurmountable challenge for Afghanistan. Although these repatriation efforts are well-intentioned, they appear to be negligent of health care concerns for the returning Afghans. It appears that the burden and geography of existing communicable disease among the refugees are overlooked. Pressures of re-settlement, terrorist and military activities, and political and economic instability are likely to facilitate the proliferation of existing epidemics in the repatriated and indigenous Afghan populations.

One pressing need: clear water, which prevents diarrhea

Plan UK, "New Risk of waterborne diseases in refugee camps in Uganda," February 2015. <http://www.plan-uk.org/media-centre/new-risk-waterborne-diseases-refugee-camps-uganda/?frommobile>

Waterborne diseases could pose a new threat to South Sudanese refugees in Uganda as the rainy season approaches, according to children's charity Plan International. Camps housing thousands of people stand on low-lying ground and could be prone to flooding during the wet season next month. There are concerns that the combination of rain and lack of sanitation could result in diarrhoea and diseases. "The settlements are in low-lying areas, more like a flood plain," says Davies Okoko, Emergency Programme Manager for Plan International in Uganda. "So when it rains, there is a

high chance of flooding in the camp, and refugees may have to evacuate and go to higher ground. “Whenever there is lots of rain and no sanitation facilities, there is a high chance of an outbreak of waterborne diseases. “I’m not really looking at the worst case scenario of cholera, but there may be diarrhoea and diseases.” There are now nearly 80,000 refugees in Uganda, according to latest UN reports. All have fled the conflict in South Sudan and experts predict that their return to the country will be slow and difficult. According to latest UN reports, more than 700,000 people have been displaced by violence within South Sudan since the start of the crisis. Thousands more have fled into neighbouring countries Ethiopia (69,456), Sudan (42,011) and Kenya (25,099).

Centers for Disease Control, “Waterborne Disease,” July 12, 2012. http://www.cdc.gov/healthywater/wash_diseases.htm

Waterborne diseases are caused by pathogenic microbes that can be directly spread through contaminated water. Most waterborne diseases cause diarrheal illness [Note: not all diseases listed below cause diarrhea]. Eighty-eight percent of diarrhea cases worldwide are linked to unsafe water, inadequate sanitation or insufficient hygiene 1. These cases result in 1.5 million deaths each year, mostly in young children 1

Poor humanitarian conditions cause and spread civil war, increasing the amount of refugees, and compounding the security problems of instability

Susan Rice, Corinne Graff and Janet Lew [Researchers at the Brookings Institution], “Poverty and Civil War: What Policymakers Need to Know”, *Brookings Institution*, December 2006. http://stanford.edu/group/scspi/_media/pdf/key_issues/conflict_policy.pdf

Civil wars occur disproportionately in poor countries. In 2002, “more than two thirds of the poorest countries of the world [were] in conflict,” according to the OECD.²⁰ By comparison, middle-income countries are less prone to violent civil conflict, and wealthy countries have little risk of experiencing internal conflict. The evidence that conflict risk rises as per capita national income drops derives primarily from a series of widely-cited studies by Oxford University economists Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, Stanford’s James Fearon and David Laitin, and Yale University professor Nicholas Sambanis.²¹ All four studies seek to identify the root causes of conflict. Collier and Hoeffler’s second article confirms the results of their first study: it shows that countries which do not experience war are “characterized by a per capita income that is more than five times higher than in countries in which wars broke out.”²² Likewise, Fearon and Laitin find that in Africa, the Middle East and Asia, “\$1,000 less in income corresponds to 36 percent greater odds of [conflict]

outbreak.”²³ The evidence gathered by Sambanis shows that “[t]he mean per capita GDP in countries affected by civil war at any point from 1960-1999 is less than half that of countries with no civil war experience.”²⁴

Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullen S. Hendrix [Researchers at the World Food Program], “Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Addressing the Challenges”, World Food Program, July 2011. <http://ucanr.edu/blogs/food2025/blogfiles/14415.pdf>

Pinstrup-Andersen and Shimokawa (2008) find that poor health and nutrition are associated with greater probability of civil conflict, though their findings are based on small sample sizes. Countries with lower per capita caloric intake are more prone to experience civil conflict, even accounting for their levels of economic development (Sobek and Boehmer, 2009). This relationship is stronger in those states where primary commodities make up a large proportion of their export profile. Some of the countries most plagued by conflict in the past 20 years are commodity-rich countries characterized by widespread hunger, such as Angola, DRC, Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone. The mixture of hunger – which creates grievances – and the availability of valuable commodities – which can 2. Food Insecurity as a Cause of Violence provide opportunities for rebel funding – is a volatile combination.

In Lebanon, poor humanitarian conditions sow the seeds of future conflict

Crisis Group, “Nurturing Instability: Lebanon’s Palestinian Refugee Camps,” Middle East Report N°84. February 19, 2009. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Sy>

Although Lebanon’s political parties all offer strong rhetorical support for the need to improve refugee living conditions and grant them basic rights,¹⁴⁶ little has changed over the years. Many refugees describe Lebanon’s policy as a form of collective punishment, the price they are compelled to pay for their role in the civil war.¹⁴⁷ Lack of hope and the absence of a viable economic horizon, together with social marginalisation and exclusion, fuel frustration and anger toward the state. Predictably, these also promote militancy and radicalism in the camps, increasing the potential for instability and violence. An official from one of the Palestinian groups said: The state’s policy toward Palestinians is very dangerous for Lebanon. Radicalism and violence are rising among refugees. The camps are a time-bomb that, sooner or later, will explode, with serious consequences for both Lebanese and Palestinians.¹⁴⁸

5.3 Alternate Ways to Help Refugees

5.3.1 Aid and Funding the UN

UN needs aid now. National interests can come later

Benedetta Berti [Fellow at the Institute for national Security Studies at the University of Tel Aviv], “The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Regional and Human Security Implications,” Strategic Assessment. Vol. 17, No. 4, January 2015. http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/adkan17_4ENG_7_Berti.pdf

Yet despite the gravity and urgency of the situation and the clear importance of preventing a further escalation of the crisis, the international assistance efforts are increasingly more cash-stripped, with the RPP having obtained only 54 percent of the needed funds.⁴⁴ The lack of funds will clearly have a direct and potentially devastating impact on access to health, education, shelter, water, and sanitation, while also compromising the refugees’ food security and putting even more pressure on the already frail host communities. In turn, this can not only push the host governments to the brink, but it can also fuel preexisting political, sectarian, or political tensions between host and refugee communities. In this context, the very first priority of the international community must be to step up its commitment and prevent the cutting of vital assistance programs by fully funding the humanitarian assistance efforts.

Aid builds civil society, increasing the likelihood of long term stability

Henk-Jan Brinkman and Cullen S. Hendrix [Researchers at the World Food Program], “Food Insecurity and Violent Conflict: Causes, Consequences, and Addressing the Challenges”, World Food Program, July 2011. <http://ucanr.edu/blogs/food2025/blogfiles/14415.pdf>

Food assistance can play an important role in social cohesion and social capital, which refers to the trust, norms and networks that are generated by participation in informal or formal groupings and associations that facilitate interaction and cooperation among people (Collier, 2000). Social capital is often severely damaged by violent conflict. Food assistance can play a role in rebuilding social capital by developing communities, networks and trust. Food assistance can also serve to replace informal safety nets based on social capital with formal forms of social protection

Direct cash transfers work

Oliver Holmes, “Cash aid for refugees succeeds despite donors’ doubts,” *Reuters*, October 23, 2014. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/23/us-syria-crisis-aid-idUSKCN0IC28K20141023>

Instead of directly supplying blankets and heaters, aid organizations gave cash to thousands of Syrian refugees living in the country's mountains this year in the hope they would spend it on blankets and heaters for the winter. They didn't. But the money wasn't squandered either. The refugees, among the millions who have escaped the Syrian war, had a better sense than the agencies helping them of what they needed most: they spent the money on food and water. In the first rigorous evaluation of cash aid to refugees, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) found in Lebanon that the money was not spent in any significant amounts on drugs and cigarettes. Neither did it fund an increase in crime or corruption, which donors had feared would accompany cash aid, or discourage people from working. Faced with such evidence, some humanitarian organizations are considering a change of tactics. But persuading private and government donors to trust the people they want to help, coupled with the inertia of aid groups themselves which have for decades decided what people need, has slowed cash aid programs. "There is a tension between people knowing what their own needs are, and the humanitarian sector not being structured in a way that allows people to make their own choices," said IRC official Radha Rajkotia. Daniel Masterson, a Yale University academic who conducted the research for IRC, said people who got money from the United Nations and other aid groups were also less likely to do dangerous work, send their children to work, or sell assets such as sewing machines which could be used for earning an income. "Cash recipients also less frequently relied on lower quality foods, skipping meals, or having smaller portions of food," Masterson said. "There was even an increase in school attendance" MISTRUST Yet monthly cash payments still account for only three percent of U.N. aid in Lebanon, which has the highest concentration of refugees in the world as a proportion of its population. Worldwide, the bulk of aid is delivered in the form of materials chosen by relief workers, such as tents and blankets. Humanitarian organizations also worry that donors are less likely to fund cash programs than more traditional aid, where they know exactly what people receive. "Existing organizations operate with a specific mandate. Cash aid cannot be contained," said Masterson. IRC's findings in Lebanon are supported by research in Africa and South America. One study found that when \$200 was given to drug addicts and petty criminals in the slums of Liberia, they spent it on simple necessities or starting their own legitimate businesses. Cash aid has another advantage: it's cheaper. Traditional humanitarian work involves huge costs. Items must be procured, transported and handed out, often for long periods. Large staffs are required and people's needs must be regularly reassessed. By contrast, there are no high transport fees for cash, says Ninette Kel-

ley, representative of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees in Lebanon, and agencies can also cut down on storage and distribution costs.

5.3.2 Humanitarian Intervention

Humanitarian intervention could have prevented Rwandan Genocide

Col. Scott R. Fiel [Researcher, Institute for Defense Analysis], “Could 5,000 Peacekeepers Have Saved 500,000 Rwandans?: Early Intervention Reconsidered”, Georgetown University Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (April 1997), https://isd.georgetown.edu/sites/isd/files/ISDreport_Could_5000_Feil.pdf

The panel members generally agreed that General Dallaire was right—a force of 5,000 peacekeepers could have interrupted the violence. Moreover, his appreciation of the situation at the time has been substantiated by subsequent scholarship. The initial violence was confined to a “political decapitation” of moderate Hutus and Tutsis located in and near Kigali. The killings, directed by extremists within the deceased President’s own party, were designed to permanently disrupt the tenuous peace process. The extremists carried out a systematic plan to attack opposition targets by spreading terror and inciting Hutus to kill Tutsis over the state radio; by uprooting the entire “target” population through local murder and intimidation; and by “straining” the refugees through a sieve of intermittently established roadblocks, selecting individual Rwandans for execution. The population upheaval had an added benefit: extremist leaders were able to secure themselves within the mass of refugees and ultimately seize control of the refugee camps in Zaire. In retrospect, a capable force of 5,000 troops inserted during April 7–21 could have significantly squelched the violence, prevented its spread from the capital to the countryside, and removed the RPF’s pretext for renewing its fight with the RGF. This force, however, would have required significantly different and enhanced capabilities than Dallaire’s original peace-keeping contingent—one with more firepower and mobility. A regular infantry brigade, with all of its organic weapons and helicopters for in-country transportation, should have formed its core. Tanks would not have been necessary—armored personnel carriers (APCs) could have intimidated any opponent. Some panelists argued that artillery would also have been needed, but most modern infantry units carry mortars, which would have been adequate. In addition, compatible, secure communications and a robust logistics and support system would have been essential. In contrast, UNAMIR’s communications were provided by contractors; it never had more than three to five days of supplies on hand; and its twelve

APCs lacked spare parts, mechanics, tools, or operator training. When the fighting started, only six were operational.

Humanitarian intervention, if done right, can stop genocide and mass killing, preventing refugee outflows (and protecting their humanitarian needs)

Taylor Seybolt [International Affairs Professor at the University of Pittsburg]. 2007. Humanitarian military intervention: the conditions for success and failure. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. <http://books.sipri.org/files/books/SIPRI08Seybolt.pdf>

Military intervention to defeat the perpetrators of violence is not humanitarian in character but it can be humanitarian in outcome. An intervener must prepare for war and in most cases must actually engage in offensive action until the perpetrators negotiate or are defeated. This kind of intervention is very difficult and dangerous and runs a serious risk of failure. If the intervener fails to dominate the perpetrators within the cost limits that its interests will allow, then it has to withdraw in defeat and give up almost all influence over the course of events. Intervention to defeat the perpetrators of violence can lead to more civilian deaths, the deaths of soldiers and long-term instability. On the other hand, if done right, it can stop genocide and mass killing.

6 Con

6.1 State Morality

Even if people have compassionate obligations, by construct, states should pursue the national interest. That is their purpose.

George Kennan [former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia]. “Morality and Foreign Policy.” *Foreign Affairs*. October 6, 2015. Accessed October 6, 2015. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1985-12-01/morality-and-foreign-policy>.

Second, let us recognize that the functions, commitments and moral obligations of governments are not the same as those of the individual. Government is an agent, not a principal. Its primary obligation is to the interests of the national society it represents, not to the moral impulses that individual elements of that society may experience. No more than the attorney vis-à-vis the client, nor the doctor vis-à-vis the patient, can government attempt to insert itself into the consciences of those whose interests it represents. Let me explain. The interests of the national society for which government has to concern itself are basically those of its military security, the integrity of its political life and the well-being of its people. These needs have no moral quality. They arise from the very existence of the national state in question and from the status of national sovereignty it enjoys. They are the unavoidable necessities of a national existence and therefore not subject to classification as either “good” or “bad.” They may be questioned from a detached philosophic point of view. But the government of the sovereign state cannot make such judgments. When it accepts the responsibilities of governing, implicit in that acceptance is the assumption that it is right that the state should be sovereign, that the integrity of its political life should be assured, that its people should enjoy the blessings of military security, material prosperity and a reasonable opportunity for, as the Declaration of Independence put it, the pursuit of happiness. For these assumptions the government needs no moral justification, nor need it accept any moral reproach for acting on the basis of them.

The resolution makes a universal statement about a government in the abstract. But morality, as it relates to states, has no universal standards

George Kennan [former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia]. "Morality and Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs*. October 6, 2015. Accessed October 6, 2015. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1985-12-01/morality-and-foreign-policy>.

Finally, let us note that there are no internationally accepted standards of morality to which the U.S. government could appeal if it wished to act in the name of moral principles. It is true that there are certain words and phrases sufficiently high-sounding the world over so that most governments, when asked to declare themselves for or against, will cheerfully subscribe to them, considering that such is their vagueness that the mere act of subscribing to them carries with it no danger of having one's freedom of action significantly impaired. To this category of pronouncements belong such documents as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, the Atlantic Charter, the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, and the prologues of innumerable other international agreements.

There exists a contractual moral obligation to citizens, but that does not extend to non-citizens.

Jurjen van Pelt [Masters in Philosophy at the University of Utrecht], "Obligations of the state concerning the human rights of citizens and non-citizens in Thomas Hobbes and John Locke." Master's thesis, University of Utrecht, 2009. <http://goo.gl/euxnwo>

Most western states legitimize the power of the state with the idea of a social contract. In contract-theories the people come together to form a binding contract that installs the state with sovereign powers and obligations. The obligations of the state are limited; instead of all members of the human species, the state has them mainly towards the citizens of the state. It is therefore doubtful whether a commitment to human rights can be united with such a view about the formation of the state. This thesis researched if accepting human rights as a guide for the national policies of a state morally obligates the state towards non-citizens with respect to human rights. Contract-theories can be used to explain that human rights are a precondition to the rights of the citizen. As we have seen with Hobbes, without the idea that all humans are by their nature endowed with human rights, the state would have no obligation to secure these rights under the contract. In Locke's contract theory the powers of the state are legitimized by its duty to enforce the human rights of its citizens. But if the powers and obligations of the state are justified in this way, there are insufficient reasons to say that states have a moral duty to enforce the human rights of

non-citizens.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is non-binding

Jurjen van Pelt [Masters in Philosophy at the University of Utrecht], "Obligations of the state concerning the human rights of citizens and non-citizens in Thomas Hobbes and John Locke." Master's thesis, University of Utrecht, 2009. <http://goo.gl/euxnwo>

What is missing with judgements on the infringements of the rights of non-citizens is an institution that is granted the power of enforcement by those affected, as well as a common law with indifferent judges. In the context of international affairs, human rights enforcement is subject to the same problems that are present for Locke in the state of nature. Human rights are not written in a common accepted standing law. Even if we agree that they are, in documents such as the Universal Declaration, they are enforced without an institution that has the authority from the community that is affected by its judgements. Therefore judgments of individual states or a community of states over the citizens outside of this community could still be done by those "who through passion, or interest, shall miscite, or misapply" human rights law.

6.2 Specific Policies Have Problems

6.2.1 Settling Refugees

Countries should not pursue policies they don't have the capacity to execute. Though here, Kennan speaks of American military affairs, the argument is applicable elsewhere

George Kennan [former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia]. "Morality and Foreign Policy." *Foreign Affairs*. October 6, 2015. Accessed October 6, 2015. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1985-12-01/morality-and-foreign-policy>.

So much, then, for the negative imperatives. When we turn to the positive ones there are, again, two that stand out. The first of them is closely connected with what has just been observed about the acceptance of one's limitations. It relates to the duty of bringing one's commitments and undertakings into a reasonable relationship with one's real possibilities for acting upon the international environment. This is not by any means just a question of military strength, and particularly not of the purely destructive and ultimately self-destructive sort of strength to be found in the nuclear weapon. It is not entirely, or even mainly, a question of foreign policy. It is a duty

that requires the shaping of one's society in such a manner that one has maximum control over one's own resources and maximum ability to employ them effectively when they are needed for the advancement of the national interest and the interests of world peace. A country that has a budgetary deficit and an adverse trade balance both so fantastically high that it is rapidly changing from a major creditor to a major debtor on the world's exchanges, a country whose own enormous internal indebtedness has been permitted to double in less than six years, a country that has permitted its military expenditures to grow so badly out of relationship to the other needs of its economy and so extensively out of reach of political control that the annual spending of hundreds of billions of dollars on "defense" has developed into a national addiction – a country that, in short, has allowed its financial and material affairs to drift into such disorder, is so obviously living beyond its means, and confesses itself unable to live otherwise – is simply not in a position to make the most effective use of its own resources on the international scene, because they are so largely out of its control. This situation must be understood in relationship to the exorbitant dreams and aspirations of world influence, if not world hegemony – the feeling that we must have the solution to everyone's problems and a finger in every pie – that continue to figure in the assumptions underlying so many American reactions in matters of foreign policy. It must also be understood that in world affairs, as in personal life, example exerts a greater power than precept. A first step along the path of morality would be the frank recognition of the immense gap between what we dream of doing and what we really have to offer, and a resolve, conceived in all humility, to take ourselves under control and to establish a better relationship between our undertakings and our real capabilities.

Most refugees land in developing countries, which hardly have the capacity for resettlement

UNRIC, "New report: Developing countries host 80% of refugees," United Nations Regional Information Centre for Western Europe. June 20, 2015. <http://www.unric.org/en/world-refugee-day/26978-new-report-developing-countries-host-80-of-refugees->

A UNHCR report released today June 20, World Refugee Day, reveals deep imbalance in international support for the world's forcibly displaced, with a full four-fifths of the world's refugees being hosted by developing countries – and at a time of rising anti-refugee sentiment in many industrialized ones. "The burden of helping the world's forcibly displaced people is starkly uneven," UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said in his message on World Refugee Day. "Poor countries host vastly more displaced people than wealthier ones. While anti-refugee sentiment is heard loudest

in industrialized countries, developing nations host 80 per cent of the world's refugees. This situation demands an equitable solution." UNHCR's 2010 Global Trends report shows that many of the world's poorest countries are hosting huge refugee populations, both in absolute terms and in relation to the size of their economies. Pakistan, Iran and Syria have the largest refugee populations at 1.9 million, 1.1 million and 1 million respectively.

Settling refugees could spread civil war, increasing refugee obligations

Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gledistch [Professors of Political Science at the University of San Diego], "Refugee Flows and the Spread of Civil War," Centre for the Study of Civil War, no date, <http://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/27705479-56a7-4545-acdc-fc412fe4de2e.pdf>

Most of scholarly literature and public discussion about refugee flows treat population movements as a consequence of conflict rather than as a possible cause (see, e.g., Azam and Hoeffler 2002, Davenport, Moore and Poe 2003, Schmeidl 1997, Weiner 1996, Zolberg, Suhrke and Aguayo 1989). The few systematic, statistical analyses of refugee flows that have appeared in print (notably Azam and Hoeffler 2002, Davenport et al. 2003, Öberg and Melander 2003, Okamoto and Wilkes 2003, Schmeidl 1997) have confirmed that civil wars, political repression, and regime change, are important predictors of flight. Some authors, however, have noted that international migration in general and refugee migration in particular can have important security consequences, which suggest that refugee flows and population movements can spur the spread of conflict both between and within states (see Loescher 1993, Teitelbaum 1984, Weiner 1992- 93). Refugees can change the ethnic composition of the host state; exacerbate economic competition; bring with them arms, combatants, and ideologies which are conducive to violence; and mobilize opposition directed at their country of origin as well as their host country. Yet these 4 arguments, which we explore more fully below, have never been put to a systematic empirical test. In this paper, we analyze the role of refugee flows in the international spread of civil war. We do so through a statistical analysis of refugees hosted from neighboring countries and civil war onset during the period 1951-2001, while controlling for other neighborhood effects and domestic factors expected to be important. Although other quantitative studies have examined the role of refugee flows on various aspects of conflict, our study is the first to examine the effects of refugees on the likelihood of conflict in refugee-recipient states. Our findings suggest that countries that experience an influx of refugees from neighboring states are significantly more likely to experience civil wars themselves. Thus, population movements are an important

factor contributing to the regional clustering of violence and the diffusion of conflict.

Case studies demonstrate that settling refugees spreads civil war, especially in ethnically sensitive countries

William Young, David Stebbins, Bryan A. Frederick, and Omar Al-Shahery [Senior Policy Analysts at the Rand Corporation], “Spillover from the Conflict in Syria,” The Rand Corporation (2014), http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR609/RAND_RR609.pdf

Refugee/Population Movements. A second significant factor that contributes to the conflict spillover is the exodus of civilians from the country in turmoil. Such movements directly and detrimentally affect the receiving nation. Some scholars posit that refugee movements may not just be the effect of an ongoing civil war but also may be the cause in many cases.⁷ While the exact mechanism by which refugee movements become civil wars or insurgencies remains under investigation, the correlation between the two is clear. The historical record is replete with examples: Liberia and Sierra Leone, Guinea and Cote d’Ivoire, the Balkans, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.⁸ Refugee encampments can be detrimental economically to first destination nation states.⁹ Not only do these types of population movements cause neighboring states to divert resources away from state capacity building and core infrastructure planning, opposition forces may find solace within such encampments that also serve as fertile recruiting grounds for insurgencies and for establishing a viable weapons supply route.¹⁰ Both of these phenomena can be observed currently in the Levant. Jordan has been hit particularly hard with infrastructure issues and a dwindling water supply,¹¹ while Sunni refugee populations may further tip the sectarian balance in Lebanon and contribute toward a re-emergence of civil war. Refugee populations are given preferential treatment, compared to minority Lebanese populations. This reinforces a negative view of the influx.¹²

6.2.2 Aid

Aid undermines economies

Dambisa Moyo [Author of *Dead Aid*], “Why Foreign Aid is Hurting Africa,” *Wall Street Journal*. March 21, 2009. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123758895999200083>

Over the past 60 years at least \$1 trillion of development-related aid has been transferred from rich countries to Africa. Yet real per-capita income today is lower than it was in the 1970s, and more than 50% of the population – over 350 million people –

live on less than a dollar a day, a figure that has nearly doubled in two decades. Even after the very aggressive debt-relief campaigns in the 1990s, African countries still pay close to \$20 billion in debt repayments per annum, a stark reminder that aid is not free. In order to keep the system going, debt is repaid at the expense of African education and health care. Well-meaning calls to cancel debt mean little when the cancellation is met with the fresh infusion of aid, and the vicious cycle starts up once again. In Zambia, former President Frederick Chiluba (with wife Regina in November 2008) has been charged with theft of state funds. ENLARGE In Zambia, former President Frederick Chiluba (with wife Regina in November 2008) has been charged with theft of state funds. AFP/GETTY IMAGES In 2005, just weeks ahead of a G8 conference that had Africa at the top of its agenda, the International Monetary Fund published a report entitled “Aid Will Not Lift Growth in Africa.” The report cautioned that governments, donors and campaigners should be more modest in their claims that increased aid will solve Africa’s problems. Despite such comments, no serious efforts have been made to wean Africa off this debilitating drug. The most obvious criticism of aid is its links to rampant corruption. Aid flows destined to help the average African end up supporting bloated bureaucracies in the form of the poor-country governments and donor-funded non-governmental organizations. In a hearing before the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in May 2004, Jeffrey Winters, a professor at Northwestern University, argued that the World Bank had participated in the corruption of roughly \$100 billion of its loan funds intended for development. As recently as 2002, the African Union, an organization of African nations, estimated that corruption was costing the continent \$150 billion a year, as international donors were apparently turning a blind eye to the simple fact that aid money was inadvertently fueling graft. With few or no strings attached, it has been all too easy for the funds to be used for anything, save the developmental purpose for which they were intended.

Food aid is associated with increases in civil war

Nathan Nunn [Professor of Economics at Harvard University] and Nancy Qian [Professor of Economics at Yale University], “US Food Aid and Civil Conflict,” *American Economic Review* 2014, 104(6): 1630–1666. http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/nunn/files/faidconf_20130806_final_0.pdf

Humanitarian aid is one of the key policy tools used by the international community to help alleviate hunger and suffering in the developing world. The main component of humanitarian aid is food aid.² In recent years, the efficacy of humanitarian aid, and food aid in particular, has received increasing criticism, especially in the

context of conflict-prone regions. Aid workers, human rights observers, and journalists have accused humanitarian aid of being not only ineffective, but of actually promoting conflict (e.g., Anderson 1999; deWaal 1997; and Polman 2010). These qualitative accounts point to aid stealing as one of the key ways in which humanitarian aid fuels conflict. They highlight the ease with which armed factions and opposition groups appropriate humanitarian aid, which is often physically transported over long distances through territories only weakly controlled by the recipient government. Reports indicate that up to 80 percent of aid can be stolen en route (Polman 2010, p. 121). Even if aid reaches its intended recipients, it can still be confiscated by armed groups, against whom the recipients are typically powerless. In addition, it is difficult to exclude members of local militia groups from being direct recipients if they are also malnourished and qualify to receive aid. In all these cases, aid ultimately perpetuates conflict.

Quantitative results confirm the logic above

Nathan Nunn [Professor of Economics at Harvard University] and Nancy Qian [Professor of Economics at Yale University], “US Food Aid and Civil Conflict,” *American Economic Review* 2014, 104(6): 1630–1666. http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/nunn/files/faidconf_20130806_final_0.pdf

Our main outcomes of interest are indicator variables that measure the existence of different types of conflict, each with at least 25 battle deaths in a country during the calendar year. We separately examine the incidence of all conflicts, civil conflicts, and interstate conflicts. The OLS estimates of the effect of US food aid on conflict are negative, small in magnitude, and statistically insignificant for all forms of conflict. In contrast, the 2SLS estimates identify a large, positive, and statistically significant effect of US food aid on the incidence of civil conflict, but show no effect on the incidence of interstate conflict. The estimates imply that increasing US food aid by 1,000 metric tons (MT) (valued at \$275,000 in 2008) increases the incidence of civil conflict by 0.25 percentage points. For a country that receives the sample mean quantity of US food aid of approximately 27,610 MT (\$7.6 million in 2008) and experiences the mean incidence of conflict (17.6 percentage points), our estimates imply that increasing food aid by 10 percent increases the incidence of conflict by approximately 0.70 percentage points. This increase equals approximately 4 percent of the mean incidence of conflict.

Not even deliverers of aid can confirm that they aren’t contributing to the war economy

Clea Kahn and Elena Lucchi [Humanitarian Affairs Advisors for MSF Operational Centre

Amsterdam]. 2009. “Are Humanitarians Fuelling Conflicts? Evidence from Eastern Chad and Darfur.” *Humanitarian Exchange Magazine* 43: 20–23. <http://www.odihpn.org/humanitarian-exchange-magazine/issue-43/are-humanitarians-fuelling-conflicts-evidence-from-eastern-chad-and-darfur>

The overall proportion of looted assets and fees paid was 2.84% in Chad, and 4.47% in Darfur. While neither the proportion nor the total sums are shocking, the contribution to the war economy is nonetheless substantial. It must also be considered that the total resources either looted or paid to the two governments in taxes, visas and fees by NGOs, UN agencies and the ICRC would be much larger, particularly given that many of these are resource-heavy operations, including food and non-food item delivery. It is also important to note that, although only the financial value of assets has been calculated here, vehicles and communications equipment have a value beyond their monetary worth for armed actors, increasing their capacity to wage war. As it is usually impossible to identify the perpetrators of crimes or their allegiance, we are unable to determine whether our aid helps or hinders one or more parties to the conflict – or, by extension, if these involuntary contributions compromise our neutrality. However, it is clear that the losses – particularly looted assets – constitute a serious barrier to the efficient and effective provision of assistance, and can contribute to the war economy. This raises a serious challenge for the humanitarian community: can humanitarians be accused of fuelling or prolonging the conflict in these two countries?

Aid entrenches dictatorial regimes

Nabamita Dutta [Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin - La Crosse], Peter Leeson [Professor of Economics at George Mason University], and Claudia Williamson [Researcher, NYU Development Research Institute], “The Amplification Effect: Foreign Aid’s Impact on Political Institutions,” New York University Development Research Institute. December 2011. <http://www.nyudri.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/driwp821.pdf>

Our analysis leads to several conclusions. First, both the optimistic and pessimistic views of aid’s impact on recipient countries’ political institutions overstate the power of aid. Our findings suggest that aid doesn’t have the ability to reverse dictatorships’ or democracies’ institutional trajectories as the optimistic and pessimistic views respectively suggest. Instead, we find evidence for a more modest impact of aid on recipients’ political institutions that reinforces the political-institutional trajectories developing nations are already on. Previous research suggests that aid may do more

to entrench recipient countries' political institutions (Morrison 2007, 2009; Kono and Monitola 2009; Wright 2009; Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010; and Nielson and Nielson 2010). Our results take this finding a step further. They suggest that aid may not only help to ensure that democratic countries remain democratic and that dictatorial countries remain dictatorship. Aid may contribute to making already democratic countries more democratic and already dictatorial countries more dictatorial.

Statistical confirmation for the above

Nabamita Dutta [Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin - La Crosse], Peter Lee-son [Professor of Economics at George Mason University], and Claudia Williamson [Researcher, NYU Development Research Institute], "The Amplification Effect: Foreign Aid's Impact on Political Institutions," New York University Development Research Institute. December 2011. <http://www.nyudri.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/driwp821.pdf>

We investigate this hypothesis using panel data that cover 124 developing countries over half a century between 1960 and 2009. Our results support the amplification hypothesis. A one standard deviation increase in foreign aid increases the average democracy's Polity score, or strengthens its democracy, by approximately one standard deviation. The same increase in aid decreases the average dictatorship's Polity score, or strengthens its dictatorship, by nearly half a standard deviation. Our results suggest that both the optimistic and the pessimistic views of aid's effect on political institutions ascribe too much power to aid's ability to influence recipients' political institutions. Aid doesn't alter the institutional trajectory that recipient countries are on. It amplifies those countries' existing trajectories.

6.2.3 Offensive Humanitarian Intervention

Offensive humanitarian intervention blurs the line between military and aid

William Easterly [Professor of Economics at New York University], "Foreign Aid Goes Military!" *New York Review of Books*. July 2, 2009. <https://www.globalpolicy.org/qhumanitarianq-intervention/48086.html>

So both statistical exercises and case study analysis give ambiguous direction on military intervention. I think the moral of the story is that, as tragic as poverty and violence are, social science does not have much to offer as a guide to using military force to stop them. This is not so surprising: Why should social scientists have any

strategic expertise on whether a contingent of foreign or international troops will pacify a country easily (Sierra Leone) or with great difficulty, or not at all (Somalia)? It is regrettable if social science is used to give spurious cover to military intervention. There may indeed be cases where humanitarian intervention is desirable. But nobody should rush to embrace the new aid imperialism, in which soldiers and aid workers are supposed to intervene together in a poor society, on the basis of social science research like that presented in *The Bottom Billion*. Although the kind of social science deployed by Collier offers little guidance on military intervention, that doesn't mean that nothing insightful can be said about it. There has already been an extensive debate among thoughtful writers on the subject, to which Collier pays scant attention. This debate is far from resolved, yet it does make clear that humanitarian intervention is not the apolitical and clean exercise Collier envisions, but extremely political and messy. Aid groups like Doctors Without Borders (Médecins Sans Frontières, or MSF) have complained that military intervention (or even the threat of such intervention) fatally compromises the neutrality of humanitarian aid workers, thus restricting their access to needy people, and sometimes putting the aid workers in danger. In Somalia, attacks on aid workers increased after American troops arrived. Aid workers were expelled from Kosovo after NATO started bombing Serbia. Pro-Indonesian militias in East Timor attacked humanitarian workers because they saw them as favoring East Timor's secession.

Humanitarian intervention has the potential to create security dilemma-like conditions, prolonging conflict

Benjamin Valentino [Professor of Government at Dartmouth University], "The True Cost of Humanitarian Intervention," *Foreign Affairs*. November/December 2011. <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~benv/files/Valentino%20True%20Costs%20of%20Humanitarian%20Intervention.pdf>

Although military interventions are calculated to increase the costs of human rights abuses for those who commit them, perhaps interventions' most perverse consequence has been the way they have sometimes actually done the opposite. If perpetrators simply blame the victims for the setbacks and suffering inflicted by the intervention, the incentives to retaliate against victim groups, and possibly even popular support for such retaliation, may rise. Foreign military interventions can change victims from being viewed as a nuisance into being seen as powerful and traitorous enemies, potentially capable of exacting revenge, seizing power, or breaking away from the state. Under these conditions, even moderates are more likely to support harsh measures to meet such threats. And with most humanitarian missions relying on air-

power to avoid casualties, potential victims have little protection from retaliation. In Kosovo, for example, the nato bombing campaign hardened Serbian opinion against the Kosovar Albanians and rallied public support behind Milosevic, at least initially. Many Serbs donned T-shirts with a bullseye and attended anti-nato rock concerts to express their solidarity against the West and for Milosevic's regime. One Serb told a reporter, "When Milosevic thought he could do whatever he wanted with us, I was against him. Now I am against nato because they are strong and we are weak." Still worse, the bombing may have actually provoked a major upsurge in the violence, or at least given Milosevic the excuse he needed to implement a long-held plan to ethnically cleanse the region. Either way, when Serbian attacks on Kosovars escalated, nato planes were flying too high and too fast to protect civilians on the ground.

6.2.4 Negotiated Settlements and Ceasefires

Cease fires allow rearmament, prolonging conflict

Edward Luttwak [Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies]. "Give War a Chance." *Foreign Affairs*. July/August 1999. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1999-07-01/give-war-chance>.

But a cease-fire tends to arrest war-induced exhaustion and lets belligerents reconstitute and rearm their forces. It intensifies and prolongs the struggle once the cease-fire ends – and it does usually end. This was true of the Arab-Israeli war of 1948-49, which might have come to closure in a matter of weeks if two cease-fires ordained by the Security Council had not let the combatants recuperate. It has recently been true in the Balkans. Imposed cease-fires frequently interrupted the fighting between Serbs and Croats in Krajina, between the forces of the rump Yugoslav federation and the Croat army, and between the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in Bosnia. Each time, the opponents used the pause to recruit, train, and equip additional forces for further combat, prolonging the war and widening the scope of its killing and destruction. Imposed armistices, meanwhile – again, unless followed by negotiated peace accords – artificially freeze conflict and perpetuate a state of war indefinitely by shielding the weaker side from the consequences of refusing to make concessions for peace.

Data demonstrate that negotiated settlements fail

Alexander Downes [Professor of Political Science at Duke University], "The Problem with Negotiated Settlements to Ethnic Civil Wars," *Security Studies* 13, no. 4. Summer 2004. http://home.gwu.edu/~downes/DOWNES_SS_2004.pdf

Negotiated settlements in general. Uncertainty regarding the intentions of one's adversary in the particularly dangerous environment of an internal armed conflict is responsible for the fact that military victories provide more stable endings to civil wars than do negotiated settlements.⁴⁶ The most current research on civil war termination finds that 77 percent of such conflicts that reach a conclusion end in decisive victory, compared to 23 percent that end in negotiated settlements.⁴⁷ Of these two types of war termination, decisive victories are more stable: only 12 percent of wars (4 of 42) ended in this way reignited, whereas 23 percent of negotiated settlements (3 of 13) broke down into renewed warfare.⁴⁸ Each of the three failures occurred in an ethnic civil war, however, and fully one-half (three of six) of the identity-based wars settled by negotiated agreements in Walter's dataset experienced further fighting.⁴⁹ This is similar to Licklider's earlier finding that half of all negotiated settlements to civil wars broke down as compared to 15 percent of military victories. Again, however, every instance of a civil war starting again after a settlement was negotiated occurred in an ethnic war: two-thirds of negotiated settlements in ethnic wars failed to endure, compared to a failure rate of only 21 percent for decisive victories.⁵⁰

Negotiated settlements provide little impetus to end conflict

Edward Luttwak [Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies]. "Give War a Chance." *Foreign Affairs*. July/August 1999. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1999-07-01/give-war-chance>.

Today cease-fires and armistices are imposed on lesser powers by multilateral agreement – not to avoid great-power competition but for essentially disinterested and indeed frivolous motives, such as television audiences' revulsion at harrowing scenes of war. But this, perversely, can systematically prevent the transformation of war into peace. The Dayton accords are typical of the genre: they have condemned Bosnia to remain divided into three rival armed camps, with combat suspended momentarily but a state of hostility prolonged indefinitely. Since no side is threatened by defeat and loss, none has a sufficient incentive to negotiate a lasting settlement; because no path to peace is even visible, the dominant priority is to prepare for future war rather than to reconstruct devastated economies and ravaged societies. Uninterrupted war would certainly have caused further suffering and led to an unjust outcome from one perspective or another, but it would also have led to a more stable situation that would have let the postwar era truly begin. Peace takes hold only when war is truly over.

7 AT: Pro

7.0.1 AT: Borders are arbitrary

Even Pogge argues that this does not mean that governments should prioritize refugee needs

Christine Bratu [Professor of Philosophy at the University of Munich] interview with Thomas Pogge [Professor of Philosophy at Yale University], “Philosophy of refugee policy – morally in the Same Boat,” Goethe Institute (March 2014), <http://www.goethe.de/lhr/prj/daz/mag/igd/en12346549.htm>

[Bratu:] Each and every one of us has only a certain amount of time and can't engage himself politically in everything. Which of the following possible engagements seems to make more sense to you: should I engage in a reform of refugee policy in my state or for structural poverty reduction?

[Pogge:] What you commit yourself to depends in part on who you are. What are your abilities, what are your motivations, what are you particularly good at? There isn't one answer that covers everyone. In general, it seems more reasonable to engage in structural measures to combat poverty. First, as citizens of rich countries, we're particularly well-placed to fight against the injustices committed in our name by our governments at the international level – for example, through arms sales. Secondly, reforming refugee policy helps at most a relatively small number of people.

[Bratu:] How would you explain this prioritizing to refugees? Doesn't it push their chance of a better future very far back on the timeline?

[Pogge:] We have only so much time, so much energy, so many resources with which to commit ourselves to justice and we have to deal sensibly with these limited resources. We therefore have to give preference to the larger, more important injustices over the smaller and less important ones. We have to see where we can do more to foster justice.

7.0.2 AT: International Law Framework

Posner argues that states have no obligation to international law because of internal inconsistency

Eric Posner [Philosophy Professor at the University of Chicago], "Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?," 55 Stanford Law Review 1901 (2003). <http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/view>

Thus, international law is caught in a dilemma. On the one hand, if international law takes the state as the fundamental obligation-bearing agent, then it can claim no loyalty from the individuals or groups upon which the state relies for its power. There could be, by definition, state obligations under international law, but these obligations would have no influence over the behavior of states except when citizens happen to identify closely with the state or have independent grounds for supporting international law. On the other hand, if international law takes the individual or nonstate group as the fundamental agent, then it can claim the agent's loyalty but it must give up its claim to regulate the relationships between states. It becomes vulnerable to the births and deaths of individuals, migrations, the dissolution and redefinition of groups, and ambiguity about the representativeness of political institutions. States would flicker, and so would their obligations to treaties and rules of customary international law. International-law scholarship grasps the first horn of the dilemma: International law purports to bind states, not individuals. 9 Although individuals sometimes have obligations under international law, these obligations are derived from the actions of states. But if we grant international law the power to bind states-and we will henceforth make this assumptionwe still must ask why individuals and governments should feel obligated to cause the state to comply with its legal obligations.

Posner argues that there is no moral obligation to comply with international law because its groundwork is not inherently just

Eric Posner [Philosophy Professor at the University of Chicago], "Do States Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?," 55 Stanford Law Review 1901 (2003). <http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/view>

I have not given the philosophical accounts of political obligation the detailed treatments that they deserve. Nor have I discussed, except in passing, various other theories of political obligation, including the "fair play" theory, the "natural justice" theory, and the "gratitude" theory. 32 There is already a vast literature devoted to these topics. But what I have said should be enough to cast doubt on the notion that

states have a moral obligation to obey international law-or that leaders and citizens have a moral obligation to cause a state to obey international law. The weakness of existing accounts of political obligation have led many philosophers to believe that individuals have no moral obligation to obey domestic law; and others to hold that such an obligation, if it exists, is quite narrow. If there is little reason to believe that citizens have moral obligations to their governments, there should be no strong expectation that states have moral obligations to the “international system.” And indeed the claim that states-or the citizens that control them-have moral obligations to other states faces formidable additional difficulties. International law is the product of agreements and practices of democratic governments that favor their own citizens over the rest of the world and authoritarian governments that favor some subset of their own citizens; of powerful governments imposing their will on others and weak governments submitting because they have no alternative; of governments pursuing timebound interests with little concern for future generations. There is little reason to believe that the resulting system as a whole is just-though particular regimes or arrangements within the international system may be-and that individuals throughout the world, or their governments, owe any duty to it.

7.0.3 AT: Economic Benefits of Refugee Acceptance

Aggregate evidence demonstrates that migrants have a near net-zero impact on recipient economies. Crucially, the average migrant tends to be more educated than the average refugee, and the average refugee also requires far more assistance

Jean Christophe Dumont and Thomas Liebig [International Migration Researchers, OECD], “Is migration good for the economy?,” *Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development*, May 2014. <http://www.oecd.org/migration/mig/OECD%20Migration%20Policy%20Debates%20Numero%202.pdf>

Recent work on the fiscal impact of migration for all European OECD countries, as well as Australia, Canada and the United States, has provided new and internationally comparative evidence (Liebig and Mo, 2013). The study suggests the impact of the cumulative waves of migration that arrived over the past 50 years in OECD countries is on average close to zero, rarely exceeding 0.5% of GDP in either positive or negative terms. The impact is highest in Switzerland and Luxembourg, where immigrants provide an estimated net benefit of about 2% of GDP to the public purse. Immigrants are thus neither a burden to the public purse nor are they a panacea for addressing fiscal challenges. In most countries, except in those with a large share of

older migrants, migrants contribute more in taxes and social contributions than they receive in individual benefits.

Jean Christophe Dumont and Thomas Liebig [International Migration Researchers, OECD], “Is migration good for the economy?”, *Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development*, May 2014. <http://www.oecd.org/migration/mig/OECD%20Migration%20Policy%20Debates%20Numero%202.pdf>

One study that looks at the impact of migration on economic growth for 22 OECD countries between 1986 and 2006 demonstrates a positive but fairly small impact of the human capital brought by migrants on economic growth. The contribution of immigrants to human capital accumulation tends to counteract the mechanical dilution effect (i.e. the impact of population increase on capital per worker), but the net effect is fairly small, including in countries which have highly selective migration policies. An increase of 50% in net migration of the foreign-born generates less than one tenth of a percentage-point variation in productivity growth (Boubtane and Dumont, 2013).

7.0.4 AT: Governments should intervene in conflicts prone to create refugee outflows for humanitarian reasons

Success requires political will (often by framing operations as in the 'national interest.) Pure humanitarian intervention often prolongs conflict

Taylor Seybolt [International Affairs Professor at the University of Pittsburg]. 2007. *Humanitarian military intervention: the conditions for success and failure*. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. <http://books.sipri.org/files/books/SIPRI08Seybolt.pdf>

Humanitarian intervention can prolong a war in at least three ways—by inadvertently supplying food and medicine to local fighting forces; by allowing outsiders to use humanitarian aid as an excuse for not taking concerted political action to stop the war; or by helping the weaker party (the ‘victims’) just enough so that they are not defeated, but not enough so that they can win. The problem of ‘feeding the war’ is often worse when humanitarian aid organizations are present and foreign militaries are not. The use of military force to protect aid operations helps to solve this problem, not make it worse. Sceptics are right that humanitarian intervention has been used as an excuse not to take stronger action, most notably in Bosnia and Herzegovina for several years and in the Rwandan refugee camps in Zaire. This is not a problem inherent in humanitarian intervention, however, as efforts in many other countries

have shown. If outsiders do not have the political will to stop a war, taking action to relieve suffering is unlikely to reduce their interest further.

on the appeal of the militant option as an avenue of improvement.

Today, neglect in Lebanon is dangerous

Crisis Group, “Nurturing Instability: Lebanon’s Palestinian Refugee Camps,” Middle East Report N°84. February 19, 2009. <http://www.crisisgroup.org/~media/Files/Middle%20East%20North%20Africa/Iraq%20Syria>

The current precarious situation is the outcome of years of neglect and mismanagement based on Lebanon’s security-first policy that discriminates against Palestinian refugees. Lacking means of socioeconomic advancement, vulnerable on all counts – politically, legally and above all physically – the camp population is angry, armed and bereft of hope, a perilous combination. It also is a breeding ground for jihadi militants, as well a tool that can be manipulated by outside actors. The shift in the Lebanese state’s language that began in 2005 is, in this sense, welcome, signalling awareness that the status quo is good neither for the refugees nor for Lebanon itself.

8.0.2 AT: Settling refugees will lead to more civil war

This only happens if refugees’ needs are neglected

Bassam Khawaja [Fellow, Human Rights Watch], “War and Memory: The Role of Palestinian Refugees in Lebanon” (2011). Honors Projects. Paper 13. http://digitalcommons.mcalester.edu/history_honors/13

In a 2006 study, Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch concluded that there was a positive correlation between the very presence of refugees from a neighboring country and the outbreak of civil war due to a continued proximity to the cause of expulsion. They claimed that it would be prudent for host countries in that case to take preemptive action by managing humanitarian needs and addressing security issues before they arise.⁷⁷ Lebanon is a prime example of a case where this did not take place.

Mozambique - Malawi Example shows the AFF world is more conducive to stability, and even the poorest countries can prioritize refugee humanitarian interests

Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch [Professors of Political Science at the University of San Diego], “Refugee Flows and the Spread of Civil War,” Centre for the Study of Civil War, no date, <http://ecpr.eu/Filestore/PaperProposal/27705479-56a7-4545-acdc-fc412fe4de2e.pdf>

We should emphasize again that most cases of refugee flows do not lead to violence (see table 1, above) and that the vast majority of refugees never engage in fighting. We

believe that proactive steps taken by host countries in cooperation with agencies such as the UNHCR and humanitarian NGOs to manage refugee camps can reduce possible security risks when they exist. In this regard, the case of Malawi during the 1980's and early 1990's is instructive. Fighting in neighboring Mozambique caused nearly 2 million refugees to escape to Malawi. At one point, refugees constituted 10 percent of Malawi's resident population, placing enormous strains on local resources. Despite its status as one of the poorest countries of the world, NGOs described Malawi's response to the refugee crisis as "heroic" [US Committee for Refugees , 1989 #2536]. Local integration efforts, access to land and employment, and extensive cooperation with the UNHCR and the World Food Program prevented the spread of conflict from Mozambique. As an example of effective management efforts, the UNHCR reported that 90 percent of the refugees were engaged in some type of productive economic activity such as making crafts, raising livestock, and processing maize (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2000: 113). Further, when the fighting ended, Malawi, Mozambique and the UNHCR cooperated in voluntary repatriation efforts that are considered to be a model in the field of refugee protection. Thus, it is possible for receiving countries to provide humanitarian access and manage potential security risks. Such efforts are clearly not adequately captured by merely looking at regime type scores, and we believe that further research on the governance of refugee communities is warranted.

8.0.3 AT: Aid Undermines Economies

Aid has a good track record

Katarina Juselius, Niels Framroze Møller, and Finn Tarp [Professors at the University of Copenhagen], "The Long-Run Impact of Foreign Aid in 36 African Countries." UNU World Institute for Development Economics Research. September 2011. http://www.wider.unu.edu/publications/working-papers/2011/en_GB/wp2011-051/

Studies of aid effectiveness abound in the literature, often with opposing conclusions. Since most time-series studies use data from the exact same publicly available data bases, our claim here is that such differences in results must be due to the use of different econometric models and methods. To investigate this we perform a comprehensive study of the long-run effect of foreign aid (ODA) on a set of key macroeconomic variables in 36 sub-Saharan African countries from mid-1960s to 2007. We use a well-specified (Cointegrated) VAR (CVAR) model as our statistical benchmark.

It represents a much-needed general-to-specific approach which can provide broad confidence intervals within which empirically relevant claims should fall. Based on stringent statistical testing, our results provide broad support for a positive long-run impact of ODA flows on the macroeconomy. For example, we find a positive effect of ODA on investment in 33 of the 36 included countries, but hardly any evidence supporting the view that aid has been harmful. From a methodological point of view our study documents the importance of transparency in results reporting in particular when the statistical null does not correspond to a natural economic null hypothesis. Our study identifies three reasons for econometrically unsatisfactory results in the literature: failure to adequately account for unit roots and breaks; imposing seemingly innocuous but invalid data transformations; and imposing aid endogeneity/exogeneity without testing.

Studies confirm that aid and trade cost-benefit ratios are positive if they are directed at specific anti-poverty methods

Matt Ridley, "Smart Aid for the World's Poor," *Wall Street Journal*. July 25, 2014. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/smart-aid-for-the-worlds-poor-1406326677>

What would my own list of five 2030 goals look like, based on the work of the Copenhagen Consensus group?

1.Reduce malnutrition. When children get better food, they develop their brains, stay in school longer and end up becoming far more productive members of society. Every dollar spent to alleviate malnutrition brings \$59 of benefits.

2.Tackle malaria and tuberculosis. These two diseases debilitate huge populations in poor countries, but they are largely preventable and curable. In the most harshly affected countries, two people often do one person's work because one of them is sick. Benefit to cost ratio: 35 to 1.

3.Boost preprimary education, which costs little and has lifelong benefits by getting children started on learning. 30 to 1.

4.Provide universal access to sexual and reproductive health, which would save the lives of mothers and infants while enabling women to be more economically productive. It would also lower birthrates (when fewer children die, people have fewer children). Benefits could be as high as 150.

5.Expand free trade. This isn't considered sexy in the development industry, and it

may seem remote from humanitarian issues, but free trade often delivers phenomenal improvements to the welfare of the poor in surprisingly quick time, as the example of China has demonstrated in recent years. One of the discoveries of the Copenhagen Consensus process is that incremental goals such as expanding free trade are often better than supposedly “transformational” goals. A successful Doha Round of the World Trade Organization could deliver annual benefits of \$3 trillion for the developing world by 2020, rising to \$100 trillion by the end of the century.

8.0.4 AT: Humanitarian intervention fails

This is because countries balk at providing necessary resources, citing national interest. The aff solves this problem

Benjamin Valentino [Professor of Government at Dartmouth University], “The True Cost of Humanitarian Intervention,” *Foreign Affairs*. November/December 2011. <http://www.dartmouth.edu/~benv/files/Valentino%20True%20Costs%20of%20Humanitarian%20Intervention.pdf>

What is more, the record of low-cost preventive missions has been at least as bad as the record of interventions reacting to atrocities. One of the most tragic aspects of the genocides in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Darfur was that international peacekeepers were present during some of the worst episodes of violence, such as the slaughter of 8,000 Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995, which was witnessed by 400 UN peacekeepers. The problem in these cases was not that no one was sent to prevent the violence; it was that the forces that were deployed were not given the resources or the mandates to stop the violence breaking out around them. In some cases, they could not even protect themselves. More robust preventive deployments might have been more effective, but they would not have been cheap.

Casualty aversion (prioritization of the national interest) causes failure

Edward Luttwak [Senior Associate at the Center for Strategic and International Studies]. “Give War a Chance.” *Foreign Affairs*. July/August 1999. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1999-07-01/give-war-chance>.

A variety of multilateral organizations now make it their business to intervene in other peoples’ wars. The defining characteristic of these entities is that they insert themselves in war situations while refusing to engage in combat. In the long run this only adds to the damage. If the United Nations helped the strong defeat the weak faster and more decisively, it would actually enhance the peacemaking potential of

war. But the first priority of U.N. peacekeeping contingents is to avoid casualties among their own personnel. Unit commanders therefore habitually appease the locally stronger force, accepting its dictates and tolerating its abuses. This appeasement is not strategically purposeful, as siding with the stronger power overall would be; rather, it merely reflects the determination of each U.N. unit to avoid confrontation. The final result is to prevent the emergence of a coherent outcome, which requires an imbalance of strength sufficient to end the fighting.

9 Cards cut by Arjun Rao

10 Affirmative Arguments

10.1 The detriment of forced migration

10.1.1 Trafficking

Misha Glenny of the New York Times

Glenny, Misha. “The Refugee Crisis Has Produced One Winner: Organized Crime.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 20 Sept. 2015. Web. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/21/opinion/the-refugee-crisis-has-produced-one-winner-organized-crime.html?_r=0.

In the midst of the refugee crisis, the European Union has for the first time ever been considering deploying naval assets against organized crime. People smuggling, chiefly from Syria and the Horn of Africa, is now a multibillion-dollar business that is as profitable, if not more so, than the trade in illegal narcotics. This is not the trafficking of migrant labor or women for sexual purposes. These criminal gangs are effectively offering travel-agent services to desperate people fleeing conflict. Their services can include false documentation, bribes to border guards and transport, in dangerous, often deadly, circumstances. Sadly, the measures countries are taking to counteract the flood of refugees serve only to make organized crime stronger. As long as European countries fail to implement a plan to take in refugees across member states, the business of people smuggling will continue to grow.

Fazzina for the UN Refugee Agency

Fazzini, A. “Smuggling and Trafficking from the East and Horn of Africa: Progress Report.” The UN Refugee Agency. UNHCR, 2014. Web. https://www.unodc.org/documents/congress/workshops/UNHCR-Smuggling_and_Trafficking-Progress_Report-screen-final.pdf.

Precise numbers are unknown. Estimates indicate that 25,000–30,000 people were victims of trafficking in the region between 2009 and 2013. The Sinai trafficking

industry reportedly generated approximately USD \$622 million in ransoms during that time. Human Rights Watch estimated that, between 2009 and 2013, trafficking claimed the lives of 5,000–10,000 victims. The European Parliament estimated that thousands of people have been kidnapped in eastern Sudan, taken to Egypt, and tortured in the Sinai and around 4,000 have died since 2008, with around 1,000 African refugees still in captivity. Victims using smuggling networks report serious human rights abuses.

10.1.2 Human Rights Violations

Setting up formal, structured programs to accept refugees would help stop these disturbing trends.

Liz Miller in Human Rights and Human Welfare

Miller, Liz. “The Irony of Refuge: Gender-Based Violence against Female Refugees in Africa.” University of Denver. Human Rights and Human Welfare, n.d. Web. <http://www.du.edu/korbel/hrhw/researchdigest/minority/Africa.pdf>

The woman recalling this story is one of hundreds of thousands of women who have experienced gender-based violence. Refugee women are more affected by violence than any other population of women in the world, and all refugee women are at risk of rape or other forms of sexual violence (Vulnerable Women’s Project 2009). Gathering specific statistics of gender-based violence against refugees is problematic; sexual violence is often under-reported and the instability of conflict zones can disintegrate civil society. Among the myriad challenges related to gender-based violence, the major themes warranting global attention include: viewing sexual assault and rape as security risks; eliminating the culture of impunity for offenders; empowering victims; and creating appropriate treatment facilities for victims. Refugees are affected by sexual violence both as victims of war-related rape crimes, and also as victims of increased domestic abuse that occurs during conflict. Additionally, evidence shows that domestic violence may even intensify post-conflict (Vulnerable Women’s Project 2009). The sexual abuse of women during conflict is not new, but it has remained an under-researched and under-documented issue. Sexual violence has become a strategic weapon of war used to destabilize, punish, coerce, and instill terror in refugee populations, and it has been institutionalized in many countries by security forces and places of supposed “refuge.”

Miller in Human Rights and Human Welfare

Gender-based violence against women is a widespread issue in many countries, in times of peace and in times of war. Moreover, the issue deserves attention and research regardless of context, but female refugees experience it in a slightly different way. When a refugee uproots her family to flee persecution, her entire frame of reference is altered, and the social structure that she knew turns out to be only a thing of the past. Changes in access to services, community support, resources, and security diminish the capacity of refugees to feel empowered (Ganeshpanchan 2005). The setting in which a refugee lives, often a refugee camp, forces her to rely on others in a way that makes her increasingly vulnerable to violence. For example, if she is no longer able to contribute to the family income, she becomes dependent on male support, increasing the likelihood that she will endure abuse in order to meet her needs. Also, there have been documented cases of humanitarian aid workers committing acts of rape and other violence against women and girls inside the camps (Amnesty International 2009). Refugee camps, however, are not the only problem. Reports by Amnesty International (2009) have highlighted the particular risk faced by females when leaving the relative safety of refugee camps to search for firewood. Families frequently decide to send out women and girls to do these tasks because it is considered “less dangerous” in armed conflict and displacement zones; females are seen as risking “only rape,” while it is believed that men and boys will most likely be killed (Marsh, Purdin & Navani 2006).

10.1.3 The underclass of labor

Dr. Benedetta Berti of the INSS

Berti, Benendetta. “The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Regional and Human Security Implications.” INSS. Institute for National Security Studies, Jan. 2015. Web. http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/adkan17_4ENG_7_Berti.pdf.

The massive refugee flows have in some cases resulted in the saturation of the job market, with a widespread perception in host communities that refugees have contributed to both a general rise in unemployment rates along with a decrease in wages. This is especially the case as the refugee population, often driven by the desperation of their circumstances and/or unable to obtain the proper work permits, agree to work for lower wages, harsher conditions, and fewer rights than their counterparts

in the host communities. For example, the International Rescue Committee estimates that wages in the service and agricultural sectors have dropped as much as 50 percent in Lebanon between 2011 and 2013. Along with the competition with local workers, Syrian refugees have also opened informal businesses that sell below market prices, further contributing to the “race to the bottom.”

John Burnett and David Whyte for the University of Liverpool

Burnett, John, and David Whyte. “The Wages of Fear: Risk, Safety, and Undocumented Work.” Positive Action for Refugees and Asylum Seekers. University of Liverpool, 2010. Web. http://www.pafras.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/The_Wages_of-Fear.pdf.

The report that follows focuses on one small sub-category of this section of the populace. It is based on detailed interviews with fourteen people who are all seeking asylum but, having had their claims refused, are left in a form of limbo. Refused asylum seekers are not allowed to work, have no access to housing, little access to statutory services, and in many cases little optimism for what the future holds. Some of the people interviewed here have been destitute for years. Some of them have experienced destitution, but at the time of writing are receiving some form of support as a result of fresh evidence having been submitted to the Home Office regarding their claim for asylum. But all of them share one thing in common in that, regardless of what the government has ruled in relation to their asylum claim, they are too afraid to return home to face violence, torture, and potentially death. As such, in an attempt to eke out an existence, they have entered the labour market as undocumented workers.

Burnett and White for the University of Liverpool

The working lives of undocumented workers betray the realities of flexible working and, for the vast majority of undocumented workers there is little or no option but to continue working in exploitative, dangerous, and oppressive conditions. A complex set of factors – albeit differing in particular contexts – ensure that vulnerability is consolidated. Whilst for others, their immigration status locks them into a form of perennial servitude. Many ‘refused’ asylum seekers are pushed into a psychological limbo where their presence has been criminalised (see Burnett, 2008), but they will not, or cannot, return to the country they fled from. And it is these factors which un-

derpin their precariousness within the labour market. The asylum seekers in this report who work 'illegally' risk imprisonment and, ultimately, refused asylum seekers risk deportation. These are risks that the respondents in this study were well aware of. The fear of being discovered by immigration authorities acted as a disciplinary mechanism that reaches into all aspects of the labour process: the enforcement of low wages, long working hours and poor safety conditions. In stark contrast to government rhetoric about worklife balances and mutual employment consensuses these are the realities of flexible working.

10.1.4 Impacts on the host country

Dr. Benedetta Berti of the INSS

Berti, Benendetta. "The Syrian Refugee Crisis: Regional and Human Security Implications." INSS. Institute for National Security Studies, Jan. 2015. Web. http://www.inss.org.il/uploadImages/systemFiles/adkan17_4ENG_7_Berti.pdf.

The cumulative effect of the ongoing crisis on the main host countries should be seen as a potential source of short term domestic and regional instability at the economic, political, and ultimately security levels. And if in the short term the failure to tackle the crisis only adds pressure to an already shaky regional security landscape, the lack of serious investments in the long term integration or resettlement of refugee communities could lead to the rise of a new group of economically deprived and politically marginalized second class citizens throughout the Levant, with negative consequences in terms of human development, political stability, and security.

10.2 AT: Detriment of forced migration

10.2.1 Refugee camps create a false sense of security

Imogen Foulkes of the BBC

Foulkes, Imogen. "UN Warns of Refugee Camp Dangers to Children - BBC News." BBC News. BBC, 15 Sept. 2010. Web. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-11307679>.

They are there because they are fleeing war, they hope they will find safety - but for children, these camps are often not safe at all, says Ms Coomaraswamy. In preparing

her report for the human rights council, she visited a number of camps, some of them in Sudan's Darfur region. "The first thing one notices is that they are dangerous, in the sense that you always meet children who have been victims of sexual violence when they went to get firewood or went to the toilet etc - so they are dangerous places," she says. "Secondly, they are places of idleness. There are situations where children are recruited into armed forces and therefore many have been recruited by one group or another." In fact, the camps are now the biggest recruiting ground for militia groups looking for child soldiers.

UN Refugee Agency

"UN Agencies Highlight Dangers of Increasing Malnutrition in Refugee Camps." UNHCR News. United Nations, 7 Oct. 2005. Web. <http://www.unhcr.org/4346ac9a4.html>.

According to UNHCR and World Food Programme (WFP) experts, 20 percent or more of the refugees are suffering from acute malnutrition in, refugee camps in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Chad. Lack of Vitamin B is a public health problem among refugees in countries like Nepal and Bangladesh. Meanwhile, more than 60 percent of the women and children in camps in Kenya and Algeria, who are highly dependent on food aid, are anaemic. "Many refugees in Africa and Asia live in a unique harsh environment for extended periods while being heavily dependent on continuous international food, and other forms of assistance, often confined to camps," said Oluseyi Bajulaiye, deputy director of UNHCR's Africa Bureau. "The international support needed to sustain their basic livelihoods has not always been forthcoming. These situations create precarious nutrition and protection situations in several camps."

Stanford Medical School

"CHILDREN AT CAMP: HEALTH IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN LIVING IN REFUGEE CAMPS." Stanford Medical. Stanford University, 23 May 2014. Web. http://med.stanford.edu/schoolhealtheval/files/AliaYaghi_HumBio122MFinal.pdf.

Children are not only impacted by what they see and hear; they are also profoundly affected by their own personal experiences. For instance, pre-migration, children may be regularly exposed to bombings, and in many refugee camps, children face an increased risk of sexual abuse and violence. Thus, it is likely that refugee children lack a sense of safety and security in their camp environment, leading to negative

psychological implications. For example, one review of psychosocial studies conducted in Canada, the United States, and Sweden found that between 30 percent and 75 percent of refugee children and adolescents demonstrated symptoms and signs of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

10.3 Responsibility to host refugees

10.3.1 UN Member states have a responsibility to protect refugees, at least in the short term

Jastram and Achiron of the UNCHR

Jastram, Kate, and Marilyn Achiron. "Refugee Protection: A Guide to International Refugee Law." Inter-Parliamentary Union. UNCHR, n.d. Web. http://www.ipu.org/pdf/publications/refugee_en.pdf.

An increasing number of countries around the world have invited refugees to settle permanently on their territories. By offering naturalization, providing land and/or permitting legal employment, governments of both asylum countries and resettlement countries have offered a lasting solution to the problems of those refugees who could not be assured protection in their home countries or in their country of first asylum. The legal framework that supports the international refugee protection regime was built by States. Through the years, States have affirmed their commitment to protecting refugees by acceding to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, the cornerstone document of refugee protection. The Convention, which was developed and drafted by States, enumerates the rights and responsibilities of refugees and the obligations of States that are parties to it. As of September 2001, 141 States had acceded to the Convention and/or its Protocol. In addition, as members of UNHCR's Executive Committee, 57 governments help shape the organization's protection policies and assistance activities.

10.3.2 In large part, foreign countries caused the conflicts that displace millions. It is their responsibility to provide a safe haven to the innocent

Steve Hilton in the New York Times

Hilton, Steve. "Who's Responsible for the Refugees?" The New York Times. The New York Times, 10 Sept. 2015. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/opinion/whos-responsible-for-the-refugees.html>.

European leaders wanted, years ago, to intervene directly in Syria in order to check President Bashar al-Assad's cruelty; the United States didn't. You can understand why — I wouldn't for one second question the judgment of American political leaders that their country was reluctant to participate in another military conflict. But at least acknowledge the consequences of nonintervention: the protracted Syrian civil war, the emergence of a lawless territory ripe for exploitation by the sick zealots of the Islamic State, and the resulting flood of millions of displaced people. So it's a bit rich for American commentators to lecture Europeans when part of the reason the refugees are arriving on Europe's doorstep is American foreign policy. It's great that the United States is by far the largest provider of humanitarian assistance to Syrians, but America is bigger than Europe, and wealthier. Why should Europe be expected to take around a million refugees practically overnight and the United States, hardly any?

10.3.3 International Law dictates that countries should not force refugees to return to their home country during conflict

Catherine Phuong of the University of Newcastle

Phuong, Catherine. "Identifying States' Responsibilities towards Refugees and Asylum Seekers." University of Newcastle. University of Newcastle, n.d. Web. <http://www.esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/Phuong.PDF>.

While there is no obligation under international law to grant asylum to refugees, states are still bound by the principle of non-refoulement as defined in article 33 of the 1951 Convention. This principle provides that no refugee shall be returned to any country "where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion." This principle is now generally considered to be part of customary international

law. It must be noted that the principle is not limited to those formally recognised as refugees. In other words, asylum-seekers should not be returned to any country where they would face persecution and they benefit from such a prohibition until they are declared not to be refugees.

10.3.4 Countries haven't upheld their obligations

Amnesty International

“The Global Refugee Crisis: A Conspiracy of Neglect.” Amnesty International. Amnesty International, 15 June 2015. Web. <https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/pol40/1796/2015/en/>.

The initial refusal of the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand to save people stranded at sea, who were clearly in desperate, sometimes life-threatening conditions, and the apparent push back operations they undertook, were in flagrant violation of their international obligations. Although only three countries in South East Asia are States Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (Cambodia, the Philippines and Timor-Leste), governments in the region have obligations under customary international law and international treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea which are relevant in this situation.

10.4 A Responsibility to host

10.4.1 Countries have an obligation first to their citizens. Their citizens give up rights to be part of a government that protects them. If the refugees pose a threat to the security of these citizens, the government does not have an obligation to host them.

Steven Heyman in the Duke Law Journal

Heyman, Steven J. “The First Duty of Government.” Duke Law Journal. Duke Law School, n.d. Web. <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3172&context=dlj>.

In a state of nature, however, an individual often lacks the power to defend himself against invasion by others, rendering the enjoyment of his rights “very insecure.” For this reason, individuals agree to form a community “for the mutual Preservation

of their Lives, Liberties and Estates,” which Locke comprehensively termed “Property.” Under the terms of this compact, each individual gives up his natural power to act for his own preservation “to be regulated by the Laws made by the Society, so far forth as the preservation of himself, and the rest of that Society shall require.” In addition, he “engages his natural force.., to assist the Executive Power of the Society, as the law thereof shall require.” In return, the individual obtains not only benefits from “the labour, assistance, and society of others in the same Community,” but also “protection from its whole strength.” In short, according to Locke, the end of government is to direct “the force of all the subjects of the commonwealth” for the purpose of “preserving the members of the commonwealth in peace from injury and violence.” Locke emphasized that, because government is established for this purpose, it is “obliged” to secure every individual’s life, liberty, and property. When it acts contrary to this trust, the government is dissolved and the community regains the right to establish a new form of government. Such dissolution occurs, in Locke’s view, where the government invades the rights of subjects, or where it fails to use its power to secure those rights. Locke implied that the Glorious Revolution of 1688, in which King James II was dethroned and replaced by William and Mary, was justified on these grounds.

10.5 Reductions in terrorism

10.5.1 Removing refugees from conflict zones reduces the chance that they are radicalized

Anne Speckhard of the New York Times

Speckhard, Anne. “How Dragging Our Feet on Refugees Creates More Terrorists.” The New York Times. The New York Times, 28 Sept. 2015. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/opinion/how-dragging-our-feet-on-refugees-creates-more-terrorists.html>.

Counterterrorism data is clear: Most of the terrorists on American soil do not come from the ranks of refugees but are individuals who are born here and who become vulnerable to recruitment because of mental illness, social marginalization, issues of discrimination and other factors that have nothing to do with admitting refugees into our country. Meanwhile, the vast majority of war-torn Syrian refugees are fleeing terrorist groups. But they are at risk. Experience from many conflict zones teaches us

that the longer these refugees are left to languish in despair in camps the more prone they become to radicalization. Just as gangs attract youth in inner cities, terrorists are adroit at exploiting the most vulnerable who might turn to them for security, justice and even hope. Young men, in particular, gravitate to perceived models of strength and protection. In my book “Talking to Terrorists,” I wrote about a young Chechen in a refugee camp in the Russian Republic of Ingushetia, who explained that his father had been crippled by the conflicts and the youth wanted to join the “Islamic brothers” (meaning Chechen terrorist groups) because they, unlike his father, “were real men.”

10.5.2 Empowering refugees allows them to escape radical groups

Khalid Koser of the Brookings Institution

Koser, Khalid. “IDPs, Refugees, and Violent Extremism: From Victims to Vectors of Change.” The Brookings Institution. The Brookings Institution, 20 Feb. 2015. Web. <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/02/20-cve-displacement-refugees-koser>.

First, there are lessons to learn from decades of efforts to empower displaced populations to find solutions to their own plight. There is new attention to how to engage people at risk of radicalization, particularly women and youth (for example the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund) which can learn from these efforts. For example, initiatives to empower refugee women have by no means always been successful, but they have been pioneering and offer insights in how the engagement of women’s groups can build stronger communities to counter violent extremism. Efforts to set up consultative mechanisms with IDPs and refugees offer alternative mechanisms for channeling grievances.

Asylum Access Annual Report

“Empowering Refugee Communities Worldwide.” Asylum Access. Asylum Access, 2012. Web. http://asylumaccess.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/AAHQ-Annual-Report_2011-2012.pdf.

Refugees are frequently unaware of their rights, and lack the tools to assert them. Less than one percent arrive in the global north. The vast majority remain in first countries of refuge in Africa, Asia and Latin America, where their rights are routinely violated. Many must fight even for the most fundamental right: the right to safety, to protection against forcible return to torture, rape or murder. Once refugees

have secured their safety, they must then put food on the table – but most countries do not allow refugees to work. Their children should go to school – but some are turned away at the schoolhouse door, and others face xenophobia, harassment, or bullying. They must be strong for their families, but they have no support to help them heal. These are daily challenges for most refugees. The primary approach to refugee assistance, however, has been emergency aid. Food, blankets and tents meet refugees' immediate needs today, but provide no lasting solution for the ongoing barriers refugees face as they strive to rebuild their lives.

10.5.3 Harboring deserted refugees is critical to reducing terrorism

Khalid Koser of the Brookings Institution

Koser, Khalid. "IDPs, Refugees, and Violent Extremism: From Victims to Vectors of Change." The Brookings Institution. The Brookings Institution, 20 Feb. 2015. Web. <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/order-from-chaos/posts/2015/02/20-cve-displacement-refugees-koser>.

Second, making the link between displacement and violent extremism may reinforce efforts to find solutions for refugees. The risk of radicalization is especially heightened where IDPs and refugees find themselves in protracted situations: marginalized, disenfranchised, and excluded. Finding solutions for displaced populations should be an urgent priority for humanitarian reasons but also as a security issue. The engagement of development actors is particularly needed to ensure that IDPs and refugees find solutions—whether return, local integration, or settlement elsewhere—that are sustainable. As a way to counter violent extremism collaboration between development and humanitarian organizations should now become an urgent priority. Third, a focus on displacement may be one way to leverage the right stakeholders in the global effort to counter violent extremism. Governments in many developing countries (and especially those with an Islamic majority), civil society, and the private sector, have all been wary of engaging in what is often perceived as a Western-driven and security-oriented agenda. The link to displacement can illustrate that countering violent extremism is as much about human rights, development, and empowerment, as it is about military, intelligence, and security interventions.

10.5.4 Providing adequate education near camps helps reduce terrorism

Francisco Martin-Rayo for the Harvard Belfer Center

Martin-Rayo, Francisco. "Countering Radicalization in Refugee Camps: How Education can Help Defeat AQAP." Harvard Belfer Center. Harvard Kennedy School, June 2011. Web. http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Countering_radicalization-Martin-Rayo.pdf.

In conclusion, the most effective method for reducing radicalization and making it more difficult for terrorist organizations to recruit is increasing access to well-rounded education programs. These programs have a lasting effect not only on the refugee population during their displacement, but also upon their return home, where their new ideas reduce the space for extremist actors to operate and make it more difficult for them to spread their ideology. Crisis situations should be seen as an opportunity to educate a population that, prior to their displacement, was in most cases disparate and had little to no access to education. Even a few years of education can make a tremendous difference, both in changing the individual student's outlook and the community as a whole, as we saw in the Jalozai and Akora cases with female education reforms.

10.6 AT: Reductions in Terrorism

10.6.1 Refugee camps are breeding grounds for instability and terrorism

World Bank's World Development Report

"The Impacts of Refugees on Neighboring Countries: A Development Challenge." World Bank. World Bank, 29 July 2010. Web. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWDR2011/Resources/6406082-1283882418764/WDR_Background_Paper_Refugees.pdf.

Refugee camps located close to the boundary of the country of origin can provide sanctuary to rebel organizations, and a base from which to carry out operations and fertile grounds for recruitment. For example, in Pakistan the involvement of Afghan refugees in the resistance against the Communist regime and its Soviet backers in Afghanistan during the 1980s – which took place with direct support from the Pakistani government - created conditions within Pakistan that radicalized sections of the population, led to a proliferation of arms, and in the long run weakened state

authority (Rashid, 2008). Another example is the rebel group made up of mainly Uganda-based Tutsi refugees from Rwanda, which in October 1990 formed the Rwandan Patriotic Army (RPA) and invaded northern Rwanda (Lomo et al, 2001).

10.6.2 Extremism is what pushed these people out of their country, until we solve for the root of the problem we can't really reduce terrorism

Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times

Kristof, Nicholas. "Compassion for Refugees Isn't Enough." The New York Times. The New York Times, 09 Sept. 2015. Web. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/opinion/nicholas-kristof-compassion-for-refugees-isnt-enough.html?_r=0.

So by all means let's respond with compassion to the refugees (not as jerks, as Hungarian officials have). But above all, let's address the crisis at its roots, particularly in the Middle East. One essential step is to improve conditions for the 3.7 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan. The World Food Program was just forced to cut 229,000 refugees in Jordan off food rations because it ran out of money, and if the world won't pay for refugees to eat in Jordan, it will have to feed them in the West. Then there's the far more difficult task of trying to make Syria habitable again. This may be impossible, but let's be clear: As things stand, we're on a trajectory for Syria to become even more horrific than it is now. Many experts expect the war to drag on for years, kill hundreds of thousands more people, and lead to an exodus of millions more refugees. We're likely to see street-to-street fighting soon in Damascus, lifting the suffering and emigration to a new level.

10.7 Economic benefits of hosting refugees

10.7.1 Stimulating local economies

Karen Jacobsen in the Journal of Modern African Studies

Jacobsen, Karen. "Can Refugees Benefit the State? Refugee Resources and African Statebuilding." University of Wisconsin. Journal of Modern African Studies, 2002. Web. <http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/schatzberg/ps362/Jacobsen2002.pdf>.

These material, social and political resources, which I call refugee resources, potentially represent an important statebuilding contribution to the host state. Refugee resources may help develop areas of the country, increase the welfare of citizens, and extend the bureaucratic reach of the state.

Jacobsen in the Journal of Modern African Studies

A second way in which the host country potentially benefits from protracted refugee situations is from the economic contribution made by refugees themselves. Refugees bring assets and resources, including social capital, into the host area. Assets include material goods brought with them from their home countries, ranging from gold to trucks to cattle and computers. Or over the course of time, refugees act as conduits for remittances from abroad – a key source of foreign exchange.

The UN Refugee Agency

“Social and Economic Impact of Large Refugee Populations on Host Developing Countries.” UNHCR News. The United Nations, 6 Jan. 1997. Web. <http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68d0e10.html>.

The economic impact of refugees on host areas, however, is not necessarily negative. An economic stimulus may be generated by the presence of refugees and can lead to the opening and development of the host regions. This stimulus takes place, inter alia, through the local purchase of food, non-food items, shelter materials by agencies supplying relief items, disbursements made by aid workers, the assets brought by refugees themselves, as well as employment and income accrued to local population, directly or indirectly, through assistance projects for refugee areas. The presence of refugees also contributes to the creation of employment benefiting the local population, directly or indirectly. Moreover, relevant line departments involved in refugee work as counterparts to UNHCR, both at central and local levels, also benefit from UNHCR assistance aimed at strengthening their coping and management capacities. Such assistance may include equipment supply, capacity building and related training components.

10.7.2 Attracting foreign aid

Karen Jacobsen in the Journal of Modern African Studies

Jacobsen, Karen. "Can Refugees Benefit the State ? Refugee Resources and African Statebuilding." University of Wisconsin. *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 2002. Web. <http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/schatzberg/ps362/Jacobsen2002.pdf>.

Although international refugee assistance is usually intended for refugees in camps, it finds its way into the host community. Both food and non-food aid items are traded in local markets and further afield. In addition, many international refugee agencies deliberately make relief assistance available to local people so as to increase the receptiveness of the host community to refugees.

The UN Refugee Agency

"Social and Economic Impact of Large Refugee Populations on Host Developing Countries." UNHCR News. The United Nations, 6 Jan. 1997. Web. <http://www.unhcr.org/3ae68d0e10.html>.

The presence of refugees, as a focus of attention, can also attract development agencies to the host areas. While infrastructure is developed in the initial stage primarily to facilitate the work of host governments, UNHCR and its implementing partners in the refugee affected regions, it can also serve as a catalyst to 'open up' the host region to development efforts that would otherwise never reach these 'marginal' areas.

10.8 AT: Economic benefits

10.8.1 Increased costs to impoverished citizens

The UN Refugee Agency

"Social and Economic Impact of Large Refugee Populations on Host Developing Countries." UNHCR News. The United Nations, 6 Jan. 1997. Web. <http://www.hindawi.com/journals/ecri/2012/297658/>.

From the moment of arrival, refugees compete with the local citizens for scarce resources such as land, water, housing, food and medical services. Over time, their presence leads to more substantial demands on natural resources, education and

health facilities, energy, transportation, social services and employment. They may cause inflationary pressures on prices and depress wages. In some instances, they can significantly alter the flow of goods and services within the society as a whole and their presence may have implications for the host country's balance of payment and undermine structural adjustment initiatives. One example of market disturbances would be the need to rent accommodation for office and residential purposes, not just for expatriates, but also for locally engaged staff, in response to a refugee situation. Increased construction activity results, but this is usually accompanied by increases in rent, benefiting those who are property owners, but adversely affecting the poor and those on fixed incomes, such as government officers. Purchase of large quantities of building material may make them scarce or unobtainable for local people, while also generating inflationary effects. Likewise, increased demand for food and other commodities can lead to price rises in the market which will stimulate local economic activity, although, again, not benefiting the poorest.

10.8.2 Increased aid hurts locals

Assandé Adom for Economics Research International

Assandé Désiré Adom, "Investigating the Impacts of Intra-regional Trade and Aid on Per Capita Income in Africa: Case Study of the ECOWAS," Economics Research International, vol. 2012, Article ID 297658, 15 pages, 2012. <http://www.hindawi.com/journals/ecri/2012/297658/cta/>.

Evidence from this study suggests that foreign aid is not an engine of growth for per capita output in the ECOWAS, but it rather acts as an impediment. At the same time, the prevalence of aid creates a culture of permanent dependency on foreign donors that may reduce incentives to conduct and implement viable macroeconomic and trade policies.

10.9 Governments are capable of responding effectively

10.9.1 Western governments took in many refugees during the Indonesian conflicts in the 20th century, now they refuse to

Christopher Phillips of the London School of Economics

Phillips, Christopher. "Syria's Refugees: When Did the West Become so Heartless?" Euro Crisis in the Press. London School of Economics, 20 Aug. 2015. Web. <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/eurocrisispress/2015/08/20/syrias-refugees-when-did-the-west-become-so-heartless/>.

So what has changed? Why were western states willing to resettle four times as many Indochinese refugees a year in 1979 as they have been willing to house in total from Syria? Westerners are no worse off or less capable of hosting refugees than they were in the late 70s. Taking arguably the worst offender, Britain, as an example, the economic situation then was not dissimilar to now. In 1979-82 Britain suffered a recession, far worse than the sluggish growth it has faced during the height of the Syria refugee crisis (2012-15). GDP per capita averaged \$9k, comparable in today's prices to the \$40k it averaged in 2012-15, while unemployment averaged 7.5%, compared to 7.3% in 2012-15. In another parallel, in May 1979 a Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher came to power on a platform of rolling back the state, one seemingly emulated by David Cameron and George Osborne today. Yet that government accepted nearly 25,000 Indochinese refugees, compared to 197 from Syria now.

Ben Rawlence of the New York Times

Rawlence, Ben. "The Other Refugee Crisis." The New York Times. The New York Times, 09 Oct. 2015. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/opinion/the-other-refugee-crisis.html>.

Rich nations are accepting fewer refugees through the formal United Nations resettlement program. Host nations such as Pakistan, Jordan and Kenya have balked at integrating any of the refugees in their camps. And so, with no prospect of an end to refugee status, many who can afford it are pursuing the illegal journey to Europe. But these are a fraction of the total. For a vast majority, refugee camps are becoming, increasingly, permanent. No one wants to admit this. Not the countries that must host them, not the United Nations, which must pay for them, and least of all the refugees themselves, who must live there. This makes for strange contradictions.

10.9.2 The impact of the refugees on the host country depends on the actions of the host

David Becker of Illinois State University

Becker, David. "The Past, Present and Future of Transnational Conflict in Jordan: A Study of Syrian Refugees in the Hashemite Kingdom." Masters Capstone Paper Project, Illinois State University, 8 May, 2013. <http://ir.library.illinoisstate.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1000&context=cppg>

The study of the impact of hosting refugees is multifaceted. A refugee flow can have significant potential, and the policies of the host government determine exactly what happens to that potential upon arrival. That potential could be manifested in both positive and negative ways, depending on how the host country treats the refugee population and how they are viewed by the host population. Jordan is understandably apprehensive about the possibility of a new refugee population integrating into the Jordanian melting pot, but for the sake of the livelihoods of both the refugees and Jordanians, it is the opinion of this researcher that the GOJ must significantly change their approach to how they treat the refugee population.

10.10 AT: Governments are capable of responding

10.10.1 A lot of host countries can't afford the scarce resource situation

The UN Refugee Agency

"Social and Economic Impact of Large Refugee Populations on Host Developing Countries." UN-HCR News. The United Nations, 6 Jan. 1997. Web. <http://www.hindawi.com/journals/ecri/2012/297658/>.

The highest refugee concentrations are in some of the poorest countries in the world. A large number of such movements are into Least Developed Countries (LDCs). The presence of refugees compounds the already prevailing economic, environmental, social and, at times, political difficulties in these countries. Often such countries are confronted by a combination of all four of these factors. Nearly always their impact is substantial. Moreover, in many refugee situations, problems are aggravated when refugees are a substantial proportion of the local, if not national population.

10.10.2 The cost of hosting refugees is immense

Refworld of the United Nations

“The Role of Host Countries: The Cost and Impact of Hosting Refugees.” Refworld. United Nations, 31 May 2011. Web. <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/520b3fa24.pdf>.

First, States that host refugees incur substantial financial costs, not least in paying salaries and meeting the other expenses of officials and members of the security services who are responsible for refugee-related tasks, and who are therefore unable to attend to other pressing national or local issues. To this can be added costs such as constructing buildings as well as purchasing and maintaining the vehicles that are required to address both emergencies and longer-term refugee situations. In addition, it is a common scenario for United Nations agencies and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to recruit local staff members from government service or the private sector, whose replacements must then be identified and provided with appropriate training.

Refworld of the UN

Third, States that host significant numbers of refugees incur important costs in terms of their security, their political process and their relationship with other States. When large numbers of refugees arrive in a country - and especially when they are in a destitute situation and do not share ethnic or cultural linkages with the host community - there is always a risk that social tensions, conflicts and even violence might arise. In the worst case scenario, refugee populations may be politicized and even militarized, a situation which would place inevitable strains on the relationship between the country of asylum and country of origin.

10.11 Prioritization

As it has been recently in public forum, the word “prioritize” will be the center of a lot of debate. Does it mean making something more important than the other? Does it mean doing something first? Does it mean putting more resources towards one thing? Having a grasp on your strategy with the word will be critical to doing well in rounds.

10.11.1 Prioritizing the humanitarian needs of refugees in the short term prevents long term harms

Stanford Medical School

“CHILDREN AT CAMP: HEALTH IMPLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN LIVING IN REFUGEE CAMPS.” Stanford Medical. Stanford University, 23 May 2014. Web. http://med.stanford.edu/schoolhealtheval/files/AliaYaghi_HumBio122MFinal.pdf.

War induced trauma, displacement, immigration, and chronic poverty are a few factors that place refugee children at heightened risk for psychological problems. Refugee children may witness family members or other people being physically assaulted, sexually assaulted, or killed. Furthermore, in war torn countries children may see gruesome injuries or deaths due to bombings. For example, in one Swedish study examining 55 Chilean newly immigrated children, of the children whose parents had been tortured or persecuted, 75 percent had sleep disturbances, 69 percent anxiety, 42 percent depression and concentration failures, and 39 percent aggressiveness. In contrast, children whose families had escaped persecution were found to have significantly lower symptom levels. It is important to note that according to a different study, most children generally show minimal distress in the face of armed conflicts; however, when the chain of violent events reaches the child’s nuclear family, psychological effects are often serious.

10.11.2 In the long term, the economic impact of refugees will be positive

Simon Nixon of the Wall Street Journal

Nixon, Simon. “Politics Hold Sway in Economic Impact of Europe’s Refugee Crisis.” WSJ. Wall Street Journal, 23 Sept. 2015. Web. <http://www.wsj.com/articles/politics-hold-sway-in-economic-impact-of-europes>

On one thing, almost all economists agree: In the long term, the refugee crisis ought to be unambiguously positive for the European economy. Over time, the new arrivals should play an important role in addressing Europe’s alarming demographic trends, improving the ratio of workers to those who are economically inactive, a ratio that is falling in many countries. Ironically, some of the Eastern European member states most resistant to accepting refugees are those most vulnerable to the demographic challenges of an aging society, including Poland and Hungary.

10.12 AT: Prioritization of refugee interests has long term benefits

10.12.1 In the areas where refugees are concentrated, focusing on refugees will entrench already existing local problems

Refworld of the United Nations

“The Role of Host Countries: The Cost and Impact of Hosting Refugees.” Refworld. United Nations, 31 May 2011. Web. <http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/520b3fa24.pdf>.

Second, refugee situations impose a wide range of economic, environmental and infrastructural costs on the countries where they are to be found. A sudden influx of people from a neighbouring or nearby State can increase market price, and decrease local wages; lead to deforestation and the reduction or contamination of water supplies; and place a significant strain on roads, bridges, warehousing facilities and the availability of land. In this respect, it is important to recognize that refugee populations are often found in remote and isolated border areas, characterized by relatively low levels of economic activity and with limited natural resources.

10.12.2 We must prioritize solving the root of the problem

John Mearsheimer for the National Interest

Mearsheimer, John J. “America Unhinged.” The National Interest. The National Interest, Jan.-Feb. 2014. Web. <http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/America%20Unhinged.pdf>.

These responses reflect three widespread beliefs about Egypt and Syria. The first is that the two states are of great strategic importance to the United States. There is a deep-seated fear that if the Obama administration does not fix the problems plaguing those countries, serious damage will be done to vital American interests. The second one is that there are compelling moral reasons for U.S. involvement in Syria, mainly because of large-scale civilian deaths. And the third is that the United States possesses the capability to affect Egyptian and Syrian politics in significant and positive ways, in large part by making sure the right person is in charge in Cairo and Damascus.

11 Negative Arguments

11.1 Economic harms of accomodating migrants

11.1.1 Increases to food and housing costs

Yusuf Akgündüz for the Institute for the Study of Labor

Agunduz, Yusuf Emre. "The Impact of Refugee Crises on Host Labor Markets: The Case of the Syrian Refugee Crisis in Turkey." Institute for the Study of Labor. IZA, Feb. 2015. Web. <http://ftp.iza.org/dp8841.pdf>.

Our results indicate that the refugee inflows have increased food prices, and to a lesser extent prices of housing in regions hosting them. We also analyzed inflation in hotel and restaurant prices, where there do not appear to be any effects, which is consistent with the idea that the refugees increase demand mostly in basic survival goods. Price effects are theoretically more straightforward than employment and internal migration effects. Even if refugees are employed in food and housing sectors in disproportionate numbers and lower production costs, the immediate effect of the refugee inflows is likely to be an increase in demand and therefore prices of survival goods.

Akgündüz for the Institute for the Study of Labor

The number of Syrian refugees in 2012 was approximately 3.4 percent of the population in the three regions with refugee camps while the corresponding number was 5 percent for the six regions in 2013. The coefficients enable us to estimate that the an inflow of refugees equivalent to 1 percent of the population would increase food inflation by 0.2 percentage points or approximately 2.2 percent since the average food inflation rate in the region is around 9%. In economic terms, these effects are not particularly large. The effects are slightly larger for housing inflation but the

11 Negative Arguments

coefficients are not consistently significant in that case. Nevertheless, the results show that the impact of the refugee inflow is consistent with the theoretical framework where higher demand leads to higher inflation.

Patricia Ongpin in the Forces Migration Review

Ongpin, Patricia A. "Refugees: Asset or Burden?" *Forced Migration Review*. FMReview, n.d. Web. <http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR33/37-38.pdf>.

The Tanzanian government attests that the refugee population it hosts has become a burden to the nation's development by exacerbating, if not creating, a scarcity of resources. They assert that the quality of national programmes such as welfare and the national poverty reduction strategy has been compromised by the reallocation of funds from government resources to refugee programmes. It is also argued that the sharing of common goods and infrastructure has strained not only resources but also relations between refugees and citizens who find themselves competing for those goods. This is most often seen in the use of grazing land, water sources and transport routes.

Yasser Abdih and Carolin Geginat on the IMF

Abdih, Yasser, and Carolin Geginat. "The Economic Impact of the Syrian Conflict on Jordan." *International Monetary Fund*. IMF, 30 Sept. 2014. Web. <http://www.imf.org/external/np/blog/nafida/093014.pdf>.

Without the conflict, the annual growth rate for 2013 could have been 4 percent instead of 3 percent. That one percentage point loss might not seem significant, but considering that it translates into a cumulative loss of incomes close to what Jordan received in budget grants last year, it is not easy to dismiss. Inflation rose mainly due to an increase in rental prices as Syrian families were looking for housing in Jordan (only a fourth of all refugees are hosted at the Zaatari refugee camp on the border with Syria). Without the conflict, rents last year would have grown by 2.7 percent instead of 7.7 percent.

Abdih and Geginat of IMF

A recent USAID study attempted to calculate the fiscal impact on Jordan of the Syria conflict. It estimates that the Jordanian government spending has increased by about one percent of GDP in 2013 and in 2014 to meet the humanitarian needs of the Syrian refugees— including for the provision of water, electricity, security, health care, and education services. The rapid rise in the number of users of such public services has also led to the deterioration of their quality (for example, larger class sizes, crowded hospitals, and stresses on the water supply systems). The study estimates that re-establishing the quality of public services to pre-crisis levels would have resulted in additional fiscal spending of 0.6 percent of GDP in 2013 and one percent of GDP in 2014—these are not investment costs, but rather expenses that are needed to ensure that Jordanians are no worse off than they were before the influx of refugees.

Anne Kamau of the Brookings Institute

Kamau, Anne W. “An Economic Perspective on the Refugee Crisis in Africa’s Horn.” The Brookings Institution. Brookings, 12 Sept. 2011. Web. <http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2011/09/12-refugee-crisis-kamau>.

The capacity of these countries to respond to the refugee and internally displaced people crisis is severely constrained because they are also facing difficult economic times. Rising food and fuel prices have led to soaring inflation of 16.7 percent in Kenya, 39.2 percent in Ethiopia and 5.2 percent in Djibouti. With the widespread drought across the region, there has been increased demand for imported food. Simultaneously, these economies have faced a rapid depreciation in their currencies, which further increases the cost of food and medical supplies. With limited instruments to deal with the economic crisis, attempts to stabilize these economies have resulted in yet another problem of rising interest rates. These countries are grappling with the unholy trinity of inflation, rising interest rates and unstable exchange rates. All of these issues are adversely hurting economic growth in Africa’s horn. Unemployment, especially among youth, is compounding the economic situation, which is only exacerbated by the influx of refugees.

11.1.2 Impacts on Education

Razan Nasser and Steven Symansky for USAID

Nasser, Razan, and Steven Symansky. "The Fiscal Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Jordan." USAID. United States Agency for International Development, 5 Jan. 2014. Web. <http://www.frp2.org/english/Portals/0/PDFs/RFP,%20Ads/2015/SYRIAN%20FISCAL%20IMPACT%20February%202014.docx.pdf>.

The country has also been aiming to eliminate the second-shift system and the use of rented school buildings, and has realized some progress.⁸ As of the 2011–2012 academic year, 404 schools, or 7 percent of them, ran the double-shift system (down almost 1 percentage point from the previous year), and 25 percent of schools still had rented buildings (see Table 7). The added pressure of the Syrian crisis is exacerbating the situation. Nearly 53,000 Syrian children have been absorbed into regular first shifts of Jordanian public schools, adding pressure to already overcrowded classrooms. In 2013, 67 schools began operating new second-shift schools to absorb an additional 34,000 students.⁹ Many of the costs related to Syrian students attending second shifts have been absorbed by donor agencies, but the added pressure on the infrastructure and school facilities is not taken into account.

11.2 AT:Economic harms

11.2.1 The harms are offset by benefits to local economies

World Bank's World Development Report

"The Impacts of Refugees on Neighboring Countries: A Development Challenge." World Bank. World Bank, 29 July 2010. Web. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWDR2011/Resources/6406082-1283882418764/WDR_Background_Paper_Refugees.pdf.

The study found a significant increase in the prices of some agricultural goods (e.g., cooking bananas, beans and milk) and a decrease in the price of aid-delivered goods (e.g., maize). As a result, many Tanzanian farmers who produced a surplus benefited from an increased demand for their agricultural products in local markets. Anecdotal evidence suggested that on average, farmers doubled the size of their cultivated land and their production of bananas and beans during 1993-1996 (Whitaker, 2002).

The increase in the size of the local markets also boosted business and trade activities conducted by both hosts and refugees. At the same time, welfare indicators such as electricity, televisions, and refrigerators increased in host population households near refugee camps (Whitaker, 2002).

11.2.2 History shows that the overall economic impact is positive

Andrew Soergel for U.S. News

Soergel, Andrew. "Refugees: Economic Boon or Burden?" U.S. News and World Report. U.S. News, 15 Sept. 2015. Web. <http://www.usnews.com/news/blogs/data-mine/2015/09/15/would-syrian-refugees-be-an-economic-boon-or-burden>.

But such a stance may ultimately prove to be Germany's loss. While a huge number of refugees could potentially strain host countries' capital and resources, a growing pool of research suggests refugees aren't necessarily the economic leeches they're often made out to be. In Cleveland, for example, local refugee services agencies spent about \$4.8 million in 2012 as they helped refugees get established in the area, according to a study conducted by Chmura Economics & Analytics. But the economic impact those refugees had on the community weighed in at about \$48 million, roughly 10 times the initial resettlement costs. "Refugees are more likely to be entrepreneurial and enjoy higher rates of successful business ventures compared to natives," the report said. "At the local level, refugees provide increased demand for goods and services through their new purchasing power and can be particularly revitalizing in communities that otherwise have a declining population."

11.2.3 Refugee influxes can protect against economic shocks of nearby conflicts

Massimiliano Cali and Samia Sekkarie of the Brookings Institute

Cali, Massimiliano, and Samia Sekkarie. "Much Ado about Nothing? The Economic Impact of Refugee 'invasions'" The Brookings Institution. The Brookings Institution, 16 Sept. 2015. Web. <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/future-development/posts/2015/09/16-economic-impact-refugees-cali>.

In fact, the inflow of refugees has arguably helped the Lebanese economy withstand the negative effect of its neighbor's civil war. Refugees have been an important source

of demand for locally produced services in Lebanon, funded from own savings and labor income, from remittances of relatives abroad and from international aid. In a recent World Bank report we estimate that an additional 1 percent increase in Syrian refugees increases Lebanese service exports by 1.5 percent. And the UNHCR and U.N. Development Program estimate a similar economy-wide impact from the \$800 million that the U.N. spends annually on Syrian refugees in Lebanon. These effects are not unique to Syrian refugees. Burundian and Rwandan refugees fleeing war in the 1990s have generated net economic gains for their Tanzanian host communities.

11.3 Harms to Security

11.3.1 Security forces are displaced

Razan Nasser and Steven Symansky for USAID

Nasser, Razan, and Steven Symansky. "The Fiscal Impact of the Syrian Refugee Crisis on Jordan." USAID. United States Agency for International Development, 5 Jan. 2014. Web. <http://www.frp2.org/english/Portals/0/PDFs/RFP,%20Ads/2015/SYRIAN%20FISCAL%20IMPACT%20February%202014.docx.pdf>.

The security sector has several responsibilities related to the Syrian refugees. In addition to their regular role within Jordanian communities, the Gendarmerie, Civil Defense, and Police (Public Security) are responsible for providing security services for the refugee camps. In contrast to these three services that provide regular services to the camps, the military operates very differently. The military's traditional security role inside Jordan is to become involved only in the case of riots or mass demonstrations, and only when the Police and the Gendarmerie need assistance. However, with regard to the refugees, the military have become the first responders, and are responsible for assisting refugees on arrival and transporting them from the border. Furthermore, compared to the pre-conflict period, they have substantial added aerial and ground responsibility as they patrol and receive refugees along the 378 kilometers of the border. In order to provide security within the camps, the Gendarmerie, Civil Defense, and Police have withdrawn manpower and equipment from other parts of the country. Not surprisingly, this has reduced the quality of services in their traditional areas of responsibility in local communities.

Patricia Ongpin of Syracuse University

Ongpin, Patricia. "Refugees in Tanzania – Asset or Burden?" Syracuse University. *Journal of Development and Social Transformation*, Nov. 2008. Web. <https://www.maxwell.syr.edu/uploadedFiles/moynihan/dst/Ongpin.pdf?n=2546>.

Government reports have indicated that strengthened efforts towards internal security have been required due to an increase in crimes committed by refugees. The national government and local individuals have attested that crime rates have increased since the introduction of large amounts of refugees in the country. Crime is more prevalent in refugee affected areas, such as Kigoma in the western portion of the country. Refugees have been connected with the proliferation of arms, thus causing an increase in armed robbery (Rutinwa, 2003, p. 15). These trends are illustrated in Table 1, where the two refugee areas of Kigoma and Kagera certainly have the largest incidences of crime for the years of 2000 and 2001.

11.3.2 Safety of locals

Inge Brees of the International Relations and Security Network

Brees, Inge. "Burden or Boon: The Impact of Burmese Refugees on Thailand." The International Relations and Security Network. ISN, 2010. Web. <http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=116622>.

In such cases, refugees can pose a security threat to the host country. For example, they can attract attacks from across the border which present a hazard to the local populations or they can be mixed in with the armed forces as in the case of Interahamwe with the Tutsi in the Congo. Relief aid can be used by leaders to control their fellow refugees and finance their own insurgent activities, which can prolong the conflict in a country of origin. Moreover, refugee camps provide a breeding ground for political radicalism, militancy, and recruitment into rebel groups. If a violent act is committed, there is often no adequate law enforcement system to punish the offenders. Since most camps are not entirely closed, the problems of crime, violence, and militarization leach out into the surrounding host community. ¹ The presence of refugees can thus pose a security problem, but the host country is usually also affected on a political, economic and environmental level. For example, large numbers of refugees who are in desperate need of cash are in a weak bargaining position. They

feel obliged to accept lower wages, which may have a detrimental effect on the wages and employment rates of the native population. This can result in rising tensions, as was the case recently in South Africa, where survival migrants from Zimbabwe were blamed for declining economic conditions. Governments usually try to reduce potential tensions by compelling refugees to stay in camps.

11.3.3 Transnational Security

World Bank's World Development Report

"The Impacts of Refugees on Neighboring Countries: A Development Challenge." World Bank. World Bank, 29 July 2010. Web. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWDR2011/Resources/6406082-1283882418764/WDR_Background_Paper_Refugees.pdf.

The direct role of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), a government-in-exile formed by Palestinian refugees, in the civil wars both in Jordan (1970) and Lebanon (1975) are examples of refugees as combatants within a host country (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006). Another example is the recruitment of Liberian refugees by insurgent movements in Sierra Leone that caused destabilization and violent conflicts during the second half of the 1990s (Hoffman, 2007). Refugees can also serve as domestic opposition groups in the host country with material resources and motivation to wage their own armed battles. For instance, Somali refugees have often worked closely with ethnic Somali separatists in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. c) Creation of bilateral tensions. At times, refugees can pose a security and political threat to the host country; and this, in turn can create tensions in bilateral relations between neighboring countries. Examples include the involvement of Sri Lankan Tamil refugees in the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 over his perceived accommodation of the Sri Lankan government, and the involvement of Rwandan Tutsi refugees in Uganda in the removal of the Milton Obote administration (1980-1985) (Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006).

11.3.4 Trafficking

Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times

Kristof, Nicholas. "Compassion for Refugees Isn't Enough." The New York Times. The New York Times, 09 Sept. 2015. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/10/opinion/>

[nicholas-kristof-compassion-for-refugees-isnt-enough.html?_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/07/opinion/nicholas-kristof-compassion-for-refugees-isnt-enough.html?_r=0).

If you have a heart, you're moved by the refugees. But if you have a head, you also know that welcoming them in Germany won't resolve the crisis. There are 60 million people displaced worldwide, and more will now be willing to board flimsy boats to cross the sea. "The trickle of refugees is only going to get bigger," says Joshua Landis, a Syria expert at the University of Oklahoma. "Once people see that refugees are going to be taken in by the West, they're going to stampede. This problem is going to metastasize." Unless we're careful, the upshot could be more drowned toddlers. As we inadvertently boost this tide of refugees, beneficiaries will include human smugglers and skinheads, neo-Nazis and far-right xenophobic politicians. An anti-immigrant party now leads the polls in Sweden, and Germany has reported 340 attacks on asylum seekers, including an apparent arson this week at a home sheltering them. So by all means let's respond with compassion to the refugees (not as jerks, as Hungarian officials have). But above all, let's address the crisis at its roots, particularly in the Middle East.

11.4 AT: Harms to security

11.4.1 Prioritization of the needs of refugees would solve this problem

Karen Jacobsen of Tufts University

Jacobsen, Karen. "The Forgotten Solution: Local Integration for Refugees in Developing Countries." UNCHR. Tufts University, July 2001. Web. <http://unhcr.org/3b7d24059.pdf>.

During the Cold War, permanent asylum and local integration were widely practiced particularly in asylum countries in the West. In developing countries, the full offer of permanent asylum and integration was less widely implemented. Many host governments, particularly in Africa, permitted refugees to settle amongst the local host community without official assistance – a practice known as self-settlement. However, the legal aspects of local integration, which require that refugees be granted full refugee status, permanent residency and other human and civil rights, were seldom granted by host governments in developing countries.

Jacobsen of Tufts University

Protracted situations are characterized today by a ‘care and maintenance’ or ‘warehousing’ model of refugee assistance in countries of first asylum. Host governments, UNHCR, donor governments and international agencies have, with a few exceptions, been unimaginative in their response to long term refugee populations. There is no vision that refugees and assistance programs could be a development asset to countries of first asylum, or that they could promote human security there. To quote one observer, “In a refugee context questions of development and human capabilities are put on hold – the situation is supposed to be merely temporary after all.” This failure to look for more creative and positive approaches to protracted refugee situations represents an extraordinary waste of resources. As Jeff Crisp, a UNHCR officer once remarked, “It doesn’t make sense to confine refugees to camps and to insist that they survive on food aid when agricultural and income-generating opportunities are waiting to be exploited.” How refugees in protracted situations should be settled and assisted in host countries is one of the challenges facing the international refugee regime. The problem is not simply how best to help refugees, but, given the climate of restrictive and temporary asylum, it is about how to find solutions that are acceptable to host countries – for without the host country’s acquiescence and active involvement it will be much more difficult to help refugees. In many ways, it is as important to focus on the needs and constraints of host countries and governments as much as on those of refugees.

U.S. Department of State

“Field Evaluation of Local Integration of Former Refugees in Tanzania.” State.gov. Department of State, 8 Sept. 2014. Web. <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/235056.pdf>.

When they were informed about the relocation plans, they were told not to build permanent structures or plant long-term crops, so their sense of security and their productivity decreased. At the same time, the level of services decreased, because district officials were told to limit investments, as the settlements were to close when the 1972 Burundians relocated to other parts of Tanzania. This decrease in public services included closing secondary schools in the settlements.

11.4.2 Security harms are usually isolated

World Bank's World Development Report

"The Impacts of Refugees on Neighboring Countries: A Development Challenge." World Bank. World Bank, 29 July 2010. Web. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWDR2011/Resources/6406082-1283882418764/WDR_Background_Paper_Refugees.pdf.

In most cases, the presence of refugees does not have a significant negative impact on the political and security situation of the host countries. Thus, the first section of this brief notes that out of the seven countries that have experienced some form of internal civil war or insurgency, and that host more than 100,000 refugees from a single country of origin, the presence of these refugees are only linked to the conflict in two cases, namely in Pakistan and in Chad. In the remaining five countries, the presence of refugees is not related to political and security instability.

11.4.3 Accommodating refugees serves to hinder extremism

Anne Speckhard of the New York Times

Speckhard, Anne. "How Dragging Our Feet on Refugees Creates More Terrorists." The New York Times. The New York Times, 28 Sept. 2015. Web. <http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/opinion/how-dragging-our-feet-on-refugees-creates-more-terrorists.html>.

Counterterrorism data is clear: Most of the terrorists on American soil do not come from the ranks of refugees but are individuals who are born here and who become vulnerable to recruitment because of mental illness, social marginalization, issues of discrimination and other factors that have nothing to do with admitting refugees into our country. Meanwhile, the vast majority of war-torn Syrian refugees are fleeing terrorist groups. But they are at risk. Experience from many conflict zones teaches us that the longer these refugees are left to languish in despair in camps the more prone they become to radicalization. Just as gangs attract youth in inner cities, terrorists are adroit at exploiting the most vulnerable who might turn to them for security, justice and even hope. Young men, in particular, gravitate to perceived models of strength and protection. In my book "Talking to Terrorists," I wrote about a young Chechen in a refugee camp in the Russian Republic of Ingushetia, who explained that his father had been crippled by the conflicts and the youth wanted to join the "Islamic brothers" (meaning Chechen terrorist groups) because they, unlike his father, "were real men."

12 Pro Cards cut by Rebecca Kuang

12.1 Status Quo

12.1.1 Hundreds of thousands of refugees are fleeing violence in Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, and other countries.

BBC News, “Why is EU struggling with migrants and asylum?” BBC News, 21 September 2015.
<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24583286>

The scale of the crisis has put huge pressures on some destination countries, particularly Greece, Austria, and Hungary. At least 350,000 migrants crossed the EU’s borders in January-August 2015, compared with just 280,000 during the whole of 2014. And that 350,000 figure - an estimate from the International Organization for Migration (IOM) - does not include the many who crossed a border undetected. Among the forces driving people to take such risks are the conflicts raging in Syria and Afghanistan, and human rights abuses in Eritrea. The majority - 62% - of those who have reached Europe by boat so far this year are from those three countries. There are also people setting out from Libya, Sudan, Pakistan, Nigeria, Kosovo, Iraq, Iran Darfur, Somalia and other countries in the hope of a new life somewhere like Germany, France or the UK.

12.1.2 The international community has done a terrible job aiding refugees.

Rajan Menon, [Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of Political Science at the Colin Powell School of the City College of New York/City University of New York and a Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at Columbia University.] “Wake Up, World: Time to Step Up Support for Syria’s Refugees,” The National Interest, 9 September 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/wake-world-time-step-support-syrias-refugees-13800>

But Europe is not an outlier. Indeed, moral minimalism is even more evident elsewhere. The scholar and human-rights advocate, Michael Ignatieff, observes in a re-

cent op-ed piece that his native Canada has admitted only 1,074 Syrians; the United States: 1,500; Australia: 2,200; and Brazil: fewer than 2,000. He's outraged by these paltry numbers, but Amnesty International reports that Russia, South Korea and Singapore are among the economically advanced countries that haven't allowed any Syrian refugees in, adding that worldwide only 104,410 placements have been offered since 2011—less than 3 percent of the refugees now living in Lebanese, Turkish and Jordanian camps.

12.1.3 Persian Gulf countries have done very little to resettle refugees.

Rajan Menon, [Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of Political Science at the Colin Powell School of the City College of New York/City University of New York and a Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at Columbia University.] “Wake Up, World: Time to Step Up Support for Syria's Refugees,” *The National Interest*, 9 September 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/wake-world-time-step-support-syrias-refugees-13800>

Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon struggle to cope with their four million Syrian refugees. Together, Iraq and Egypt host another 381,838. By contrast, the oil-rich Persian Gulf monarchies condemn Assad's brutality loudly and routinely, but have not resettled any Syrian refugees. That's not for lack of resources; their per-capita incomes are among the world's highest. Despite the tumble in oil prices, Kuwait's was \$55,470 last year, and Saudi Arabia's was \$26,340. (The figure for Jordan, where the number of Syrian refugees is expected to top 900,000 by year's end, is less than half of Saudi Arabia's.) True, the Gulf countries have contributed money to UN agencies caring for Syria's refugees: Saudi Arabia has given \$18.4 million; Kuwait: \$304.6 million. That's not chump change, but neither is it generous considering that the former's foreign exchange reserves totaled \$756 billion in 2014, and the latter's \$38.5 billion.

12.1.4 Germany has pushed for other EU members to do more, but has met resistance.

BBC News, “Why is EU struggling with migrants and asylum?” BBC News, 21 September 2015. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-24583286>

Germany has been critical of France and the UK over the countries' relatively meagre commitments to take people in and called on all EU members to do more. Earlier this month, European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker set out proposals

for 120,000 additional asylum seekers to be distributed among EU nations, with binding quotas. Mr Juncker's proposals were criticised by the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Romania.

12.2 Economy

12.2.1 Welcoming refugees would benefit the host country's economic objectives—Canada is proof.

Kareem El-Assai, [Research Associate, Education & Immigration, the Conference Board of Canada], "Why Does Canada Accept Refugees?" 21 January 2015, http://www.conferenceboard.ca/commentaries/immigration/01-21/why_does_canada_accept_refugees.aspx

Canada's refugee policy also contributes to national economic objectives. For example, many of the Hungarian refugees resettled in Canada in 1956 were viewed as adaptable and were received during a period of economic expansion when the country needed more labourers. It has also been argued that Canada selectively accepted highly skilled Czechoslovakian refugees in 1968 because they were seen as potentially valuable contributors to the economy.⁸ Today, Canada faces pressing demographic challenges and requires high levels of immigration to maintain a competitive economy. Although refugees are brought in on humanitarian grounds, they do bolster the national population and labour force and contribute to the economy. It is also often overlooked that, like economic immigrants, refugees are capable of possessing skills, education, and work experiences beneficial to Canada's economy.

12.3 Germany

12.3.1 Germany's cannot shoulder the full burden—other EU countries must act.

Patrick Kingsley, [The Guardian], "Syrian refugees in Hungary:"This is the so-called developed Europe?" 7 September 2015, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/sep/07/syrian-refugees-hungary-camp-cold-hungry>

The scene highlighted how Germany's recent generosity will not alone be enough to deal with a steady flow of refugees that is likely to continue until mid-October, when the weather in the Aegean sea makes the crossing between Turkey and Greece

more dangerous. Although Germany welcomed a few thousand from Hungary over the weekend, there could be at this moment up to 50,000 making their way to Hungary from the Greek islands, based on the latest estimates of refugees in each of the countries on the Balkan route. In a week's time, most of those 50,000 will have been replaced by a similar number of new refugees. Several thousand are reportedly at the Macedonian border, and the International Rescue Committee says up to 25,000 are on the island of Lesbos.

12.4 Gulf States

12.4.1 Gulf states need to do more to share the burden.

Nile Gardiner [director of the Heritage Foundation's Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom], "Five Key Points on Europe's Refugee Crisis," 8 September 2015, Heritage Foundation, <http://dailysignal.com/2015/09/08/five-key-points-on-europes-refugee-crisis/>.

As tens of thousands of refugees make their way to Europe, it is important to point out that the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE, Oman, and Kuwait) have not opened their doors to those displaced by the fighting in Syria. For example, Jordan has taken more than 630,000 refugees but has a per capita income of only \$11,000. Qatar has a per capita income of \$143,000 and has not taken any refugees from Syria. This is a reflection of the Gulf Cooperation Council's broader attitude toward the fight against ISIS in Syria and Iraq, which is one of reluctance to get involved in any meaningful way.

12.5 International Treaties

12.5.1 The 1951 Refugee Convention obligates states to take in refugees.

Holly Yan [CNN], "Are countries obligated to take in refugees? In some cases, yes," CNN, September 9, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/08/world/refugee-obligation/>.

The 1951 Refugee Convention was adopted after World War II, when hundreds of thousands of refugees were displaced across Europe. The treaty defines what refugees are – those who is seeking refuge from persecution. It also gives them a very important right – the right to not be sent back home into harm's way, except under extreme

circumstances. “Since, by definition, refugees are not protected by their own governments, the international community steps in to ensure they are safe and protected,” said the UNHCR, the United Nations’ refugee agency. The treaty was amended in 1967, in part to include refugees from around the world. And according to the provisions, “refugees deserve, as a minimum, the same standards of treatment enjoyed by other foreign nationals in a given country and, in many cases, the same treatment as nationals,” the UNHCR said. The agency said more than 50 million refugees have been resettled.

12.5.2 142 states have signed on to the Refugee Convention.

Holly Yan [CNN], “Are countries obligated to take in refugees? In some cases, yes,” CNN, September 9, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/08/world/refugee-obligation/>.

Over the past several decades, 142 states have signed on to both the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 protocol. Hungary is one of the signatories. But it has been criticized by migrants and activists who say refugees are left in decrepit conditions as they await transfer. Now, Hungary is erecting a fence at the Serbian border to help control the flow of migrants. Countries outside of Europe are also stepping up to handle the current flood of refugees. Venezuela, which signed on to the 1967 protocol, said it will take in 20,000 refugees. Australia said it has absorbed 4,500 refugees from Syria and Iraq over the past year. Noticeably absent from the list: the Gulf states of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.

12.5.3 States are also bound the principle of non-refoulement to grant asylum to refugees if they are fleeing violence.

Catherine Phuong, [University of Newcastle, UK], “Identifying States’ Responsibilities towards Refugees and Asylum Seekers,” 2005, <http://www.esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/Phuong.PDF>.

While there is no obligation under international law to grant asylum to refugees, states are still bound by the principle of non-refoulement as defined in article 33 of the 1951 Convention. This principle provides that no refugee shall be returned to any country “where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” This principle is now generally considered to be part of customary international law. 9 It must be noted that the principle is not limited to those formally recognised as

refugees. 10 In other words, asylum-seekers should not be returned to any country where they would face persecution and they benefit from such a prohibition until they are declared not to be refugees

12.6 Principle of Mutual Aid

12.6.1 Countries are bound by the principle of mutual aid to help refugees.

Joseph H. Carens, [Professor, Department of Political Science of the University of Toronto], "Refugees and the Limits of Obligation," *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1992.

I begin with Michael Walzer whose discussion of this topic has shaped much of the subsequent debate.¹ Walzer says that states have a broad moral (as well as legal) right to admit or exclude whomever they choose, because control over admissions is crucial to communal self-determination. Nevertheless, he qualifies this right to exclude in important ways. States are bound, Walzer says, by the principle of mutual aid, the obligation everyone has to help others in urgent need when the cost to oneself is low. So, states may not exclude aliens for the sake of "things superfluous," a phrase Walzer borrows from Hobbes but which he defines more narrowly than Hobbes, counting as not superfluous "the needs of particular historical communities."² Applying these principles to refugees, Walzer argues that mutual aid creates a basic obligation toward refugees. Their need is great and the cost to us of admitting them is low so long as the numbers are small. Where the numbers are large, we are apparently entitled to choose because the cost to us is no longer trivial, although Walzer expresses some ambivalence about this. In any event, our discretion to choose is constrained by the principle of asylum. We must not turn away genuine refugees who have managed to reach our shores.

12.7 Syria

12.7.1 The Syrian conflict has led to the world's worst ongoing humanitarian and refugee crisis.

Senator Dick Durbin and Senator Amy Klobuchar, Letter to President Obama, 21 May 2015, <http://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senators-urge-president-to-allow-more-syrian-refugees-to-resettle-in-us>

The Syrian conflict has led to the world's worst ongoing humanitarian crisis and worst refugee crisis since World War II. More than half of Syria's 23 million people have been forced from their homes. Almost four million Syrians are registered as refugees. The vast majority of these refugees are women and children, including almost two million children, hundreds of thousands of whom are under the age of five. An entire generation of Syrian children is at risk. More than ten thousand Syrian children have been killed, and half of Syrian refugee children are not attending school, more than one hundred thousand are working to support their families, and thousands are unaccompanied or separated from their parents.

12.7.2 Syria is facing the worst humanitarian disaster since the end of the Cold War.

Maithili Bagaria and Melody Tan, "Appropriate Humanitarian Responses to the Syrian Conflict," *Public Diplomacy and Global Policymaking in the 21st Century*, <http://bakerinstitute.tendenciapp.com/media/files/file/pub-QatarReport-070314.pdf#page=36>, 2014.

The UN has called the conflict "the worst humanitarian disaster since the end of the Cold War" (LaFranchi 2013). At the heart of the humanitarian crisis is a lack of food and medical aid. The World Health Organization (WHO) reported that Syria and its neighboring countries face an increased risk of disease epidemics, especially diseases carried in water, such as hepatitis, typhoid, and cholera. These poor health outcomes are primarily due to poor sanitation practices and decreasing availability of and access to clean water (WHO 2013). More troublingly, the Syrian government has laid sieges across Syria, deliberately blocking food and medical aid from reaching opposition-controlled areas to gain an upper hand in the conflict. Government shelling has destroyed local hospitals, forcing medical personnel to treat patients in improvised field clinics. In addition, Syrians are experiencing severe food shortages as a result of these restrictions (Human Rights Watch 2013). However, the Syrian government is not the sole actor in imposing blockades. Inside the city of Aleppo, opposition fighters have prevented supplies from reaching government-controlled areas. Under international humanitarian law, all combatants involved in an armed conflict are obligated to facilitate rapid and unimpeded humanitarian assistance to all civilians in need (Human Rights Watch 2013). To address the international law, on February 22, 2014, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 2139 requiring the opposing parties to stop blocking the delivery of humanitarian aid (United Nations News Center 2014).

12.7.3 The crisis is only going to get worse.

Pinar Yazgan [Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology, Sakarya University], “Syrian Crisis and Migration,” *Migration letters*, Volume 12, No. 3, 16 August 2015.

Syrian crisis was not expected and began to produce refugees in April 2011. Now 4 years on, there are estimated to be over 6 million displaced about two thirds of whom headed abroad, most arrived in neighbouring countries. Today, the UNHCR reports 2.1 million registered Syrians in Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Lebanon, more than 24,000 Syrian refugees registered in North Africa and 1.95 million registered Syrians in Turkey (<http://data.unhcr.org>, 06.09.2015). In order to understand the whole picture, we also need to consider Syrian refugees who cannot able to register to the officials and/or try irregular ways to stay in other countries. This number is not stable as Syrians continue to stream into different countries. Since the environment of human insecurity² in Syria gives no signs to change in the foreseeable future, it seems that large-scale refugee movements from this country will continue. Thus, Syrian’s intensifying refugee crisis together with human tragedies in the Mediterranean Sea diverted public as well policy makers’ attention to the subject. Particularly, policy makers whose main focus on possible impacts of refugees on their country became to discuss humanitarian aspect of the topic and they also emphasised the importance of a collective responsibility in the field.

12.7.4 Root causes of violence in Syria are unlikely to disappear soon—Syrian refugees desperately need help.

Pinar Yazgan [Assistant Professor at the Department of Sociology, Sakarya University], “Syrian Crisis and Migration,” *Migration letters*, Volume 12, No. 3, 16 August 2015.

Nevertheless, the root causes in Syria are unlikely to disappear soon. Long before the current violence, this was a country of multifaceted problems: unemployment, income inequality, suppression of minorities, suppression of opposition is just a few issues to name. If one wants economic drivers for migration, the average GDP per capita in Syria has been about a third of –or less- that is in Turkey, and about a tenth of the averages in most European countries. This means even without the current violence, there were adequate reasons for many Syrians to leave. The violence is perhaps providing an opportunity framework to facilitate the process. We should not also forget that the conflict migration is not a Syrian problem, it is a wide spread issue

and the responses to this must be transnational and comprehensive in nature. We mean, offering more blankets and tents here and there will only sooth the upset of the giver but will not alleviate the much deeper issues countries like Syria are facing. Therefore, any effort to manage migration has to focus on securing livelihoods for people in their home countries. Syrian migration will continue for the foreseeable future just like Iraqi emigration and Afghan emigration continues; after a while it may slow down but Europe must accept to live with sizeable Syrian immigrant communities from now on. If there is no settlement about the crisis in Syria these outflows will remain to be strong for a long while. United States

12.7.5 The United States has a moral obligation to admit more Syrian refugees.

David Wolpe [Max Webb Senior Rabbi of Sinai Temple in Los Angeles], “The US Has a Moral Obligation to Help Syrian Refugees,” *Time*, September 9 2015, <http://time.com/4024901/the-u-s-has-a-moral-obligation-to-help-syrian-refugees/>

The U.S. has admitted some 1,500 Syrian refugees. With our resources, we can devote more time and energy to the vetting process involved when admitting. Will we ever get it wrong? Of course. But the U.S. standard has been to admit those with a well founded fear of persecution, a criteria more than amply met by those fleeing the conflict in Syria. There is a temptation for everyone who has made it safely to the shore of a secure nation to roll up the drawbridge behind them. Those who come after may spoil it for those who are already here. But America was founded on the ideal of refuge. Indifference is a betrayal of its founding mission. The words on the Statue of Liberty cannot be an empty promise if we are to remain the great nation we have been for close to 250 years.

12.7.6 Soft power—if the United States increases the number of Syrian refugees accepted, it would send a signal about its concern worldwide.

Senator Dick Durbin and Senator Amy Klobuchar, Letter to President Obama, 21 May 2015, <http://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senators-urge-president-to-allow-more-syrian-refugees-to-resettle-in-us>

While the United States is the largest donor of humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees, we must also dramatically increase the number of Syrian refugees that we accept for resettlement. The United States has a moral obligation to assist countries

that are hosting Syrian refugees, but we also have a national security interest in maintaining stability in this critical region. Moreover, at this delicate moment in relations between the United States and the Arab world, offering safe haven to more Syrian refugees will send a positive signal about our concern for the suffering of innocent Syrian civilians.

12.7.7 Other countries have reached a tipping point- the US must step in and help.

Senator Dick Durbin and Senator Amy Klobuchar, Letter to President Obama, 21 May 2015, <http://www.durbin.senate.gov/newsroom/press-releases/senators-urge-president-to-allow-more-syrian-refugees-to-resettle-in-us>

The Syrian refugee crisis is perhaps the most serious challenge to the legal obligation to protect refugees since World War II. Upon returning from a recent visit to the region, a delegation of officials from the U.S. Catholic Conference of Bishops (USCCB) said the crisis “has reached a ‘tipping point,’ in which countries in the region are no longer able to handle the flow of refugees across their borders.” Indeed, we cannot expect countries hosting Syrian refugees to continue shouldering such a disproportionate burden if the United States and other industrialized countries do not begin resettling many more Syrian refugees. UNHCR is seeking to resettle 130,000 Syrian refugees over the next two years and has thus far submitted more than 12,000 resettlement cases to the United States for consideration. Refugee Council USA, a nonpartisan coalition of the leading U.S. refugee organizations (including Church World Service, HIAS, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, Episcopal Migration Ministries, USCCB, National Association of Evangelicals’ World Relief), recently called for the United States to resettle at least 65,000 of these Syrian refugees by the end of 2016.

12.7.8 The US is obligated to step in—the crisis was caused by the failure of US policy in the Middle East.

Nile Gardiner [director of the Heritage Foundation’s Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom], “Five Key Points on Europe’s Refugee Crisis,” 8 September 2015, Heritage Foundation, <http://dailysignal.com/2015/09/08/five-key-points-on-europes-refugee-crisis/>.

Europe’s refugee crisis cannot be separated from the broader failure of Obama’s disastrous approach to the Middle East. Four million Syrians have been forced to flee

their country after years of civil war and the relentless rise of ISIS. The Obama administration's complete lack of a strategy in dealing with the Syrian issue has allowed the brutal regime of Bashar al-Assad to remain in power, while ISIS has grown in strength at the same time. As former U.K. Defense Secretary Liam Fox made clear in an address to The Heritage Foundation last week, there will be no end to the European migrant crisis until ISIS is defeated and the Syria situation is resolved. U.S. leadership matters in the world, and at present, there is very little of it

12.8 Women and Girls

12.8.1 Millions of Syrian women need assistance and access to reproductive health services.

Samira Sami [John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health] and Monica Onyango [Boston University], "Responding to the Syrian crisis: The needs of women and girls," *The Lancet*, November 2013.

Inside Syria, about 1.7 million women of reproductive age are in need of assistance and do not have access to reproductive health services.³ The human rights violations occurring in Syria, such as attacks on civilians and hospitals,⁶ affect women's access to safe deliveries, and antenatal and postnatal care. Recent reports document that a growing proportion of total deliveries are done by caesarean sections in Homs (66%), Aleppo (60%), and Damascus (52%) because of safety concerns and fears of having an unattended birth. Similarly, more women are giving birth at home than were before the crisis.¹⁸ Both caesarean section deliveries and at-home births pose risks that can threaten the life of the mother and newborn baby.

12.8.2 Without foreign assistance, women and girls will not have access to the health care they need.

Samira Sami [John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health] and Monica Onyango [Boston University], "Responding to the Syrian crisis: The needs of women and girls," *The Lancet*, November 2013.

The realities of a continuing acute emergency, in addition to the situation of Syrian refugees who have crossed the border into neighbouring countries, challenge the implementation of services, including MISIP, mainly when attempting to scale-up and

expand services. As the Syrian crisis continues, the humanitarian response will be faced with provision of both comprehensive reproductive health services and additional MISP priority services for the newly displaced. Other priorities include the importance of maintaining of a contraceptive supply chain, continuing training of staff, and provision for community education. The use of syndrome-based treatment for sexually transmitted infections is essential, since infections, if left untreated, can lead to serious long-term health effects. The continuation of antiretroviral drugs to those on treatment for HIV needs to be maintained to prevent drug resistance, and the provision of culturally appropriate sanitary materials to women and girls could become a part of hygiene non-food-item distribution.¹⁰ Despite the complexities of the situation, relief agencies emphasise that the focus on women is a key strategy in the effort to improve the health of the Syrian community.⁸ Reproductive health needs are increasingly being recognised in crises. Although guidelines and standards now exist, the 2004 Global Evaluation of Reproductive Health in Crises reported gaps in funding, institutional capacity, and access to effective interventions.¹² The Syrian crisis is complex; the refugee numbers continue to increase and the strain on host communities is exacerbated. The long-term implications for reproductive health services have been noted by host governments and UN agencies in an effort to support the continued, rather than sporadic, provision of essential services. These services include human resources for health-care provision, health technologies and pharmaceuticals, health-information systems, and health-care financing.⁵

12.8.3 This crisis calls for expedited registration of refugees.

Samira Sami [John Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health] and Monica Onyango [Boston University], “Responding to the Syrian crisis: The needs of women and girls,” *The Lancet*, November 2013.

Despite the increased complexity of these settings, the humanitarian community has improved the status of reproductive health in displaced populations.²⁰ Reports from the Iraqi crisis have improved the humanitarian response for refugees overall.¹⁴ Nevertheless, lessons learnt from more than a decade of emergencies²⁰ emphasise that health systems are under substantial strain, and that attention must be given to the integration of services within national health systems to support host governments with equity between host and refugee populations.⁵ Recommendations to support women and girls include new approaches for reaching hard-to-access populations within Syria, and improved coverage of out-of-camp refugees. Additionally, increased

access to cash assistance, in place of in-kind support, is needed to mitigate risks for sexual exploitation and abuse. Expedited registration of refugees needs to be continued to ensure continuing access to life-saving reproductive health services and to offer protection for women and girls who are at increased risk for abuse. Despite the opening of additional refugee camps in neighbouring countries, long-term strategies must address the growing tensions about access to livelihoods and services in host communities.⁵ Ultimately, because of the extended nature of the conflict, the humanitarian response and development agendas need to be integrated to provide opportunities to strengthen health, education, and sanitation infrastructure to accommodate the refugees and host communities.

12.9 AT Diplomacy with Assad

12.9.1 Negotiations—even the recent negotiations between Merkel and Assad- won't go anywhere.

Kristin Helberg, [only accredited Western correspondent in Syria from 2001 to 2008,] “New German Syria policy: Is Assad the solution?” 24 September 2015, <http://www.dw.com/en/new-german-syria-policy-is-assad-the-solution/a-18740505>.

Kristin Helberg: The Assad regime has been taking part in negotiations since 2012. In this respect, Merkel hasn't really said anything new. Negotiations with the Assad regime have been taking place on a regular basis. Staffan de Mistura, the United Nations Special Envoy for Syria, travels to Damascus on a regular basis to hold talks. So there is no question about seeking a political resolution supported by the federal government of Germany. This is not really something new. There should be no misunderstanding about Assad being accepted as a partner, for example, against the “Islamic State”, or as a partner in talks about refugees. That is not what Merkel said and I don't think it is what she intends to do. Why has the dialogue not got us anywhere until now? If you speak to the representatives who took part in talks in Geneva and Montreux, they often say that the Syrian regime has torpedoed all progress because Assad himself and his people have no reason to talk about a change of power as they still have enough international support - mainly from Iran and the Lebanese Hezbollah, who fight on Assad's side. Moreover, Russia has been holding its protective hand over Syria in the UN Security Council. No matter how weak Assad is in the country itself, the support has not led him to make any compromises.

12.9.2 Even if Assad formed an alliance, he would barely provide any help.

Kristin Helberg, [only accredited Western correspondent in Syria from 2001 to 2008;]“New German Syria policy: Is Assad the solution?” 24 September 2015, <http://www.dw.com/en/new-german-syria-policy-is-assad-the-solution/a-18740505>.

Bashar al Assad is militarily very weak in his country. He is only able to hold his territory - the center of Damascus and the coastal region – with the massive support of Iran, Hezbollah and Russia. That means he actually cannot offer much in the way of an alliance in the battle against IS. Moscow would like to forge such an alliance but that would be a mistake, because Assad has not been fighting IS; on the contrary, he has been fighting on the IS side against all the other groups, and mainly moderate rebel groups. The international alliance needs ground troops. But who is fighting on the ground against IS? Not Assad’s forces - they would probably run away from IS. The Syrian army has disintegrated.

12.10 AT Gulf States

12.10.1 Migrants cannot go to Gulf States- they must flee to Europe to have future prospects.

Donna Abu-Nasr, [Bloomberg] “Syria’s Refugees Feel More Welcome in Europe Than in the Gulf,” Bloomberg, September 4, 2015, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-09-04/syria-s-refugees-feel-more-welcome-in-europe-than-in-the-gulf>.

Searching for a new home, Yassir Batal says Germany and its unfamiliar voices and customs are more enticing for his wife and five children than the wealthy Arab states whose culture, religion and language they share. Like so many other Syrians who have escaped civil war, the 36-year-old has ruled out heading south through Jordan to Saudi Arabia or beyond. They wouldn’t be welcomed the same way, he said. “In Europe, I can get treatment for my polio, educate my children, have shelter and live an honorable life,” said Batal, as he left a United Nations office in Beirut, the city that’s been the crossroads for more than a million refugees since the violence started in March 2011. “Gulf countries have closed their doors in the face of Syrians.”

12.11 AT Hungary

12.11.1 Hungary has clamped down the border on the rising tide of refugees.

Yoron Steinbuch and Post Wires, [NYP], “Hungary closes border to lock out Syrian refugees,” New York Post, September 15, 2015. <http://nypost.com/2015/09/16/hungary-closes-border-to-lock-out-syrian-refugees/>

Hungary clamped down on the rising tide of refugees from Syria Tuesday by declaring an emergency and slamming its border with Serbia shut to stem their flow. New measures were imposed as hundreds of migrants amassed in a no-man’s land, where they pitched tents, shouted, “Open the border!” and, in some cases, refused food and water in protest. “I will sit here until they open the border. I cannot go back to Syria. Life in Syria is finished,” said a Kurd from Syria who gave his name as Bawer, Reuters reported. The refugee crisis also claimed more lives Tuesday when at least 22 migrants — including four children — drowned and 249 were rescued when their Greece-bound boat sank off Turkey in the Aegean Sea, AFP reported. Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijarto said the razor-wire fence that the country completed along the Serbian border would be extended for “a reasonable distance” along the border with Romania. Romanian and Serbian officials decried the severe measures. “Raising a fence between two EU member states who are strategic partners is not a fair gesture from a political point of view, according to the European spirit,” the Romanian Foreign Ministry said. “No one will be sent back. Serbia is not a concentration camp,” declared Aleksandar Vulin, minister for labor and social policy, The Telegraph reported. “You cannot send them to Serbia without their permission.” Hungarian authorities arrested 174 people Tuesday under new laws — 60 of whom face possible terms of five years in prison for “cutting or damaging” the fence and 114 for illegal crossing, which carries a sentence of up to three years, AFP reported. Out of 48 asylum requests made at the main Roszke crossing, Hungary rejected 16 within hours and 32 were being processed, Reuters reported. “The message we want to send is: ‘Don’t come. This route will not take you to your destination,’” Gyorgy Bakondi, Prime Minister Viktor Orban’s chief adviser, told AFP.

12.11.2 Refugees don’t want to stay in Hungary.

Anemona Hartocollis, [Reporter, NYT], “Travelling in Europe’s River of Migrants,” The New York Times, 5 September 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/reporters->

notebook/migrants/hungary-treatment-refugees

One group of Syrian refugees climbed over and under a razor wire fence — with small children and an elderly woman — in order to evade the Hungarian police and thereby have a chance at quickly passing through the country. Most seem to want to move on to other European countries, especially Germany and those in Scandinavia. Their determination to keep moving raises a question: What's so bad about staying in Hungary? When asked, the migrants now stuck at a train station in Budapest say that they put Hungary in much the same category as Macedonia and Serbia, the Balkan countries they passed through on their journey. They see Hungary as having a thin veneer of prosperity, but being fundamentally relatively poor and still developing. And Greece, though developed, is in economic crisis. They want to live in a truly developed land of opportunity. It is common to hear the migrants here say that being in Hungary has been the worst experience they have had on their journey. But take this with a grain of salt. When the migrants were in Greece, Macedonia and Serbia, they talked about how painful that was as well. In some ways, passing through each of those countries is like a difficult and yet hopeful pregnancy. And perhaps like women giving birth, the migrants have to forget the pain of overcoming the last hurdle, or they will never be able to do it again.

12.11.3 Migrants would rather go to Greece or Germany.

Anemona Hartocollis, [Reporter, NYT], "Travelling in Europe's River of Migrants," The New York Times, 5 September 2015. <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/projects/cp/reporters-notebook/migrants/hungary-treatment-refugees>

If they were wary of Hungary before, now that they have been stopped at the train station and forced to sleep on the concrete sidewalk, they are even more disillusioned about their prospects here. Shaded by a concrete barrier, the group sat on a delicate, persimmon-colored blanket, embossed with gold flowers. Like many Syrians, they maintained a sense of decorum by removing their shoes before sitting on their blanket. Yes, perhaps they could rent hotel rooms in Budapest, the friends said. But at this point, if they spent their money on hotels, they would have none left to move on. They said they resented being called eyesores and being blamed for trash. This was not their true nature, they said. There were clues that they had left middle-class lives back in Syria. Mr. Darwish was a law graduate. Another, Imad Ziyad, 23, wore a pair of stylish black and white houndstooth checked shorts and sleek eyeglasses; he was a

dental student. Another, Ahmad Ali, 24, had been an interior design worker. They spoke good English. The young men had tried to sneak across the border from Serbia, but they had been caught by the Hungarian police and taken to a camp where they were fingerprinted. In the camp, they said, all they were given to eat was a piece of bread, a can of sardines and a tiny jar of marmalade. Camp security officers were selling cigarettes at what the Syrians considered extortionary prices of 15 euros a package. “We’ve been through all these countries, this one is definitely the worst,” Mr. Darwish said, sounding like a lawyer. “It is supposed to be an E.U. country, but it has broken every single tenet they had. Greece is such a poor country, and it treated us better.”

12.12 AT Military Intervention

12.12.1 Military intervention would make the conflict worse.

Rajan Menon, [Anne and Bernard Spitzer Professor of Political Science at the Colin Powell School of the City College of New York/City University of New York and a Senior Research Scholar at the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace at Columbia University.] “Wake Up, World: Time to Step Up Support for Syria’s Refugees,” *The National Interest*, 9 September 2015, <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/wake-world-time-step-support-syrias-refugees-13800>

Moreover, military intervention, a blunt instrument, can sometimes make conflicts worse, as witnessed in Libya, where the 2011 attack against Gaddafi, supported by Ignatieff and many others, has begotten violence and chaos. One consequence: Libya has become a favored departure point for refugees from Africa and the Middle East seeking to reach Europe. This year alone, over 30,000 risked perilous voyages across the Mediterranean to Italy, many in makeshift vessels. Many hundreds have drowned. Smugglers, though, have struck gold.

12.13 AT Terrorism

12.13.1 Refugee cases are carefully vetted and screened.

Barnini Chakraborty, [Fox], “US under new pressure to absorb Syrian refugees as Europe faces crisis,” *Fox News*, 3 September 2015, <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/09/04/as-pressure-mounts-for-us-to-open-its-borders-to-syrian-refugees-some-lawmakers/>.

Anne Richard, U.S. assistant secretary of state for population, refugees and migration, disagrees. She recently insisted on NPR that “these cases are the most carefully vetted of any travelers to the United States, and nobody comes in without having a Department of Homeland Security interviewer agree that they are, in fact, bona fide refugees.” To date, 250,000 Syrians have died and 11 million more have been displaced, making Syria the largest single source of refugees in the world, according to Antonio Guterres, the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees.

13 Con Cards cut by Rebecca Kuang

13.1 Population Age

Accepting migrants is in European countries' national interest: Europe's population is growing too old.

Lydia Tomkiw, [IB Times] "Refugee Crisis 2015: Could Syrians Help Europe's Aging Population Problem?" International Business Times, September 10, 2015.

Europe's aging population needs a younger population to look after its elderly, work in healthcare and move to more rural areas that are being emptied out by population decline and economic flight. Europe's countries are "no longer self-sustaining," according to the Guardian, citing government spending on pensions among other indicators. The reverberations of the 2008 economic crisis are still being felt across Europe with high rates of internal European migration as people leave countries, including Portugal and Spain, to find work elsewhere. Portugal's population has been shrinking for the last five years, with the National Statistics Institute estimating that by 2060, it could fall to 6.3 million from 10.5 million. Prime Minister Pedro Passos Coelho has said, "We've got really serious problems."

Refugees from Syria could solve Europe's aging problem.

Lydia Tomkiw, [IB Times] "Refugee Crisis 2015: Could Syrians Help Europe's Aging Population Problem?" International Business Times, September 10, 2015.

European countries have some of the world's most rapidly aging populations, meaning they need more young people to replace retiring workers. As record numbers of refugees continue to try to enter the European Union from conflict-ridden and repressive states, including Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Eritrea, officials said some EU states could benefit from the influx of young refugees and families amid a looming demographic crisis. Here's a look at the current population issues facing Europe.

13.1.1 The countries with the lowest quotas now would benefit most from accepting immigrants.

Lydia Tomkiw, [IB Times] “Refugee Crisis 2015: Could Syrians Help Europe’s Aging Population Problem?” International Business Times, September 10, 2015.

EU officials were debating this week a proposal by European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker that called for resettling 160,000 refugees across states, taking into account the economic conditions of each country. States opposing quotas have questioned how much countries would have to spend on resettlement, integration and possible social support if refugees have difficulty finding employment. Far-right parties across the EU, including France’s rising National Front, have argued that refugees would steal jobs and are being used for cheap labor. Some countries with the lowest fertility rates have been reticent to accept refugee quotas, with the Polish government saying it would not accept a quota system. Spain, however, changed its position after the announcement of Juncker’s plan. If Spain follows the proposed quota system, it would take in the third-largest number of refugees in Europe.

13.2 Instability

13.2.1 European countries face social conflict and instability from the strain of an influx of refugees.

Mark R. Amstutz, [Professor of Political Science, Wheaton College], “International Ethics: Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global Politics,” Rowman & LittleField Publishers, 2013.

Although many developed states face international migration pressures, they are especially acute in several Western European countries (notably France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain) and the United States. Two of the major immigration challenges faced by Europeans are the challenge of integrating non-European peoples more effectively into the fabric of national culture and the need for more effective control of borders, especially maritime borders. The first challenge was graphically portrayed in 2005 when civil unrest broke out in France after the accidental killing of two Muslim teenagers. The riots, which were perpetrated chiefly by French immigrant youths, caused hundreds of millions of dollars of damage. Growing tensions with immigrant groups have also been evident in the Netherlands, a country that has maintained some of the most liberal immigration policies in the world. The Dutch

model of integrating non-Europeans through education has not worked well, however. Muslim immigrants in particular have sought to maintain their own cultural traditions and language rather than integrate into Dutch society. Most Dutch-born members of immigrant families import their spouses from their “home country,” usually Turkey or Morocco. Given the growth in ethnic ghettos, the government has established more restrictive immigration policies, requiring that applicants for residency have not only some knowledge of the Dutch language but also some familiarity with Dutch society and culture. 4

13.3 Moral Priorities

13.3.1 States have unique moral obligations to their own citizens.

Veit Bader, [Professor of Sociology, European University Institute], “The Ethics of Immigration”, *Constellations* Vol. 12, No 3, 2005.

These are strong arguments against unqualified communitarian defenses of priority for compatriots. Do they also convincingly show that nations and democratic polities are “morally irrelevant”?⁸⁹ Is a co-national exactly in the same way a stranger as members of foreign states, as Shue claims?⁹⁰ Four arguments refute this claim: (i) special relations do not only result from intimacy or direct interactions. (ii) It neglects that not only thick, shared values or cultures may create special ties and obligations, but also a common political history, common practices of contestation, and even bitter conflicts.⁹¹ (iii) If and to the degree that there exists a common ethno-national culture compatible with minimal moral requirements, this may create special obligations among those sharing these practices. This argument gains in strength if these cultures are intrinsically intermingled with the huge and morally legitimate variety of practices of liberal democracy.⁹² (iv) Even if states could and should be strictly neutral and antiperfectionist, as many liberal political philosophers claim, their civic relations would generate special political obligations for compatriots neglected by abstract cosmopolitans (and democratic patriotism rightly has pointed out its democratic weakness).⁹³

13.3.2 Closed borders are necessary for trust and democratic culture.

Veit Bader, [Professor of Sociology, European University Institute], “The Ethics of Immigration”, *Constellations* Vol. 12, No 3, 2005.

The necessity of trust and democratic culture is seen to favor closed borders in two different, interconnected ways. First, majority decisions are acceptable only under conditions of trust, meaning that citizens are sufficiently benign and reasonable as not to exploit minorities. Trust is historically linked to “nation-state forms of political integration.”¹¹² This argument is mainly directed against proposals to delegate powers to supranational or global units, but it is also mobilized against immigrants who cannot be trusted owing to their lack of a common history of special relations. Second, the entry of many immigrants who supposedly lack a tradition of, or are even hostile to, civic and democratic culture – like the ‘Catholic Irish’ in the nineteenth century or the ‘fundamentalist Muslims’ nowadays – will inevitably threaten the maintenance and flourishing of democracy. The maintenance of democracy or the protection of “the ongoing process of liberal conversation itself”¹¹³ is a value recognized by ‘thin’ liberal democrats¹¹⁴ and by all stronger democrats (Barber, Unger), democratic communitarians like Walzer, and republicans like David Hollinger or Michael Lind.

13.4 Polls

13.4.1 Americans do not feel obligated for the US to take in refugees.

Daniel Greenfield, [Shillman Journalism Fellow at the Freedom Center], “Majority of Americans: US is Not Responsible for Taking In Refugees,” 20 September 2015, <http://www.frontpagemag.com/point/260188/majority-americans-us-not-responsible-taking-daniel-greenfield>.

Now this is a Huffington Post poll so you can bet that it was loaded every which way, but the respondents still shot down the premise right away. 54 to 27 percent say that the US is not obligated to take in refugees. A majority reject any obligation to take in Syrian refugees by 50 to 27 percent. A majority opposes allowing more Syrian migrants in, even though Obama is doing it anyway. Even support for sending money to Europe to help them is weak, but a majority are willing to go for it.

13.5 Stability

13.5.1 A massive influx of refugees causes social instability.

Philippe Fargues [Director of the Migration Policy Centre], “Europe Must Take On its Shares of the Syrian Refugee Burden, but How?” European University Institute, Migration Policy Center Policy Brief, February 2014.

Beyond economics, the social equilibrium and the political stability of the countries of first asylum are put at risk by the massive influx of Syrian refugees. It has to be borne in mind that nations are not the only lines structuring this part of the world. Religious and ethnic communities which span nations are also of paramount importance. Those fleeing Syria, be they Sunni Arabs, Shia Arabs, Christian Arabs, Muslim Kurds or Syrian Palestinians, naturally find shelter within their community on the other side of the border. With numbers growing their mere presence can become a trigger fanning dormant tensions alight. Moreover, camps and informal settlements sheltering the refugees might easily become hotbeds for terrorist organizations.

13.6 Terrorism

13.6.1 Refugee resettlement allows ISIS and other militant fighters to infiltrate the country.

Barnini Chakraborty, [Fox], “US under new pressure to absorb Syrian refugees as Europe faces crisis,” Fox News, 3 September 2015, <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2015/09/04/as-pressure-mounts-for-us-to-open-its-borders-to-syrian-refugees-some-lawmakers/>.

But not everyone is on board with the idea, warning there’s potential for the Islamic State and other militant fighters to infiltrate the resettlement process. Rep. Peter King, R-N.Y., who chairs the House Homeland Security Counterterrorism and Intelligence Subcommittee, said at a hearing while he believes “the vast majority of Syrian refugees do not have ties to terror groups” he does have “a number of concerns, not the least of which is the lack of on-the-ground intelligence necessary to identify terror links.”

13.6.2 Resettling Syrian refugees in the US would be extremely dangerous.

Chairman Michael McCaul, [Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee], Letter to President Obama, 11 June 2015, <https://homeland.house.gov/files/documents/061115-Letter-Syrian-Refugee%20States.pdf>.

“Despite all evidence towards our homeland’s vulnerability to foreign fighters, the Administration still plans to resettle Syrian refugees into the United States. The Director of the National Counterterrorism Center and the Deputy Director of the FBI both sat before my Committee this Congress and expressed their concern with admitting refugees we can’t properly vet from the global epicenter of terrorism and extremism in Syria. America has a proud tradition of welcoming refugees from around the world, but in this special situation the Obama Administration’s Syrian refugee plan is very dangerous.”

13.6.3 Terrorist operatives will exploit the refugee resettlement program—empirically proven.

Chairman Michael McCaul, [Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee], Letter to President Obama, 11 June 2015, <https://homeland.house.gov/files/documents/061115-Letter-Syrian-Refugee%20States.pdf>.

We are increasingly concerned by the decision to accelerate the resettlement of thousands of Syrian refugees here in the United States despite the serious national security implications of doing so. There is a real risk that individuals associated with terrorist groups will attempt to exploit the refugee resettlement program in order to gain entry into our country. Terrorist networks are constantly probing our defenses and would not hesitate to manipulate a program meant to save those fleeing violence for the purpose of infiltrating operatives onto American soil. Indeed, ISIS’s predecessor al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) has already successfully exploited US government refugee resettlement programs in 2009 when two terrorists responsible for killing four Pennsylvania National Guard soldiers in Iraq in 2005 were granted entry and resettled in Bowling Green, Kentucky.

13.6.4 US screening systems are too vulnerable and lack intelligence sources.

Chairman Michael McCaul, [Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee], Letter to President Obama, 11 June 2015, <https://homeland.house.gov/files/documents/061115-Letter-Syrian-Refugee%20States.pdf>.

Our screening processes currently suffer from vulnerabilities given the dynamic terror threat environment in Syria, the lack of intelligence sources on the ground, and the paucity of biometric and biographic information needed to conduct high-confidence assessments. As FBI's Assistant Director for Counterterrorism testified before the House Homeland Security Committee in February, due to the lack of a U.S. footprint on the ground in Syria "the databases won't have the information we need" for effective vetting. Simply put, we cannot screen against derogatory information we do not have.

13.7 Unsustainable Solution

13.7.1 Syrians do not want to be in Europe- the only sustainable solution is the resolve the war in Syria.

Sreenivasan Jain, "We Don't Want to go to Europe: The Other Reality of Syrian Refugees," October 3, 2015, <http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/we-dont-want-to-go-to-europe-the-other-reality-of-syrian-refugees-1225414>

But life for those who do not want to enter Europe isn't easy in any way. As we reported earlier, many are unemployed, or working for a pittance. In Suruc, kids as young as 12 were working long hours at 1/10th the minimum wage. Moreover, just because they are no longer in Syria doesn't mean they are out of danger. A cultural centre in Suruc, home to thousands of Syrian refugees, bears the scars of recent violence. A peace keeping mission to Kobane was bombed by ISIS just 3 months ago, killing over 30 people. Mahmut, a Turkish journalist, told us: "You can see the effect of the bomb explosion there," pointing at a nearby building, its glass front shattered by the blast. "The victims were from different parts of the country who wanted to just support the reconstruction of Kobane." A little memorial for the dead stood under a tree nearby and there were still traces of bloodstains on the cobblestones. The gaze of Europe has to move from those at its doorstep to supporting the countries

hosting much larger numbers. Resolving the war in Syria is the only solution. It has in its power to push for peace, and not just stem the flow to its doors.

13.7.2 Millions would rather not have to relocate to the west.

Sreenivasan Jain, “We Don’t Want to go to Europe: The Other Reality of Syrian Refugees,” October 3, 2015, <http://www.ndtv.com/world-news/we-dont-want-to-go-to-europe-the-other-reality-of-syrian-refugees-1225414>

But what we witnessed on the Turkish border is the unacknowledged reality of this crisis, that millions are not keen or able to make the journey to the West. The estimated 500,000 refugees on Europe’s doorstep are just 4 per cent of all refugees. The biggest numbers are of those internally displaced in Syria - over 8 million. Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon host a huge 4.5 million between them. Near the border check-post, we met another Syrian man, who lives in Turkey, and makes tentative trips back and forth to Kobane. “I want to come back,” he said. He wasn’t interested in going to Europe. “I have my family here- my father, mother. They are old and I can’t leave them.” In Kobane, 70 per cent of which is destroyed according to an estimate by a Kurdish group, it’s not as if the ISIS can’t strike again. It recently re-entered the city killing hundreds and causing another exodus. Vast areas in the countryside still remain in the conflict zone. But several Syrians we met, say they would still prefer to stay close to the border, rather than risk a European trip. Mustafa, who came to Suruc in South Turkey 18 months ago with his wife and 4 children, said he doesn’t want to go because he wants to be close to his country. “My children can’t recognise their uncle or aunt anymore because they haven’t seen them for a very long time,” he said.

13.7.3 Refugees want to be able to go back to Syria—the focus should be on making Syria safe, not resettling refugees.

Hamish de Bretton-Gordon [chemical weapons advisor to NGOs working in Syria and Iraq], “We’re missing the point about Syrian refugees,” 5 September 2015, Aljazeera, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/09/missing-point-syrian-refugees-150903110038405.html>

Europe and the Middle East are looking at a million refugees needing help today. This figure could easily escalate to five million by the end of the year, unless there is a significant policy shift by the international community towards Syria. But are we

missing the point about opening our doors to Syrian refugees? Surely we must set the conditions to allow them to return as soon as possible to their homes in Syria? Listening to news media today demanding that the UK government and others open their doors to thousands of Syrian refugees strikes me as the completely wrong approach - and illustrates that we really haven't learned lessons from Iraq and Afghanistan. I've been to Syria a bit in the last four years and to Iraq and Afghanistan a lot over the last 25 years. I know many Syrians; every single one wants to return to Syria.

13.7.4 Defeating ISIL should be the focus instead.

Hamish de Bretton-Gordon [chemical weapons advisor to NGOs working in Syria and Iraq], "We're missing the point about Syrian refugees," 5 September 2015, Aljazeera, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2015/09/missing-point-syrian-refugees-150903110038405.html>

Therefore, if you accept the last thesis, ISIL could still have considerable amounts of mustard agent and the capability to make more. This signifies a considerable step up in ISIL's terror campaign, and one wonders where they might go to next. Of course, any hint that this deadly chemical weapon arsenal is moved out of the Iraqi and Syrian theatre of war could have a very significant psychological impact regionally and globally. But as we are helping doctors and first responders on the ground mitigate this threat in Syria, the same should apply outside of the warzone. In sum, we must create a no-fly zone to prevent the haemorrhaging of civilians out of Syria, closely followed by "safe zones" to allow aid in. In conjunction with this, the international military coalition must step up its air and land campaign and hit - very hard - any ISIL units likely to possess or use chemical weapons. This is a red line we absolutely cannot afford to ignore, and we must begin to set the conditions for Syrian refugees to return to Syria, or it will not be one million looking for homes in the UK, Europe and the Middle East, but more like five million, and as early as the end of this year.

13.8 Welfare

13.8.1 Taking in the influx of refugees would hugely strain Europe's welfare systems.

Nile Gardiner [director of the Heritage Foundation's Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom], "Five Key Points on Europe's Refugee Crisis," 8 September 2015, Heritage Foundation, <http://dailysignal.com/2015/09/08/five-key-points-on-europes-refugee-crisis/>.

There can be little doubt that Europe's vast and generous welfare and entitlement systems are a significant attraction for many people seeking to escape poverty in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East and live within the European Union. The addition of hundreds of thousands of migrants, and possibly millions more in the years to come, will lead to a huge strain on welfare resources in European countries. Germany, for example, following the pledges made by Chancellor Angela Merkel, will be compelled to provide housing and schooling for large numbers of non-German speakers. Germany has agreed to take in around 800,000 asylum seekers from Syria. There will also be the issue of integrating a multitude of new immigrants into European cities that are already facing tremendous challenges in terms of assimilation.

13.9 AT Freedom of Movement

13.9.1 **There is no universal human right to freedom of movement and residence.**

At present, state laws and international law do not guarantee a universal human right to international free movement and residence. These liberties are explicitly restricted to "everyone lawfully within the territory of a State," excluding illegal immigrants, and hold only "within that territory," excluding a general right to entry. ⁵¹ Why should there be such a general moral right to free entry, strong enough to generally outweigh competing moral rights, particularly democratic self-determination?⁵² To be plausible, such a view should explicitly reject the ideas that each right is a trump in itself (unrestricted freedom of movement as the most basic human right), that all rights (the long list of – often competing – civil, political, social, and cultural human rights) are equally compossible, and that rights cannot be limited by other normative arguments. The main issue, then, is the weight of a moral right in balancing all relevant normative arguments.

13.9.2 **The presumption of free movement can be overridden.**

Veit Bader, [Professor of Sociology, European University Institute], "The Ethics of Immigration", *Constellations* Vol. 12, No 3, 2005.

There are no 'absolute' rights and the presumption of free movement, like other basic individual rights, can be overridden. "The above mentioned rights shall not be subjected to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to

protect national security, public order, public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present covenant.”⁴⁹ Most defenders of the moral and legal right to exit accept that it can be overridden not only by other basic rights, but also by other special moral and legal obligations. The right to exit does not legitimize evading punishment for serious crimes, payment of debts, compulsory universal military or civil service and, as some argue, even paying back public costs for higher education. Obviously, these limitations can be interpreted very restrictively or very extensively, and the margins of discretion get even wider when it comes to “national security, public order, public health or morals.” Even defenders of as liberal as possible a right to exit do not, in principle, deny the moral legitimacy of some of these limitations.⁵⁰ Equally, the right to internal free movement and settlement is seen to be legitimately limited by other basic individual rights, and also by indigenous peoples’ collective land and autonomy rights, and by prudential and realist arguments – avoiding congestion, necessary regulations of space (traffic, building, city- and regional planning, and so on) – and other important values (e.g., protection of wildlife, nature), which can be interpreted in such an extensive way that little actual freedom is left.

13.10 AT Germany

13.10.1 Germany has created a policy quagmire that has made the situation worse.

Salvator Babones, [The National Interest], “Europe’s Migrant Crisis: Ideals vs Realities,” The National Interest, 16 September 2015.

And what about the non-Syrians among the refugees currently overrunning Europe? It is Germany’s position that most of them should be returned to their home countries. But how? By force? Germany and the other countries of northern Europe will ultimately accept these asylum seekers or face mass homelessness on their streets. Having traversed two continents to find better lives for themselves and their children, they will not voluntarily go home. What Germany has created through three weeks of unrestrained idealism is a policy quagmire that may reverberate for generations. Eventually Europe will go the way of Orbán’s Hungary and reestablish its external borders—though more likely at the Mediterranean coastline than at Hungary’s meaningless border fence. Schengen will survive and those lucky many who made it to Europe in 2015 will remain.

13.11 AT Gulf States

13.11.1 Gulf States have no obligation to take in refugees- it would cause instability and feed into ISIS' appeal.

Holly Yan [CNN], "Are countries obligated to take in refugees? In some cases, yes," CNN, September 9, 2015, <http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/08/world/refugee-obligation/>.

Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the United Arab Emirates have each given millions of dollars to the United Nations to help Syrian refugees. But they haven't housed any of them, according to Amnesty International. "We've been asking that not only the borders of the region are open, but that all other borders – especially in the developed world – are also open," said Antonio Guterres, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Abdul Khaleq Abdulla, a retired professor from United Arab Emirates University, said Gulf states have security on their minds. Gulf states offer little physical support to migrants Gulf states offer little physical support to migrants 02:49 "Having refugees also feeds into ISIS' appeal," Abdulla said. "And it feeds into the violence in the region, which is already the most violent region on Earth. So all in all, anything that goes in the neighborhood impacts the security and the stability of the Arab Gulf states who are by far the most stable and the most secure." And those Gulf states aren't party to the international treaty – so technically, they don't have to help.

13.12 AT International Law

13.12.1 No such treaty exists- efforts to establish a right to territorial asylum have failed miserably.

Catherine Phuong, [University of Newcastle, UK], "Identifying States' Responsibilities towards Refugees and Asylum Seekers," 2005, <http://www.esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/Phuong.PDF>.

There have been numerous attempts to establish a right of territorial asylum. Following the adoption of the UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum in 1967,⁶ the Carnegie Endowment Working Group proposed its first draft Convention on Territorial Asylum in 1972,⁷ which led to the United Nations Conference on Territorial Asylum in Geneva in 1977. The various texts under discussion only indicated that states shall

use their ‘best endeavours’ to grant asylum. Even then, the 1977 Conference miserably failed to adopt the draft Convention, and no further attempt has since been made to develop a right of territorial asylum. 8

13.12.2 There is no binding moral obligation to admit refugees- it is only a humanitarian act.

Mark R. Amstutz, [Professor of Political Science, Wheaton College], “International Ethics: Concepts, Theories, and Cases in Global Politics,” Rowman & LittleField Publishers, 2013.

From a moral perspective, the persons with the strongest claim to admission in the United States are likely to be refugees. Because such individuals have fled their homeland to avoid persecution, there is a general consensus that such persons are entitled to special protection. However, their need of refuge does not entitle them to admission into the United States (or, for that matter, any other state), because admission in the contemporary international system is normally regarded as a humanitarian act, not a binding moral obligation. This is the underlying principle of the 1980 Refugee Act, which views refugee admissions as “an exceptional ex gratia act provided by the United States in furthering foreign and humanitarian policies.”

13.13 AT Monetary Aid

13.13.1 Monetary aid and food aid won’t work.

Inga Vesper, [news and features editor at SciDev.Net], “The wrong solution for the refugee crisis,” SciDev, 14 September 2015, <http://www.scidev.net/global/migration/editorials/wrong-solution-refugee-crisis-syria-EU.html>.

Then there is the rhetoric, starting with the title. A Trust Fund for Africa ignores the fact that the continent’s 54 countries represent a wide variety of societies and economies, each with its own challenges and many with reasonable standards of stable economic growth. The Sahel, for example, comprises ten countries with different government systems, religions and societies that range from politically stable to those governed by warlords and living in fear of terrorist groups. The fund also infantilises North Africa’s people — a trust fund is usually set up for children. Apart from war, what leads many to emigrate from North Africa is food insecurity caused by drought,

unsustainable farming practices and overpopulation. So what's the European Union fund going to do about this? Food aid may seem like a good idea, but in practice it is difficult. Administration in the area is weak, food would have to be shipped from far away and even if supplies get to local airports and cities, who is going to ensure they reach people in remote regions often in greatest need? And once the food runs out, the same problems remain. A different strategy might be to provide money for local people to invest in their businesses to expand the economy, so people can afford imported food.

13.14 AT Moral Obligation

13.14.1 A failure to act is not a moral violation.

Joseph H. Carens, [Professor, Department of Political Science of the University of Toronto], "Refugees and the Limits of Obligation," *Public Affairs Quarterly*, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1992.

In contrast to this kind of case, there are many forms of omission relating to refugees which are not the equivalent of actions and for which we should not be held morally responsible. Not every failure to admit is the moral equivalent of deportation. For example, for almost every (legitimate) asylum claimant who reaches our shore, there are doubtless several in his or her country of origin who face comparable or worse dangers and would welcome an offer of asylum. Is our failure to identify them and make them such offers morally equivalent to deporting the claimant? Are we morally responsible for their plight? I think not. This sort of failure to admit refugees is not the same as denying entry permits. Seeking out such potential candidates might entail unknown, complications. International interventions, even those conducted with the best intentions, often have undesirable side effects. Because of these circumstances, this sort of omission would normally be morally defensible, while deportation of the (legitimate) asylum claimant would not. Even if there were no potentially complicating circumstances, I do not think the failure to seek out claimants would normally be morally equivalent to deporting them or even to denying them entry permits. The chain of causal connections in the world is too great, the range of possible actions too wide for us to be held responsible for the consequences of every action not performed. Responsibility for omissions makes sense only when there is some specific connection to a person or a situation so that it becomes reasonable to assert that we should have acted in that particular case or under those circumstances

13.15 AT Refugee Convention

13.15.1 The 1951 Refugee Convention is too vague to establish an obligation.

Catherine Phuong, [University of Newcastle, UK], "Identifying States' Responsibilities towards Refugees and Asylum Seekers," 2005, <http://www.esil-sedi.eu/sites/default/files/Phuong.PDF>.

It is crucial to determine exactly by which duties states are bound with regard to these two issues. The first difficulty is that the 1951 Refugee Convention does not mention asylum procedures and makes no reference to which state is responsible for determining whether a person is a refugee or not. The assumption has always been that the state where the application was made is responsible for assessing the merits of the claim. As mentioned earlier, this had been the practice of states until the 1990s. To some extent, it could be argued that the transfer of responsibility to examine an asylum application to a 'safe third country' is not incompatible with the duties of the sending states, since the principle of non-refoulement is not violated. The crux of the matter obviously lies in the definition of 'safety'. This should include at a minimum physical safety and protection of the refugee's human rights as defined under international law. The idea of safety should also encompass a guarantee of access to fair asylum procedures. Transfers of responsibility for examining an asylum procedure have raised numerous problems for refugees. For one thing, the 1951 refugee definition has not been uniformly interpreted and it may happen that a person is recognised as a refugee in one country, but not in another. ²³ In practice, states are not able to transfer responsibility to any 'safe third country': the receiving state usually accepts a transfer only where a link between the refugee and that state has been demonstrated, e.g. transit, family link, etc.

13.16 AT Resettlement

13.16.1 Resettlement is not a long-term solution.

Megan Bradley, [Nonresident Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings], "Is Resettlement a Solution for Syria's Refugee Crisis?" November 13, 2013, Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/11/13-syria-refugee-crisis-bradley>.

As a resettlement caseworker with UNHCR, the UN refugee agency, in Cairo, I saw firsthand how resettlement can provide a new lease on life to refugees trapped in risky

and difficult circumstances. I am proud to have helped resettle hundreds of Somali refugee women and children to the United States, where many are now flourishing as employees, entrepreneurs and students. But I also saw the unintended negative consequences that often accompany resettlement programs. Inevitably, there are not enough resettlement places to go around. In 2012, 88,600 of the world's 15.4 million refugees were resettled – less than 0.6 percent. In principle, resettlement opportunities are to be provided to those most in need, such as torture survivors and refugees with serious medical problems. Yet even if they do not fall into one of the groups that are prioritized for resettlement, many refugees are in desperate straits and may take big risks to try to access coveted resettlement spots. While I was working in Cairo, my colleagues and I saw refugees stage protests, divide up their families, and physically harm themselves, believing this would increase their chances of being resettled.

13.16.2 Resettlement programs can create instability.

Megan Bradley, [Nonresident Fellow, Foreign Policy, Brookings], “Is Resettlement a Solution for Syria’s Refugee Crisis?” November 13, 2013, Brookings, <http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2013/11/13-syria-refugee-crisis-bradley>.

While resettlement outside the region may lessen the risks these refugees face, resettlement efforts may create risks of their own. Resettlement programs can generate competition within already tense refugee communities, and resentment amongst poor host community members who cannot participate in such processes. The vast majority of displaced Syrians remain inside their country, and will be unable to access resettlement opportunities. UNHCR and resettlement states aim to use resettlement strategically, so that it benefits more people than just those refugees who are resettled. At its best, resettlement is a demonstration of solidarity and responsibility-sharing that can relieve the pressure on host states, encouraging them to keep their borders open and support the integration of refugees in local communities. However, a recent review of resettlement efforts by UNHCR concludes that while this is a “brilliant idea...implementation has not lived up to the concept’s potential.” The report suggests that attempting to use resettlement in such a strategic way is an approach “based on hopes rather than evidence.”

13.17 AT Quota System

13.17.1 The quota system is doomed to fail.

Salvator Babones, [The National Interest], “Europe’s Migrant Crisis: Ideals vs Realities,” The National Interest, 16 September 2015.

The official German line is that the refugee crisis is a European problem, not the responsibility of any one EU country to solve. But any quota system designed to distribute refugees among EU member states is doomed to fail because no one has consulted the refugees themselves. Will refugees assigned to the Balkans and the Baltics actually go to those countries? If they do go, will they stay? The answers are probably: no and no.