


# Champion Briefs

Sept/Oct 2017

## Public Forum Brief



**Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea's best interest.**

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These seven statements, while simple, represent the complex notion of what it means to advance students' understanding of the world around them, as is the purpose of educators.

**Letter from the Editor**

Welcome to another exciting year of Public Forum Debate! Here at Champion Briefs, we're thrilled to continue serving the debate community, and we thank all our readers for your continued support. We truly hope that this debate season will be a great one for each and every one of you.

“Ripped from the headlines” is an understatement when it comes to the first topic of this season. Every day, new information is published about North Korea and a dynamic, looming crisis, and with each new day, the crux of debate on this topic changes. However, this topic is special not just because it's timely, but because many people around the globe are justifiably afraid of the current situation. For the first time since the Cold War, the continental United States faces a real nuclear threat, a fact that has many Americans deeply unsettled. If you're still debating in high school, you weren't alive during the Cold War, so I encourage you to talk to someone that remembers this frightening era. It may lend some insight about America's reaction to similar circumstances.

Also exciting about this topic is the opportunity to learn about a part of the world rarely discussed in Public Forum debate. While many of our topics revolve around domestic issues and the interests of the United States, this topic forces students to consider the best interests of the South Korea. While the United States certainly plays a role in this conflict, you should learn about the unique interests of South Korea's population before determining the best presentation of impacts. Take some time to immerse yourself in the intricacies of Asian continental politics and the geopolitics of nuclear weapons. No matter how many times you've debated topics related to nuclear weapons, there's always more to learn.

This month we've prepared a wide array of arguments for you to peruse while preparing your cases and blocks. Our writers have stepped out of their own comfort zones while researching, and I highly encourage our readers to do the same. Much of the best evidence on this topic cannot be found with a precursory Google search. Dive into the literature, and remember that debates are typically won not by the team with more evidence, but by the team with more knowledge. Good luck!

Michael Norton  
Editor-in-Chief

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
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# Champion Briefs

Sept/Oct 2017

Public Forum Brief



# Topic Analyses

## **Topic Analysis by Jakob Urda**

*Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea's best interest*

### **Introduction**

Welcome back to the circuit! The September/October topic is always one of the most exciting of the year. As PF's only two-month topic, it allows novices to find their footing and everyone else to explore a policy area in more depth than any other point of the year. Starting in early September there are tournaments almost every week. The tournament quality is also very high, with favorites such as Yale and Bronx sticking out.

This topic intercedes foreign policy, security studies, and actor analysis. Almost never does the NSDA ask debaters to put on the shoes of another nation and debate *their* national interests. The debate is also constantly evolving, with news about North Korea or missile defense breaking every day. This is the type of topic that debaters should set up google alerts for, and possibly expect new developments to unfold while at major tournaments. This topic will, more than others, reward consistent attention to current events and a mastery of the theory behind international relations. By the end of October most teams will come to understand the broad strokes, but the teams that win will have command over the discipline of International Relations; they will be familiar with deterrence, credibility, and force.

### **Tournament Considerations**

September/October tournaments are some of the most varied and prestigious of the year. Because there are so many this topic analysis will only cover the familiar ones in September. These tournaments, like many other months, are large and competitive. Unlike other months, debaters have been prepping for these tournaments for months, and provide an opportunity to further prepare for another month of competition in October. Debaters should enter the field prepared, and ready to learn from their own mistakes.

The first wild card of the season will be the University of Kentucky. UK will take the spot of Wake Forest as the season's early-bird, which means that while a lot about it is uncertain, there is a lot that a team can prepare for. Areas such as judging and punctuality are unknowns, highly dependent on the school staff. On the other hand, much like Wake, we know that historically some of the strongest teams have shown up to the early bird. Competitors will have had all summer to prep, but arguments tend to mirror those run at debate camps. What makes the early bird interesting is that sometimes these arguments play over well on the circuit, and sometimes they do not. For future use at Yale, teams that are looking to improve will be especially sure to watch elimination rounds to see which arguments work on real judges,

The other tournament to cover is the Yale invitational. As the first Octo bid of the year, fielding a national draw, Yale is one of the most exciting times of the season. Yale's judge pool has historically been fairly technical. As the first major tournament of the year, Yale usually has more first-year-out coaches judging, as well as members of the Yale APDA debate team. By Yale, teams should expect their opponents to have solid responses to almost any point being run on the circuit. This means that in order to make it to elimination rounds, more so than at other tournaments, pre-prepared frontlines are necessary.

### Strategy Considerations

Before we get into the meat of the topic, we should consider how the resolution is framed, and what areas of contention might be in terms of the ground of the topic.

One of the most interesting and challenging parts of the resolution is the South Korea actor analysis. By framing the topic in “South Korea’s best interest”, the resolution asks us to adopt Seoul’s outlook on the world, which limits the field of impacts available to teams. For instance, questions about the US’s grand strategy in East Asia are probably less relevant than immediate impacts to South Korean security. At the same time, teams should ask themselves every round ‘how much does the opposing impact *actually* benefit South Korea?’ The winning impacts will have solid, clear connections to South Korean national interests.

The largest impact in terms of magnitude, by far, is war on the Korean Peninsula. A conflict would almost certainly kill millions, and threaten the existence of South Korea itself. War has been a sword of Damocles, hanging over the South Korean regime for decades, but conflict has not broken out due to a delicate but stable balance of power in the region. The most important thing to understand about war is the basic framework of security studies.

International relations tend to make two keystone principles. First, that states are rational. This has been called into question with North Korea, but by in large Pyongyang has acted to preserve its grip on power. This leads into the second principle: that states will act to maximize relative power in their region, and thereby their security. Although North Korea is poor and belligerent, it is hard to argue that the Kim regime has not maintained an iron grip on state control by aggressively supporting the military and raising the specter of conflict with South Korea. This is important because it explains why war has not broken out between North and South Korea: because the North knows it would lose. So far, a conflict with the South would

prompt US intervention (due to the existing military agreements and troops stations in South Korea), and the combined US-SK force would almost certainly topple the government of the North.

But the security architecture of the Korean peninsula is changing, in large part because of nuclear weapons. Pyongyang has recently acquired nuclear weapons capable of reaching the US, which changes what scholars call the ‘balance of threats’ in the region. Until recently, North Korea’s belligerence was limited by the credible threat of US intervention in conflict. The US troops in the region and history of support were enough proof to the North that we would stand by our allies. Pyongyang knows that the costs to American intervention and security are relatively low (the commitment of our forces in East Asia), but the benefits to defending our allies are high (preserving friendly, democratic regimes in South Korea and Japan).

But with the advent of nuclear weapons in the Kim regime’s hands, threats to North Korea may become significantly less credible. This is because North Korea knows that the US is more likely to intervene in a Korean conflict if Pyongyang can credibly threaten to hit a major US city with a nuclear weapon. If the US knows that intervening to support South Korea would come at the cost of a major US city, America may well want to stay out of a conflict. This is because the costs to intervention (the loss of millions of American lives) now outweighs the benefits. Knowing this, the development of nuclear weapons may provide North Korea with the security that it needs to increase its aggression in the region.

Having built a basic understanding of conflict we must ask ourselves: Why THAAD?

### **Affirmative Argumentation**

There are a few arguments that Affirmative teams should consider, but first it is important to think about uniqueness. This problem exists for both sides, and comes from the fact that regardless of South Korean support, there will be missile defense platforms and military presence in the region provided by the United States. The Aegis BMD system is ship based and Korean support is unlikely to change its deployment in the area, and the large US military presence in the region means that regardless of whether or not South Korea supports missile defense there is the potential threat of posturing by the US towards North Korea. It is important to keep these points in mind when thinking about what the marginal change is between a world with or without South Korean support for missile defense.

The first area of argumentation to consider is how missile defense affects the credibility of the American commitment to South Korea and our other regional allies. The argument was made earlier that nuclear weapons make US threats to intervene in the case of a conflict dramatically less credible, because losing a major population center in North Korean retaliation is a cost that America is unlikely to be willing to bear. Missile defense may change this equation. If South Korea and the United States invest in missile defense technology successfully, it would make North Korean threats of nuclear retaliation on America less credible (because their missiles could not hit American targets). In turn, because this would lower the cost of American intervention on the behalf of South Korea (because our cities would be defended from nuclear weapons), we could once again credibly defend Seoul. If American can be assured that it will not suffer nuclear retaliation, it is much more likely to come to the defense of South Korea, and North Korea knows this. Therefore, successful missile defense technology can deter North

Korean aggression in the South by making the threat of US retaliation against the Kim regime credible.

Another avenue for Affirmative teams to consider is how missile defense programs affect North Korean grand strategy. In order to do this, we must consider what North Korea wants out of a nuclear weapon. While the exact object of Pyongyang's desire is uncertain, it is clear that North Korea wants nuclear weapons to threaten South Korea, Japan, and the United States. Missile defense puts this goal in jeopardy by threatening to take North Korea's nuclear threat off the table. Therefore, if North Korea wishes to blackmail its adversaries it must invest in more, expensive, technology. To maintain its nuclear threat, Pyongyang would have to build more missiles, and make its existing missiles more advanced – creating more innovative delivery systems to confuse and overwhelm US-SK defenses. This would be incredibly costly for North Korea. Its existing, small, program already is estimated to cost between 1 and 3 billion dollars a year, a major fraction of its 12 billion-dollar GDP. To put that in perspective, the United States which leads the world in military expenditures spends 3.3 percent of its GDP on all defense. As North Korea has to deal with more countermeasures, the costs associated with developing, producing, maintaining, and testing the technology in its nuclear program is likely to balloon. At a certain point, North Korea may not be able to keep up, and be forced to draw back its rhetoric.

It is worthwhile to think about the effects of squeezing North Korea's military spending. If Pyongyang is forced to cope with the larger costs of an expanded nuclear program, then several impacts are possible. First, it may trade off with their conventional military spending, which would in turn make them less likely to initiate conflict. Second, Pyongyang may realize the futility of an arms race with the West, and reconcile itself to a more peaceful role. Third, North Korea may have to liberalize, as it did a little bit during the famine of the 1990s, to

generate more revenue. This in turn may make North Korea more peaceful as an emerging middle class may not share the regime's attitude towards war.

### **Negative Argumentation**

The negative side of the topic has a lot of interesting argumentative ground to work with. Much like with the Affirmative, defining one's own ground is important here. This is because the withdrawal of South Korean support for missile defense will only impact a select few programs. This limits the scope of the debate from the impacts of missile defense writ large to programs which South Korea has a say over. This is important because it allows neg teams to kick out of all of the harms to stopping *all* missile defense programs, and focus on attacking certain particularly counterproductive strategies being perused on the Korean Peninsula. It also gives teams a strategy where they can claim that general-affirmatives are nonunique (because the US and Japan will pursue missile defense regardless), so the debate should focus on the harms of South Korean programs.

One program that might have to be scrapped if South Korea pulled out support from anti-missile programs is the Kill Chain Plan. Kill Chain is an integrated system of intelligence gathering and rapid response weapons (think cruise missiles and penetration bombers) designed to take out North Korean nuclear weapons on the launchpad and cripple Pyongyang's ability to access the brunt of their missile force. By spotting the signs of missile launch early and shutting down the weapons sites themselves, South Korea is building a missile defense program that does not rely on kinetic interceptors targeting missiles mid-flight.

The Kill Chain system can be argued to be incredibly risky, because it creates an incentive for North Korea to escalate and turn opaque. Because the system relies on intelligence gathering and preemptive strikes, the response from Pyongyang is likely to be to publicized escalation less, operate in more secrecy, and convert their missile pads into mobile truck based launchers. These developments are problematic because they increase the room for error and diminish our ability to accurately gauge where tensions stand. Normally, disagreements between two nations escalate until the brinkmanship from one country proves too much for their adversary, and they reach a compromise. This is called interstate bargaining. However, with Kill Chain, bargaining becomes harder because North Korea no longer has an incentive to show South Korea and America their process of escalation. Washington or Seoul might think that their threats are going well, but in reality, a more secretive North Korean escalation program is raising the stakes. Teams could use this argument to say that even if BMD programs in general are good, South Korea's program is intensely counterproductive because it makes a rational assessment of the situation much more difficult. Good luck, and happy hunting!

**Topic Analysis by Liya Khan**

*Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea's best interest*

Welcome back to the competitive season! September-October is always a fun introduction back into the circuit and gives new debaters a little bit more time to understand the details of debate strategy before jumping into the next topic. Big tournaments on this topic include Yale, Bronx, Apple Valley, and Grapevine-all great opportunities for rigorous competition, dynamic arguments, new strategies, and bids. The research approach for this topic-probably in conjunction with school starting for most districts-should be a progressive build. If you were fortunate enough to attend a debate camp that chose the resolution to prep, challenge yourself to push beyond the competitive strategies you were taught in camp and step up your research game. If you didn't go camp, the joint September-October timeline allows you to get caught up with prep and still have opportunities to compete.

If you're a team that will be competing at multiple tournaments on this topic, your approach to research should be to use your first or first two tournaments (even if they're smaller district or local tournaments) to test out as many strategic angles as you feel comfortable with. Try not to just rely on stock cases or arguments for your first competitive opportunities, because you may end up at a larger national tournament later on with no idea how your more nuanced strategies or interesting case arguments actually fare in front of judges. Two months allow teams to figure out what approach on the topic works the best for them, and to build on it so that their strategies improve with each tournament; this also gives teams a longer period of time to get the most out of speech redos and debriefs after tournaments in preparation for the next one on the

same topic. Take advantage of the two months you have refine your arguments and to redo your speeches as consistently as possible; two months is as much a time to reintegrate back into the season and the crazy schedule of debate as it is to practice comprehensive researching, practice debating, and figuring out time commitments with your partner.

That laundry list of recommendations aside, debaters should absolutely be looking forward to the topic at hand. An international relations topic is a fantastic pick for September-October since it gives teams a chance to do a deep dive in their research and consider multiple sides of the same arguments, all while improving their technical and analytical skills in-round. This topic also seems to be updating constantly with the current geopolitical climate on the Korean peninsula as well as the shifting tones of the White House on the issue of North Korean nuclear development. Teams should pay special attention to developments in the news during these months as it will absolutely shape what arguments remain topical and which ones do not.

### **Framework**

This resolution offers a deceptively clear framing mechanism right within its wording: “...in South Korea’s best interest.” Right away, this wording indicates a few important things about the topic. First, it points out that the overarching framing mechanism of the round has to circle back to the concept of South Korea’s best interest. Opinions of allies, such as the United States, China or other regional powers, while important, shouldn’t be the deciding element of the way arguments are researched and written. It is certainly possible to impact out an argument where anti-missile system deployment affects an ally and that, in turn, may or may not serve South Korea’s best interests, but the focus still has to come down to what that ‘best interest’ is and how teams can weigh it. Secondly, the term ‘best interest’ is incredibly vague. This mean

that each case argument should include some type of warranting of how the contention serves South Korea's interests, and specify exactly what those interests are. Does South Korea prioritize the security of its population when discussing the possibility of an attack from North Korea, even if those choices alienate the balancing power of China? Can South Korean interests in its regional security come at the expense of its relationship with larger overseas powers? Why or why not? These are all great questions that teams can ask themselves (and in each other) when establishing what South Korea's interests actually look like in round.

Additionally, teams should weigh arguments about the relevance or immediacy of the interests that South Korea values. It's perfectly reasonable to argue, for example, that South Korea's vested interest in beefing up its defense capabilities in the wake of increased North Korean nuclear tests is more significant now than it has been in the past. This would mean that South Korea may value the efficacy of an anti-missile system and security of its nation over the potential loss of diplomatic relations or even the possibility of a regional arms race. This could also be argued the other way, where the scenario of losing regional allies or alienated other foreign powers in the name of a marginal increase in security is not a tradeoff that South Korea ought make. These are two potential ways to evaluate scenarios involving South Korean interests, and more nuanced arguments will be able to tap into a plethora of ways to do the same type of weighing.

### **Affirmative Arguments**

There are two arguments I would look into on the Affirmative side of this topic. The first is a straightforward argument about security interests and why the clear threat posed to South Korea via North Korean missile tests and escalating rhetoric between Pyongyang and

Washington forms the basis for making South Korean defense capabilities better. Again, approaching these arguments from multiple angles is important on a two-month timeline, so I'll present a few warrants for this argument, and teams should get into the habit of developing the same reasoning for each contention they write.

The first warrant for this argument can be used to establish why South Korean defense capabilities are currently lacking in their ability to fend off attacks from hostile powers and why the deployment of anti-missile systems is a necessary strategic step. Teams should (and can) find decent inherency evidence about how South Korean defense capabilities contain significant gaps in their ability to protect the most concentrated population of citizens in the country living in Seoul. Teams can write convincing arguments about why anti-missile systems, such as THAAD, help to fill these gaps by producing multiple layers of defense to intercept missiles at multiple ranges. Optically, I would recommend that teams avoid making arguments about missile technology too technical at the risk of losing your judges. Make sure to condense analysis about the relative strengths and weaknesses of missile technology into a way that could be understood by someone who had never heard about it before.

The second warrant teams can use is that the strategic positioning of anti-missile systems are meant to not only intercept missiles, but also allow for the fortification of military bases and troops if necessary. This warrant is useful if teams want to argue that the technological aspect of anti-missile defense systems are not as important as their ability to supplant holes in the military force structure that may exist now for South Korean defense capabilities. Strategic positioning of anti-missile systems is less a question of actual technological accuracy and more a part of a larger narrative of military strategy in the region. Protecting military bases from strikes or fallout or assisting potential troop reinforcement may not only serve as an additional physical defense

for South Korean citizens via an anti-missile system, but the mere presence of a system may serve as a deterrent to any further escalation on the part of North Korea.

The third warrant for this argument is about the unpredictable nature of the region and the question of comparative benefits to South Korea's security situation. Teams should draw on evidence about North Korean missile test escalation in the last two years and the firestorm of potentially dangerous rhetoric being exchanged between North Korea and the United States that all may be bringing the current situation to a boiling point not seen in recent history. This warrant can be used to frame the immediacy of South Korea's need to attain an anti-missile system; teams can argue, in a pretty concise one-liner, that the odds of a safer South Korea increase dramatically in the short term with the deployment of an anti-missile system than without one.

The second argument for the Affirmative side is an argument about the possible diplomatic flip present with China. China has long served as a lifeline to North Korea and an optically ineffective enforcer at curbing its nuclear ambitions. There is one warrant as to why the deployment of an anti-missile system may serve to bring China as a closer protectorate of South Korea, which would, in turn, serve its security interests immensely.

The warrant relies on two components: first, that China can't sustainably defend North Korea from the consequences of its actions militarily (and will choose not to in the long term), and second, that the collective needs of South Korea, China, and the United States form a stronger base for diplomatic alliance than the converse.

Given the escalation of North Korean missile tests and the violation of international treaties, North Korea's action serves as a serious issue for China to continue to serve as their one diplomatic connection in the world. As North Korea begins to approach the point of no return,

China will no longer be able to defend its actions without risking retaliation from every other major power. The President of China has already told Pyongyang that if the threat against Guam materializes, their leadership is effectively on its own. This means that there is strong reason to believe that China will need to flip its stance on North Korea relatively soon and move closer to a narrative of regional security if it seeks to maintain its geopolitical legitimacy in the region.

Additionally, teams can argue pretty straightforwardly that the security interests of China are also decently at stake when it comes to North Korea nuclear escalation. The unpredictability of the regime in Pyongyang doesn't safely rule out the possibility of striking China or any of the areas it has geopolitical superiority in. Teams can also say, probably without controversy, that a full out war between the United States and North Korea is not in China's interests. Therefore, there are two scenario-based reasons why China would move closer on the diplomatic scale towards the United States and South Korea. The strength of China as a regional ally is strong impact for the Affirmative in terms of South Korean interests in regional stability and security for its nation.

While both of these Affirmative arguments ultimately impact out to security scenarios for South Korea, they both contain diplomatic elements concerning the geopolitics of the region. It's this type of dynamic layering of argumentation that teams should seek to replicate for each stand-alone argument.

### **Negative Arguments**

There is one negative argument with two convincing elements to it that teams can look into for this topic. Anti-missile systems in South Korea provoke Chinese backlash and retaliatory measures that not only damage South Korea's relative security, but also its economic

proficiency. The important context for this argument is that China sees the deployment of a THAAD missile system as having radar capabilities that could potentially surveil movements of China's own missiles, effectively rendering the utility of their strikes useless. Critically, the THAAD missile system may not even be able to technologically accomplish the type of surveillance that China fears, however, that still means that China's adverse reaction to the deployment of the system reveals a political motivation to keep it out of the region. This means that China will remain indefinitely resolved against the system as a mark of its geopolitical strength more so than a real technological threat.

China's retaliation and disapproval of the system gives it plenty of reason to develop advanced weaponry, or at the very least, better weapons technology that they believe gives them an advantage over the THAAD system. Teams can find a lot of good evidence about why Chinese militarization in both the short and long term poses serious risks to stability in the region. The reality of Chinese weapons development or any incentive to pursue advanced military options is not far off given the already precarious situation of North Korea's advancing nuclear brink. Teams can argue that even risking the possibility of Chinese militarization in a security climate that is already largely disintegrating under the weight of North Korea's brinkmanship could push every player past the point of no return.

China's retaliation is also materializing economically in unofficial sanctions against South Korean business and imports. These unofficial sanctions and pressing economic realities against South Korea have already endangered \$124 billion of their exports market, or about 25.1% of all exports. In terms of economic security, teams can argue that a tanking economy coupled with the advancing threat from both North Korean aggression and Chinese retaliation spells absolute disaster for South Korea.

This argument functionally has impact scenarios built into both the political and economic elements of Chinese retaliation, but teams should absolutely carry the narrative throughout the round and frame it via the risks posed to South Korea. Chinese militarization can have disastrous consequences on the security of the rest of the region as well, potentially amounting to a regional arms race as each regime scrambles to develop advanced weapons for fear of their own security. Unofficial economic sanctions on South Korea may create a climate of retaliatory economic maneuvering that breaks down the legitimacy of trade relations and diplomacy between key players in an evolving security dilemma. From whichever way teams choose to take it, impact scenarios from this argument will always be able to triangulate back to the interests of South Korea with clarity.

Looking forward to seeing you all (a little more sparingly) this year on the circuit—it's going to be a great competitive year! Good luck!

**Topic Analysis by Charles Fisher**

***Resolved:** Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea's best interest*

This may be one of the most troubling topic analyses I've had the pleasure to write, as either a morning twitter rant or the evening news on any given day manages to upend any clear picture of the status quo or hope for the next few days. It can only get more burdensome. The research curve will explode from here. My goal in recognizing this is to offer a route of focus within this deluge. While keeping this buzzing fear going for the competitive edge, I encourage you to sit back with a cup of tea and read (2016 Nebraska Teacher of the year) [Tim Royer's overview of the building Korean situation on Medium](#). Basically: we've been here before time and again. Mellow out and focus on the long game.

With that in mind, I'll hack the resolution up into contextual considerations, then wording and definitions integration, and point you towards some conceptual stability in preparation for changing your cases entirely between rounds.

**Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea's best interest.**

A major issue going into this topic that needs to be addressed up front: there is no actor specified whatsoever. To this end as well, there is no timeframe or event-of-reaction specified. It can be vaguely inferred that this resolution is "about" South Korea itself deploying anti-missile systems on home soil in reaction to North Korean missile threats, but this sets out an artificial limitation to your research and argumentation that will be swiftly undermined by reality and

specifics of the situation at hand. Ultimately, South Korea is placed by this resolution as a weighing mechanism within a grander game of risk. If you were to rely solely on major western media coverage of current events on the Korean peninsula, this is an easy picture to see.

However, I extend the challenge to all on this topic to not merely view South Korea as a passive recipient of the outcomes of any scenario, but as the primary consideration before, during, and after all courses of action even/especially in circumstances where South Korea may not be the primary agent. I'll come back to this idea as we get through the definitions of the key words.

### **“Deployment”**

Far be it from my liberal arts degree to want to get into language criticisms, but doing so may mean some viable routes for you. While it may be tempting to call this the verb of the resolution, when we consult [Cambridge](#) dictionary, deployment is a *noun*. This ends up working the angle mentioned above that South Korea plays the *object* fiddle to the resolution sentence's *subject* of deployment. While I doubt (and actively hope against) this kind of diagramming coming up within a round, let this inform the question you seek to answer in any given round: “How does such-and-such course of action affect South Korea?” While seemingly simple, framing the subject of the debate in this manner as opposed to (what became popular across camp sessions this summer) “How should South Korea react to North Korea?” stabilizes a round into comparative analysis of outcomes instead of jaunting about with non-clashing ‘advocacies’. I haven't even given you actual definitions yet because grounding this formulation of questioning in word relationships is a tool students should be using across topics.

Returning to the Cambridge definition, we have two options. First, “the use of something or someone in an effective way”, followed by “the movement of soldiers or equipment to a place

where they can be used when they are needed”. This military context leads me further to the [US Dept. of Defense](#) to define deployment as “The rotation of forces into and out of an operational area.” This puts ‘deployment’ in the frame of moving a working thing into a place that it is needed and effective for a set course of action.

While I will be the first to admit that I attempted to conflate ‘deployment’ with ‘development’ (specifically R&D) in the context of anti-missile systems over the course of argument research this summer, I’ve come to see a need in drawing a clear line between putting a working system in place to be effective towards a goal [deployment], and working towards a system that has yet to be fielded [development]. This provides a potentially necessary barrier to arguments based on up-and-coming miracle defense systems. Still, the resolution is without a set timeframe or event-of-reaction. As such this interpretation at least offers each side the opportunity to compare timeframes for future scenarios as part of the impact on South Korea to balance.

This “operational area” element and lack of actor specification potentially makes the topic area limitless. If Israel expands the [Iron Dome](#) system into a new area, this would qualify as deployment of an anti-missile system – so would [US/NATO deployment in Romania](#). Even closer regionally would be [Japan’s installation and activation of THAAD equipment](#). How do any of these affect South Korea? Rather than see this as a problem with the topic, such openness may lead to some of the larger questions guiding arguments. Seeing deployment from an interwoven global perspective in which South Korea plays a key role ends up pushing South Korea to center stage of geopolitics above the middling squirt gun distance contest dominated by the United States and North Korea.

**“Anti-missile systems”**

There are several routes to take this definitionally. [Collins Dictionary](#) gives us another two-part that ends up opening options if you take anti-missile in isolation. Alone, this is a missile intended to shoot down a missile; contextually appropriate. This leads us to research on systems like THAAD, PAC, Aegis, and the Iron Dome. It is also [adjective] “designed as a defense against ballistic missiles”. While it is tempting to focus yourself on the prepackaged systems listed above, I encourage you to think wider on the matter towards *courses of action* that provide defense. Returning to Collins for ‘systems’, “A system is a way of working, organizing, or doing something which follows a fixed plan or set of rules.” This specifically refers to something like [South Korea’s Kill Chain](#) plan of preemptive strike that is composed of the systems mentioned above combined with traditional air, sea, and ground forces in concerted effort. This plan is designed as a deterrence effort in addition to its offensive/defensive capacity. It is this deterrence component that can lead down a creative path.

If traditional deterrence, that is: preventing an attack with threat of retaliatory force, is seen as a designed defense against a missile attack, it meets this contextual definition of anti-missile systems. In fact, what we are seeing as a response to a weakening global US military commitment, and growing antagonism from North Korea and China in the region is an explicit call to [nuclear development by South Korea and Japan](#). Striking about this, is that it is being politically couched as a defensive measure to prevent attack by threat of preemption and retaliation. This relies on the [paradox of nuclear weapons](#) to function as an argument, and even if you don’t decide to run this direction [calling nuclear weapons an anti-missile system], I would encourage you read on the subject in preparation for the entire debate and even future international relations topics. The slippery slope that this leads down under a less comprehensive

definition would be that any military buildup is potentially an “anti-missile system”. Check this with the ‘systems’ definition: if and only if a military protocol is directed at missile defense in a comprehensive design [as per Kill Chain] should it be reasonably within the scope of the resolution. However, this expansion could also work in the favor of a negative that wishes to discuss the expansion of the military industrial complex as uniquely harmful to regional stability or the global peace that South Korea relies on.

Still, putting your nose to the grindstone with stock arguments is going to lead you back to THAAD as a trigger scenario for the resolution and engage much of the research from this past spring. From a technological standpoint, the [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense product from Lockheed Martin](#) represents every core component for an anti-missile system package. The multi-unit guided missile launcher battery is connected to an active radar system and fire control. Youtube is your best friend here because of the vital need to understand this in visual terms. To keep this in a bigger picture: systems like this are nothing new. The US fielded the Minuteman program to counter the Russians. Same with the ship-mounted Aegis system. We paid for development of the Patriot systems during the 80s in lead up to Desert Storm. These have been deployed globally and in the Asia-Pacific for DECADES. North Korea has been developing arms for some time. Why is there sudden beef? It’s not the missile portion. It’s the [radar](#). Until recently, THAAD was a failure. Technological developments have pushed tracking, identification, control, and reaction capacity of nominal anti-missile systems into the realm of sci-fi fantasy leagues beyond that of Reagan’s Star Wars program.

21<sup>st</sup> century [x-band radar](#) is longer range and more granular than anything we could have hoped for in a [Heinlein](#) novel. To boot, the information gathered is typically network shared, and controlled by the US, a US ally, or a US contracted defense partner. If you want to get all Metal

Gear tech hungry, your opportunity to pull back files and whitepapers from DARPA is right here. This is the kind of information war imbalance that is stated as a pushback to North Korea, but ends up being the kind of preemptive offensive technology that China and Russia are rightly concerned about being placed in a theatre of conflict on their borders. If the new nuclear war is information and “the cyber”, global deployment of anti-missile systems and their integrated technologies is tantamount to a Cuban Missile Crisis with the US as an aggressor. Even with this technological marvel you are going to find that conflict technologies age very well. I refer to the fact that we still can’t “track” howitzer shells or block 100% of non-guided, short range, high velocity rockets. I’ll let you guess what [the primary threat from North Korea](#) really is.

A note here that plays to the above: ‘systems’ is PLURAL. I saw too many affs and negs this summer limiting themselves to a single system [usually THAAD] and getting stuffed with ready-made blocks or a single news article from the last 45minutes that undermined their entire case within 30seconds of the rebuttal. Small aside with rebuttals, and I don’t think I can stress this enough: abandon the damn acronyms if you want judges to care and understand. Broadening your research to include multiple systems and interpretations of systems within the conceptual bundle of ‘anti-missile systems’ is strategically and performatively sound. I would take this even further by dealing with ‘anti-missile systems’ in broad terms as a *concept* rather than fighting the uphill battle of technological specifics. I LOVE the gamesmanship of tech talk...and even I don’t want to hear about “shoot-look-shoot” or “endo-exo-transition” when there are larger geopolitical considerations to answer in a 2-minute speech. The best cases I saw and read in the past two months are those that recognized the technology and wide variance of ‘systems’ as a SYMBOL within grander dealings between South Korea and the world. For that, I’ll turn to our final segment.

**“South Korea’s best interest”**

Increasingly often in PF we are given topics ‘on balance’ that presume a granted utilitarian calculus for judging. For this topic, I would say that phrasing might have helped. The singular ‘best interest’ upends things somewhat insofar that it potentially allows one side to say one impact area (like defense) is the ‘best interest’ and whoever achieves/maximizes this ought to win. The result of this interpretation is a mixed bag. Either both sides agree and the clash is heated and direct, or there are two interpretations that don’t clash or integrate in any meaningful way and the round is a slapdash of judges begging for cards to hash out their own chain of links. Part of this comes down the lack of topicality/theory in PF competition, which is a blessing and curse. However, look to Lincoln-Douglas value-criterion structure to develop a framework for weighing. This approach could be helpful and maybe stabilize some of the impact mechanics thrown about on a topic on the edge of nuclear war.

‘South Korea’s best interest’ ought to be something of value to South Korea across both civilian/citizen and governmental levels. Preservation of life comes to mind only as something I’ve had to hear during camps ad nauseam. What other things bridge this gap? Legitimacy of governance, personal/governmental autonomy, food access, means of living/production, non-conflict, freedom of movement, environmental sustainability, other such core human impacts spring to the front. By what means are these values achieved? Security, military development, expanding a sphere of influence, diplomacy, regional cooperation, liberalized market access, open Global Commons, or international partnership building may be a few means of achievement. Does the ‘deployment of anti-missile systems’ expand or contract these means for

South Korea to access core values? Answer that question on an impact by impact basis and you've calculated the round out for the judge with a pretty straightforward narrative.

In a grander breakdown, South Korea sits at the crossroads of a major shift in world power. The [United States is actively withdrawing itself](#) from the kind of global police role it has fulfilled since WW2. Its military forces are spread thin in a myriad of combat zones and shadow wars. The Liberal World Order and the guarantees of the Global Commons is in question. China [continues its rise](#) to military, diplomatic, and economic leadership regionally and globally. Russia surges to protect borders and [power interests](#) long thought closed since the end of the Cold War as a foil to a faltering US foreign policy outline. Japan's rightwing politics gains [strength and justification with regional instability](#). [North Korea's nuclear ambitions are achieved](#), and this development has put everyone in a no-win position when it comes to saving face.

As host to some of the largest US military bases in the world, a major trading partner with China, a historical antagonist-alliance with Japan, a danger-zone locked with North Korea, and seeming odds between protesting citizens and a newly-elected president, South Korea has every possible angle of consideration to deal with gain or loss. This multifaceted interpretation of interest: security, economy, diplomacy, hardpower, softpower, negative peace, positive peace, and legitimacy are all equally viable start points for your argument construction when paired with an interpretation of deployment that accounts for the non-actor status of the resolution and the broad understanding of anti-missile systems.

This is a real opportunity to dig into international relations theory of Realism vs. Liberalism as part of your research and insulate your arguments from some of the micro shifts in the 24hr news cycle. Can the deployment/non-deployment of anti-missile systems give South

Korea or other regional players power over one another? This goes back to ‘anti-missile systems’ as symbols within a greater game beyond mere security. [Scott Snyder](#) nails this, “For months, China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea.” While South Korea has [weathered these threats of sanction EXCEEDINGLY well](#), the real question at hand is much larger. The security concerns of South Korea facing external pushback from a regional trade partner potentially undermines governmental legitimacy and future autonomous decision making. This is the kind of interplay that highlights the multifaceted nature of ‘best interest’. Should South Korea abandon deployment in step with China, or hold strong to its commitment to a US defense alliance? Look for all opportunities you can to diversify your impacts and warrants in this manner, and be willing to view the comparative interplay between each in the round as they relate to South Korea and you’ll be in a great spot.

From a mile-high conceptual standpoint you will do yourself and your judges a favor in offering a big question that frames the round and the cases to be presented. Ideally, this is grounded in the resolution like we’ve discussed above. Some of the best I’ve heard so far:

- “Is it not a reasonable response to prepare for the absolute worst in a radically unpredictable context?”
- “Should South Korea take this opportunity to stand up to a regional hegemon and forge its own path forward?”
- “Can cooperation based around increasing economic ties overcome the risk of conflict?”


- “Can expanding the scope of military technology outpace a defensive vs offensive imbalance in future conflicts?”
- “How can South Korea and its allies best cope with the reality of a nuclear North Korea?”
- “Is expanding a country’s military power projection under the auspices of defense justified if it raises tensions?”

As a closing tidbit, I would like to offer you a complete documentation of my own thought process and online research undertaken between the announcement of the “Korean peninsula” topic area, and the final release of the resolution. You’ll notice the shifts in thinking and an expansion on some of the more conceptual elements presented here solely on the timeframes outlined. I hope it helps you settle on some options and furthers your comfort with the resolution.

# Champion Briefs

Sept/Oct 2017

Public Forum Brief



General  
Information


## General Information

**Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea's best interest.**

**Foreword:** We, at Champion Briefs, feel that having deep knowledge about a topic is just as valuable as formulating the right arguments. Having general background knowledge about the topic area helps debaters form more coherent arguments from their breadth of knowledge. As such, we have compiled general information on the key concepts and general areas that we feel will best suit you for in- and out-of-round use. Any strong strategy or argument must be built from a strong foundation of information; we hope that you will utilize this section to help build that foundation.

An abbreviated history of the Korean Peninsula

**Two Koreas: History at a glance**



”The Korean Peninsula, located between the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, has seen heightened tensions in recent months as US President Donald Trump has threatened to act against North Korea's continued missile tests.

<sup>1</sup> “Two Koreas: History at a glance.” Al Jazeera. 27 Apr 2017. <<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/04/infographic-history-koreas-170425090508219.html>>

After the defeat of the Japanese empire in World War II, Korea was split into two spheres. The Soviet Union controlled the territory in the north and the US controlled the south.

In 1950, North Korea invaded South Korea, starting the three-year-long Korean War. Since the signing of the armistice agreement in 1953, the north and south have been divided by a 4km wide demilitarised zone stretching 250km.

Both Koreas have steadily increased their military spending over the decades. Today, North Korea spends more than any other country on military spending relative to GDP. Nearly a quarter of its GDP goes towards the military.

As world leaders have come and gone, North Korea's Kim dynasty has remained in power. After withdrawing from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty in 2003, North Korea has gone on to conduct several nuclear tests, most recently in September 2016.”<sup>2</sup>

### **The history of the North Korean nuclear program**

#### **1985-2010**

“1985 North Korea signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

1993 The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) demands that inspectors be given access to two nuclear waste storage sites. In response, North Korea threatens to quit the NPT but eventually opts to continue participating in the treaty.

1994 North Korea and the United States sign an agreement. Among other stipulations, North Korea pledges to freeze and eventually dismantle its old, graphite-moderated nuclear reactors in exchange for international aid to build two new light-water nuclear reactors.

2002 January 29 - US President George W. Bush labels North Korea, Iran and Iraq an "axis of evil" in his State of the Union address. "By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger," he says.

October - The Bush Administration reveals that North Korea has admitted operating a secret nuclear weapons program in violation of the 1994 agreement.

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<sup>2</sup> “Two Koreas: History at a glance.” Al Jazeera. 27 Apr 2017.  
<<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/04/infographic-history-koreas-170425090508219.html>>

2003 January 10 - North Korea withdraws from the NPT. February - The United States confirms North Korea has reactivated a five-megawatt nuclear reactor at its Yongbyon facility, capable of producing plutonium for weapons. April - Declares it has nuclear weapons.

2005 North Korea tentatively agrees to give up its entire nuclear program, including weapons. In exchange, the United States, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea say they will provide energy assistance to North Korea, as well as promote economic cooperation.

2006 July - After North Korea test fires long range missiles, the UN Security Council passes a resolution demanding that North Korea suspend the program. October - North Korea claims to have successfully tested its first nuclear weapon. The test prompts the UN Security Council to impose a broad array of sanctions.

2007 February 13 - North Korea agrees to close its main nuclear reactor in exchange for an aid package worth \$400 million. September 30 - At six-party talks in Beijing, North Korea signs an agreement stating it will begin disabling its nuclear weapons facilities. December 31 - North Korea misses the deadline to disable its weapons facilities by the end of the year.

2008 June 27 - North Korea destroys a water cooling tower at the Yongbyon nuclear facility. October 11 - North Korea is removed from the US list of states that sponsor terrorism. December - Six-party talks are held in Beijing. The talks break down over North Korea's refusal to allow international inspectors unfettered access to suspected nuclear sites.

2009 May 25 - North Korea announces it has conducted its second nuclear test. June 12 - The UN Security Council condemns the nuclear test and imposes new sanctions.”<sup>3</sup>

## **2010-2016**

“2010 November 20 - A Stanford University professor publishes a report that North Korea has a new nuclear enrichment facility.

2011 October 24-25 - US officials meet with a North Korean delegation in Geneva, Switzerland, in an effort to restart the six-party nuclear arms talks that broke down in 2008.

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<sup>3</sup> CNN Library. “North Korea Nuclear Timeline Fast Facts.” CNN. 14 Aug 2017.  
<<http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html>>

2012 February 29 - The State Department announces that North Korea has agreed to a moratorium on long-range missile launches and nuclear activity at the nation's major nuclear facility in exchange for food aid. May 24 - A spokesman for South Korea's Defense Ministry says that based on analysis of commercial satellite images at North Korea's nuclear test site, North Korea appears ready to carry out a nuclear test at any time.

2013 January 24 - North Korea's National Defense Commission says it will continue nuclear testing and long-range rocket launches in defiance of the United States. The tests and launches will feed into an "upcoming all-out action" targeting the United States, "the sworn enemy of the Korean people," the commission says. February 12 - Conducts third nuclear test. This is the first nuclear test carried out under Kim Jong Un. Three weeks later, the United Nations orders additional sanctions in protest.

2014 March 30-31 - North Korea warns that it is prepping another nuclear test and the following day, the hostility escalates when the country fires hundreds of shells across the sea border with South Korea. In response, South Korea fires about 300 shells into North Korean waters and sends fighter jets to the border.

2015 May 6 - In an exclusive interview with CNN, the deputy director of a North Korean think tank says the country has the missile capability to strike mainland United States and would do so if the United States "forced their hand." May 20 - North Korea says that it has the ability to miniaturize nuclear weapons, a key step toward building nuclear missiles. A US National Security Council spokesman responds that the United States does not think the North Koreans have that capability. December 12 - North Korea state media says the country has added the hydrogen bomb to its arsenal.

2016 January 6-7 - North Korea says it has successfully conducted a hydrogen bomb test. A day after the alleged test, White House spokesman Josh Earnest says that the United States has not verified that the test was successful. March 9 - North Korea announces that it has miniature nuclear warheads that can fit on ballistic missiles. September 9 - North Korea claims to have detonated a nuclear warhead. According to South Korea's Meteorological Administration, the blast is estimated to have the explosive power of 10 kilotons.”<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>4</sup> CNN Library. "North Korea Nuclear Timeline Fast Facts." CNN. 14 Aug 2017.  
<<http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html>>

**2017**

“2017 January 1 - In a televised address, Kim Jong Un claims that North Korea could soon test an intercontinental ballistic missile. January 8 - During an interview on "Meet the Press," Defense Secretary Ash Carter says that the military will shoot down any North Korean missile fired at the United States or any of its allies. January 12 - A US defense official tells CNN that the military has deployed sea-based radar equipment to track long-range missile launches by North Korea. July 4 - North Korea claims it has conducted its first successful test of an intercontinental ballistic missile, or ICBM, that can "reach anywhere in the world." July 25 - North Korea threatens a nuclear strike on "the heart of the US" if it attempts to remove Kim Jong Un as Supreme Leader, according to Pyongyang's state-run Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). August 7 - North Korea accuses the United States of "trying to drive the situation of the Korean peninsula to the brink of nuclear war" after the UN Security Council unanimously adopts new sanctions in response to Pyongyang's long-range ballistic missile tests last month. August 9 - North Korea's military is "examining the operational plan" to strike areas around the US territory of Guam with medium-to-long-range strategic ballistic missiles, state-run news agency KCNA says. The North Korea comments are published after President Donald Trump warns Pyongyang that if it continues to threaten the US, it would "face fire and fury like the world has never seen."”<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> CNN Library. “North Korea Nuclear Timeline Fast Facts.” CNN. 14 Aug 2017.  
<<http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html>>

Political action against North Korea

## Five nuclear tests in the past decade



The U.S. pushed to block all exports of military equipment to North Korea.

President Barack Obama called the test a “grave threat,” but military officials said this was a diplomatic, not military, matter.

The U.S. moved missile defense equipment and nuclear-capable stealth bombers closer to North Korea.

After the January nuclear test, Congress passed a law empowering the administration to sanction those who trade with North Korea. In September, Obama pushed the United Nations to toughen sanctions and ban other countries from importing North Korean coal.

THE WASHINGTON POST <sup>6</sup>

<sup>6</sup> “Erickson, Amanda. Timeline of North Korea’s five nuclear tests and how the U.S. has responded.” The Washington Post. 14 Apr 2017. < [https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/04/14/a-timeline-of-north-koreas-five-nuclear-tests-and-how-the-u-s-has-responded/?utm\\_term=.1cde9e6ea363](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/04/14/a-timeline-of-north-koreas-five-nuclear-tests-and-how-the-u-s-has-responded/?utm_term=.1cde9e6ea363)>

“When it comes to dealing with North Korea's nuclear weapons program, many people hope sanctions are a useful tool. But not all sanctions are created equal.

This weekend, the U.N. Security Council voted unanimously to impose strict new sanctions on Pyongyang — a response to North Korea's launch of two intercontinental missiles last month. The new measures significantly step up restrictions on North Korea's international trade: Estimates say they may cost Pyongyang \$1 billion a year, an enormous sum for a relatively poor country.

The hope is that these efforts may lead Kim Jong Un's regime to abandon its nuclear weapons program, or at least bring it to the negotiation table. But the effectiveness of sanctions is hard to predict — often it is difficult to quantify their effect even in hindsight — and North Korea's weapons program has appeared relatively impervious to previous sanctions.”<sup>7</sup>

### **How are these sanctions different?**

“North Korea has long been under sanctions. The Security Council imposed wide-ranging sanctions after Pyongyang conducted its first nuclear test, in 2006. The United States has imposed its own sanctions on Pyongyang, as have the European Union, South Korea and Japan. In response to a missile launch last year, the Security Council passed Resolution 2270. The harshest sanctions yet, these sweeping measures took the punishment a step further by targeting North Korean economic activity not directly related to proliferation, including the export of mineral resources such as coal or iron. The new sanctions in Resolution 2371 largely expand upon those measures, broadening a cap on coal and iron exports to a full-fledged ban and adding restrictions on things such as seafood exports and the use of North Korean laborers abroad. Notably, it appears to remove parts of the old sanctions that aimed to avoid “adverse humanitarian consequences” for civilians, Benjamin Katzeff Silberstein, an associate scholar at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, observed on the North Korean Economy Watch blog. “In

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<sup>7</sup> Taylor, Adam. “What the new U.N. sanctions on North Korea mean.” The Washington Post. 7 Aug 2017. <[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/07/what-the-new-u-n-sanctions-on-north-korea-mean/?utm\\_term=.bb40cd142cae](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/07/what-the-new-u-n-sanctions-on-north-korea-mean/?utm_term=.bb40cd142cae)>

sum, the new resolution appears much more holistic than its predecessors in fully cutting off North Korea's most central export revenues," Katzeff Silberstein wrote.

The effect of such sanctions could be big: The aim is to cut off a third of North Korea's estimated \$3 billion in annual exports. However, the new sanctions will still rely on implementation from U.N. member states, which has proved to be problematic.”<sup>8</sup>

### **Why are Russia and China important?**

“On Twitter, President Trump has pointed to Russian and Chinese support for the new sanctions.

Getting China and Russia on board for sanctions is certainly important. Both are major economic partners of North Korea, so if they apply pressure, it will be felt in North Korea. But it's perhaps not quite as simple a victory as Trump portrays it to be. China and Russia supported the Obama-era U.N. sanctions agreed upon last year, but critics contend that the two countries have not done enough to limit their economic relationship with North Korea.

Earlier this year, Russia expanded its use of North Korean migrant workers. Notably, while the new sanctions prohibit any increases in the number of these migrant workers, they do not call for those already abroad to be sent back. Troy Stangarone of the Korea Economic Institute of America suggests that these workers could end up sending *more* money home if their wages were to increase.

Meanwhile, it took months for China to make any effort to meet last year's U.N. cap on coal imports from North Korea, and there remain major questions about whether the trade figures it released publicly are truthful. Even if the figures on coal imports are accurate, they do not appear to have negatively affected the booming China-North Korea trade overall — despite frequent warnings from the Trump administration.”<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Taylor, Adam. “What the new U.N. sanctions on North Korea mean.” The Washington Post. 7 Aug 2017. <[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/07/what-the-new-u-n-sanctions-on-north-korea-mean/?utm\\_term=.bb40cd142cae](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/07/what-the-new-u-n-sanctions-on-north-korea-mean/?utm_term=.bb40cd142cae)>

<sup>9</sup> Taylor, Adam. “What the new U.N. sanctions on North Korea mean.” The Washington Post. 7 Aug 2017. <[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/07/what-the-new-u-n-sanctions-on-north-korea-mean/?utm\\_term=.bb40cd142cae](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/07/what-the-new-u-n-sanctions-on-north-korea-mean/?utm_term=.bb40cd142cae)>

**Will new sanctions work?**

“There's little doubt that the new sanctions are a rare diplomatic success for Trump. That doesn't necessarily mean they will work as intended, however.

Many experts doubt that they will be effective if not fully enforced. “The \$1 billion number depends on China implementing the UN sanctions,” Anthony Ruggiero, a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and a former U.S. Treasury Department official, wrote on Sunday on Twitter, “we only have 11 years of evidence they will not do so.”

Both China and Russia share a border with North Korea and remain deeply worried about the prospect of economic chaos in that country. Russia's state media quoted the country's U.N. ambassador, Vasily Nebenzya, as saying Saturday that sanctions “shall not be used for economic strangling” of North Korea. Notably, the new sanctions do not cut off North Korean crude-oil imports, thought to be a major part of China and North Korea's economic relationship.

A bigger problem may be that even if the sanctions are implemented fully, they still may not produce the desired effect. In the past, North Korea has used sanctions as a domestic propaganda tool and an excuse for its own economic mismanagement. Resolution 2371 explicitly mentions this, with language expressing regret for Pyongyang's “massive diversion of its scarce resources toward its development of nuclear weapons and a number of expensive ballistic missile programs.”

Moreover, North Korea's leadership clearly views its nuclear weapons program as central to its long-term survival — and perhaps loftier and ideologically driven desires to unite the Korean Peninsula. The country has weathered economic disaster before and found inventive ways to flout trade restrictions.”<sup>10</sup>


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<sup>10</sup> Taylor, Adam. “What the new U.N. sanctions on North Korea mean.” The Washington Post. 7 Aug 2017. <[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/07/what-the-new-u-n-sanctions-on-north-korea-mean/?utm\\_term=.bb40cd142cae](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/08/07/what-the-new-u-n-sanctions-on-north-korea-mean/?utm_term=.bb40cd142cae)>

The role of missile defense systems

## U.S. deploys THAAD to South Korea

The U.S. military has begun installing a controversial missile defence shield in South Korea. The Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system is designed to protect against threats from North Korea



Sources: U.S. DoD, wire agencies

\*Reported THAAD location

11

<sup>11</sup> "US deploys THAAD to South Korea." Graphic News. 7 Mar 2017. <<https://www.graphicnews.com/en/pages/35176/MILITARY-U.S.-deploys-THAAD-to-South-Korea>>

“The United States said it conducted a successful missile defense test in the Pacific Ocean on Sunday amid growing tensions with North Korea.

US forces tested the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system in Alaska by launching a ballistic missile over the Pacific Ocean, according to the US military.

The medium-range ballistic missile was detected, tracked and intercepted, it said.

The tests appears to be a show of force two days after North Korea conducted an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test -- though the THAAD system is not capable of intercepting ICBMs, and the test had been scheduled since earlier this month.

US Missile Defense Agency director Lt. Gen. Sam Greaves said it's part of an effort "to stay ahead of the evolving threat," but did not provide specifics.

"In addition to successfully intercepting the target, the data collected will allow the Missile Defense Agency to enhance the THAAD weapon system," he said.

Soldiers used the same procedures they would use in an actual combat scenario, according to the US military. It said this is the 15th such test for the THAAD weapon system.”<sup>12</sup>


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<sup>12</sup> Karimi, Faith. “U.S. tests defense system after North Korea missile launch.” CNN. 30 Jul 2017. <<http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/30/politics/us-military-tests-thaad-system/index.html>>

# Champion Briefs

Sept/Oct 2017

Public Forum Brief



Pro Arguments with  
Con Responses

## **PRO – Deployment buys South Korea time**

**Argument:** Deploying anti-missile systems provides South Korea with a meaningful defense against North Korean missiles. Thus, either a North Korean attack will have minimal damage as South Korea will have time to mount a full defense, or North Korea is forced to spend time developing new weapons to get around South Korean defenses, buying South Korea time to develop their own forces.

**Warrant:** THAAD would buy South Korea time in the event of a North Korean attack.

Thomson, Jason. “Will THAAD make the Korean peninsula safer?” The Christian Science Monitor. 7/21/16. Web. Accessed 8/14/17.  
<https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Global-News/2016/0721/Will-THAAD-make-the-Korean-peninsula-safer>.

**“In seeking to counteract that threat, however real it may be, THAAD is a decent option, says Thomas Karako, director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, citing a perfect intercept record in trials to date. Yet, as Dr. Karako is keen to emphasize, missile defense systems are not intended to ‘sit and play catch.’ That is to say, they may not be able to prevent every missile from finding its target in the event of an attack, but integrated into the overall military structure, they can provide valuable support. ‘In the event of an attack, the aim [of a missile defense system] is to defend critical infrastructure,’ says Karako. ‘North Korea wouldn’t be able to decapitate the military in the south, and so THAAD would buy time to bring the full military forces to bear.’”**

**Warrant:** South Korean defenses are evolving too slowly to counter the North Korean threat.

Snyder, Scott. "South Korea's Decision To Halt THAAD Carries Hidden Risks." Forbes. 6/11/17. Web. Accessed 8/15/17.

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2017/06/11/south-koreas-decision-to-halt-thaad-carries-hidden-risks/#50311e78429a>.

"Given the Moon campaign's longstanding criticisms that the previous administration had failed to manage the THAAD decision and deployment in a transparent manner, it was inevitable that there would be a domestic review of decisions made by the acting government in the months prior to Moon's election. However, outside observers are skeptical that the review may be a ploy to reverse South Korean public support for the deployment. This despite assurances from the government to the United States that the decision by Moon will not change the outcome of South Korean support for the THAAD deployment. It shouldn't. **Barely a day after Moon Jae-in's announcement, North Korea reportedly launched four short-range anti-ship missiles. North Korea's missile advances across the board are cause for concern--and cause for defensive countermeasures.** The risks and vulnerabilities are out in the open: **South Korea's indigenous missile defense efforts are developing too slowly to counter North Korean progress, and that could put U.S. Forces in Korea at risk.**"

**Warrant:** THAAD is successful when used as part of a multi-layered defense system.

Pearson, James. "Even with THAAD defense, North Korea missile barrage poses threat to South." Reuters. 3/7/17. Web. Accessed 8/15/17.

<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-defence-analysis-idUSKBN16F0CT>.

**"North Korea theoretically had enough launchers to send at least 36 ballistic missiles of various types at the same time,** said Joseph S. Bermudez, a strategic advisor

at Allsource Analysis Inc and contributor to the 38 North Korea monitoring project. **To counter that risk, South Korea, Japan and the United States have installed layers of different missile defenses that can work together to reduce the threat. ‘If all three nations and their assets are integrated – and they can be integrated, there are systems for doing that – then the system has a synergy that is quite remarkable,’** Bermudez said. In addition to the new THAAD system, **South Korea also operates a Patriot PAC-3 missile defense system** while Japan is upgrading its PAC-3 defenses and mulling a shore-based version of the Aegis missile-defense system used on Japanese ships.”

**Impact:** North Korea’s nuclear program is developing faster than expected.

NBC. “North Korea’s Missile Program Is Progressing Faster Than Expected: South Korea.” NBC News. 5/16/17. Web. Accessed 8/15/17.  
<http://www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/north-korea-s-missile-program-progressing-faster-expected-south-korea-n759921>.

**“North Korea's missile program is progressing faster than expected, South Korea's defense minister said on Tuesday,** hours after the U.N. Security Council demanded the Kim Jong Un's regime halt all nuclear and ballistic missile tests. **The reclusive North, which has defied all calls to rein in its weapons programs, has been working on a missile, mounted with a nuclear warhead, capable of striking the U.S. mainland.** President Donald Trump's administration has called for an immediate halt to Pyongyang's provocations and has warned that the "era of strategic patience" with North Korea is over. **South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo told parliament that Sunday's test-launch was ‘successful in flight.’** ‘It is considered an IRBM (intermediate range ballistic missile) of enhanced caliber compared to Musudan missiles that have continually failed,’ he said, referring to a class of missile designed to travel up to 1,860 to 2,485 miles. Asked if North Korea's missile program was developing faster than the South had expected, he said: ‘Yes.’”

**Impact:** North Korea continues to develop new types of missiles in the status quo.

Warden, John K. “North Korea’s Nuclear Posture An Evolving Challenge for U.S.

Deterrence.” Institut francais des relations internationales. 3/17. Web. Accessed 8/15/17.

[https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/warden\\_north\\_korea\\_nuclear\\_posture\\_2017.pdf](https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/warden_north_korea_nuclear_posture_2017.pdf).

“North Korea, in five nuclear tests, has demonstrated that it has crude nuclear weapons at the very least. **Judging by North Korea’s plutonium and uranium stockpiles, analysts estimate that North Korea has 13-21 nuclear weapons.**<sup>9</sup> **Even absent the ability to mount a weapon on a missile, Pyongyang could threaten to deliver a crude nuclear device by, for example, using miniature submarines or special operations forces,** two areas where North Korea has demonstrated proficiency.<sup>10</sup> **At minimum, North Korea’s nuclear program has already exceeded expectations by expanding fissile material production, working toward miniaturization, and making progress toward greater explosive yield.**<sup>11</sup>”

**Analysis:** You should use this argument to create a narrative that South Korea is being outpaced by North Korean development, putting them at a severe strategic advantage. In order for South Korea to be adequately protected, it must implement new missile defense systems that force North Korea to divert resources from its planned program. You want to emphasize that any diversion of resources is a positive thing, as North Korea is now forced to play catch-up rather than continue to grow their program. In terms of weighing, you can use timeframe as an impact magnifier on this argument, arguing that the longer we wait to deploy anti-missile systems, the greater the technological disparity becomes and the more danger South Korea faces.

## **A2 – Deployment buys SK time**

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**Answer:** THAAD already can't defend against North Korean missiles.

**Warrant:** THAAD can be overwhelmed by multiple targets.

Pearson, James. "Even with THAAD defense, North Korea missile barrage poses threat to South." Reuters. 3/7/17. Web. Accessed 8/15/17.  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-defence-analysis-idUSKBN16F0CT>.

"THAAD's job is to intercept and destroy a ballistic missile in its final phase of flight, either inside or just outside the earth's atmosphere. But with its specifications secret and having never been used in wartime, **THAAD's ability to deal with a barrage of missiles at the same time is uncertain. 'The use of multiple shots, timed ever-more-closely together, appears destined to rehearse saturating a defensive system by presenting it with an overwhelmingly complex radar picture,'** Joshua Pollack, editor of the U.S.-based Nonproliferation Review, said of Monday's launch."

**Warrant:** North Korea can develop new weapons to get around THAAD.

Pearson, James. "Even with THAAD defense, North Korea missile barrage poses threat to South." Reuters. 3/7/17. Web. Accessed 8/15/17.  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-defence-analysis-idUSKBN16F0CT>.

"**South Korean military and intelligence officials said the four North Korean missiles appeared to be an upgraded version of the Scud type - the 'ER' or 'Extended Range' Scud. 'An advantage of the ER Scud over the Rodong is that the ER Scud is much cheaper,'** said Jeffrey Lewis of the California-based Middlebury Institute of

International Studies. ‘So **North Korea can presumably build more ER Scuds to overwhelm THAAD,**’ Lewis said.”

**Warrant:** North Korea will easily develop new systems to skirt THAAD.

Regehr, Ernie. “What a U.S. missile defence system and a new president mean for South Korea.” Open Canada. 5/11/17. Web. Accessed 8/15/17.

<https://www.opencanada.org/features/what-us-missile-defence-system-and-new-president-mean-south-korea/>.

“There is another problem. **While THAAD might be effective against isolated attacks, North Korea is already practicing barrage attack techniques with its older, tried and proven extended range Scud missiles.** As the experts explain, **swarm-like attacks could overwhelm the system’s radars and in turn render the interceptors unreliable.** **The obvious North Korean response will be the even more determined build up of its inventory of attack missiles to ensure it can overwhelm any regional defence capacity. Adding attack missiles will always be a lot cheaper than building credible nation-wide defences in South Korea.**”

**Analysis:** This argument allows you to cast doubt on the pro’s notion that THAAD will provide a meaningful obstacle to North Korea’s nuclear program. If they already have the capabilities to work around THAAD’s system or can easily and cheaply develop them, there won’t be any real slow-down in development. You should emphasize that it is always cheaper for North Korea to add a few more missiles to their arsenal than for South Korea to develop meaningful defenses across the entire nation, which they sorely lack.

**Answer:** Kim will never slow his nuclear program.

**Warrant:** The Kim regime sees its nuclear program as key to its survival.

Beauchamp, Zack. "North Korea isn't crazy. It's insecure, poor, and extremely dangerous." Vox. 7/5/17. Web. Accessed 8/15/17.  
<https://www.vox.com/world/2017/7/5/15922446/north-korea-nuclear-war-casualties>.

"Facing the twin dangers of domestic instability and foreign attack, **the North has devised a strategy for survival that depends (somewhat counterintuitively) on provoking the South and the United States. The North will do something that it knows will infuriate its enemies, like testing an intercontinental ballistic missile or shelling a South Korean military base. This limit-pushing behavior is designed to show that the North is willing to escalate aggressively in the event of any kind of action from Washington or Seoul that threatens the regime**, thus deterring them from making even the slightest move to undermine the Kim regime. **It also sends a signal to the North Korean people that they're constantly under threat from foreign invasions**, and that they need to support their government unconditionally to survive as a nation."

**Warrant:** The US is less likely to topple Kim's regime as long as he has WMD.

Stratfor Intelligence. "Why North Korea Needs Nukes." Stratfor Intelligence. 5/20/15. Web. Accessed 8/15/17. <https://worldview.stratfor.com/analysis/why-north-korea-needs-nukes>.

"The lesson in this story for Kim Jong Un is clear: that while his safety with nuclear weapons is clearly uncertain, he would be even less safe if he gave them up. After all, **had Gadhafi kept building his WMD capacity throughout the years following the American invasion of Iraq, however slowly, the Americans might have hesitated a bit more before backing the Libyan rebels. There are just fewer risks to toppling a regime without WMD than trying to topple one with them.** One of the reasons the Obama administration hesitated in trying to topple the Syrian regime was the fear of the regime's chemical weapons arsenal falling into rebel hands. And the Bush administration

toppled Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq in order to prevent it from acquiring what it thought might be nuclear weapons.”

**Analysis:** This argument allows you to give more specific analysis on Kim’s rationale as a leader than your opponents, which is key for link-level weighing later in the round. You want to directly combat the idea that North Korea is headed by an irrational leader. While Kim’s actions may be unpredictable at times, they tend to follow a very clear goal: ensuring regime survival. North Korea’s nuclear program is crucial for them to maintain power over their citizens and thus, you can argue, they will not be deterred or slowed substantially by the deployment of new defenses.

**Answer:** South Korea’s military is already superior to North Korea’s.

**Warrant:** South Korea’s conventional military technology is superior.

Beauchamp, Zack. “North Korea isn’t crazy. It’s insecure, poor, and extremely dangerous.” Vox. 7/5/17. Web. Accessed 8/15/17.  
<https://www.vox.com/world/2017/7/5/15922446/north-korea-nuclear-war-casualties>.

“Pyongyang is one of the world’s poorest countries. Its GDP per capita is estimated at about \$1,000, about 1/28th of South Korea’s. It faces chronic shortages of food and medical supplies, depending on Chinese aid to meet its citizens’ basic needs. There’s a real risk that the Kim regime collapses under the weight of its own mismanagement. **Nor is the North secure from military attack. While its army is extremely large personnel-wise, with about 1.2 million soldiers, it uses antiquated Cold War technology while its neighbors to the South are equipped with top-of-line modern gear. Moreover, the presence of 23,500 US troops in South Korea means any war between North and South Korea would draw in the world’s only superpower, though with potentially enormous American casualties.**”

**Analysis:** This argument allows you to beat back the idea that South Korea needs to catch up with North Korea in the status quo. Though North Korea's nuclear weapons give them a valuable strategic tool, you should argue that those are far less likely to be used than conventional weapons in any sort of actual confrontation and that in such a case, South Korea would handily win.

## **PRO - THAAD/AMS Deters North Korea**

**Argument:** THAAD or general anti missile systems can help stop missiles from landing on South Korea through either shooting such missiles down or sending a message to Kim Jong Un that his missiles are worthless. This will save many lives.

**Warrant:** Elites are turning their back against Kim Jong Un, making his regime more at risk of collapse.

Lui, Kevin. "A High-Ranking North Korean Defector Says the Kim Regime's Days Are 'Numbered'" Time News. Web. January 25, 2017, Web., Date Accessed: 7/10/17  
<http://time.com/4649731/north-korea-defector-kim-jong-un-dissent/>

"The defection of Thae, North Korea's erstwhile deputy ambassador to the U.K., with his wife and children last August was one of the most high-profile cases in recent years. Speaking to reporters, Thae said that the North Korean regime's attempts to crack down on the spread of outside information and unsanctioned economic activities was not working as a result of corruption and what he called unprecedented resistance. **"Low-level dissent or criticism of the regime, until recently unthinkable, is becoming more frequent," he said, according to NBC News. He also said the elites were becoming disillusioned with Kim Jong Un, and predicted that " more defections of my colleagues will take place, since North Korea is already on a slippery slope."** Thae called on foreign powers to continue sanctions against North Korea, and argued that the dissemination of outside information would be the best way to spark a rebellion within the North."

**Warrant:** North Korea is at risk of lashing out in a world where his demise is inevitable.

Mansourov, Alexandre. "Is Kim Jong-un a martyr?," Washington Times. March 30, 2016, Web. Date Accessed: 7/10/17

<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2016/mar/30/north-korea-nuclear-threat-is-kim-jong-un-a-martyr/>

**“Kim Jong-un may lash out after convincing himself he has no other choice to survive but attacking the U.S.-ROK alliance preemptively, thus throwing Northeast Asia into chaos and presenting his Chinese patron with a fait accompli. Mr. Kim probably knows the growing weaknesses of his regime better than anyone else and must feel increasingly insecure and cornered.** His reckless and provocative behavior threatening his neighbors, and ruthless and inhumane treatment of his own people led to escalating international pressure depleting his resources and severely restricting his policy options. This young man is under a lot of mental stress. He often snaps, and his closest aides usually lose their lives as a result. He does not sleep well at night. He must be haunted by the ghosts of scores of senior party, military and state officials whom he mercilessly executed on a whim, out of fear of betrayal. He lives in the phantom world of self-delusion.”

**Warrant:** Having a defensive system in place makes the threat of the defender more credible as they have the fire power to back up their claim.

Quackenbush, Steven. National Missile Defense and Deterrence, University of Missouri, December 2006, Web. Date Accessed: 7/10/17  
[https://www.jstor.org/stable/4148056?seq=1#page\\_scan\\_tab\\_contents](https://www.jstor.org/stable/4148056?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents)

**“These results demonstrate that national missile defense generally enhances the stability of deterrence.** In particular, if classical deterrence theorists (e.g., Brams and Kilgour 1988; Powell 2003) are correct to assume that the high costs of nuclear war make conflict the worst possible outcome, then effective national missile defense is the only way to achieve successful deterrence. Nonetheless, perfect deterrence theory's conclusion that threat credibility is an important determinant of deterrence success is well supported here (Zagare and Kilgour 2000; Zagare 2004). **National missile defense**

is stabilizing precisely because it makes Defender's retaliatory threat more credible.”

**Warrant:** THAAD has the ability to shoot missiles out of the sky.

Panda, Akit. “What Is THAAD, What Does It Do, and Why Is China Mad About It?” ,  
The Diplomat, February 25, 2016, Web., Date Accessed: 7/10/17  
<http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/what-is-thaad-what-does-it-do-and-why-is-china-mad-about-it/>

**“THAAD is particularly well-suited to intercept and destroy short, medium, and intermediate-range ballistic missiles in their terminal phase.** Rod Lyon, in a recent post at the National Interest, helpfully catalogues some of THAAD’s tried-and-tested abilities, which attest to that fact. THAAD’s overall operation is similar to many other missile interceptor and surface-to-air missile systems: an X-Band active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar (AN/TPY-2) kicks off THAAD’s interception, detecting the target projectile. THAAD’s fire control and support equipment identifies, verifies, and initiates the launcher. **The launcher—a road-mobile erector launcher, to be precise—finally releases the infrared seeker head-equipped THAAD missile which, according to the system’s manufacturer, then uses “kinetic energy to destroy [the] incoming missile.” In plain English, missile meets missile in mid-air; both missiles go “Boom.”** There’s a lot more to THAAD’s feature set. The “high altitude” part of the acronym isn’t there for show: THAAD is able to intercept incoming missiles at endo- and exo-atmospheric altitudes, with a maximum engagement altitude of roughly 93 miles above the earth’s surface. The missile itself can travel at speeds over Mach 8, placing it in the “hypersonic” category. Indeed, THAAD manufacturer Lockheed Martin is interested in developing an extended range THAAD variant to counter hypersonic glide vehicles, including China’s own WU-14.”

**Impact:** The impact of a war on the peninsula would result in 1 million dead and nearly 1 trillion dollars of economic damage.

Powell, Bill. "WHAT WAR WITH NORTH KOREA LOOKS LIKE" NewsWeek, ,  
April 25, 2017, Web. Date Accessed:  
7/10/17<http://www.newsweek.com/2017/05/05/what-war-north-korea-looks-588861.html>

“But this would not be a one-week walkover, like the first Gulf War against Saddam Hussein, when his forces were arrayed like clay pigeons in the Iraqi and Kuwaiti deserts, where they were easily destroyed by U.S. air power. Conventional thinking in the Pentagon is that it would be a four- to six-month conflict with high-intensity combat and many dead. In 1994, when President **Bill Clinton contemplated the use of force to knock out the North’s nuclear weapons program, the then commander of U.S.- Republic of Korea forces, Gary Luck, told his commander in chief that a war on the peninsula would likely result in 1 million dead, and nearly \$1 trillion of economic damage.**”

**Analysis:** Showing inherency to this argument is very important as it shows the probability Un will attack South Korea. Without showing some sort of risk of attack, you may put yourself in a position whereby you receive very little offense. There are many ways to show probability that Un will attack whether be threats by Kim Jong Un himself or evidence that shows that in the case of a collapse (which is likely) that Un would lash out.

## **A2 – THAAD/AMS Deters North Korea**

**Answer:** THAAD can not stop North Korean missiles

**Warrant:** THAAD lacks the ability to stop missiles that are underwater.

Elleman, Michael. "Some Significant Caveats," US Korea Institute At John Hopkins SAIS, March 10, 2016. Web. Date Accessed: 7/10/17 <http://38north.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/THAAD-031016-Michael-Elleman-and-Michael-Zagurek.pdf>.

“Lastly, to protect against missile attacks launched from North Korean territory, all of the PAC-3 and THAAD radars would necessarily be pointed north. **If North Korea successfully develops and deploys a submarine-launch ballistic missile, as it has been attempting over the past year or two, the missile defenses discussed above would be ineffective against the missiles fired from the waters east, west and south of the lower Korean peninsula.**”

**Warrant:** North Korea has been adapting its missiles to be able to bypass US missile systems including THAAD.

Scarborough, Rowan. “North Korea tests missiles designed to defeat U.S. THAAD defense system.” Washington Times, May 3, 2017 Web. Date Accessed: 7/10/17 <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/3/north-korea-missiles-can-defeat-us-defense-systems/>

“North Korea has tailored its spate of ballistic missile tests to defeat the U.S.-stationed defense systems ready to protect the South and Japan from descending warheads, a report to Congress says. The bellicose North regularly flight-tests a panoply of ballistic missiles that could, in war, be capped with miniaturized nuclear

warheads and strike its two democratic neighbors and U.S. allies. The U.S. military has matched this threat by first stationing Patriot anti-missile batteries and then announcing that the wider-range, mobile THAAD system is now in place to shoot down incoming warheads. The Congressional Research Service reported that the regime launched test missiles last year in flights precisely designed to avoid interception by rocketing them into much higher altitudes. The result: The re-entry warhead will descend at a steeper angle and faster speed, “making it potentially more difficult to intercept with a missile defense system,” the CRS said. In another maneuver, the CRS said, “North Korea has also demonstrated an ability to launch a salvo attack with more than one missile launched in relatively short order.”

**Warrant:** If North Korea were to launch multiple missiles at once, anti missile systems could become overwhelmed and be rendered useless.

Jeff Daniels . South Korea's THAAD missile shield could be 'overwhelmed' by swarm-like attack from North. CNBC,. 7/13/2017. Web. Date Accessed: 7/10/17  
<http://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/13/south-koreas-thaad-missile-shield-could-be-overwhelmed-by-pyongyang.html>

**“Critics say, however, that the military's testing may not reflect the danger of swarm-type attacks by multiple incoming ballistic missiles from North Korea or other enemies. Such a scenario could overwhelm or confuse the system and render it useless.**” While the THAAD system does have a good number of interceptors, I can imagine it getting overwhelmed by sheer numbers,” said Laura Grego, a missile defense expert and senior scientist in the Global Security Program for the Union of Concerned Scientists. Similarly, Grego said the U.S. military's May 30 test of the “less mature” GMD system designed to protect the U.S. homeland from ballistic missiles has flaws and was “not challenged in the way they would be [in] a real-world scenario.” “We generally say they are scripted for success. They don't have challenging countermeasures of the type that a really dedicated adversary would include,” Grego added.”

**Analysis:** There are many ways THAAD can be rendered ineffective and South Korea can do nothing to solve back for these inefficacies in the THAAD system. If an attack were to occur and THAAD were to be trusted for security, it could make the attack more devastating as South Koreans would think they are safe but lack the ability to protect themselves in case of attack. This could make the attack more devastating and put millions of lives at risk.

**Answer:** Other missile systems already installed like the Patriot unit can protect South Korea from incoming attacks. These missile systems are used around the world.

Mizokami, Kyle. "Why America's Enemies Fear the Patriot Missile Defense System (Even After Almost 40 Years)" National Interest. March 20, 2017 Web. Date Accessed: 8/14/17

**"Today Patriot is on the front lines across the world, from South Korea and Taiwan to Turkey, Israel and Yemen. Israeli Patriot batteries have shot down three drones operated by Hamas and Syria. In addition, Saudi Patriot units have shot down missiles aimed at the country by Houthi rebels. Wary of North Korean ballistic missiles, Japan has deployed Patriot missiles to protect key locations, from downtown Tokyo to the distant Ryukyu Islands."**

**Analysis:** Advocating for the status quo allows you to garner all of the benefits of deploying missile systems without deploying THAAD specifically. This can be especially strategic as you force the affirmative to advocate for THAAD instead of anti missile systems in general

**PRO – Kill-Chain will be used if AMS isn't deployed**

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**Argument:** If THAAD isn't deployed, either the United States or South Korea would lash out and try to eliminate North Korea's nuclear stockpile with a pre-emptive strike.

**Warrant:** Kill-Chain is part of South Korea's official and public defense strategy

Richard Sisk "First Strike Against North Part Of South Korea's Defense Strategy"  
Defense Tech. 6/28/17. < <https://www.defensetech.org/2017/06/28/first-strike-north-part-south-koreas-defense-strategy/>>

The U.S. tends to avoid talk of a first strike against North Korea but **pre-emptive action called the "Kill Chain" is part of the official and public national defense strategy of South Korea.** The stark difference between Seoul and Washington on the ultimate form of deterrence against North Korean dictator Kim Jong-un is an example of the many issues in dispute in the once-solid U.S.-South Korea alliance. Those differences will be the subject of "frank and serious" discussions in White House talks between President Donald Trump and new South Korean President Moon Jae-in, a senior White House official said on background Wednesday.

**Warrant:** Moon Jae-In is accelerating deployment of Kill-Chain

"South Korea President Moon Jae In's Main Policy Pledges." The Strait Times. 5/11/17.  
<[www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-korean-presidential-shoo-in-moon-jae-ins-main-policy-pledges](http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/south-korean-presidential-shoo-in-moon-jae-ins-main-policy-pledges)>

**Moon** said the new administration should make a final decision on the deployment of a U.S. anti-missile system known as Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). Moon will also seek a summit with China to resolve a dispute over the system, which China sees as a threat to its security. **He has also vowed to enhance a self-reliant**

**defence capability. Plans include** the transfer of wartime operational control of the South Korean military from the United States during his presidency and **the early deployment of a pre-emptive strike system "Kill Chain"**, and a homegrown missile defence system called Korea Air and Missile Defense. **FISCAL POLICY** Moon said he will push immediately for a supplementary budget to create jobs. He has said the budget could rise by more than 10 trillion won (\$8.80 billion) from a current 400.5 trillion won approved for this year. He said he would aim to boost investment in 10 key sectors. **JOBS** Moon says he expects to create, on average, more than 500,000 new jobs a year. He aims to create 810,000 jobs in the public sector during his five-year term, including 514,000 in service sectors across welfare agencies, schools and in police stations. Some temporary positions at public agencies will be turned into regular positions, to improve working conditions and job security.

**Warrant:** Ex-Pentagon chief says pre-emptive strikes are military options, however bad they may be

Jeff Nesbit "Could 'Kill Chain' Kill Any Chance at Peace?" US News. 3/27/17. <  
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/27/reunifying-korea-a-possibility/>>

President Trump has said contradictory things about negotiating with North Korea, so I don't take that as a guideline. I think the important thing is what the security team is saying. In this case, I think Tillerson and Mattis and possibly [National Security Adviser H.R.] McMaster are all interested in looking at the possibility of negotiations. So it's possible that they will come up with a negotiating approach and present it to the president. Trump has said that all options are on the table. Do you see a preemptive strike, a military option, being a viable path forward? **I have myself - both when I was secretary of defense and, later, when I was advising the government - seriously considered preemptive strikes as a military option. But whether or not this was a good idea in those days, I am persuaded, I am convinced it's not a good idea today.**

A military strike would lead surely to a military response against the South and would do much damage to the South even with conventional weapons. It would likely involve the United States because we've got almost 30,000 troops over there, and it could all too easily escalate into a nuclear conflict. So I would not recommend a preemptive military strike at this time.

**Warrant:** US National Security Advisor (McMaster) doesn't care about the South Korean people

Uri Friedman "North Korea: The Military Options" The Atlantic. 5/17/17.

<<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/war-north-korea-options/524049/>>

The North Koreans could swiftly bombard South Koreans with artillery guns stationed in the Kaesong area near the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ)—roughly as far from the South Korean capital of Seoul, a sprawling metropolis of 25 million people, as Baltimore is from Washington, D.C. **"What the president has first and foremost on his mind is to protect the American people," McMaster said. Where that left the South Korean people, McMaster didn't say.** "If we were to launch a preemptive strike against their nuclear program, their missile program, we're talking about human catastrophe, aren't we?" Wallace inquired. "Well, yes," McMaster replied.

**Warrant:** An option alternative to pre-emptive strikes is beefing up THAAD

Uri Friedman "North Korea: The Military Options" The Atlantic. 5/17/17.

<<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/05/war-north-korea-options/524049/>>

The Options Within the Military Option A **"military" option need not involve strikes at all. It could mean deploying military assets to deter North Korea from using**

**weapons of mass destruction**, just as the United States and its allies deterred rival nuclear states during the Cold War. **This might include beefing up missile defenses like the THAAD system in South Korea**, which the Trump administration has been rapidly installing. It might even include “the reintroduction of nuclear weapons” to Japan and South Korea to emphasize “that we’re determined to fully deter any [North Korean] attack and, should deterrence fail, that it would result in a prompt and overwhelming response,” just as America deployed Pershing missiles to Europe during the Cold War, according to Wallace Gregson, a retired lieutenant general who served as the assistant secretary of defense for Asian and Pacific security affairs in the Obama administration.

**Impact:** Using pre-emptive strikes is a bad idea

Larry Diamond “There Is a Peaceful Way Out of the North Korea Crisis.” The Atlantic. 4/26/17. < [www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/north-korea-trump-china/524349/](http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/north-korea-trump-china/524349/)>

The third element is the tough-talking new American president, Donald Trump. While the new American administration has declared the end of “strategic patience” and vowed that the North Korean missile threat “will be taken care of,” Trump is pursuing a more “transactional” approach to engaging China in pursuit of a diplomatic resolution of the crisis. Thus, North Korea is reported to have figured prominently in the first head-to-head meeting between Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping at the president’s Mar-a-Lago estate recently. It is difficult to exaggerate the stakes here. **A preemptive strike on North Korea’s military facilities** would have nothing like the limited scope of containment or punishment conveyed by the recent American cruise missile strike on Syria. To accomplish anything meaningful, an American strike on North Korea would have to be on a scale many, many times larger. Even then, it **would likely fail to eliminate all of Kim’s short-range missiles (many of which are mobile) or his nuclear weapons (which are surely hidden). And so it could bring on the worst of all scenarios, a furious military response from North Korea with its nuclear arsenal**

**still intact, putting millions of lives in South Korea and potentially Japan as well at imminent risk.** It is no wonder, then, that the Trump administration has rather quickly discovered the virtues of a diplomatic track. Yet the six-party talks, launched in 2003 among Japan, South Korea, Russia, China, the U.S., and North Korea to find a diplomatic formula to halt North Korea's nuclear program, have been suspended since 2009.

**Analysis:** Not only does the Sisk evidence indicate that Kill-Chain is an official part of the South Korean defense strategy, The Strait Times article's characterization of its accelerated deployment would imply that it was becoming more of an option in the window of time that Moon Jae-In opposed THAAD's full deployment. The interview with HR McMaster confirms that although US officials know that using Kill-Chain wouldn't be in South Korea's best interests, they would use it anyway and consider beefing up THAAD to be one of the many alternatives to using pre-emptive strikes. The Diamond evidence impacts this, first of all reminding us that a pre-emptive strike could never hope to be completely successful. He then furthers that North Korea would retaliate to such a strike with force, with nuclear weaponry never out of the question. Such an impact would supersede others on magnitude and scope.

## **A2 – Kill-Chain will be used if AMS isn't deployed**

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**Answer:** US and North Korean leaders are smart enough not to unnecessarily incite a war.

**Warrant:** Moon Jae-In would prefer not to use Kill-Chain

Jeff Nesbit “Could 'Kill Chain' Kill Any Chance at Peace?” US News. 3/27/17. <  
<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/27/reunifying-korea-a-possibility/>>

Today, however, younger Chinese leaders understand and talk openly about the ugly piece of baggage the North represents for China itself. Skeptics believe China will reject reunification principally on two grounds. **Beijing dreads with good reason that Pyongyang's collapse could produce a refugee flood across the Yalu River into Manchuria, a humanitarian emergency taxing China's resources and also risking political and economic destabilization. (Seoul fears a similar refugee tide into the Demilitarized Zone.)** In response, Washington and our regional allies should pledge full cooperation with Beijing to avoid massive refugee flows from North Korea as its prison-camp structures dissolve. This will doubtless involve complex, fraught issues like deconflicting intervening foreign forces in the region as the North's regime collapses, and securing its missile facilities and stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction.

**Warrant:** South Korean government asserts that no strike will happen without its approval

Choe Sang-Hun “South Korea Seeks to Assure Citizens U.S. Won't Strike North Pre-emptively” Washington Times. 4/11/17.  
<<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/11/world/asia/south-korea-north-military-strike.html>>

SEOUL, South Korea — **Reacting to worries** and conjecture spreading in South Korea **of a possible pre-emptive American military strike on nuclear-armed North Korea, the government sought to reassure citizens** on Tuesday that **there would be no such attack without its consent**. Statements of reassurance from government officials came as a leading presidential candidate warned that no foreign countries, including the United States, should bring war to the Korean Peninsula. Anxiety and rumormongering among South Koreans that the Trump administration would answer the North's messages of nuclear belligerence with a military strike have intensified over the last week. The anxieties were fed by Mr. Trump's willingness to use force, as seen in his missile attack on Syria; the redeployment of American warships near the Korean Peninsula; and Mr. Trump's impatience with China over what he views as its reluctance to pressure North Korea's leader, Kim Jong-un.

**Warrant:** Experts agree that pre-emptive strike against North Korea is unlikely

Feliz Solomon "Experts Say It's Unlikely U.S. Will Launch a Strike on North Korea"  
Time. 4/14/17. < <http://time.com/4739812/north-korea-donald-trump-preemptive-strike/>>

No one knows exactly what would play out if the U.S. launched an attack on North Korea. **Most experts agree, however, that the outcome would be very deadly.** While a strike on North Korea's testing facilities would likely result in very few casualties, **Pyongyang would be compelled to launch a "very serious military response,"** Delury says. "North Korea would retaliate in a way that would probably inflict serious loss of life," he tells TIME. His colleagues agree. "They would have a number of options," Sean O'Malley, a professor of international relations at Busan's Dongseo University, tells TIME. "One would be an artillery barrage sent toward Seoul." He and other experts say the South Korean capital, home to more than 10 million people, would be the most likely target for a retaliatory strike, while U.S. military installations in South Korea could also be high on Pyongyang's list. **An estimated 28,000 U.S. troops are stationed in a**

**number of military bases in the South**, many at the southern Busan air base. **South Korea, located only about 120 miles south of Pyongyang, is also host to an estimated 150,000 to 200,000 American expatriates**, who would most likely have to be evacuated in the event of conflict.

**Analysis:** Many experts on foreign policy, including members of Trump's cabinet, urge that using a pre-emptive strike would be a horrible idea. Although it is true that the ultimate decision lies in Trump's hands, it would be unfair to say that he is an insufferably irrational leader who would put his people at risk just to prove to the world that he isn't just talk. Additionally, Moon Jae-In is vehemently against such a strike, confirming to his people that the US would not be permitted to use Kill-Chain without the South Korean government's approval.

**Answer:** THAAD actually increases the chances of a pre-emptive strike

**Warrant:** THAAD gives the US a degree of protection against nuclear retaliation

Eric Gomez "THAAD and the Future of Strategic Stability in East Asia" Cato Institute. 3/10/17. <<https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/thaad-future-strategic-stability-east-asia>>

China's small, survivable nuclear force bodes well for strategic stability, because there is little incentive for such a force to use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. **A small nuclear force** is incapable of disarming a better-armed adversary like the United States, but such a force **could ride out a first strike and feel confident in their ability to strike back**. **The high cost of an assured second strike prevents the United States from using nuclear weapons first**, while China doesn't use nuclear weapons first because it couldn't disarm the United States. **THAAD and other forms of BMD upend this strategic balance by providing the United States a degree of protection against nuclear retaliation**. The United States could feel more confident about conducting a first strike against Chinese nuclear forces if the few surviving forces can be defeated by BMD

systems. Improvements to American remote sensing, conventional precision strike, and nuclear capabilities increase the potency of a disarming first strike, while advances in BMD systems increase the likelihood that China's surviving nuclear weapons can be destroyed en-route to their targets.

**Warrant:** THAAD puts the US in a better position to respond to North Korean provocations with force

Ryan Barenklau "THAAD Is Operational in South Korea. What Next?" Cato Institute. 5/2/17. <<http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/thaad-is-operational-in-south-korea-what-next/>>

The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system has now officially gone into operation in South Korea. The purpose of THAAD, as The Diplomat has previously explained, is to detect and destroy enemy ballistic missiles, such as the ones North Korea is currently fielding. **With the introduction of the THAAD system in South Korea, the United States is certainly in a better position to respond to North Korean provocations such as a missile or nuclear test with military force.** This could easily be accomplished with, for example, the Carl Vinson strike group now sitting off the North Korean coast.

**Analysis:** It is safe to assume that the primary reason the US hasn't yet engaged in a pre-emptive strike is because of the fear of North Korean retaliation, as the idea of a belligerent dictator with his hands on nuclear warheads doesn't exactly brighten up Trump's day. The argument here is that THAAD puts the US in a more confident position to take out North Korea's nuclear stockpile because it can then worry less about North Korea's second strike.

**PRO –Strengthens SK’s hand at the negotiating table**

**Argument:** Deploying adequate missile defenses gives South Korea a security guarantee that, should negotiations fall through, they will be protected in the event of an attack. As such, their hand is strengthened at the negotiation table, as they are no longer desperate to accept any possible solution, even one that may be to their detriment.

**Warrant:** South Korea is vulnerable to a North Korean attack.

Kelly, Robert. “An Agenda for South Korea’s New Leader.” New York Times. 5/9/17.  
Web. Accessed 8/15/17. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/opinion/an-agenda-for-south-koreas-new-leader.html>.

“South Korean equanimity toward the North’s threats surprises Westerners, but the South Koreans have lived for decades with Pyongyang’s provocations and, more recently, the nuclear program. Young South Koreans increasingly consider the North Korean menace a fact of life. **South Korea’s vulnerability to a devastating attack from the North — Seoul’s northernmost suburbs begin just 20 miles from the demilitarized zone — adds to the sense here that the South should do everything it can to avoid war.**”

**Warrant:** A stronger South Korea will be more effective in negotiations.

Kelly, Robert. “An Agenda for South Korea’s New Leader.” New York Times. 5/9/17.  
Web. Accessed 8/15/17. <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/opinion/an-agenda-for-south-koreas-new-leader.html>.

“An overture from the incoming Moon administration to start talks with Pyongyang should be made with caution. Engagement with North Korea has a mixed, if not poor, record, and **new talks would be more effective if started from a position of strength. It is vital that Mr. Moon pursue policies to decrease his country’s vulnerability to**

**attack, while dangling the possibility of talks.** Beijing and Washington are key to any deal with North Korea, but Seoul can do a lot on its own.”

**Warrant:** Moon has said engagement with North Korea is only possible with more strength.

Kim, Christine. “South Korea says engagement with North possible only with strength.”

Business Insider. 6/23/17. Web. Accessed 8/15/17.

<http://www.businessinsider.com/r-south-korea-says-engagement-with-north-possible-only-with-strength-2017-6>.

**“South Korean President Moon Jae-in said on Friday engagement with North Korea would only be possible when the South has the security ability to overwhelm the North,** the presidential office said in a media briefing. Moon made the comments during a visit to the state-run Agency for Defense Development, where he watched a test-firing of an indigenously developed ballistic missile, hours after U.S. officials said North Korea has carried out a test of a rocket engine that they believe could be for an intercontinental ballistic missile.”

**Impact:** Negotiations are crucial for a peaceful peninsula.

Litwak, Robert S. “Preventing North Korea’s Nuclear Breakout.” Wilson Center. 2/17.

Web. Accessed 8/14/17.

[https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/preventing\\_north\\_koreas\\_nuclear\\_breakout.pdf](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/preventing_north_koreas_nuclear_breakout.pdf).

“In rejecting the use of military power, **this study argues for a pivot to serious diplomacy through a strategy of coercive engagement. A new conjunction of factors creates an opportunity to achieve a freeze agreement—one that, in the near term, optimizes the interests among all the major parties. Such an interim agreement would forestall a North Korean nuclear breakout and reaffirm the goal of long-term**

**denuclearization** (the urgent U.S. interest), while preventing the collapse of the North Korean regime and the loss of a buffer state (the Chinese interest) and leaving the Kim family regime in power with a minimum nuclear deterrent (the paramount North Korean interest). This analytical option should be put to the political test through revitalized diplomacy. The nuclear agreement with Iran is a relevant precedent. As with Iran, **the goal of reinvigorated nuclear diplomacy with North Korea would be to buy time and prevent a deteriorating situation from getting worse. A renewed diplomatic channel would also lower the risk of an inadvertent military clash through miscalculation.**”

**Impact:** Diplomacy must be enacted over military action to handle North Korea.

Litwak, Robert S. “Preventing North Korea’s Nuclear Breakout.” Wilson Center. 2/17.

Web. Accessed 8/14/17.

[https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/preventing\\_north\\_koreas\\_nuclear\\_breakout.pdf](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/preventing_north_koreas_nuclear_breakout.pdf).

“Basically, **to prevent a North Korean nuclear breakout, the Trump administration has two options: a preventive military strike on North Korea’s nuclear and missile infrastructure to destroy its capability to threaten the United States; or a revitalized diplomatic track to deny North Korea a breakout capability by negotiating a freeze of its nuclear and missile programs.** This section critically analyzes these two options—identifying and assessing the key assumptions underlying each and placing them in historical context. The analysis sustains the conclusion that **the military option, considered and rejected by the Clinton administration during the first nuclear crisis in 1994, continues to carry the catastrophic risk that even a limited strike on the North’s nuclear infrastructure would likely escalate into a general war on the Korean peninsula.**”

**Impact:** Use of force in Korea would result in devastating collateral damage.

Litwak, Robert S. "Preventing North Korea's Nuclear Breakout." Wilson Center. 2/17.

Web. Accessed 8/14/17.

[https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/preventing\\_north\\_koreas\\_nuclear\\_breakout.pdf](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/preventing_north_koreas_nuclear_breakout.pdf).

**“Historical precedents (such as the Operation Desert Fox air campaign against Saddam Hussein’s suspect WMD sites in 1998) reveal that a major constraint on the use of force as a counterproliferation instrument is the danger of unacceptable collateral damage—either to the environment or in civilian casualties. Israel’s use of force (Iraq 1981, Syria 2007) was against sites that were not operational with fissile material loaded into the reactor cores. All of the prospective nuclear targets in North Korea—the Yongbyon nuclear facility (the five-megawatt reactor), the fuel nuclear fabrication facility, the reprocessing facility for the separation of plutonium, and nuclear-weapon storage installations (if known to U.S. intelligence)—are active sites with radioactive materials. Yongbyon is only 65 miles from Pyongyang.** Even with advanced precision ordnance to mitigate consequences, U.S. policymakers, in considering a counterproliferation strike, could not discount the potential risk of collateral damage.”

**Impact:** Negotiations ought to be used over escalatory military actions

Litwak, Robert S. "Preventing North Korea's Nuclear Breakout." Wilson Center. 2/17.

Web. Accessed 8/14/17.

[https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/preventing\\_north\\_koreas\\_nuclear\\_breakout.pdf](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/preventing_north_koreas_nuclear_breakout.pdf).

“After the first North Korean nuclear crisis in 1994, a senior U.S. of official who participated in the negotiation of the U.S.- DPRK Agreed Framework stated that the Pyongyang regime did not distinguish between a narrow U.S. counterproliferation option on the North’s nuclear facilities and general war. **On the American side, the fear of**

**inadvertent escalation and catalytic war—the possibility that a counterproliferation strike on the DPRK’s nuclear infrastructure would have a “catalytic” effect triggering all-out war on the Korean peninsula—was a key policy determinant of the Clinton administration’s decision-making. This overriding concern, manifested in the South Korean government’s staunch opposition to military action, prompted the Clinton administration to pursue alternative non-military approaches—initially, economic sanctions in the UN; later, bilateral negotiations leading to the Agreed Framework.”**

**Impact:** War on the peninsula would have devastating consequences.

Litwak, Robert S. “Preventing North Korea’s Nuclear Breakout.” Wilson Center. 2/17.

Web. Accessed 8/14/17.

[https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/preventing\\_north\\_koreas\\_nuclear\\_breakout.pdf](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/preventing_north_koreas_nuclear_breakout.pdf).

**“At the time of the first nuclear crisis, the commander of U.S. forces in South Korea warned that a large-scale conflict would result in one million casualties and entail economic costs of \$1 trillion. Now more than two decades later, the human and economic costs, and the escalatory risks of the military option, to which South Korea would likely remain opposed, would be even greater. First, the scale of the counterproliferation strikes, which would invariably include command-and-control facilities, would likely be perceived by the Kim Jong-un regime as the starting gun of a broader war of regime change. The regime would perceive the strikes within the context of U.S. and South Korean references to decapitating strikes on the North Korean leadership should war break out. Second, even if counterproliferation strikes successfully nullified the North Korean nuclear capacity (a huge if), the Pyongyang regime would retain the capability of retaliating against South Korea with its stocks of chemical and biological weapons, as well as its forward-deployed artillery that pose a catastrophic threat to Seoul. Third, U.S. military strikes, which would be**

**undertaken presumably without advance consultation with Beijing, would have uncertain escalatory potential with China,** particularly if it viewed the U.S. action as precipitating regime collapse and potential Korean unification on American terms. In sum, no U.S. president could consider military action against North Korea without taking into account the profound escalatory potential.”

**Impact:** Coercive diplomacy is likely to work on North Korea.

Litwak, Robert S. “Preventing North Korea’s Nuclear Breakout.” Wilson Center. 2/17.

Web. Accessed 8/14/17.

[https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/preventing\\_north\\_koreas\\_nuclear\\_breakout.pdf](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/preventing_north_koreas_nuclear_breakout.pdf).

“In rejecting the use of military power, this study argues for a pivot to serious diplomacy through a strategy of coercive engagement. At first glance, the record of nuclear diplomacy with North Korea does not encourage optimism. Abortive efforts most recently include the 2012 “Leap Day” agreement, originally thought to be a breakthrough. Why should a renewed diplomatic push to bound North Korea’s nuclear ambitions fare any better? **A new conjunction of factors creates an opportunity to achieve a freeze agreement—one that, in the near term, optimizes the interests among all the major parties. Such an interim agreement would forestall a North Korean nuclear breakout and reaffirm the goal of long-term denuclearization (the urgent U.S. interest), while preventing the collapse of the North Korean regime and the loss of a buffer state (the Chinese interest) and leaving the Kim family regime in power with a minimum nuclear deterrent (the paramount North Korean interest).** This analytical option should be put to the political test through revitalized diplomacy.”

**Analysis:** You want to make it clear that negotiations will only occur if South Korea feels comfortable enough to engage with North Korea in the first place and that they will only feel comfortable if they have defense systems deployed. Further, you can weigh by saying that even

if negotiations were to occur absent missile defense systems, South Korea would be less likely to see favorable outcomes since they would be coming to the table with much weaker standing.

## A2 – Strengthens SK’s hand at the negotiating table

**Answer:** South Korea’s soft power strategies are sufficient.

**Warrant:** South Korea’s soft power offsets its lack of hard power.

Kim, Steven. “Korea’s Cultural Juggernaut is a Soft-Power Strategy Worth Copying.”

National Interest. 8/4/16. Web. Accessed 8/14/16.

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/koreas-cultural-juggernaut-soft-power-strategy-worth-copying-17246>.

“In seeking to raise its international profile and influence, Taiwan can take lessons from South Korea’s growing soft power. Its soft power has been expanding through the growing appeal and attraction of its popular culture (a.k.a. Korean Wave or Hallyu) worldwide. As a result, **the government has vigorously promoted Korean popular culture, taking advantage of its growing popularity to enhance Korea’s international standing and national image, as well as shape foreigners’ attitudes and preferences on issues of importance to Korea.** The urgent lessons of Korea’s growing soft power for Taiwan are twofold. **While smaller countries cannot surpass larger countries in terms of hard power, the former can not only increase their soft power, but even surpass that of the latter. Increasing the ability to shape the attitudes and preferences of foreign peoples and their governments through cultural attraction can offset a country’s limited hard power.** As in the case of Korea, Taiwan can expand its soft power to counterbalance its limited capabilities and constricted international space. More importantly, there is no limit to Taiwan’s expansion of soft power, as there is in the acquisition of hard power.”

**Warrant:** Soft power makes political leadership easier

Nye, Joseph. "The Benefits of Soft Power." Harvard Business School. 8/2/04. Web. Accessed 8/17/17. <http://hbswk.hbs.edu/archive/4290.html>.

**Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others.** In the business world, smart executives know that leadership is not just a matter of issuing commands, but also involves leading by example and attracting others to do what you want. Similarly, contemporary practices of community-based policing rely on making the police sufficiently friendly and attractive that a community wants to help them achieve shared objectives. **Political leaders have long understood the power that comes from attraction. If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to use carrots or sticks to make you do it. Soft power is a staple of daily democratic politics. The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, political values and institutions, and policies that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority.** If a leader represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead.

**Analysis:** This answer allows you to beat back the narrative that South Korea needs military prowess to hold international sway. Rather, you should argue that they have found a sound footing in the international community through robust soft power. It's also important to make link-level analysis about why this soft power influence and the relationships it has gained them with China and other countries is in fact more important for the success of negotiations than hard power.

**Answer:** The US already provides South Korea with a security guarantee.

**Warrant:** There are 23,500 American troops currently stationed in South Korea.

Price, Greg. "U.S. Military Presence in Asia: Troops Stationed in Japan, South Korea and Beyond." Newsweek. 4/26/17. Web. Accessed 8/15/17. <http://www.newsweek.com/us-military-japan-north-korea-asia-590278>.

**“By the end of last year, a little more than 39,000 troops were stationed in Japan,** with the Marine Corps representing roughly a third of that force at 13,724 personnel, according to the most recent data released by the Department of Defense. That’s by far the largest force stationed overseas among the entire U.S. military, with Germany next up at more than 34,000 troops, **followed by South Korea at nearly 23,500 troops.”**

**Warrant:** The US has a substantial military presence in the Korean peninsula.

Price, Greg. “U.S. Military Presence in Asia: Troops Stationed in Japan, South Korea and Beyond.” Newsweek. 4/26/17. Web. Accessed 8/15/17.  
<http://www.newsweek.com/us-military-japan-north-korea-asia-590278>.

“As the graphic above shows, the U.S., since Japan has not been allowed to create a traditional military after its defeat in World War II, has set up naval and air bases to the north and south of Japan. Altogether, the Army has two bases, the Marine Corps two (though Camp S D Butler is technically broken down and spread across Okinawa into a number of bases including the controversial Futenma), three for the Navy and three for the Air Force, with the 18th Wing and 35th Fighter Wing also based there. Along with that balanced bevy of troops, ships and aircraft, **South Korea also has a heavy U.S. military presence. Four Army, one Navy and three other Air Force installations have long served as deterrents to the North in the years following the Korean War.** The U.S also has installations in Singapore and Guam.”

**Warrant:** The US is committed to protecting South Korea.

Kang, Shinhye. “Top U.S. General Reassures South Korea in a Visit to Seoul.” Bloomberg. 8/14/17. Web. Accessed 8/15/17.  
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-14/top-u-s-general-reassures-south-korea-after-meeting-president>.

**“Marine General Joseph Dunford, chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to protect South Korea after a meeting with President Moon Jae-in, spokesman Park Su-hyun told reporters in Seoul on Monday. ‘Dunford told Moon everyone hopes to resolve the current situation without going to war,’ Park said. While a U.S. military spokesman said Dunford ‘affirmed the ironclad commitment of the U.S. to the alliance’ with South Korea, he indicated the general also made clear during his meetings in Seoul that military action against North Korea remains a possibility. ‘He conveyed America’s readiness to use the full range of military capabilities to defend our allies and the U.S. homeland,’ Captain Darryn James said in a statement.”**

**Analysis:** You want to be making the analysis that the US is the strongest security guarantee that South Korea could possibly have because A) US key strategic interests in the region (especially with an increasingly belligerent North Korea) make it near impossible we would ever leave the region and B) the full force of the US military provides far more security than South Korea developing a few more missile systems. Thus, US support is more than enough to strengthen South Korea’s position at the negotiating table and ensure they get what they want out of talks.

**PRO – Anti-Missile systems not named THAAD are effective**

**Argument:** Anti-missile defense systems currently deployed in South Korea are effective and operational.

**Warrant:** Aegis is deployed in SK and has worked in the past

Brad Lendon “How US Could Stop a North Korean Missile.” CNN. 3/5/17.

<<http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/14/politics/us-north-korea-aegis-ballistic-missile-defense/index.html>>

(CNN) North Korea's test of a ballistic missile last month showed new, more dangerous capabilities in its missile program, but the Pentagon says the US and its Asian allies have defenses to deal with threat. When North Korea launched the missile on February 12, the US Navy had two destroyers in the Sea of Japan with the ability to shoot it down, a US defense official said. **The guided missile destroyers, USS Stethem and USS McCampbell, are equipped with the Aegis ballistic missile defense system, which is able to track 100 missiles simultaneously and fire interceptors to take out an enemy's ballistic projectiles.** “We worked very quickly with our Japanese and South Korean allies to make sure that it did not pose a threat to them either. As you know we maintain abilities to be able to respond quickly and intercept missiles from North Korea if they do pose a threat to us or our allies,” a Pentagon spokesman, US Navy Capt. Jeff Davis, said. The North Korean launch involved the first land-based test of an intermediate-range missile that, in the past, has been fired from a submarine, two US officials said. And because it was launched from a missile site on North Korea's west coast, it flew farther than any previous North Korean tests, about 300 miles before dropping into the Sea of Japan.

**Warrant:** New Aegis update gives South Korea three upgraded destroyers, two of which could defend all of Japan

Brad Lendon "How US Could Stop a North Korean Missile." CNN. 3/5/17.

<<http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/14/politics/us-north-korea-aegis-ballistic-missile-defense/index.html>>

**Under the contract, Lockheed Martin will provide upgrades to two Japanese and three South Korean destroyers.** Currently, the destroyers are equipped with older versions of the Aegis radar system that only allow the ships to engage aerial targets. Aegis was originally developed in the 1970s to defend carrier battle groups from massed Soviet anti-ship missile attacks. The system, which originally consisted of the SPY-1 radar and a software package, has been continually improved over the decades to meet evolving threats. The update will bring all five up to the so-called "Baseline 9" standard, giving them the capability to shoot down ballistic missiles. The most current version, Baseline 9, can intercept low-flying cruise missiles, aircraft, anti-ship missiles, high-flying aircraft, and even ballistic missiles and satellites in low Earth orbit. A special version of the Standard missile, the SM-3, was developed just for this purpose. Baseline 9 can even allow ships to attack other ships with the SM-6 air defense missile. **The Aegis/SM-3 combination works by tracking and engaging ballistic missiles in the so-called "midcourse phase" where a missile has already launched off the ground, but has not yet sent its warhead on a ballistic trajectory through near space towards the targets. As a result, this solution can defend a much wider area than other missiles. The anti-missile version of the Patriot, for example, is more suitable toward defending individual cities and military bases, while just two Aegis Baseline 9-equipped destroyers can defend all of Japan.**

**Warrant:** New Aegis update performs at a higher altitude than THAAD does

Brad Lendon "How US Could Stop a North Korean Missile." CNN. 3/5/17.

<<http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/14/politics/us-north-korea-aegis-ballistic-missile-defense/index.html>>

SEOUL, May 29 (Yonhap) — South Korean Navy’s Aegis destroyers will get an upgraded missile launch system that will allow them to intercept North Korean ballistic missiles, a government source said Sunday. **The Navy is moving to install new vertical missile launch systems** on its three King Sejong the Great class ships that will allow them to launch the **longer range SM-3 and SM-6 ship-to-air missiles**, said the military source who declined to be identified. At present, the ships are only able to fire off the SM-2 missiles with a range of 150 kilometers, which is insufficient to intercept ballistic missiles. **The SM-3 can fly up to 500 kilometers, while the SM-6 has a range of 400 km. The SM-3, in particular, has the ability to attack targets at a higher altitude than the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system and can reach speeds of Mach 7.8.**

**Impact:** China is only angry about THAAD because of its advanced radar capabilities

Adam Taylor “Why China is so mad about THAAD, a missile defense system aimed at deterring North Korea” The Washington Post. 3/7/17. <  
<https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/07/why-china-is-so-mad-about-thaad-a-missile-defense-system-aimed-at-deterring-north-korea/>>

**On the surface of it, it may be hard to understand Beijing's fury with THAAD.** For one thing, it's a purely defensive system — THAAD systems don't carry warheads, relying on the force of the “interceptor” to destroy the incoming missile rather than a detonation. And while, in theory, the system could be used to intercept Chinese ballistic missiles, it would only work on missiles in their terminal phase: ruling out those targeting the United States, which would still be ascending. Moreover, while China is well-known as a key ally and “big brother” of North Korea, it has shown itself to be exasperated by Pyongyang's recent missile launches. Beijing recently blocked coal imports from North Korea, striking a major blow to the isolated nation's economy. Instead, **many experts**

**argue that China's anger over THAAD has less to do with the missiles than with the sophisticated radar capabilities included in the system. These radars could be used to track China's own missile systems, potentially giving the United States a major advantage in any future conflict with China.** Some Chinese analysts argue that THAAD itself is of only limited use against North Korea anyway, as it would not be able to take out short-range missiles and artillery that do not reach high altitudes, hinting that the radar may be the real reason for the deployment.

**Analysis:** It can be argued that the current systems in place in South Korea are enough for effective missile defense, or at the very least, deterrence. For example, such deterrence can be used as a bargaining chip while dealing with North Korea and China on the diplomacy front, while still not deploying THAAD so as to anger China to a point at which it stops cooperating during talks with North Korea. These cards should principally be used to caveat out of negative arguments that stem from Chinese retaliation.

**A2 – Anti-missile systems not named THAAD are effective**

**Answer:** The current umbrella has a host of deficiencies.

**Warrant:** US isn't capable of defending against everything NK has

Jeff Daniels "South Korea Looks to Double Its Firepower to Counter Rising Threat from North Korea." CNBC. 7/24/17. <<https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/24/south-korea-looks-to-double-its-firepower-to-counter-rising-threat-from-north-korea.html>>

The U.S. has more than 28,000 troops stationed in South Korea and around 50,000 American personnel in Japan. There also are more than 6,000 troops in Guam. **As things stand now, Wit isn't so sure the U.S. has the capability to destroy all the missiles in North Korea or to defend against "large salvos" of rockets.** "It would be very difficult if the North Koreans for some reason started launching large numbers of missiles to deal with it," said Wit. "A lot of them would get through." Then again, the Joint Chiefs chairman also said at the Aspen event that there's concern about the ability of North Korea to ramp up its missile capacity and development. He also pointed out that the regime of Kim Jong Un also has stepped up its missile testing and conducted several nuclear tests last year. "Our concern is the growth in capacity that has increased numbers of missiles over time and the combination of an intercontinental ballistic missile and nuclear weapons obviously concern us," said Dunford.

**Warrant:** PAC-3 is deployed, but with deficiencies

Kyle Mizokami "Why America's Enemies Fear the Patriot Missile Defense System (Even After Almost 40 Years)." The National Interest. 3/20/17.  
<<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-americas-enemies-fear-the-patriot-missile-defense-system-19833>>

The best explanation was that the locally produced Scuds, also known as Al Hussein, suffered from a design flaw that caused them to disintegrate on reentry. This created a larger target cloud of debris and warhead that the Patriot's proximity warhead could not successfully engage. Critics also charged the missile's proximity fuse was designed to engage aircraft, but could not engage ballistic-missile warheads moving at high mach speeds. In light of PAC-2's shortcomings, a new version was designed to exclusively engage ballistic missile warheads. PAC-3 incorporates "hit-to-kill" technology, destroying ballistic-missile warheads through direct impact rather than proximity explosion. **PAC-3 is much smaller than previous versions, with a Patriot launcher able to keep sixteen PAC-3s at the ready where it can only keep four PAC-2s. With a smaller missile comes a shorter range, however, and PAC-3 has a range of only twelve miles.** Today Patriot is on the front lines across the world, from South Korea and Taiwan to Turkey, Israel and Yemen. Israeli Patriot batteries have shot down three drones operated by Hamas and Syria. In addition, Saudi Patriot units have shot down missiles aimed at the country by Houthi rebels. Wary of North Korean ballistic missiles, Japan has deployed Patriot missiles to protect key locations, from downtown Tokyo to the distant Ryukyu Islands.

**Warrant:** Patriot is deployed in SK, but has many flaws

Philip E. Coyle "US Builds Missile Defense System for South Korea, Causing More Tension." The Hill. 7/26/17. < <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/foreign-policy/324610-us-builds-missile-defense-system-for-south-korea-but-just>>

THAAD is designed to intercept short, medium and intermediate range missiles as they descend towards their targets. A standard THAAD battery is comprised of truck-mounted launchers carrying interceptors, a fire control and communications unit, and a radar system. THAAD's radar has a 120-degree field of view and can detect incoming missiles at a distance of 1,000 km. Proponents of THAAD's deployment argue that South Korea

needs a more robust missile defense system to protect it from Pyongyang's advancing nuclear and missile programs. **Currently, South Korea deploys U.S.-produced Patriot missile defense systems, which have a limited capability and are insufficient to protect the entire country. However, it is not clear that THAAD can completely fill in the gaps.** After a very poor record with six test failures in a row in the 1990's, THAAD has successfully intercepted its targets in 11 out of 11 tests since 2006, but these tests are highly scripted to maximize the system's chance of success. In its most complicated test to date, THAAD cooperated with Patriot and Aegis defense systems to down five ballistic and cruise missiles. Although this test was considered integrated, each missile defense system operated separately, and THAAD only intercepted one medium-range ballistic missile.

**Warrant:** PAC-2 has a poor intercept rate, which led to talks about THAAD

Kyle Mizokami "The Missile-Killer That Has China, South Korea, and the U.S. in Turmoil" The Hill. 3/20/17.

<<http://www.popularmechanics.com/military/weapons/a25752/all-about-thaad-the-missile-killer-straining-us-south-korean-chinese-ties/>>

THAAD development began in 1987. The system was not ready for the 1991 Persian Gulf War, when the Iraqi military launched between 85 and 93 Al Hussein missiles, a locally produced version of the Scud, at targets in Saudi Arabia and Israel. The missiles were engaged by **PAC-2, the latest version of the Patriot missile with less than optimal ballistic missile defense capability. The poor intercept rate of the Patriot missile, the devastating cost of a missile impact, and the threat of ballistic missile proliferation worldwide (especially from countries such as North Korea) bolstered the argument for THAAD** into the 1990s. The system was so important that it survived test failures that would have doomed other military tech, including six failed tests in a row out of eleven conducted between 1995 and 1999.

**Analysis:** There is a reason THAAD is even in the picture. If the missile defense systems currently protecting South Korea were sufficient, the US government would probably decide not to foot the \$1 billion Lockheed-Martin bill and increase Congress' salaries instead. There are holes in each of the systems that currently are deployed in South Korea. Neg teams must respond by arguing that simply using the current umbrella isn't enough and that THAAD is necessary to fill those holes. They can then draw link chains from THAAD's deployment, such as angering China, starting a regional arms race, etc.

**Answer:** Anti-missile systems in general are the reason North Korea is mad in the first place.

**Warrant:** Patriot was initially deployed in 1985

Kyle Mizokami "Why America's Enemies Fear the Patriot Missile Defense System (Even After Almost 40 Years)" The National Interest. 3/20/17.

<<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-americas-enemies-fear-the-patriot-missile-defense-system-19833>>

As ambitious as SAM-D was, it had a lengthy development cycle. In 1973 it was nearly terminated by Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, who, among other things, believed that a long-range surface-to-air missile was an Air Force responsibility and that the system was overly complicated. By 1975, it had proved its ability to shoot down targets, and around then was renamed MIM-104 Patriot. Patriot stands for Phased Array Tracking Intercept of Target, although it's unclear what came first—the name or the acronym. **Patriot entered low-rate production in 1980, with the missile first fielded in 1985.** Unlike the older Nike Hercules system, Patriot was truck-mounted and mobile. A firing battery could roll into position and be ready to fire in a less than an hour. A battery consisted of a phased array radar set, engagement control station, electric power plant, an antenna mast group, communications relay group, and up to eight launching stations controlling four missiles each. **Like all medium- to long-range SAMs, Patriot is a radar-guided missile and relies on radar to provide airspace surveillance, target**

**detection, classification and tracking, and finally missile guidance to the actual missile.**

**Warrant:** North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003, tested its first nuke in 2006

CNN Library “North Korea Nuclear Timeline Fast Facts” CNN. 8/14/17.

<<http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/29/world/asia/north-korea-nuclear-timeline---fast-facts/index.html>>

**2003 January 10 - North Korea withdraws from the NPT.** February - The United States confirms North Korea has reactivated a five-megawatt nuclear reactor at its Yongbyon facility, capable of producing plutonium for weapons. April - Declares it has nuclear weapons. 2005 North Korea tentatively agrees to give up its entire nuclear program, including weapons. In exchange, the United States, China, Japan, Russia and South Korea say they will provide energy assistance to North Korea, as well as promote economic cooperation. **2006 July -** After North Korea test fires long range missiles, the UN Security Council passes a resolution demanding that North Korea suspend the program. **October - North Korea claims to have successfully tested its first nuclear weapon.** The test prompts the UN Security Council to impose a broad array of sanctions. 2007 February 13 - North Korea agrees to close its main nuclear reactor in exchange for an aid package worth \$400 million.

**Warrant:** North Korea’s arsenal is a means of protecting itself from the United States

Samuel Osborne “North Korea says it needs nuclear missiles capable of striking heart of US mainland to prevent invasion” The Independent. 8/7/17.

<<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/north-korea-intercontinental-missiles-us-strike-mainland-invasion-donald-trump-kim-jong-un-a7880606.html>>

**North Korea has defended its weapons programme, saying it needs the capability to launch intercontinental missiles at the heart of the United States to prevent an invasion.** It warned that the country was ready to give the US a "severe lesson" with its strategic nuclear force if it takes military action against it, it said in a statement to a regional meeting in Manila. In a transcript of a statement by the North's foreign minister, Ri Yong-ho, Pyongyang called new UN sanctions "fabricated" and warned there would be "strong follow-up measures" and acts of justice. "We will under no circumstances put the nukes and ballistic rockets on the negotiating table," Mr Ri said.

**Warrant:** AMDs are perceived as an offensive move

Paul D. Shinkman "U.S. Sends Message to China in THAAD Deployment" US News. 3/7/17. <<https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-03-07/us-sends-message-to-china-in-south-korea-thaad-deployment-experts-say>>

Do more to influence Pyongyang or face the consequences of U.S. efforts to contain North Korea militarily. "The Chinese do have grounds to be displeased," says Sung-Yoon Lee, who teaches U.S.-East Asian relations at Tufts University and specializes in the Korean peninsula. "No military deployment, exercise or weapon is purely defensive. **There is certainly an aggressive or even offensive element to this: If you build up your missile defense system, your intention is to negate your adversary's military capabilities.**" The missile shield deployment to South Korea is directed squarely at China, says Robert Ross, a professor at Boston College and associate with Harvard University's John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, in an attempt to compel it to increase pressure on North Korea and in response to China's developing its own missile capabilities.

**Analysis:** This argument flips the Pro's narrative on its head, as it is AMDs that created, or at least contributed to, the monster that is North Korea. AMDs like Patriot and Aegis preceded the rise of North Korea's nuclear stockpile. The Osborne evidence indicates that the only reason

North Korea ever pursued nuclear missiles was to protect themselves from a potential America offensive. Since AMDs are perceived as a part of this offensive threat, it is reasonable to conclude that AMDs deployed in South Korea are a major part of the reason North Korea poses such a threat to the South. AMDs, then, are merely solving a problem they created.

**PRO – AMS reaffirm South Korea’s commitment to the US**

**Argument:** With major ideological differences between President Moon and President Trump, the South Korea/US relationship is on the rocks. South Korea must demonstrate its willingness to cooperate on anti-missile systems to save the alliance.

**Warrant:** South Korea must remain focused on security over its “Korea first” policy

Fitzpatrick, Mark. “Mutual security should be theme of Moon-Trump summit.”

International Institute for Strategic Studies. 6/26/17. Web. Accessed 8/10/17.

<http://www.iiss.org/en/expert%20commentary/blogsections/2017-4431/june-47ea/moon-trump-summit-b6fb>

**“As much as Moon may be inclined to push back on such slights by taking his own ‘Korea first’ approach, he should focus the conversation on the main security issue confronting both nations. North Korea's bristling arsenal and proclivity for provocations has long presented a severe threat to South Korea. Development of nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missiles may soon pose a threat to the American homeland as well. Moon should seek reaffirmation that the U.S. security commitment remains firm. Although Trump omitted an Article V commitment to collective defense in his speech to NATO last month, his belated reference to it during the Romanian President's visit this month suggests that he now realizes the importance of honoring security obligations. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un may think that by holding American cities at risk he can deter the U.S. from coming to South Korea's aid in the event of renewed conflict on the Korean Peninsula.”**

**Warrant:** South Korea must signal its willingness to work with the US on security issues.

Fitzpatrick, Mark. “Mutual security should be theme of Moon-Trump summit.”

International Institute for Strategic Studies. 6/26/17. Web. Accessed 8/10/17.

<http://www.iiss.org/en/expert%20commentary/blogsections/2017-4431/june-47ea/moon-trump-summit-b6fb>

“Trump should make it clear that this decoupling strategy will not work, and that it will only make the U.S. all the more determined to face down North Korean threats. **Military deterrence and strengthened sanctions will remain key elements of any North Korea policy. Moon should acknowledge that THAAD is a useful defensive measure, and downplay the deployment delay over an environmental impact assessment. He should also confirm that South Korea will continue to firmly implement U.N. sanctions.** This means postponing any plans for reopening the Gaeseong Industrial Complex or any other steps that would transgress the U.N. ban on public and private support for trade with North Korea.”

**Warrant:** THAAD is a crucial part of the US-SK security alliance.

Lee, Hee Ok. “THAAD: A Critical Litmus Test for South Korea-China Relations.” US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS. 3/2/17. Web. Accessed 8/12/17.  
<http://www.38north.org/2017/03/hlee030217/>.

“When the decision was originally made, the ROK government anticipated a negative Chinese reaction to THAAD deployment, but went ahead with it for several reasons. First, its anxiety about security and lack of missile defenses had increased significantly in response to the acceleration of North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile development. Second, **the ROK government needed to manage the risk of Washington abandoning the US-ROK alliance.** In doing this, **it considered THAAD to be one means of filling security gaps and securing conditions for the stable presence of US forces.** Third, Seoul understood the system’s effective radar detection range to be limited to the Korean peninsula and is oriented solely to detect North Korean ballistic missiles. Fourth, **Seoul needed to demonstrate that it would not permit China to exercise a veto over its right to deploy a system to defend its national security.** Fifth, the ROK government

dismissed the fear that a THAAD battery in its territory would become integrated into the US ballistic missile defense system as groundless.[1] In addition to these factors, opponents of President Park Geun-hye's conservative administration won a majority of National Assembly seats in the subsequent general election, raising the prospect that deploying THAAD would have become less politically feasible with further delay."

**Warrant:** US is concerned about Moon's plan to engage North Korea.

Byong-Chul, Lee. "Challenges Ahead for the US-South Korea Alliance." US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS. 6/13/17. Web. Accessed 8/12/17.  
<http://www.38north.org/2017/06/bclee061317/>.

**"Yet despite Korean optimism, there is ample American pessimism about Moon's agenda, as pundits in Washington express concerns that Moon's pro-engagement stance toward Pyongyang is at odds with Washington's preferred pace and policy, and is unlikely to succeed given continued North Korean provocations. With North Korea likely to continue testing missiles or conducting a sixth nuclear test, Moon's remarks in favor of an inter-Korean presidential summit may put the sanctions-driven Trump administration on a collision course with leadership in Seoul."**

**Warrant:** The US wants to re-start THAAD deployment.

Byong-Chul, Lee. "Challenges Ahead for the US-South Korea Alliance." US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS. 6/13/17. Web. Accessed 8/12/17.  
<http://www.38north.org/2017/06/bclee061317/>.

**"Just last week, President Moon suspended the installation of the remaining components of the THAAD system until an assessment of the system's impact on the environment could be done. The US has, in response, reiterated the importance of completing the THAAD deployment as soon as possible, given North Korea's**

**continued missile testing, and underscored US commitment to the alliance.** While no fundamental changes to the THAAD deployment are expected as a result of the environmental assessment, the continued controversy over this matter can be an indication of how difficult core alliance and security discussions may be at the upcoming Moon-Trump summit, especially when dealing with the growing North Korean WMD threat.”

**Warrant:** The US/SK alliance is fragile.

Mount, Adam. “How to Put the U.S.-South Korean Alliance Back on Track.” Foreign Affairs. 6/28/17. Web. Accessed 8/12/17.

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-06-28/how-put-us-south-korean-alliance-back-track?cid=int-rec&pgtype=art>.

**“Even though the Trump administration has prioritized North Korea and dispatched senior officials to Seoul, over the last few months, problems have appeared in the U.S.–South Korean alliance. South Korean officials have been frustrated by the U.S. administration’s vacillations over North Korea policy and by its attempts to renegotiate bilateral economic and security agreements. Such frustrations help explain why, on June 1, Moon pledged that South Korea “will take the lead in dealing with Korean Peninsula issues without relying on the role of foreign countries.” The deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system has been a particularly sensitive issue. Shortly before Moon’s election, Park’s administration authorized the installation of the U.S. missile defense system. China condemned the move and showed its displeasure by sanctioning South Korean businesses that operate in China. Trump exacerbated the pressure on South Korea by appearing to renege on Washington’s commitment to funding THAAD in late April. Around six weeks later, lacking consistent support from the United States and facing opposition from China and his own political base, Moon suspended the deployment of the missile batteries. Officially, the original bargain is still on: the Moon**

government has allowed the parts of THAAD already in place to remain intact and says that it is still open to completing the deployment. In the United States, meanwhile, National Security Adviser H. R. McMaster walked back Trump's demand that Seoul pay for the system. Yet the drama surrounding the deployment has already turned THAAD from a source of strength into a political liability.”

**Impact:** Halting THAAD strengthens NK-China standing while diminishing US/SK's.

Snyder, Scott. “The Halt of South Korea's THAAD Deployment.” Council on Foreign Relations. 6/12/17. Web. Accessed 8/12/17. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/halt-south-koreas-thaad-deployment>.

“Moon will hold his first summit with Trump in later this month. At that time, **the United States and South Korea should reestablish a coordinated strategy for addressing the North Korean problem and focus on South Korean vulnerabilities to North Korean missiles in a comprehensive fashion**, while also improving South Korean governmental transparency on these issues. **But if the deployment is paralyzed by opponents of the system in South Korea's new government, that outcome would mark gain for North Korea and China and a setback for the U.S.-ROK alliance.**”

**Impact:** Halting THAAD could signal withdrawal of troops

Snyder, Scott. “The Halt of South Korea's THAAD Deployment.” Council on Foreign Relations. 6/12/17. Web. Accessed 8/12/17. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/halt-south-koreas-thaad-deployment>.

“The Moon administration must find a way to enhance governmental transparency and accountability while upholding its credibility as a strong U.S. security partner. **If the perception becomes that the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public**

**support for U.S. troop commitments. It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea.”**

**Impact:** THAAD deployment strengthens the US-ROK alliance

Institute for Security & Development Policy. “THAAD in the Korean Peninsula.”

Institute for Security & Development Policy. 11/16. Web. Accessed 8/12/17.

<http://isdpeu/publication/korea-thaad/>.

“Another worry for China is the stronger relationship between South Korea, the U.S., and Japan. **Through the deployment of THAAD, South Korea would have a long-term commitment with the U.S. strengthening its presence in Northeast Asia. China would have a lesser role in South Korea’s national security decision-making because of South Korea’s larger dependence on the U.S.** Conclusion. The deployment of THAAD in South Korea is a symbolic issue. The ROK has traditionally balanced its security interests between China and America. **The inclusion of THAAD into South Korea’s missile defense would certainly tip the scales towards a ROK-U.S. alliance.** From a U.S. perspective, North Korea’s advancing nuclear program and the looming presidential election have made Pentagon officials push for THAAD as soon as possible. In their minds, cooperation between them, Japan and the U.S. would increase overall stability and security.”

**Impact:** US-SK Alliance is vital for South Korean economic prosperity

Vu, Khang. “Mutually Assured Benefit: Why America Must Stay in Korea.” National Interest. 8/16/16. Web. Accessed 8/12/17. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-america-gains-staying-south-korea-17375>.

“The first entails America’s security and economic interests in South Korea and in East Asia as a whole. **This region is in a middle of an economic boom that has brought about tremendous wealth, not only for Asians but also for Americans.** China, Japan

and South Korea are all on the list of the United States' top ten trade partners, and in return, the three countries all have the United States included in their top-five lists. **Apparently, America played a vital role in bringing about the Asian economic miracle. The presence of its armed forces in the region reduces the chance of conflict between Japan and China; prevents states like Taiwan, South Korea and Japan from seeking nuclear weapons; and enforces an open trade-based environment that binds East Asian countries together. No Asian country can take on America's job as a regional policeman, for each lacks both credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of its neighbors."**

**Impact:** Absent US presence, conflict becomes more likely

Vu, Khang. "Mutually Assured Benefit: Why America Must Stay in Korea." National Interest. 8/16/16. Web. Accessed 8/12/17. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-america-gains-staying-south-korea-17375>.

**"The United States clearly understands that in order to continue benefiting from East Asia's economic growth and avoid a breakdown of the regional order, it must prevent all sources of instability on the Korean Peninsula from erupting into full-scale wars. As stated in my previous post, the presence of American troops has helped achieve this end, because it simultaneously deters attacks from North Korea and constrains dangerous retaliating actions from South Korea. Bandow has stated that "the chief danger on the Korean peninsula is not aggression but mistake," and I believe that pulling out U.S. troops is more likely to increase miscalculations between the two Koreas than not doing so. Deterrence does fail, sometimes; however, look at how deterrence kept the United States and the Soviet Union from fighting one another, or how America's show of force gives it the dominating position in international affairs, or how America's presence on Korean soil has preserved the peace for more than sixty years. It is evident that Washington must keep its troops stationed in South Korea, because a damaged trading system in East Asia resulting from**

conflicts would cost America a higher price than that of maintaining its military presence. Moreover, the collapse of South Korea would not bring North Korean troops closer to American soil, but it would definitely take away thousands of American jobs and push American troops in the region to a passive position.”

**Analysis:** This argument demonstrates that THAAD and other anti-missile systems are a litmus test for the US/SK relationship. South Korea’s rejection of THAAD could lead the US to question their commitment to the alliance, which you can argue would have devastating geopolitical consequences. Be sure to terminalize these consequences as you weigh the argument at the end of the round, painting a clear picture of what a destabilized Korean Peninsula looks like absent US presence.

**A2 – AMS reaffirm South Korea’s commitment to the US**

**Answer:** The US/SK alliance is in fact quite strong.

**Warrant:** South Korean support for the alliance remains high.

Jiyeon, Kim. “A New Beginning for ROK-U.S. Relations: South Koreans’ View of the United States and Its Implications.” The Asian Institute for Policy Studies. 7/17/17. Web. Accessed 8/12/17. <http://en.asaninst.org/contents/a-new-beginning-for-rok-u-s-relations-south-koreans-view-of-the-united-states-and-its-implications/>.

“This report makes the following conclusions. **The U.S. remains South Koreans’ most favored country even though President Trump’s favorability ratings are much lower than former President Barack Obama’s. The United States’ numbers have been relatively steady, unlike China’s, which dropped precipitously following its retaliation against South Korea for the deployment of THAAD and its lukewarm participation in the North Korea sanctions regime after the North’s consecutive nuclear tests in 2016. By contrast, mutual trust between South Korea and the U.S. over the past few years has led to the U.S.’ consistent score.** Regarding THAAD, more Koreans approve of the American missile defense system, as North Korea continues to conduct missile tests.”

**Warrant:** THAAD isn’t worth the controversy.

Mount, Adam. “How to Put the U.S.-South Korean Alliance Back on Track.” Foreign Affairs. 6/28/17. Web. Accessed 8/12/17. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-06-28/how-put-us-south-korean-alliance-back-track?cid=int-rec&pgtype=art>.

**“There are plenty of unresolved issues in the bilateral relationship. But for now, both sides should pursue a more modest goal: a strong working relationship.**

Longer-term issues—such as the potential renegotiation of the U.S.–Korea Free Trade Agreement, the financing for U.S. forces on the peninsula, and the reestablishment of social and economic ties between the two Koreas—should be deferred until the alliance is on firmer footing. Expect the Moon team to come prepared with economic favors—for example, a commitment to import U.S. petroleum or to provide new foreign direct investment. This is a strategy that has worked for other leaders, including Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who have sought to win over the Trump administration. **As for THAAD, U.S. officials should not insist on its immediate deployment if doing so would derail the talks: the alliance is more important than the missile defense system.”**

**Analysis:** This allows you to establish that the relationship is not as precarious as the pro would have the judge believe. You should emphasize the key reasons for both parties to remain in the alliance and that those will not change absent THAAD.

**Answer:** South Korea should become independent of the US.

**Warrant:** South Korea is capable of defending itself without the US.

Bandow, Doug. “South Korea Must Learn to Defend Itself – Without America.” The National Interest. 7/31/17. Web. Accessed 8/12/17.

<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/south-korea-must-learn-defend-itself—without-america-17193?page=show>.

“But why would South Korea lose? Indeed, why couldn’t it deter a North Korean attack? Vu does not deny that South Korea is capable of defending itself. After all, **South Korea possesses an economy around forty times as large and population about twice as**

**large, and has neutralized North Korea’s two traditional military allies, China and Russia.** Unless the peninsula has a special gravitational field which prevents South Korea from building as many tanks and fielding as many soldiers as the northern nation, **Seoul could easily match, indeed overmatch, the so-called Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”**

**Warrant:** South Korea has the financial means to defend itself.

Bandow, Doug. “South Korea Must Learn to Defend Itself – Without America.” The National Interest. 7/31/17. Web. Accessed 8/12/17.  
<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/south-korea-must-learn-defend-itself—without-america-17193?page=show>.

“Yet Vu worries about a ‘vacuum of power,’ apparently fearing that South Korea would not bother to build up its own forces. Like the Europeans who, though possessing far more military potential, don’t see any need to spend more on their own defense. Rather, they want to rely on the United States, apparently forever. America therefore must spend more, deploy more troops and repeatedly ‘reassure’ its helpless allies. **Ohm Tae-am of the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses recently defended South Korea inadequate spending as having increased six times since 1991.** So what? **The objective should not be ‘cost-sharing’ with America, as he argued, but ‘cost-bearing’ by South Korea. Seoul is poorer than America, but far richer than the DPRK. So South Korea has no excuse for claiming it cannot defend itself. If Pyongyang can afford to threaten the Republic of Korea, South Korea can more than afford to respond appropriately.”**

**Warrant:** Deterrence frequently fails.

Bandow, Doug. “South Korea Must Learn to Defend Itself – Without America.” The National Interest. 7/31/17. Web. Accessed 8/12/17.

<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/south-korea-must-learn-defend-itself—without-america-17193?page=show>.

“Of course, Vu says, don’t worry, ‘the presence of American troops has effectively thwarted North Korean attacks in the first place.’ However, **deterrence frequently has failed. In both World Wars I and II alliances turned into transmission belts of war rather than acting as firebreaks to war. Moreover, the chief danger on the Korean peninsula is not aggression but mistake. Kim Jong-un appears to be less responsible, more impulsive and less experienced than his father and grandfather. It is impossible to deter misjudgment.** If something goes wrong, the United States will find itself automatically involved in someone else’s war.”

**Analysis:** This beats back the doomsday conflict scenarios that the pro will be arguing will happen without US presence. Emphasize that not only is the US presence unnecessary, but actively harmful to stability in the region.

**PRO - THAAD encourages an Offensive South Korea**

**Argument:** THAAD discourages South Korea to rely on preemptive military attacks that greatly increase the probability of war in the region.

**Warrant:** President Moon would use a preemptive strike in the face of an imminent North Korean threat.

Nesbit, Jeff. "Could 'Kill Chain' Kill Any Chance at Peace?" US News, June 30, 2017 Web. Date Accessed: 7/10/17 <https://www.usnews.com/news/at-the-edge/articles/2017-06-30/south-korea-with-kill-chain-wants-to-up-its-guard-against-north-korea>

“Moon started on Apr. 23 by saying he would “leverage South Korea’s overwhelming defense supremacy to create a peaceful Korean Peninsula.” **Moon also said he would work quickly to set up a Kill Chain for a preemptive strike in the event of signs of an imminent North Korean nuclear or missile attack, and a Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system to intercept North Korean missiles. His message appeared to be an attempt to target conservatives amid rampant speculation about a “crisis” on the peninsula by playing up his image as a presidential contender who is “strong on national security.”**”

**Warrant:** THAAD makes South Korea less reliant on escalatory policies such as Kill Chain.

Klingner, Bruce. “South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense” The Heritage Foundation, June 12, 2012 Web. Date Accessed: 7/10/17 <http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense>

“Beijing should be less concerned with THAAD than with Seoul’s “Kill Chain” strategy. While THAAD is a defensive system, the latter is a pre-emptive attack strategy. **By not**

**deploying THAAD, Seoul would be more reliant on a tripwire, escalatory policy that requires perfect intelligence to identify and track a North Korean mobile missile in the field, discern the type of warhead, and assess the North Korean leadership's intentions (training, political gesture, or imminent attack) with sufficient time to attack before the missile launch.** The Kill Chain strategy assumes that the South Korean president would authorize a preemptive attack on North Korea and thus be potentially responsible for triggering an all-out war on the Korean Peninsula with a nuclear-armed enemy.”

Slantchev, Branislav. “Defense Spending,” UC San Diego, May 18, 2005. Web. Date Accessed: 8/13/17 <http://slantchev.ucsd.edu/courses/ps12/12-defense-spending.pdf>

**“It is worth noting that one important reason all these advanced developed countries can spend less than the U.S. is because we are paying for their security as well.** One relic of the Cold War is that America shouldered the defensive burdens for Western Europe and the Far East (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), **which allowed countries under the security umbrella to spend much less on the military relative to what they would have had to spend if they had to provide their security for themselves.** (The exception, the two NATO countries that have relatively high expenditures—Greece and Turkey—have been in conflict with each other for a long time.)”

**Warrant:** A more offensive South Korea with the ability to watch North Korea's operations could make war a real possibility

Nesbit, Jeff. “Could 'Kill Chain' Kill Any Chance at Peace?” US News, June 30, 2017 Web. Date Accessed: 7/10/17 <https://www.usnews.com/news/at-the-edge/articles/2017-06-30/south-korea-with-kill-chain-wants-to-up-its-guard-against-north-korea>

“But "Kill Chain" – should it become a real possibility – is something else altogether. **It is precisely the sort of action that North Korea's military leadership constantly bangs the war drums about inside the closed country. If the United States or Israel equips South Korea with such an offensive capability, combined with real-time surveillance and monitoring of North Korea's manufacturing facilities, regional nuclear war is more than just a distant fear. It could become a real possibility.**”

**Impact:** A nuclear attack on Seoul would devastate South Korea.

Christys, Patrick. “What would happen if Trump NUKED North Korea? How many people would perish?”, Express News, April 22, 2017 Web. Date Accessed: 7/10/17 <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/794905/North-Korea-Donald-Trump-Kim-Jong-un-nuclear-war-World-War-3-China-New-York>

“Kim could retaliate in two ways - by nuking Seoul, or Los Angeles – although the jury is out as to whether the despot’s arsenal could reach US soil. The strength of Kim Jong-un’s nuclear warhead, if it exists, would be unknown, but there is more information about the strength of one he tested in 2013 than there is about his current models. **That device was 10 kilotons and would kill an estimated 77,670 people instantly if it was detonated in the sky above Seoul - a further 268,590 would suffer horrific injuries.** If the tubby tyrant decided to actually strike his nemesis’ turf, it would only kill 48,940, although the downwind fallout would spread for 98.7km and potentially back within his own country if the wind blew in the wrong direction.”

**Analysis:** A South Korea that is more offensive means that the United States will be less likely to decide if a war should occur. When you have more actors with weapons in a region, it makes the probability of a war to occur significantly higher. A world in which South Korea has more military might, is not necessarily a safer world.

## **A2 – THAAD encourages an Offensive South Korea**

**Answer:** South Korea will only push for a peaceful solution

**Warrant:** President Moon is a supporter of more a peaceful solution to the crisis on the peninsula.

Tamkin, Emily “In South Korea, Will Moon Bring Back Sunshine?” Foreign Policy Magazine, May 9, 2017 Web. Date Accessed: 7/10/17  
<http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/05/09/in-south-korea-will-moon-bring-back-sunshine/>

“But though South Korea’s domestic politics likely played the largest role in Moon’s victory, his win will have international consequences — including for President Donald Trump’s policy toward North Korea. **Moon is an outspoken advocate of dialogue with North Korea, and open to returning the Blue House to what used to be known as the “sunshine policies,” of greater engagement with the North. As chief of staff to President Roh Moo-hyun during Roh’s term from 2003 to 2008, Moon was part of an administration that pursued exactly that, increasing political and economic contact with North Korea in an effort to keep the peace.**”

**Analysis:** This shows there is a low probability Moon would turn to ramping up its military spending or relying on more escalatory policies as he ran a campaign promoting the exact opposite.

**Answer:** South Korea needs military power to protect itself

**Warrant:** South Korea needs more military might in order to ensure that South Korea has the ability to destroy underground Silos and locations that are critical to North Korean leadership.

Phippen, Weston. "South Korea Asks to Increase Its Firepower", The Atlantic, Web. July 29, 2017, Web. Date Accessed: 7/10/17  
<https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2017/07/south-korea-missile/535359/>

"Moon Jae-in's request to allow South Korea to build more powerful missiles would require re-examination of agreement from the 1970s between South Korea and the U.S. According to the treaty, the U.S. would provide help in building the missiles. In exchange, South Korea agreed that the missiles would be limited to a range of less than 500 miles, and with payloads no heavier than half a ton. The intention was to limit an arms race in the region. **Moon now says that, with North Korea's new capabilities and aggressive stance, his own country needs more protective firepower. An increase in range probably doesn't matter: all of North Korea is within the current 500-mile range. Therefore South Korean officials will likely ask to increase payload, so as to ensure that South Korea could destroy underground silos and locations of Pyongyang's leadership.** Any increase, however, is likely to upset China."

**Analysis:** In order for South Korea to be able to destroy North Korea in the event of a war, they may need a stronger military. This operates as a turn on their argument as a stronger military for South Korea would lead to a shorter conflict and possibly less casualties.

**Warrant:** Trump's America first approach in Asia may mean less support for America's Asian allies.

Townshend, Ashley. "AMERICA FIRST: US ASIA POLICY UNDER PRESIDENT TRUMP", The United States Studies Centre, March 16, 2017, Web. Date Accessed: 7/10/17 <https://www.usssc.edu.au/analysis/america-first-us-asia-policy-under-president-trump>

**"Changes in US Asia policy will likely produce more volatile relations with competitors, and potentially between Washington and its allies and partners.**

Instability in US-China relations: Trump's abrasive policies, particularly on Taiwan, are likely to deepen friction with China and increase the risk of mixed signals and communication breakdowns. **Disunity and fragility in the US alliance network: Trump's "America first" approach to Asia is at odds with the policy preferences and public opinions of most regional allies, creating potential constraints on coordination between Washington and its Asian alliance network."**

**Analysis:** It may be necessary for South Korea to become more offensive and build up its military in a world whereby America would stay idle in the event of conflict.

**Answer:** Strong military umbrellas between powerful and weak nations can increase the probability of war.

**Warrant:** Alliances between nations can embolden those who are protected by the United States to take risks that they have otherwise not have. This is because they feel safe since they have the support of a powerful hegemon.

Friedman, Ben. Why the U.S. Military Budget is 'Foolish and Sustainable', Cato Institute,. Spring 2012, Web. Date Accessed: 7/10/17  
<https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/articles/logan-friendman-obis-spring-2012.pdf>

“The argument that U.S. alliances are necessary for stability and global commerce is only slightly more credible. **One problem with this claim is that U.S. security guarantees can create moral hazard—emboldening weak allies to take risks they would otherwise avoid in their dealings with neighbors. Alliances can then discourage accommodation among neighboring states, heightening instability and threatening to pull the United States into wars facilitated by its benevolence.** Another point against this argument is that even if regional balancing did lead to war, it would not obviously be more costly to the U.S. economy than the cost of the alliance said to prevent

it. Neutrality historically pays.<sup>10</sup> The larger problem with the idea that our alliances are justified by the balancing they prevent is that wars generally require more than the mutual fear that arms competition provokes. Namely, there is usually a territorial conflict or a state bent on conflict. Historical examples of arms races alone causing wars are few.<sup>11</sup> This confusion probably results from misconstruing the causes of World War I—seeing it as a consequence of mutual fear alone rather than fear produced by the proximity of territorially ambitious states.”

**Analysis:** This operates as a turn on their argument as it means comparatively South Korea would be significantly more aggressive in a world in which an alliance exists versus a world in which it fell apart.

**PRO – War is inevitable, THAAD protects South Korea**

**Argument:** A war between North and South Korea is inevitable. Deploying THAAD is the only way to protect South Korea effectively, as it patches holes in the current nuclear umbrella.

**Warrant:** US-NK War inevitable

Bruce Wright “US-North Korea War Is Inevitable: China.” MSN News. 8/3/17. <  
[www.msn.com/en-my/news/world/us-north-korea-war-is-inevitable-china/ar-AAo06l2?li=BBuW5jp](http://www.msn.com/en-my/news/world/us-north-korea-war-is-inevitable-china/ar-AAo06l2?li=BBuW5jp)>

If the rhetoric and military posturing keeps up, **the U.S. and North Korea are destined to collide, a senior Chinese politician reportedly said** Wednesday local time. **The words seemed to hint that war between the two countries was all but inevitable.** "The U.S. and North Korea are like two accelerating trains speeding towards each other with neither side willing to give way," Yang Wi told reporters during a media briefing in China, according to the Guardian's reporter Tom Phillips. Wi touched on a number of topics during the media briefing, including making a case for the U.S. and China to increase cooperation. "There is a compelling reason for China and the US to respect each other," Wang said. "Our interests are intertwined."

**Warrant:** South Korea says conflict with North Korea is at a very high possibility

“South Korea: ‘High Possibility’ of Conflict with North Korea.” Reuters. 5/17/17. <  
[nypost.com/2017/05/17/south-korea-high-possibility-of-conflict-with-north-korea/](http://nypost.com/2017/05/17/south-korea-high-possibility-of-conflict-with-north-korea/)>

South Korean President **Moon Jae-in said on Wednesday there was a “high possibility” of conflict with North Korea, which is pressing ahead with nuclear and missile programs it says it needs to counter U.S. aggression.** The comments came

hours after the South, which hosts 28,500 U.S. troops, said it wanted to reopen a channel of dialogue with North Korea as Moon seeks a two-track policy, involving sanctions and dialogue, to try to rein in its neighbor. **North Korea has made no secret of the fact that it is working to develop a nuclear-tipped missile capable of striking the U.S. mainland and has ignored calls to halt its nuclear and missile programs, even from China, its lone major ally.** It conducted its latest ballistic missile launch, in defiance of UN Security Council resolutions, on Sunday which it said was a test of its capability to carry a “large-size heavy nuclear warhead”, drawing Security Council condemnation. **“The reality is that there is a high possibility of a military conflict at the NLL** (Northern Limit Line) and military demarcation line,” Moon was quoted as saying by the presidential Blue House. He also said the North’s nuclear and missile capabilities seem to have advanced rapidly recently but that the South was ready and capable of striking back should the North attack. Moon won an election last week campaigning on a more moderate approach towards the North and said after taking office that he wants to pursue dialogue as well as pressure. **But he has said the North must change its attitude of insisting on pressing ahead with its arms development before dialogue is possible.** South Korean Unification Ministry spokesman Lee Duk-haeng told reporters the government’s most basic stance is that communication lines between South and North Korea should reopen.

**Warrant:** Trump also agrees that the chance of a major conflict with North Korea is possible

“South Korea: ‘High Possibility’ of Conflict with North Korea.” Reuters. 5/17/17. <  
nypost.com/2017/05/17/south-korea-high-possibility-of-conflict-with-north-  
korea/>

U.S. President Donald Trump has said he wants South Korea to pay for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system which detected Sunday’s test launch. **China has strongly opposed THAAD, saying it can spy into its territory, and South Korean companies have been hit in China by a nationalist backlash over the**

**deployment.** The United States said on Tuesday it believed it could persuade China to impose new U.N. sanctions on North Korea and warned that Washington would also target and “call out” countries supporting Pyongyang. Speaking to reporters ahead of a closed-door U.N. Security Council meeting, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley also made clear that Washington would only talk to North Korea once it halted its nuclear programme. As about Haley’s comments, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said China would work hard at reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula and finding a peaceful resolution. Trump has called for an immediate halt to North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests and U.S. Disarmament Ambassador Robert Wood said on Tuesday that China’s leverage was key and Beijing could do more. **Trump warned this month that a “major, major conflict” with North Korea was possible, and in a show of force, sent the Carl Vinson aircraft carrier strike group to Korean waters to conduct drills with South Korea and Japan.**

**Warrant:** NK’s weapons are much more advanced than we thought

John Schilling “What Is True and Not True About North Korea's Hwasong-14 ICBM: A Technical Evaluation | 38 North: Informed Analysis of North Korea.” 38 North. 7/10/17. < <http://www.38north.org/2017/07/jschilling071017/>>

However, with a year or two of additional testing and development, it will likely become a missile that can reliably deliver a single nuclear warhead to targets along the US west coast, possibly with enough accuracy to destroy soft military targets like naval bases. In perhaps five years, North Korea may be able to incorporate a modest suite of decoys and penetration aids to challenge US missile defenses. Let’s hope US missile defenses are up to that challenge. **Contrary to the assertions of some analysts that the missile is currently capable of carrying several warheads, not just one, it may eventually be able to carry a modest suite of decoys or penetration aids, though probably not for several years.** A multiple warhead capability, while theoretically possible, would require

a very lightweight warhead, which will require a lot more nuclear testing and is probably a decade in the future at best.

**Impact:** US can fend off at least one IRBM with Thaad

Greg Price “The U.S. Just Showed It Could Thwart a North Korea Intermediate-range Missile.” Newsweek. 7/19/17. < <http://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-us-stop-attack-634872>>

U.S. President Donald Trump has said he wants South Korea to pay for the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system which detected Sunday’s test launch. **China has strongly opposed THAAD, saying it can spy into its territory, and South Korean companies have been hit in China by a nationalist backlash over the deployment.** The United States said on Tuesday it believed it could persuade China to impose new U.N. sanctions on North Korea and warned that Washington would also target and “call out” countries supporting Pyongyang. Speaking to reporters ahead of a closed-door U.N. Security Council meeting, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Nikki Haley also made clear that Washington would only talk to North Korea once it halted its nuclear programme. As about Haley’s comments, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said China would work hard at reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula and finding a peaceful resolution. Trump has called for an immediate halt to North Korea’s missile and nuclear tests and U.S. Disarmament Ambassador Robert Wood said on Tuesday that China’s leverage was key and Beijing could do more. **Trump warned this month that a “major, major conflict” with North Korea was possible, and in a show of force, sent the Carl Vinson aircraft carrier strike group to Korean waters to conduct drills with South Korea and Japan.**

**Impact:** Thaad is perfect for regional defense against NK

Lily Hay Newman “The US Missile Defense Tech That’ll Protect South Korea---And Tick Off China.” Wired Magazine. 6/2/17. <  
<https://www.wired.com/2017/04/missile-defense-will-protect-south-korea-make-china-nervous/>>

Additionally, the United Arab Emirates bought a THAAD from primary developer Lockheed Martin back in 2012. The US and South Korea announced in 2016 that the US would place a THAAD in South Korea to defend the country and US military assets against potential North Korean missile strikes. **“THAADs are tailored to those medium-range threats that North Korea has in spades—North Korea regularly demonstrates that kind of capability,” says Thomas Karako, the director of the Missile Defense Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “THAADs are exactly the kind of thing that you would want for a regional area.”** The only downside? South Korea doesn't have enough of them. In fact, even when fully functional, the current South Korea THAAD "can't even cover Seoul, let alone catch Chinese missiles going to the US," says Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation. Because the THAAD has a relatively small interceptor range of around 125 miles, it would take two or three of them to cover all of South Korea. Still, the country having some protection against a potential North Korean strike beats having none. Just not if you're China.

**Impact:** THAAD fills in holes in current system, namely countering medium range threats that North Korea has

Lily Hay Newman “The US Missile Defense Tech That’ll Protect South Korea---And Tick Off China.” Wired Magazine. 6/2/17. <  
<https://www.wired.com/2017/04/missile-defense-will-protect-south-korea-make-china-nervous/>>

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**Analysis:** The Wright and Reuters evidence indicate that a war with North Korea is almost inevitable for the South. With such a high probability of conflict, with or without THAAD's deployment, it is imperative that South Korea take all possible protections to make sure its citizens are safe when a war starts. It would be misguided to put the use of nuclear weapons beyond Kim Jong-Un, so a comprehensive nuclear umbrella should be a priority. It is clear that the current umbrella, with components from both the United States and South Korea, has a few holes in it, which THAAD would patch up.

**A2 – War is inevitable, THAAD protects South Korea**

**Answer:** War is not inevitable.

**Warrant:** CIA chief rejects the idea that war with North Korea is imminent

Associated Press “CIA chief Mike Pompeo says conflict with North Korea not 'imminent' - but risk is much higher now” The Telegraph. 8/14/17. <  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/08/14/cia-chief-mike-pompeo-says-conflict-north-korea-not-imminent/>>

**There is only one way to respond to the threat of intercontinental ballistic missiles such as the SALT (strategic arms limitation treaties) that brought stability to Europe.** During the early 1970s, the two sides of the Cold War divide made a commitment to addressing their various disagreements in three ways: through bilateral nuclear agreements between Moscow and Washington, through political and economic discussions in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and through the reduction of military forces in Europe in the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations. But today the United States is not even considering such an approach. But there is even more to this tragic decision. The immediate threat to security in Northeast Asia is not missiles or nuclear weapons. **Creating a peaceful political environment and embracing disarmament regime, starting with the United States, will greatly reduce the chance that such weapons would ever be employed.** But drones are developing at a rapid rate and pose a poorly-understood security threat around the world. The players behind future drone warfare may not even be nation states at all. We have not even started to draft protocols to address the proliferation of drones in the region and their employment. Drones are potentially the most destabilizing aspect of an arms race in East Asia.

**Warrant:** The only way to counter nuclear aggression is with diplomacy and arms reduction treaties

Emanuel Pastreich “The Unbearable Sadness Of THAAD.” The Huffington Post.  
7/18/16. < [www.huffingtonpost.com/emanuel-pastreich/the-unbearable-sadness-of\\_b\\_11051426.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/emanuel-pastreich/the-unbearable-sadness-of_b_11051426.html).>

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**Analysis:** The most basic response is to contest the premise that war is inevitable, something that isn't necessarily true. In fact, the Pastreich evidence indicates that the only way to bring long term stability to a region is through arms reductions and that a disarmament stretch could greatly reduce the chance nuclear weapons are ever deployed.

**Answer:** THAAD isn't enough to protect South Korea.

**Warrant:** SK is too close to NK for effective missile defense

Philip Cunningham “Anti-missile Missile System Missing the Point in South Korea.” The Japan Times. 7/18/16. < [www.huffingtonpost.com/emanuel-pastreich/the-unbearable-sadness-of\\_b\\_11051426.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/emanuel-pastreich/the-unbearable-sadness-of_b_11051426.html).>

The utility of defensive missiles cannot be dismissed offhand, especially in the case of Japan, which is at sufficient remove to improve the odds of interception. The long arc of a missile crossing the expanse of the Sea of Japan, for example, might offer time and distance sufficient to target incoming strikes. But this is not the case with **South Korea**, which is way too close to North Korea for effective anti-missile missile defense. **What's more, field tests, even under relatively ideal conditions, have been riddled with failure.** Beijing is not wrong to assume that the underlying motivation of the controversial missile placement is both prod and shield to China itself. Although the kinetic missiles — designed to knock out incoming fire by deadweight collision — are not offensive weapons, the radar monitoring necessary to identify incoming objects is intrusive and could easily be reconfigured to focus on China. The upgraded AN/TPY-2 radar system can “look” 2,000 km over the horizon.

**Warrant:** THAAD can't defend Seoul from North Korean missiles because it is out of range

Eric Gomez “THAAD Won't Save Asia (or America) from North Korea.” The National Interest. 5/15/17. < [nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-wont-save-asia-or-america-north-korea-20665](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-wont-save-asia-or-america-north-korea-20665)>

Last week U.S. officials confirmed that the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense battery deployed on a South Korean golf course reached initial

operating capability. As tensions grow on the Korean peninsula, THAAD's deployment is supposed to improve deterrence by bolstering the ability of the United States and South Korea to defend against North Korean ballistic missiles. **While THAAD does reduce the chances of a successful North Korean missile attack against important U.S. military bases and some South Korean cities, it probably won't do much to cool down the situation on the peninsula.** In fact, THAAD could contribute to instability and increase the likelihood of a crisis. Why is that? First, it is important to understand what the THAAD system is and isn't capable of doing. **THAAD is not able to defend Seoul from North Korean missiles because most of the capital city is just outside the 200 km range of THAAD's interceptors.** While not in a position to defend Seoul, THAAD could protect several locations that are essential for conducting sustained combat operations against North Korea, such as the port of Busan and Kunsan air base. Moreover, even if THAAD were deployed closer to Seoul, it would not be able to defend against the conventional artillery threat to the city.

**Warrant:** THAAD is entirely useless against artillery, which would be the preferred mode of attack against South Korean citizens

Emanuel Pastreich "The Unbearable Sadness Of THAAD." The Huffington Post.

7/18/16. <[www.huffingtonpost.com/emanuel-pastreich/the-unbearable-sadness-of\\_b\\_11051426.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/emanuel-pastreich/the-unbearable-sadness-of_b_11051426.html)>

**After all, if North Korea wanted to kill tens of thousands or more South Korean civilians, it does not need to use any missiles at all, but rather can use its substantial artillery units for which Seoul is fully within range. THAAD is entirely useless against artillery.** Moreover, there are any number of strategies that render the missile defense system ineffective. As THAAD is aimed at missiles flying at a high altitude, most likely it will simply encourage the Chinese, who perceive the system as intended primarily to deter them, to build many more missiles. That will only bring on an arms race and greater insecurity. There is only one way to respond to the threat of

intercontinental ballistic missiles such as the SALT (strategic arms limitation treaties) that brought stability to Europe.

**Analysis:** The next line of attack is to take down the second half of the argument, which means contesting the reliability and applicability of THAAD to a potential war between the North and the South. There is ample evidence to suggest that THAAD is out of range of main population centers in South Korea and the Pastreich evidence indicates that North Korea's primary mode of attack would be artillery anyway, which THAAD does nothing to stop. It would be prudent to look for ways to stop such a war from occurring, instead of throwing diplomacy in the towel and rallying behind a missile defense system that isn't proven to work.

**Answer:** Studies that talk about THAAD's effectiveness are biased.

**Warrant:** THAAD may not actually be as effective as it is purported to be as the tests it has gone through are scripted

Julian Cho "THAAD Will Not Protect South Korea." Zoomin Korea. 4/8/17. <  
[koreaexpose.com/thaad-missile-defense-no-help-korea/](http://koreaexpose.com/thaad-missile-defense-no-help-korea/)>

Philip Coyle, Senior Science Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, concurred. "**After a very poor record with six test failures in a row in the 1990s, THAAD has successfully intercepted its targets in 11 out of 11 tests since 2006, but these tests are highly scripted to maximize the system's chance of success.**" And there is the problem of countering more than two projectiles. "We don't know whether THAAD can intercept three incoming missiles, let alone hundreds," he concludes. Furthermore, according to Coyle, THAAD has blind spots. Its radar can only cover 120 degrees at a time, so North Korea could circumvent the system by launching a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) from any point not covered by the radar.

**Warrant:** THAAD's deployment is profit-driven

Emanuel Pastreich “The Unbearable Sadness Of THAAD.” The Huffington Post.

7/18/16. < [www.huffingtonpost.com/emanuel-pastreich/the-unbearable-sadness-of\\_b\\_11051426.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/emanuel-pastreich/the-unbearable-sadness-of_b_11051426.html).>

But this time all logic and science has fallen out of the debate. In fact, it seems as if the decision to deploy was made at the highest level with minimal consultation with the wide range of experts on security who have harbored doubts about the effectiveness of missile defense. **The project seems to be driven more by the potential for profit, and recalls the tragic consequences of the political machinations of multinational arms dealers one hundred years ago that drew the world into World War One.** To start with, THAAD is an outdated technology whose ability to stop missiles is doubtful. To the degree that THAAD might work, it does so for missiles flying at high altitudes. North Korea does not need to send missiles at high altitudes to attack South Korea, if such an unlikely scenario unfolded.

**Analysis:** This answer ties into the second one, but it is a more compelling takeout of the reports that THAAD is 100% successful. Pastreich makes it clear that there is a profit motive driving the behind the scenes operations for THAAD and its testing. The Cho evidence furthers that the tests that purport its success were largely scripted and shouldn't be trusted. This response shouldn't be used independently, but combined with the argument that THAAD isn't actually effective, it can shut down the argument.

**PRO – Forces China to come to the negotiating table.**

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**Argument:** Deployment of anti-missile systems will incentivize China to reestablish regional dominance by coming to the negotiating table. Such an outcome is advantageous for South Korea, as negotiations are the only long-term path to peace.

**Warrant:** US regional presence incentivizes China to work with the US.

Bader, Jeffrey A. “U.S.-China challenges: Time for China to step up.” The Brookings Institution.

1/12/17. Web. Accessed 8/9/17. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/u-s-china-challenges-time-for-china-to-step-up/>.

**“China has a strong interest in seeing a change in North Korea’s behavior and its isolation from the rest of the world. Xi Jinping clearly regards North Korean leader Kim Jong-un with disdain, and has yet to meet with the North Korean leader and China’s former ally. He sees North Korea as a time bomb on China’s border. North Korea’s provocations are undermining China’s national security by inviting ever-increasing American, Japanese, and South Korean military modernization, exercises, and build-up in China’s immediate neighborhood. No less than Henry Kissinger has opined that a major target of North Korea’s nuclear program is China itself. That should give Beijing pause. China has complicated interests in North Korea, but it cannot look upon the current situation with any comfort. Threats of escalation from incidents provoked by North Korea are a deep concern to China, and its preference for a denuclearized North Korea is not mere lip service. China also is uneasy about the possibility of U.S. imposition of sanctions upon Chinese entities that maintain commercial relations with North Korea. The status quo may be an easy day-to-day fallback for China, but it is not in its long-term interest, nor is the increasing security focus of the United States and its allies on its neighbor.”**

**Warrant:** China would benefit from working with the US on North Korea

Bader, Jeffrey A. "U.S.-China challenges: Time for China to step up." The Brookings Institution.

1/12/17. Web. Accessed 8/9/17. <https://www.brookings.edu/research/u-s-china-challenges-time-for-china-to-step-up/>.

**“Recommendation: China should decisively move away from its long-term habit of balancing between North Korea and the United States, of valuing short-term but unsustainable stability in the Korean peninsula over addressing seriously the North Korean nuclear threat. To demonstrate its new thinking, it should put forward a comprehensive set of proposals addressing the security concerns of the United States and its allies, consistent with China’s own national security interests. China should propose that the United States, South Korea, and China begin an ongoing private dialogue about a future nuclear-free unified Korea. The dialogue could begin with sharing of intelligence about North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction programs and proceed to policy and military coordination discussions to deal with possible North Korean collapse scenarios. It also could include questions relating to the U.S.-ROK post-reunification alliance and deployments, which would be of special interest to China and make such discussions more attractive.”**

**Warrant:** US needs to get tough on China to incentivize cooperation.

Stromseth, Jonathon. "As Xi and Trump meet, China’s neighbors will be watching." The Brookings Institution. 4/4/17. Web. Accessed 8/9/17.

<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2017/04/04/as-xi-and-trump-meet-chinas-neighbors-will-be-watching/>.

**“At the same time, there is a growing consensus among American China experts on the need to get tougher with China by strengthening the U.S. military and**

**diplomatic position in Asia and then, together with friends and allies, encouraging Beijing to take more constructive positions on regional issues. Recent steps in this direction include the broadening of U.S. defense cooperation with Japan, and deploying the THAAD anti-missile system in South Korea as the nuclear program of China's lone ally, North Korea, continues unabated.** More generally, it's important for the United States to remain fully engaged in Asia in the face of China's bold maritime moves and expanding economic footprint in the region."

**Warrant:** THAAD increases joint leverage between the US and South Korea.

Moore, Sarah; Jun Jun, Young. "THAAD and the Military Balance in Asia: An Interview with Mark Fitzpatrick." Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs. 7/19/16. Web. Accessed 8/10/17.  
[https://asianstudies.georgetown.edu/sites/asianstudies/files/documents/gjaa\\_3.1\\_fitzpatrick\\_0.pdf](https://asianstudies.georgetown.edu/sites/asianstudies/files/documents/gjaa_3.1_fitzpatrick_0.pdf)

**"I think that THAAD deployment does increase the U.S. and ROK joint leverage vis-à-vis North Korea because it adds to a tiered, layered defense against incoming North Korean nuclear armed missiles by being able to effectively knock out those missiles before they might land. The United States and South Korea have what is called 'deterrence by denial.' That is, they deny North Korea the capability of actually hitting South Korean cities.** Now, THAAD doesn't make the defense perfect—nothing can—but the level of confidence will be high enough as long as North Korea is not able to launch a huge salvo: a couple dozen missiles or more. They probably don't have that many missile launchers. The danger is that they might launch decoys and other means of confusing the American and South Korean defense. **But for the time being, I think THAAD really will enhance the defenses and will provide additional leverage by denying North Korea the capability to hit South Korea with nuclear weapons."**

**Warrant:** China will react to THAAD by opening up negotiations with the US.

Lee, Hee Ok. "THAAD: A Critical Litmus Test for South Korea-China Relations." US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS. 3/2/17. Web. Accessed 8/12/17. <http://www.38north.org/2017/03/hlee030217/>.

**“Nevertheless, China, for several reasons, should consider limiting any direct “retaliation and sanctions” targeting the ROK. First, Korea still holds strategic value in the full-blown competition between China and the United States over norms and institutions, escalation in South China Sea and responses to Japanese revisionism. Second, if China interferes too much with South Korean security sovereignty, its international reputation will suffer and neighboring states may increasingly see China as a threat. Third, no Chinese retaliatory action is likely to alter South Korean behavior. Fourth, non-tariff barriers have limits as tools for retaliation.[5] With these considerations in mind, China will respond to THAAD primarily by strengthening its military ties and cooperation with Russia, stably managing its relations with North Korea and attempting strategic negotiations with the United States. South Korea has its own reasons to limit its tensions with Beijing. Up to 25 percent of the ROK’s trade volume comes from China, and reunification of the Korean peninsula is not possible without Beijing’s constructive role in the process. Therefore, ‘China bashing’ is unrealistic and can return like a boomerang to haunt the ROK. In particular, South Korea stands to incur diplomatic costs if the region’s security dynamic changes from ‘DPRK versus the international community’ to ‘ROK-US-Japan versus China-Russia-DPRK.’[6]”**

**Warrant:** Halting THAAD would be seen as appeasement by China.

Snyder, Scott. "The Halt of South Korea’s THAAD Deployment." Council on Foreign Relations. 6/12/17. Web. Accessed 8/12/17. <https://www.cfr.org/blog/halt-south-koreas-thaad-deployment>.

“The Moon administration must find a way to enhance governmental transparency and accountability while upholding its credibility as a strong U.S. security partner. If the perception becomes that the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public support for U.S. troop commitments. It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea. Moon's decision also carries another risk. **For months, China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea.**”

**Impact:** China pushes for more realistic solutions with North Korea.

Cha, Victor. “Making China Pay on North Korea.” *Foreign Affairs*. 3/21/17. Web. Accessed 8/10/17. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-03-21/making-china-pay-north-korea>.

“China couples any sanctions it levies on North Korea with demands for the United States to go back to the negotiating table. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated during U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s trip to Asia, the Chinese fear that the United States and North Korea are on a collision course driven by U.S. military pressure and North Korea’s continued advances in its nuclear and missile programs. In addition, Chinese interlocutors have urged the United States to drop its insistence that talks with Pyongyang be about denuclearization, given that Kim Jong Un has declared that his country will never give up its weapons—a declaration that is also enshrined in the North Korean constitution. Rather, Beijing wants Washington to agree to a partial capping and freezing of the North Korean nuclear program in exchange for a peace treaty. The Chinese acknowledge that this is an imperfect solution, but they argue that it is a better option than a full-blown military crisis.”

**Impact:** China pushes for beneficial outcomes short of denuclearization.

Cha, Victor. "Making China Pay on North Korea." *Foreign Affairs*. 3/21/17. Web. Accessed 8/11/17. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-03-21/making-china-pay-north-korea>.

“China couples any sanctions it levies on North Korea with demands for the United States to go back to the negotiating table. As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated during U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s trip to Asia, the Chinese fear that the United States and North Korea are on a collision course driven by U.S. military pressure and North Korea’s continued advances in its nuclear and missile programs. In addition, **Chinese interlocutors have urged the United States to drop its insistence that talks with Pyongyang be about denuclearization, given that Kim Jong Un has declared that his country will never give up its weapons—a declaration that is also enshrined in the North Korean constitution. Rather, Beijing wants Washington to agree to a partial capping and freezing of the North Korean nuclear program in exchange for a peace treaty. The Chinese acknowledge that this is an imperfect solution, but they argue that it is a better option than a full-blown military crisis.**”

**Impact:** US should pursue negotiations with North Korea.

Krieger, David. “North Korea doesn’t want war – Trump needs to negotiate.” *The Hill*. 5/8/17. Web. Accessed 8/10/17. <http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/foreign-policy/332402-despite-nuclear-program-north-korea-doesnt-want-war-trump>.

“**Given the massive disadvantages of initiating a preemptive war, including the illegality and immorality of doing so, the U.S. should dial down its threatening rhetoric (‘all options are on the table’) and behaviors (sending U.S. warships to the vicinity), and instead seek negotiations with the North Korean leadership on mutual**

**security needs.** In addition, as a poor country, there is much that North Korea needs for its people. Food and energy would be high on the list of bargaining chips the U.S. could offer, as well as negotiating an end to the Korean War rather than continuing with the truce set in place in 1953. **The U.S. should actively seek China’s help in getting North Korea to the negotiating table and in participating in the negotiations. Following the path of peace and diplomacy would demonstrate an important step toward maturity for the national leaders of North Korea and the United States.”**

**Impact:** China holds key leverage over North Korea.

Wright, Greg. “Opinion: China is the key to avoiding nuclear ‘fire and fury’ in North Korea.” Marketwatch. 8/10/17. Web. Accessed 8/11/17.  
<http://www.marketwatch.com/story/this-is-why-china-wont-use-its-leverage-over-north-korea-2017-07-07>.

**“China’s large market, proximity and — most importantly — willingness to trade with North Korea has led to a situation in which North Korea has become highly dependent on trade with what has become its primary patron. About half of North Korean exports and imports go directly to and from China and most of the rest of its trade is handled indirectly by Chinese middlemen.** North Korea’s dependence on its northern neighbor has grown hand-in-hand with China’s increasing economic dominance of East Asia, which gained momentum 15 years ago when China joined the World Trade Organization. Since then, both Chinese gross domestic product as well as its annual trade with North Korea have increased nearly tenfold, to around \$11 trillion and \$6 billion, respectively. **North Korea imports pretty much everything from China, from rubber tires to refined petroleum to pears, with no single category dominating.** Meanwhile, coal constitutes about 40% of its exports to China, followed by “non-knit men’s coats.””

**Impact:** China has the most leverage over North Korea out of any nation.

Hu, Elise. "China's Leverage – And Its Limits – In North Korea." NPR. 8/4/7. Web. Accessed 8/11/17.  
<http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2017/08/04/541104144/chinas-leverage-and-its-limits-in-north-korea>.

**“China shares its northeast border with North Korea. During the Korean War, it fought with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung's troops, and today is Pyongyang's largest economic link to the rest of the world. China accounts for at least 85 percent of North Korea's trade — up from last year, despite North Korea's provocations and subsequent sanctions. ‘Trump is right that China has the most leverage over North Korea of any country because of the decades-long relationship and economic relationship between the two sides,’** says Amy King, a lecturer at the Australian National University.”

**Impact:** Negotiations with North Korea are necessary.

Pearlstine, Norman. "The Time for Negotiations With North Korea Is Now." TIME. 7/27/17. Web. Accessed 8/11/17. <http://time.com/4872018/north-korea-us-negotiations-talks/>.

“Those arguments notwithstanding, **it is hard to argue against increasing our diplomatic efforts with North Korea.** While U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis may be right in saying we would win a war with North Korea, he is also right in saying that **any war would be ‘catastrophic’ – to our allies and most probably to ourselves.** President Trump has made contradictory statements about North Korea. Along with his increasingly belligerent threats, Trump, while campaigning for the Presidency and in an interview with Bloomberg News in May, that he would be willing to meet with North Korea’s Kim Jong Un, ‘under the right circumstances.’ Those circumstances weren’t

defined. **Don Gregg is right in thinking talks should begin without preconditions. Now is the time to do so.**”

**Impact:** Negotiations can also fix human rights violations in North Korea.

Cohen, Roberta. “A Serious Human Rights Negotiation with North Korea.” US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS. 2/1/17. Web. Accessed 8/11/17.  
<http://www.38north.org/2017/02/rcohen020117/>

**“During the Cold War, the United States did not limit its discussions with the USSR to one subject—arms reduction. Instead, it insisted upon an expanded information flow between the communist bloc and the West and a more open society; and advocated for core human rights concerns—Soviet Jewish emigration, the protection of Pentecostals and other Christians, the release of political dissidents, the unification of families and the formation of human rights organizations to monitor the Helsinki Final Act. It raised these concerns in bilateral discussions and in the multilateral Helsinki process. Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries, a doctrine espoused by the Soviet Union to shield itself from criticism was not accepted by the US in its negotiations with Moscow. Neither should it be in the case of North Korea, as increasing numbers of policy experts now point out.[3] A recent Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Task Force report suggests that nuclear negotiations could expand into broader talks and that a peace agreement and normalization of relations will have to depend on both ‘nuclear disarmament’ and ‘progress on human rights.’[4] Even more cautious strategists also acknowledge that human rights must be part of any future negotiation.[5]”**

**Impact:** North Korea is guilty of major human rights violations.

Cohen, Roberta. "A Serious Human Rights Negotiation with North Korea." US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS. 2/1/17. Web. Accessed 8/11/17.  
<http://www.38north.org/2017/02/rcohen020117/>

“But which human rights issues should be raised? The UN General Assembly’s annual resolution on North Korea’s human rights situation—adopted by consensus in 2016—lists a wide range of violations, many said to constitute crimes against humanity.[6] The UN Commission of Inquiry (COI)’s 400-page report provides extensive backup information on the crimes committed.[7] **Beginning in 2016, the US sanctioned some 30 North Korean individuals and entities responsible for serious human rights abuses, from the head of state down.[8] It follows that any human rights negotiations between the US and North Korea would have to address these serious issues of concern rather than limit talks to the lower standard that is sometimes proposed.** For example, it has been argued that the US should raise at the outset of negotiations only those human rights issues the DPRK is ready to discuss, in particular, ‘low hanging fruit,’ that is, the rights of women, children and the disabled to which North Korea agreed in a UN process known as the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).[9] Such initial talks would presumably also encompass the recommendations agreed to by North Korea concerning the rights to food, health care and education.”

**Impact:** The US can achieve major human rights wins through negotiations

Cohen, Roberta. "A Serious Human Rights Negotiation with North Korea." US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS. 2/1/17. Web. Accessed 8/11/17.  
<http://www.38north.org/2017/02/rcohen020117/>

“Another important priority would be access to North Korea by human rights and humanitarian actors since access is an effective entry point for addressing human rights issues. It would enable North Koreans to engage with the world, bring needed

information and knowhow into the country, and correct the human rights findings it says are fabrications. In particular, **the US should insist on: Access for the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights in the DPRK and for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights**, whose offices have requested entry for more than a decade. Since 2014, North Korea has indicated it might allow entry to these officials although it has also obstructed their proposed visits. At the UPR, North Korea agreed to cooperate with UN human rights mechanisms. **Access by humanitarian agencies to the most vulnerable in the country. At the UPR, the DPRK accepted ‘free and unimpeded access to all populations in need’ so that humanitarian aid can reach ‘the most vulnerable.’**[18] The US should continue to support this principle together with the language adopted by General Assembly resolutions that the most vulnerable include children, pregnant and lactating women, the elderly, the disabled and ‘political prisoners,’[19] those held in a cruel network of prison camps.”

**Impact:** War with North Korea is imminent.

Thakur, Ramesh. “North Korea: Could we see a nuclear war or is this serial brinkmanship?” Open Canada. 5/5/17. Web. Accessed 8/11/17.  
<https://www.opencanada.org/features/north-korea-nuclear-war-and-serial-brinkmanship/>.

“Speaking to Reuters in an interview at the Oval Office on April 27, **United States President Donald Trump said: ‘There is a chance that we could end up having a major, major conflict with North Korea. Absolutely.’** The portents are ominous. **On April 29, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or, North Korea) conducted another failed missile test. The U.S. Congress has been briefed, Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Rex Tillerson have toured allied and friendly countries around the Asia-Pacific, U.S. Navy fleets are assembled in the vicinity of Japan and South Korea, which are in a state of heightened alert, and an anti-missile defence system has been installed in South Korea.”**

**Impact:** War with North Korea would be devastating.

Andreasen, Ottar. "Time to Test Diplomacy with North Korea." US-Korea Institute at Johns Hopkins SAIS. 2/23/17. Web. Accessed 8/11/17.  
<http://www.38north.org/2017/02/andreasen022317/>.

**"We also understand what a second war on the Korean peninsula would mean: the loss of tens of thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, of lives in North and South Korea and Japan—including heavy American casualties. The economy of a vital region would be severely disrupted for decades, costing America alone billions of dollars. It could involve, as it did over 60 years ago, a military conflict between North Korea's patron, China, and the United States. It could also involve either the use of nuclear weapons or their falling into the hands of non-state actors during the fog of war.** Last September, North Korea tested a nuclear weapon estimated to be the size of the atomic bomb that devastated Hiroshima. This was North Korea's fifth nuclear test—and its largest to date. It has short-, medium- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles that could carry a nuclear warhead and target South Korea and Japan; it is working to develop solid-fueled missiles that will be harder to defend against and longer-range missiles that could possibly hit the United States with a nuclear warhead. **The growing stockpile of nuclear weapons and materials in North Korea increases the likelihood of a nuclear weapon falling into the hands of terrorists or another unsavory regime, given the North's willingness to transfer ballistic missile and nuclear technology to other countries.** In short: it is hard to find a more serious threat for President Donald Trump, and his still emerging—and untested—government."

**Analysis:** This argument should be used to emphasize that the only path towards long-term peace with North Korea is through negotiations. Only in a world where a peace agreement has been reached is there a zero percent chance of war. China is clearly a necessary actor at the negotiating table if a viable solution is ever to be reached. You should emphasize that China pushes for solutions North Korea will actually agree to.

**A2 - Forces China to come to the negotiating table.**

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**Answer:** China's concerns about THAAD are unfounded.

**Warrant:** THAAD radars do not reach as far as China believes.

Pollack, Jonathon D. "South Korea's THAAD decision: Neither a surprise nor a provocation." The Brookings Institution. 7/8/16. Web. Accessed 8/9/17.  
<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/07/08/south-koreas-thaad-decision-neither-a-surprise-nor-a-provocation/>.

"Seoul did not undertake this commitment lightly. In recent years, South Korean strategic analysts have hotly debated the missile defense issue, but the political-military leadership has proceeded very deliberately. It was only in the aftermath of North Korea's fourth nuclear test in early January and a long-range rocket test that soon followed that President Park Geun-hye's administration agreed to initiate consultations on the "earliest possible" deployment of a THAAD missile battery. The North's accelerated missile testing program, evident since April, reinforced the need for a meaningful response to Pyongyang's actions. **Neither China nor Russia seems mollified by today's announcement. Beijing and Moscow both perceive a malign U.S. strategic design, purportedly intended to detect and intercept Chinese and Russian strategic missiles, thereby invalidating their respective deterrence capabilities. But these worst-case estimates attribute technical reach and refinement to the Raytheon radar system likely to accompany the THAAD deployment that substantially exceeds even the manufacturer's claims.**"

**Warrant:** China has deployed its own radars of similar scope in the region.

Bennet, Bruce W. "Why THAAD Is Needed in Korea." RAND Corporation. 8/7/17.  
Web. Accessed 8/9/17. <https://www.rand.org/blog/2017/08/why-thaad-is-needed-in-korea.html>.

**"Lest there be any doubts about the importance of THAAD, consider the fact that China has reportedly deployed an S-400 missile defense system, which is similar to THAAD, on the Shandong Peninsula, between Pyongyang and Beijing. It appears that China put it in place to defend against North Korean missiles. So it is unclear why China is waging economic warfare against South Korea for defending itself with the THAAD system, or why China is unwilling to perform far more serious economic warfare against North Korea for posing an offensive missile threat to both South Korea and China. China often complains about THAAD's over-the-horizon radar, which can detect targets at long ranges and potentially collect information inside China, but China has reportedly deployed at least two similar radars in the area surrounding the Korean Peninsula. China should recognize that if it needs such long-range radars to defend against North Korean missiles, it is only fair for the United States to put in place similar capabilities to defend South Korea."**

**Warrant:** THAAD is a response to increased tensions in the region, not a cause of them.

Pollack, Jonathon D. "South Korea's THAAD decision: Neither a surprise nor a provocation." The Brookings Institution. 7/8/16. Web. Accessed 8/9/17.  
<https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2016/07/08/south-koreas-thaad-decision-neither-a-surprise-nor-a-provocation/>.

**"China and Russia also contend that the THAAD deployment will further complicate the larger goal of denuclearization and threat reduction on the Korean**

**Peninsula. But this places the cart before the horse. Pyongyang’s determination to expand and diversify its nuclear and missile programs has triggered the THAAD decision. Without the North’s accelerated military efforts, it is very doubtful that sentiment in Seoul would favor deployment of THAAD.** Beijing and Moscow assuredly know how to connect the dots, but they seem unwilling to do so. Beijing also calculates that warning South Korea of unspecified consequences will convince Seoul to forego the THAAD decision. But this underestimates the South’s determination to proceed with missile defense, which will tie Seoul even more integrally to longer-term cooperation with the United States. **This decision is unwelcome in China, but it is wholly within Seoul’s sovereign right to defend its vital interests by all appropriate means; China routinely does the same.”**

**Analysis:** This answer demonstrates that China isn’t really angry about THAAD’s radar capabilities, but rather the current state of geopolitical affairs in general. They’re angry that the United States insists on using sanctions and other stick-tactics and that South Korea continues to support the US’ stances. This fundamental dynamic doesn’t shift with missile systems and thus, China will not be a helpful actor in negotiations.

**Answer:** Negotiations won’t work.

**Warrant:** Past efforts to coerce North Korea to negotiate have failed.

Lukin, Artyom. “Thinking Beyond China When Dealing with North Korea: Is There a Role for Russia?” Foreign Policy Research Institute. 4/4/17. Web. Accessed 8/10/17. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/04/thinking-beyond-china-dealing-north-korea-role-russia/>

**“However, so far, there are no visible signs that the Trump White House is pursuing a North Korea policy that would be much different from the administrations of Barack Obama and George W. Bush. As is clear from remarks by Tillerson and**

other officials, Washington is banking on the combination of military deterrence and sanctions, which was essentially the stance taken by the previous administrations. Also, in continuation with its predecessors, the Trump national security team sees China as having exclusive leverage over North Korea and seeks to get Beijing to apply meaningful pressure to the DPRK. It is logical to assume that, **if this approach failed under the Obama administration, it is not likely to work now with a new administration.** One major flaw with this strategy is that it sees China as the lynchpin to resolve the North Korean nuclear issue. Even though Beijing may not be happy with Pyongyang's nuclear aspirations, China has always been reluctant to do the heavy lifting with regard to North Korea on behalf of the United States. If Beijing goes along with Washington and squeezes the North really hard by cutting off trade and financial transactions, then those policies may cause the collapse of the DPRK, an outcome which remains unacceptable to the Chinese.”

**Analysis:** This answer allows you to circumvent any offense about negotiations working. All of those impacts don't matter in the round if they're highly unlikely to materialize in the first place. You can also use probability weighing later in the round to demonstrate how even if the magnitude of their impacts is large, they likely aren't gaining access to them.

**Answer:** China doesn't want to negotiate.

**Warrant:** China has an interest in North Korea acquiring nuclear weapons.

Lukin, Artyom. “Thinking Beyond China When Dealing with North Korea: Is There a Role for Russia?” Foreign Policy Research Institute. 4/4/17. Web. Accessed 8/10/17. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/04/thinking-beyond-china-dealing-north-korea-role-russia/>

“Some would even argue that Beijing “uses North Korea like a thug nation to do some of its dirtier jobs and act as a buffer against nations it sees as potentially hostile like South

Korea and Japan.” One can speculate that, **from the Chinese perspective, North Korea’s acquiring nuclear capability, including ICBMs, may not be such a bad thing, after all. The North Korean missile threat could eventually force the United States to disengage from its ally South Korea in order to avoid a possible atomic attack against the homeland. If America withdraws from the Korean Peninsula, it will be a major geopolitical coup for China.** Even if Beijing were truly interested in denuclearizing North Korea, its actual leverage over the recalcitrant neighbor and formal junior ally may be quite limited. Think of Israel’s nuclear breakout in the 1960s. Despite their presumable dependence on the United States, the Israelis defied Washington and went ahead with its nuclear program. Imperatives of survival in an extremely hostile environment trump any amount of persuasion and pressure from the senior ally.”

**Analysis:** This answer demonstrates that China’s interests do not align with South Korea’s. Even if China comes to the negotiating table, they are not going to act in a way that will benefit South Korea’s interests because they continue to want North Korea to have nuclear weapons.

## **PRO – Protects civilians from missile attacks**

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**Argument:** When South Korea builds Anti-Missile defense systems, they will be able to defend against attacks from North Korea that may endanger the lives of millions of South Korean civilians.

**Warrant:** North Korea is likely to attack South Korea with a nuclear weapon because Kim Jong Un would like to gain further support among North Korean elites.

Albert, Eleanor. “What’s the Status of North Korea’s Nuclear Program?” Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 Aug. 2017, [www.cfr.org/background/north-koreas-military-capabilities](http://www.cfr.org/background/north-koreas-military-capabilities).

**“Kim has struggled to deliver on his economic promises. Demonstrating unquestioned military might, particularly of the nuclear variety, is the means by which the young leader seeks to consolidate his rule and portray himself as powerful. The nuclear program has a dual purpose: to deter external threats but also to bolster the strength and image of Kim. ‘Kim Jong-un believes that nuclear weapons are his guarantee of regime survival,’ says Bruce Bennett, a senior researcher at RAND Corporation, a California-based think tank.”**

**Warrant:** North Korea may attack South Korea due to miscalculation.

Berlinger, Joshua, and Brad Lendon. “North Korea Rhetoric Is Angry -- but Is Conflict Closer?” CNN, Cable News Network, 26 Apr. 2017, [www.cnn.com/2017/04/26/asia/north-korea-chance-of-war/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/26/asia/north-korea-chance-of-war/index.html).

**“Analysts fear the situation is a tinderbox that could be set off by a small spark. ‘The real question now is somebody going to make a stupid mistake, because some kind of minor escalation could get out of hand,’ said Bruce Bennett, a senior defense**

**analyst at the RAND Corporation.** ‘It’s not so dangerous that I’m not going to go to (South) Korea in three weeks. But it is a dangerous situation that could get out of hand,’ said Bennett.”

**Warrant:** Thaad has 100 percent success rate.

Klingner, Bruce. “South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense.” The Heritage Foundation, 12 June 2015, [www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense](http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense).

“South Korea’s planned indigenous L-SAM would have less altitude and range than THAAD and would not be available for deployment until at least 2023. However, that target date is unlikely since creating a missile defense system is a long, expensive, and difficult process. For example, THAAD took approximately 30 years for the U.S. to fully develop, test, and field. **The THAAD system has already been developed, tested (scoring a 100 percent success rate of 11 for 11 successful intercepts), and deployed.**”

**Warrant:** Thaad is part of a layered missile defense.

Woolf, Christopher. “How Good Is the New Missile Defense System the US Just Deployed in South Korea?” Public Radio International, PRI’s the World, 3 May 2017, [www.pri.org/stories/2017-05-03/how-good-new-missile-defense-system-us-just-deployed-south-korea](http://www.pri.org/stories/2017-05-03/how-good-new-missile-defense-system-us-just-deployed-south-korea).

“So THAAD is good, but no panacea. ‘And it was never meant to be,’ Axe explains. **‘THAAD is part of a layered missile defense system. Most countries that try to build missile defense systems, aim for defense in depth. So in addition to THAAD, you might have sea-based Aegis missiles, that fire from warships and can cover other areas and are much more mobile. And then you have shorter-range Patriot missiles.**

**You can connect all of these weapons to the same sensor and command network so you can coordinate your defenses.”**

**Impact:** A layered Missile defense will save hundreds of thousands of lives.

Daewoo, Lee. “Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD).” Sejong Institute, 14 Apr. 2017.

“Obviously, even though there are costs to bear, **deploying THAAD (and PAC-3) will save around 340,000 civilians for intercepting one North Korean nuclear missile and 700,000 civilians for intercepting two nuclear missiles.** As such, there are sufficient reasons to deploy THAAD in South Korea.”

**Analysis:** This argument has the simplest link chain of any on this topic, and so there are fewer opportunities for opposing teams to take it out. As long as you can prepare frontlines for common responses, this argument will win a lot of rounds. Many con teams will argue that deploying missile defense will anger North Korea or China. However, this argument interacts with that by saying that even if North Korea or China are more likely to attack, the likelihood of an attack is already high, so we might as well defend the lives of civilians with BMDs.

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## **A2 - Anti-Missile Systems protect civilians from missile attacks**

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**Answer:** There are easy ways for North Korea to circumvent Missile Defenses.

**Warrant:** North Korea could easily fire barrages of missiles and overpower Thaad.

“Even with THAAD Defense, North Korea Missile Barrage Poses Threat to South.”

Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 8 Mar. 2017, [www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-defence-analysis-idUSKBN16F0CT](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-defence-analysis-idUSKBN16F0CT).

“THAAD’s job is to intercept and destroy a ballistic missile in its final phase of flight, either inside or just outside the earth’s atmosphere. But **with its specifications secret and having never been used in wartime, THAAD’s ability to deal with a barrage of missiles at the same time is uncertain. The use of multiple shots, timed ever-more-closely together, appears destined to rehearse saturating a defensive system by presenting it with an overwhelmingly complex radar picture, Joshua Pollack, editor of the U.S.-based Nonproliferation Review, said of Monday’s launch.**”

**Warrant:** Thaad does not defend against conventional artillery shot by North Korea.

Gomez, Eric, et al. “THAAD Won't Save Asia (or America) from North Korea.” The National Interest, The Center for the National Interest, 15 May 2017, [nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-wont-save-asia-or-america-north-korea-20665](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-wont-save-asia-or-america-north-korea-20665).

“THAAD is not able to defend Seoul from North Korean missiles because most of the capital city is just outside the 200 km range of THAAD’s interceptors. While not in a position to defend Seoul, THAAD could protect several locations that are essential for conducting sustained combat operations against North Korea, such as the port of Busan

and Kunsan air base. Moreover, **even if THAAD were deployed closer to Seoul, it would not be able to defend against the conventional artillery threat to the city.**”

**Warrant:** Thaad cannot distinguish between real missiles and decoys.

Cho, Julian, and Hyun Lee. “THAAD Will Not Protect South Korea.” KOREA EXPOSÉ, Zoominkorea, 8 Apr. 2017, [koreaexpose.com/thaad-missile-defense-no-help-korea/](http://koreaexpose.com/thaad-missile-defense-no-help-korea/).

“Postol also notes the THAAD system has not been proven to work. **“The infrared seeker on THAAD interceptors is easily fooled by decoys,” he said. An enemy can launch several fake missiles along with the real one; they would shoot out in different directions to confuse the THAAD system, which would then have a hard time discerning and honing in on the real missile.** According to Postol: “The infrared seeker on a THAAD interceptor cannot determine the distance from the target, and the THAAD radar cannot determine the precise azimuth of the target even if the decoys are only about 100 meters away from the real warhead.””

**Analysis:** As long as there is one way for North Korea to get around Missile Defenses, South Korea might as well not have them at all. These holes in South Korea’s missile defense system mean that all North Korea must do to harm South Korea is exploit these dangerous opportunities.

**Answer:** Thaad does not even cover Seoul.

Kelly, Robert E, et al. “Can THAAD Save South Korea?” The National Interest, The Center for the National Interest, 14 Oct. 2016, [nationalinterest.org/feature/can-thaad-save-south-korea-18047](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/can-thaad-save-south-korea-18047).

This is so much sturm und drang over very little – heavily fanned by China, which knows very well how little THAAD changes things and why South Korea wants it. THAAD changes almost nothing geopolitically. It is a defensive system intended recapture the status quo ante against Northern missilization. It does not facilitate American or South Korean offensive action against North Korea or China. Its X-band radar may ostensibly reach into China, as Beijing claims, but other U.S. systems can already determine a Chinese missile launch, so X-band adds nothing. **South Korea is only buying one THAAD battery, which has only 8-10 rockets. That battery will not, as a concession to the China, cover Seoul.** THAAD also does nothing to reduce North Korea's conventional, artillery-barrage choke-hold on Seoul.

**Analysis:** If Thaad does not even cover Seoul, the capital of South Korea, this means that North Korea could easily attack without ever even worrying about Thaad's success. This creates an easy way for North Korea to strike South Korea's most populous city of nearly ten million people.

**PRO – THAAD stops Chinese Hegemony**

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**Argument:** Implementing THAAD will help prevent China from increasing its growing influence over South Korea.

**Warrant:** Implementation of THAAD sends message that the United States and South Korean alliance is strong.

Snyder, Scott. “Two Koreas Defy Chinese Sanctions.”, May 2017. CCIS, Web. Date Accessed: 7/8/17 [cc.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/1701\\_china\\_korea.pdf](http://cc.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/1701_china_korea.pdf).

“In the case of North Korea, China’s economic pressure is being applied at the behest of the US and despite China’s qualms that too much pressure could lead to war or instability, that China has long sought to avoid. Yet it is increasingly likely that the objective of denuclearization can only be achieved at the cost of war or instability. China’s application of enhanced economic pressure has resulted in strident objections from Pyongyang, but has failed to convince North Korea to change direction. Instead, North Korea has doubled-down on its nuclear and missile development. China’s economic pressure on South Korea has likewise thus far been a failure, antagonizing the South Korean public and strengthening support for the THAAD deployment. If South Korea’s domestic politics produce an outcome that shows South Korea to be vulnerable to China’s pressure, this result will signal a steady curtailment of Korea’s autonomy and could erode the alliance with the United States. **If South Korea stands firm against Chinese economic pressure, there will be material losses for South Korea, it will send a message from a “peripheral state” about the limits of China’s power, and provide evidence of the utility and durability of the US-ROK alliance.**”

**Warrant:** China opposes THAAD to weaken US-South Korean security alliance.

Newsham, Grant, et al. “The Real Reason China Is Desperate to Stop THAAD.” The National Interest, The National Interest, 25 Mar. 2017, Web. Date Accessed: 7/8/17 [nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-real-reason-china-desperate-stop-thaad-19895](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-real-reason-china-desperate-stop-thaad-19895).

**Chinese opposition to South Korea’s deployment of the THAAD missile defense system is less about missiles than about an ongoing effort to weaken—and ideally demolish—the United States’ network of formal and informal alliances in Asia that has underpinned the regional order for the last seventy years.** The THAAD controversy that heated up in 2016 once deployment became likely displays a familiar Chinese modus operandi: First, pick a fight over an allegedly offensive act. Next, follow up with vitriol and veiled threats, and then inflict economic pressure—while making bland denials or declaring it the spontaneous reaction of the righteously offended Chinese people.

**Warrant:** Chinese success at blocking THAAD would set dangerous precedent to use coercive control in the future.

Glaser, Bonnie S., et al. “The Good, the THAAD, and the Ugly.” Foreign Affairs, 17 Mar. 2017, Web. Date Accessed: 7/8/17 , [www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-02-15/good-thaad-and-ugly](http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-02-15/good-thaad-and-ugly).

**“If China succeeds—or even appears to succeed—in blocking THAAD, it could set a dangerous precedent, emboldening Chinese policymakers to expand their use of economic leverage as a coercive tool against China's other trading partners.** To counter this risk, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump should continue to strengthen its cooperation with Seoul on North Korea and work toward THAAD’s deployment, while at the same time trying to reassure China that the missile defense system does not undermine China’s nuclear deterrent. It should also look for opportunities to raise the costs of Beijing’s coercive behavior.”

**Impact:** A more powerful China will have the ability to influence the policy of its neighboring states.

Xiaoting, Li “Applying offensive realism to the rise of China: structural incentives and Chinese diplomacy toward the neighboring states”, *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, Volume 16, Issue 2, 1 May 2016, Web., Date Accessed: 7/9/17 Pages 241–271, <https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcv019>

“Instead, through calculated strikes at unbending foes, a rising state could demonstrate to its neighbors that it is not a paper tiger and defying its ascendance has a price, thereby deterring further challenges to its interests. **Furthermore, as China's relative capabilities continue to grow apace, the local balance of power and geography will cease to pose insurmountable obstacles to the flexing of Chinese muscles.** The PRC's rapid military modernization, for example, has enabled the progressive expansion of China's maritime defense perimeter, enhancing Beijing's ability to frustrate or complicate American intervention in a major conflict on China's periphery (Montgomery, 2014). In contrast, many Asian states are worried that US budgetary constraints would erode Washington's strategic preponderance in the Asia-Pacific, leaving them unable to withstand China's burgeoning power (Johnson et al., 2014, pp. 39–43). **This is not to imply, however, that a materially stronger China will attempt to conquer the rest of Asia, which offensive realism considers unlikely as well as infeasible** (Mearsheimer, 2014[2001], p. 370). **Rather, the point is that Beijing will possess great coercive means – economic, military, and diplomatic – to influence the foreign policy choices of its neighbors and to push harder for a distinct sphere of influence**

**Impact:** China has been using coercion to allow for it to expand in South China Sea

Gertz, Bill. “Pentagon: China Militarizing Disputed Islands in Bid to Control Asian Seas” *Washington Free Beacon*, June 7, 2017 Web. Date Accessed: 8/13/17

<http://freebeacon.com/national-security/pentagon-china-militarizing-disputed-islands-bid-control-asian-seas/>

“China is militarizing disputed islands in the South China Sea and is using non-military coercion in a bid to control strategic waters in Asia, the Pentagon said in its latest annual report on the Chinese military. "China continues to exercise low-intensity coercion to advance its claims in the East and South China Seas," the report to Congress says, adding that Beijing's tactic involves the use of "timed progression of incremental but intensifying steps to attempt to increase effective control over disputed areas and avoid escalation to military conflict."

**Analysis:** If the United States does not secure its role as the hegemon in the Asian region, China will take its place. China is a much worse actor for South Korea as it cares very little about the North Korean crisis, human rights, and the importance of South Korean autonomy when it comes to trade. Therefore, China would be a much worse hegemon as it would force South Korea to promote policy that is not necessarily in their best interest.

## **A2 – THAAD stops Chinese Hegemony**

**Answer:** US and South Korean Security alliance is harmed in either world.

**Warrant:** The uncertainties of Trump administration is the root cause of the destruction of the security alliance between South Korea and the United States, not THAAD.

Snyder, Scott. "Is the U.S.-South Korea Alliance in Trouble?" The National Interest, June 26, 2017 Web., Date Accessed: 7/9/17 <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-us-south-korea-alliance-trouble-21323>

“Following a decade of convergence between South Korean conservatives and the Obama administration, American analysts have been bracing for a new round of alliance-shuddering tensions under Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in similar to those that existed a little over a decade ago during the George W. Bush and Roh Moo-hyun administrations. **But this analysis overlooks constraints Moon faces that are likely to keep him on track; instead, South Koreans are holding their breath over the possibility that the greatest risks to the U.S.-ROK alliance could come from uncertainties generated by President Trump himself.**”

**Analysis:** By proving the uncertainties of Trump is the issue, and not the implementation of this new missile system, your opponents will fail to gain offense off their argument since it is no longer unique to the resolution.

**Answer:** Political polarization has made the United States an undesirable ally as very little gets done.

**Warrant:** There is increasing polarization between parties within the United States and it seems as though congress is mostly paralyzed when attempting to solve foreign or domestic problems.

Suslov , Dmitry. "US Global Leadership Dilemma as a Challenge for the US-Russia Relations," The National Research University Higher School of Economics, February 20, 2014, Web. Date Accessed: 7/10/17  
[https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract\\_id=2398855](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2398855)

While trust in the US economic dynamism and progress has been one of the major foundations of American soft and hard power. Symbolic (in terms of determining perceptions of the vector, which is of utmost importance in today world) is a comparison between the booming Shanghai with the aging infrastructure in the US. **Politically, the US is facing unprecedented in recent decades and self-destructing polarization between Democrats and Republicans, which can hardly find anything to agree upon in both domestic and foreign policies, and their mutual diminishing popularity and loss of appeal – witness the Tea Party movement. Both Parties, and especially the Republicans, are undergoing dangerous transformation, with the traditional center depleting and the center of gravity going to the flanks, which aggravates polarization. This means that for the next years the US political system will remain to be paralyzed, and thus reducing effectiveness of the US domestic and foreign policies, reducing a US capacity to act as a responsible and a reliable partner.**

**Analysis:** China's ability to pass policy with a lack of compromise may make it a superior ally than that of the United States. This is because it would allow for conflicts to end possibly quicker or before they worsen.

**Answer:** Unless the United States concedes its hegemonic conquests in the region the likely result will be war.

**Warrant:** China sees the United States presence in Asia as a direct threat to their survival. If the United States continues to maintain a presence in the region the likely result is war because it is impossible for China to rise peacefully.

Glaser, John. "The US and China can avoid a collision course – if the US gives up its empire." The Guardian. May 28, 2015. Web. Date Accessed: 7/10/17  
<https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/28/conflict-us-china-not-inevitable-empire>

**To avoid a violent militaristic clash with China, or another cold war rivalry, the United States should pursue a simple solution: give up its empire.** Americans fear that China's rapid economic growth will slowly translate into a more expansive and assertive foreign policy that will inevitably result in a war with the US. **Harvard Professor Graham Allison has found: "in 12 of 16 cases in the past 500 years when a rising power challenged a ruling power, the outcome was war."** Chicago University scholar John Mearsheimer has bluntly argued: **"China cannot rise peacefully. But the apparently looming conflict between the US and China is not because of China's rise per se, but rather because the US insists on maintaining military and economic dominance among China's neighbors.** Although Americans like to think of their massive overseas military presence as a benign force that's inherently stabilizing, Beijing certainly doesn't see it that way. **According to political scientists Andrew Nathan and Andrew Scobell, Beijing sees America as "the most intrusive outside actor in China's internal affairs, the guarantor of the status quo in Taiwan, the largest naval presence in the East China and South China seas, [and] the formal or informal military ally of many of China's neighbors."** (All of which is true.) They think that the US **"seeks to curtail China's political influence and harm China's interests" with a "militaristic, offense-minded, expansionist, and selfish" foreign policy.**

**Analysis:** This could quite possibly be the largest impact in the round. Use this disadvantage to outweigh the argument they present in case. A world in which China and the United states end up in a full fledged war is not a stable world.

**PRO – Forces China to cooperate on sanctions.**

**Argument:** The deployment of anti-missile systems incentivizes China to back sanctions on North Korea that are necessary to debilitate their nuclear program.

**Warrant:** China has recently stated it is willing to back stronger sanctions against North Korea.

Griffiths, James; Wag, Serenitie. “China willing to ‘pay a price’ for stronger North Korea sanctions.” CNN. 8/8/17. Web. Accessed 8/9/17.

<http://www.cnn.com/2017/08/08/asia/china-north-korea-sanctions/index.html>.

**“China is willing to take the economic hit of greater sanctions on North Korea, a top official said Monday, as Washington continues to pressure Beijing on the issue.**

‘Given China's traditional economic ties with North Korea, China more than anyone will pay a price for implementing the resolution,’ Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said at the ASEAN Regional Forum in the Philippines, according to a statement from the ministry. **‘In order to maintain the international nuclear non-proliferation system and regional peace and stability, China will, as always, enforce the full content of relevant resolutions in a comprehensive and strict manner.’** Sanctions were imposed in the wake of Pyongyang's testing of an intercontinental missile apparently capable of reaching the US mainland amid increased tensions on the Korean Peninsula. In a Japanese defense white paper Tuesday, Tokyo said the threat from North Korean nuclear weapons has reached a ‘new stage,’ adding it was ‘conceivable’ North Korea had made progress on miniaturizing a nuclear warhead to place on its new long-range missiles.”

**Warrant:** Anti-missile systems could create an interoperable system

Buckley, Chris. "Why U.S. Antimissile System in South Korea Worries China." New York Times. 3/11/17. Web. Accessed 8/10/17.  
[https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/world/asia/us-south-korea-thaad-antimissile-system-china.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/world/asia/us-south-korea-thaad-antimissile-system-china.html?_r=0).

**"Even so, China's real, underlying worry appears to be that Thaad could open the door to a much wider, more advanced fence of antimissile systems arrayed around it by America's allies, several experts said. That would magnify Chinese worries about the effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent, and entrench Chinese fears of encirclement by a coalition knit together by a shared antimissile system. 'I think this is what really worries them, because then what you have is the basis for a common interoperable system,' said Michael J. Green, the former senior director for Asia in the National Security Council under President George W. Bush. 'I think it's more about the creation of a virtual collective security system,' he said of China's worries about Thaad."**

**Warrant:** Anti-missile system radars can see into Chinese territory.

Buckley, Chris. "Why U.S. Antimissile System in South Korea Worries China." New York Times. 3/11/17. Web. Accessed 8/10/17.  
[https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/world/asia/us-south-korea-thaad-antimissile-system-china.html?\\_r=0](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/11/world/asia/us-south-korea-thaad-antimissile-system-china.html?_r=0).

**"The Chinese government worries that the American antimissile system, called the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or Thaad, could erode its nuclear deterrent — its ability to scare off potential foes from ever considering a nuclear attack. Its chief worry is not that Thaad could take down missiles: the system offers a canopy of**

potential protection over South Korea, but does not have the reach to bring down China's intercontinental ballistic missiles. **Instead, China's complaint is focused on Thaad's radar system, which Chinese experts have said could be used to track the People's Liberation Army's missile forces. Deploying Thaad's current radar system 'would undermine China's nuclear deterrence by collecting important data on Chinese nuclear warheads,'** Li Bin, a nuclear weapons expert at Tsinghua University in Beijing, wrote last week."

**Warrant:** THAAD should be used as a bargaining chip with China.

Etzioni, Amitai. "THAAD: Best a Bargaining Chip." The Diplomat. 8/10/17. Web.

Accessed 8/11/17. <http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/thaad-best-a-bargaining-chip/>.

"Whether THAAD batteries are truly effective or their prowess much more limited than advertised, whether they are designed to work only against North Korean missiles but ignore Chinese ones, or whether the Chinese have reasons to be concerned – there is no doubt that they are highly destabilizing. The Chinese cannot simply accept that these anti-missile batteries will not hamper their ability to retaliate, especially given Washington's continued refusal even to state that it will not strike first. The U.S. cannot simply remove the THAAD system, because of the very serious North Korean threat to U.S. forces in the region, to South Korea and Japan, and soon to the U.S. mainland. These batteries do seem to be able to mitigate such a threat to some extent. However, **their destabilizing side effects strongly compel the U.S. to intensify the quest for more effective and compensative ways to deal with the North Korean nuclear threat.** As I suggested here, **such a drive best entails a major deal with China – in which the removal of THAAD can serve as one bargaining chip. The bargain entails a commitment from the U.S. that if China helps defang the North Korea threat – the U.S. will have no reason to keep THAAD in South Korea.**"

**Impact:** China imposed coal sanctions on North Korea in February.

Kim, Hooyeon; Shi, Ting. "China Message to Trump With North Korea Coal Ban: Let's Deal." Bloomberg News. 2/19/17. Web. Accessed 8/9/17.  
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-02-19/china-s-message-to-trump-with-north-korea-coal-ban-let-s-deal>.

**“China’s move to ban coal imports from North Korea, effectively slicing the country’s exports by about half, came with a message for the U.S. and its allies: It’s time to do a deal. Authorities in Beijing announced on Saturday that China would halt all shipments from Kim Jong Un’s regime until the end of the year, in compliance with United Nations Security Council resolutions over North Korea’s nuclear program. At the same time, Chinese officials said that pushing North Korea into a corner won’t work as Kim’s regime will keep developing its nuclear capability until it feels safe. Instead, it’s time to restart talks and ‘break the negative cycle on the nuclear issue,’ Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said in a statement on Sunday after meeting South Korean counterpart Yun Byung-se at a security meeting in Munich. ‘The Chinese are getting more frustrated with North Korea,’ Eurasia Group President Ian Bremmer said in an interview at the same conference. ‘They clearly don’t feel that they have a lot of influence and they’re worried that the U.S. under Trump is going to blame China as opposed to continuing a multilateral process.’”**

**Impact:** Economic pressure from China is vital to destabilize the Kim regime.

Bader, Jeffrey A. "U.S.-China challenges: Time for China to step up." The Brookings Institution. 1/12/17. Web. Accessed 8/9/17.  
<https://www.brookings.edu/research/u-s-china-challenges-time-for-china-to-step-up/>.

**“Such talks should be accompanied by a more vigorous Chinese economic squeeze on North Korea. China lately has supported tightened sanctions against North Korea and has been enforcing U.N.-imposed measures, but as North Korea’s largest trading partner by far there is more than it can do. It could follow in the footsteps of South Korea, which in the last decade has dramatically curtailed a once modest but real trade and investment relationship with the North. These pressures need not lead necessarily to the collapse of North Korea that China has long feared. They could instead serve to concentrate the minds of North Korea’s leaders, forcing them to realize that they truly have no path forward beyond absolute international isolation, disappearance of access to luxury goods for the Party elite, and national economic collapse that would imperil the future of the regime. Under such circumstances, North Korea’s leaders might decide to return to the negotiating table, with the offer of inducements such as American diplomatic recognition, a peace treaty, and a relaxation of the international economic embargo.”**

**Impact:** China is a major economic backer for North Korea.

Albert, Eleanor. “The China-North Korea Relationship.” Council on Foreign Relations. 7/5/17. Web. Accessed 8/10/17. <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounders/china-north-korea-relationship>.

**“China provides North Korea with most of its food and energy supplies and accounts for upwards of 90 percent of North Korea’s total trade volume. Conversely, China’s purchases from its neighbor include minerals, seafood, and manufactured garments. In the first quarter of 2017, China–North Korea trade was up 37.4 percent from the same period in 2016. “China is currently North Korea’s only economic backer of any importance,” writes Nicholas Eberstadt, senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. In September 2015, the two countries opened a bulk cargo and container shipping route to boost North Korea’s export of coal to China and China established a high-speed rail route between the Chinese border city of**

**Dandong and Shenyang, the provincial capital of China’s northeastern Liaoning province.”**

**Impact:** China provides North Korea with crucial aid

Albert, Eleanor. “The China-North Korea Relationship.” Council on Foreign Relations. 7/5/17. Web. Accessed 8/10/17. <https://www.cfr.org/backgroundunder/china-north-korea-relationship>.

**“Beijing also provides aid [PDF] directly to Pyongyang, primarily in food and energy assistance. China, Japan, South Korea, and the United States have provided more than 75 percent of food aid to North Korea since 1995, but donations from all countries except for China have shrunk significantly since the collapse of the Six Party Talks in 2009.** North Korea, whose famine in the 1990s killed between eight hundred thousand and 2.4 million people, reported its worst drought in decades in June 2015 and extensive flooding in September 2016, which seriously damaged harvests. **UN agencies designated up to 60 percent of the population, or fifteen million people, as food insecure.** There is also concern about the distribution of aid in North Korea, particularly since China has no system [PDF] to monitor shipments. Recently, however, ‘Beijing has been trying to wean Pyongyang off pure aid in favor of more commercially viable ties,’ University of Sydney’s James Reilly writes.”

**Impact:** China supports North Korea’s nuclear program

Stanton, Joshua et al. “Getting Tough on North Korea.” Foreign Affairs. 5/17. Web. Accessed 8/11/17. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-04-17/getting-tough-north-korea>.

“UN sanctions look strong on paper, but member states have often failed to enforce them. **China, in particular, has made a show of voting for each round of sanctions, only to**

**flagrantly violate each of them. China’s state-owned companies have sold missile trucks to Pyongyang; its banks have laundered the regime’s money; its government has allowed UN-sanctioned companies and the North Korean hackers who attacked Sony Pictures in 2014 to operate on its soil; and its ports have allowed the transshipment of arms, materials for North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs, and luxury goods headed to North Korea—all without fear of punishment.”**

**Impact:** Sanctions give us a crucial bargaining chip

Kelly, Robert. “Learning to live with a North Korean ICBM.” Lowy Institute. 7/10/17. Web. Accessed 8/12/17. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/learning-live-north-korean-icbm>.

“Sanctions: Often unfairly condemned for not stopping the nuclear and missile programs, but that is not an appropriate counterfactual. The better question to ask is: **'Where would these programs be without the sanctions effort?' Also, sanctions, and sanctions relief, give us a bargaining chip if the regime ever chooses to negotiate, just as they did in the Iranian denuclearisation negotiations.** China: Whatever else we may say about Trump, his instincts on China and North Korea are correct. He did the right thing by trying to engage China on Pyongyang. **China’s economic leverage over North Korea is enormous. The North’s trade and banking operations – licit and illicit – go through China. If China were to genuinely close the pipeline into North Korea and strictly enforce sanctions, North Korea would almost certainly enter a major economic crisis.** We have little choice but to keep working with Beijing, as every president since the 1990s has realised.”

**Analysis:** This argument establishes that China is in a position where we can convince them to support sanctions by applying pressure via THAAD and other anti-missile systems. It’s vital to make the analysis in-round that China will react to this pressure by acquiescing to the United States because of how threatened they are by THAAD’s radars and power projection. THAAD is

so repugnant to China that they are willing to support sanctions in order to see its removal or prevent future, similar systems from being deployed. The impact of China cutting economic ties with North Korea provides the affirmative with a physical mechanism to solve back for the nuclear program, cutting off its supply at the source. This allows you to outweigh any con arguments about increased belligerence from North Korea because you can argue that they won't be able to do so if they don't have the physical means to support their nuclear program.

**A2 - Forces China to cooperate on sanctions**

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**Answer:** Other countries will fill the economic void left by China.

**Warrant:** Russia is now Pyongyang's most important partner.

Lukin, Artyom. "Thinking Beyond China When Dealing with North Korea: Is There a Role for Russia?" Foreign Policy Research Institute. 4/4/17. Web. Accessed 8/10/17. <https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/04/thinking-beyond-china-dealing-north-korea-role-russia/>

**“Washington’s continued fixation on China as the only route to the solution of the North Korea nuclear problem is misplaced.** It ignores other factors and actors that have an impact and can contribute to the resolution of the ongoing crisis on the Korean Peninsula. Russia is one such actor that is often overlooked. **Russia is now the only major country that is on more or less friendly terms with Pyongyang. Its current economic leverage with the North comes mostly from the importation of North Korean labor, which provides Pyongyang with a vital source of cash. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) trusts no person or country, but it probably distrusts Russia much less than China and the United States.** This dynamic gives Russia a potential diplomatic role in the North Korean problem.”

**Warrant:** Countries across the globe support North Korea’s nuclear program.

Stanton, Joshua et al. "Getting Tough on North Korea." Foreign Affairs. 5/17. Web. Accessed 8/11/17. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/north-korea/2017-04-17/getting-tough-north-korea>.

**“Other countries deserve a share of the blame, as well. Until 2016, South Korea let approximately \$100 million a year flow into Pyongyang through Kaesong without**

**questioning how Pyongyang used the money, despite UN resolutions requiring Seoul to ensure that the North Korean regime would not use South Korean funds for its nuclear program. The fleet of ships that North Korea uses to smuggle weapons has flown Cambodian and Mongolian flags; its nuclear and missile scientists have visited Indian and Russian laboratories; its slave laborers have toiled at Qatari construction sites, Malaysian mines, and Polish shipyards; its military has trained Ugandan pilots and built weapons for Iran and Namibia; its doctors have sold quack medicines in Tanzania; and its generals have bought Swiss watches.** In testimony before a U.S. congressional committee in 2015, the scholar Larry Nicksch estimated that **North Korea receives over \$2 billion a year from “various forms of collaboration” with Iran alone. The cash that Pyongyang has gained by disrupting sanctions enforcement may be modest by global standards, but it has been enough to keep the regime in power and advance its nuclear program.”**

**Analysis:** This answer allows you to circumvent the benefits of the pro, demonstrating that there are many other sources from which North Korea can find funding for its nuclear program. It is especially key to emphasize the reasons why each of these countries may seek to support such a program, from ideological alignment to regional geopolitical advantages.

**Answer:** China won't acquiesce to the United States.

**Warrant:** China is angry about THAAD deployment, believes it is being used to spy on them.

Etzioni, Amitai. “THAAD: Best a Bargaining Chip.” The Diplomat. 8/10/17. Web.

Accessed 8/11/17. <http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/thaad-best-a-bargaining-chip/>.

**“American officials sought to ease China’s anxiety by offering a briefing on the technical details of THAAD. As then U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken said, ‘We realize China may not believe us and also proposed to go through the technology and specifications with them...and prepared to explain what the technology**

does and what it doesn't do and hopefully they will take us up on that proposal.' Defense Secretary James Mattis told reporters in South Korea simply, 'There is no other nation that needs to be concerned about THAAD other than North Korea if they're engaged in something that's offensive.' **The Chinese are far from convinced. According to state news media, President Xi Jinping has said that THAAD will not solve the North Korea problem, and accused the U.S. of 'using responding to a threat as a pretext to unilaterally deploy missile defense systems in Europe and Asia, causing serious harm to the strategic security interests of countries in the region.'** Li Bin, an academic with expertise in arms control, explains that **Chinese officials are worried THAAD's radar system 'would undermine China's nuclear deterrence by collecting important data on Chinese nuclear warheads that the United States could not acquire from other sources.'** With a relatively small nuclear arsenal, China is worried that surveillance of this kind would undermine its ability to strike back if attacked by the U.S."

**Warrant:** China's concerns about THAAD's capabilities are legitimate.

Etzioni, Amitai. "THAAD: Best a Bargaining Chip." *The Diplomat*. 8/10/17. Web. Accessed 8/11/17. <http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/thaad-best-a-bargaining-chip/>.

"Addressing China's claim that THAAD may be used against their missiles, Greg Thielmann, former State Department intelligence analyst and board member of the Arms Control Association, argued that **Beijing has legitimate concerns about the impact of the THAAD radar on China's nuclear deterrent. Although this radar's present configuration is oriented toward defense against North Korean missiles, it would only take hours to convert the system software into a configuration that would improve the effectiveness of US strategic defenses based in Alaska and California against Chinese ICBMs by providing earlier tracking data on their launches toward the United States.** Theodore Postol, professor emeritus at MIT, notes: '[Deploying THAAD] puts South Korea at odds with China over a defense system that

has no merit for South Korea's defense, and it will certainly raise tensions between China and Japan.' Postol adds **that an indirect and far-ranging consequence of THAAD could be the downgrade of American credibility, as deployment affirms 'the view of many nations that deal with the U.S. that the U.S. is untrustworthy in terms of its commitments.'**"

**Warrant:** Coercion won't work on China.

Bandow, Doug. "The China Option." Foreign Affairs. 11/1/16. Web. Accessed 8/10/17.  
<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-11-01/china-option>.

**"U.S. policymakers have only two real options: coerce China or convince China. Coercion seems unlikely to work when applied to the nationalistic government of an emerging great power. China is determined to overcome what it sees as decades and even centuries of humiliation at the hands of Western powers, and it would be difficult for United States to make its threats seem credible. Beijing's response to South Korea's decision to deploy the U.S.-made THAAD missile defense system was anything but conciliatory: China chastised Seoul and warmed to Pyongyang. Worse, launching economic war against China over North Korea—the Obama administration is reportedly considering sanctions on Chinese banks and other companies that deal with North Korea—would poison the entire relationship. Coercion is more likely to push Beijing and Pyongyang together.** The second course, that of convincing China, may remain a long shot, but it is still better than the alternatives. To succeed, Washington will need to listen to Beijing's concerns and respond accordingly. For example, Chinese officials argue that hostile U.S. policy has forced North Korea to pursue nuclear weapons, and insist that the North's nuclear program is not Beijing's responsibility anyway. **Instead of confronting China, Washington should work with South Korea and Japan to develop a grand bargain package, focused on denuclearization, to offer to North Korea, for which Beijing's support would then be sought.** Such a package would require granting some concessions to Beijing."

**Warrant:** China doesn't cooperate, instead retaliates through cutting ties.

Gurtov, Mel. "Diplomatic Remedies for THAAD Madness: The US, China and the Two Koreas." *Asia-Pacific Journal*. 3/15/17. Web. Accessed 8/10/17.  
<http://apjif.org/2017/06/Gurtov.html>.

**“Another cost of THAAD deployment is the sudden end of the China-South Korea honeymoon. Until recently China was on a roll with South Korea in everything from trade and investment to tourism, entertainment, and educational exchange.<sup>3</sup> The two countries were officially described as having a ‘matured strategic cooperative partnership,’ reflected in much more frequent high-level contact between Beijing and Seoul than between Beijing and Pyongyang. THAAD has placed South Korea on China’s enemy list: South Korean goods and entertainers are being boycotted, and some Chinese sources are calling for direct political and even military action against South Korea. This rupture bodes ill for Chinese cooperation on UN-authorized sanctions against North Korea as well as for Chinese aspirations to become as important to South Korea as the Americans have traditionally been.<sup>4</sup>”**

**Warrant:** THAAD destroys MAD, makes China more likely to attack.

Etzioni, Amitai. "THAAD: Best a Bargaining Chip." *The Diplomat*. 8/10/17. Web.  
Accessed 8/11/17. <http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/thaad-best-a-bargaining-chip/>.

“Those quick to exclaim ‘Great, two for the price of one’ should recall that **nuclear powers hold each other at bay; that mutually assured destruction seems to be a major reason why the big powers have avoided war since 1945.** To remind: The logic of nuclear deterrence presumes that if either China or the U.S. launches a nuclear attack, they must expect to be paid back in kind, to be devastated, making any major strike virtually suicidal. However, **if one nuclear power can prevent a retaliatory strike (by**

**an anti-missile defense system, for instance), the other nation must fear the possibility of a devastating attack without the ability to respond. As a result, mutual destruction is no longer assured, and the deterrence effect breaks down. Further, such concerns may well lead the newly vulnerable nation to put its nuclear forces on a hair trigger alert, ready to strike preemptively at any sign of preparation of an attack by the other. In short, if THAAD batteries are effective, they are highly destabilizing.”**

**Analysis:** This answer gives you the advantage of explaining specifically how China operates as a regional actor; namely, China won't just roll over for the United States. It's important to emphasize that China sees North Korea as a key regional ally and that it uses North Korea to maintain a strategic regional power balance. As such, China won't respond to more pressure by the United States kindly. Instead, they will seek to harm South Korea, seeing them as a proxy of the United States.

**PRO – THAAD sends message US supports its allies**

**Argument:** The United States implementing THAAD would send a powerful message that it stands by its allies. This would help mitigate the fears of other alliances across the world who may want to nuclearize or arm themselves in the age of Trump.

**Warrant:** Trump makes South Korea unsure if US is there to back them

Sang Hun, Choe. “In South Korea Campaign, One Topic Eclipses Others: Trump”, New York Times, May 4, 2017 Web. Date Accessed: 8/14/17  
<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/04/world/asia/in-south-korea-campaign-one-topic-shoulders-out-others-trump.html>

**“Mr. Delury said that for South Koreans, who were “used to the United States playing a stabilizing and benevolent role,” the Trump presidency was “uncharted territory.” “The combination of Donald Trump as the American president and a progressive as South Korea’s president may be toxic.” said David Straub, a former American diplomat and the author of the book “Anti-Americanism in Democratizing South Korea.” During his campaign, Mr. Trump irked South Koreans by repeatedly accusing them of getting a free ride in their national defense and not paying enough for the American military presence here. After his election, he sent top aides, including Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, to reaffirm that he was with the South Koreans “100 percent.””**

**Warrant:** Countries across the globe are watching the United States relationship with its allies.

Campbell, “The Nuclear Tipping Point” Center for a New American Security, 2004,  
Web. Date Accessed: 8/14/17 , pg. 23  
<https://books.google.com/books?id=Dg5nEk7YNscC&pg=PA23&lpg=PA23&dq=Certainly,+the+United+States+is+not+the+only+factor+in+the+calculations+co>

ountries+make+about+their+own+security,+but+it+is+a+major+one.&source=bl&ots=iyPs\_eDKv1&sig=OS2tUCSizBtbnNO8QAIj3HDw4q4&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwid\_IWcvtnVAhXDKyYKHQmNAJ0Q6AEIKDAA#v=onepage&q=Certainly%2C%20the%20United%20States%20is%20not%20the%20only%20factor%20in%20the%20calculations%20countries%20make%20about%20their%20own%20security%2C%20but%20it%20is%20a%20major%20one.&f=false

“**Certainly**, the United States is not the only factor in the calculations countries make about their own security, but it is a major one. The policies and actions of the most powerful and influential country in the world affect every nation and have an impact on everything from global and regional security to economic stability, international norms and practices, and the sustainability of whatever global consensus exists. Much like the brilliant (or simply martinet) professor whose students write down his every sneeze or cough lest they miss something that will be on the final exam, U.S. actions are closely observed, noted, and interpreted by states around the world. American policy can, sometimes inadvertently, increase or decrease confidence substantially -a key component in any country's evaluation of whether--or when-a nuclear capability is required.”

**Warrant:** Implementation of THAAD would send message that the alliance is alive and well.

Byun, See Won. “Two Koreas Defy Chinese Sanctions.”, May 2017. CCIS, Web. Date Accessed: 7/13/17 [cc.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/1701\\_china\\_korea.pdf](http://cc.csis.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/1701_china_korea.pdf).

“In the case of North Korea, China’s economic pressure is being applied at the behest of the US and despite China’s qualms that too much pressure could lead to war or instability, that China has long sought to avoid. Yet it is increasingly likely that the objective of denuclearization can only be achieved at the cost of war or instability. China’s application of enhanced economic pressure has resulted in strident objections from Pyongyang, but has failed to convince North Korea to change direction. Instead,

North Korea has doubled-down on its nuclear and missile development. China's economic pressure on South Korea has likewise thus far been a failure, antagonizing the South Korean public and strengthening support for the THAAD deployment. **If South Korea's domestic politics produce an outcome that shows South Korea to be vulnerable to China's pressure, this result will signal a steady curtailment of Korea's autonomy and could erode the alliance with the United States,. If South Korea stands firm against Chinese economic pressure, there will be material losses for South Korea, it will send a message from a "peripheral state" about the limits of China's power, and provide evidence of the utility and durability of the US-ROK alliance."**

**Impact:** A lack of credibility of US security assurances will cause countries across the globe to begin to nuclearize.

Payne, Keith. "The Continuing Roles for U.S. Strategic Forces" *Comparitive Strategy*, October 2007, Web. Date Accessed: 8/14/17  
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/01495930701598615?scroll=top&needAccess=true&journalCode=ucst20>

"Some see an incongruity in the U.S. maintaining a nuclear arsenal for deterrence while simultaneously advocating nuclear non- proliferation. I have heard this seeming incongruity likened to a drunkard advocating abstinence. In reality, this seeming incongruity is not hard to see through; indeed, the U.S. deployment of nuclear capabilities makes an essential contribution to nuclear non-proliferation. This positive linkage may be counterintuitive, but it is unquestionable. How so? It is on the basis of the U.S. nuclear "umbrella" that allied countries such as Japan have chosen to remain non-nuclear: the continued credibility of our nuclear umbrella is critical to their decisions to remain non-nuclear, and their decisions to remain non-nuclear have been and continue to be critical to non- proliferation. It is hard to imagine a greater stimulus to nuclear proliferation than decisions by U.S. allies and friends to "go nuclear" themselves as a

result of their loss of confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella. A detailed review of specific countries by noted regional experts reaches a similar conclusion: "**The case studies suggest that the perceived reliability of U.S. security assurances will be a critical factor, if not the critical factor, in whether such countries as Japan, Saudi Arabia, South Korea, Taiwan, and Turkey reconsider their nuclear options.**"

**Analysis:** This argument allows you to reach an impact with global implications. Instead of just impacting to South Korea specifically, you can argue that a stable global security is in all country's best interest as it means better trade, less war, and more cooperation.

**A2 – THAAD sends message US supports its allies**

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**Answer:** Other actions affect whether our allies see that we support them

**Warrant:** Troop deployment is key to showing allies abroad that we are there to support them

Jackson, Jimmie, “AN ORGANIZATIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR US PACIFIC COMMAND COURSE”, US Military, 1995, Date Accessed: 8/14/17  
<http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA440529&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf>

**“A key feature of US forces over the past 45 years has been their worldwide forward deployment. The bulk of these forces deployed to Europe totaling approximately 323,000 in the late 1980s. (4:18) The US also stationed forces in Korea and Japan and have smaller contingents in a number of locations, such as Panama, Turkey, and Iceland. Forward deployment replaces forward presence where the US has reduced the size of the military force.** Forward presence continues to "show our commitment, lend credibility to our alliances, enhance regional stability, and provide a crisis-response capabilityM(11"7)but with fewer military forces. The forward presence of these forces sends explicit signals about the firmness of US commitment in a region.“

**Warrant:** Trump is still being hostile towards US allies with his distaste for free trade agreements that were passed years before his administration took office.

Cheng, Jonathan. “Donald Trump's Trade Talk Unnerves South Korea” Fox Business April 28, 2017. Date Accessed: 8/14/17  
<http://www.foxbusiness.com/features/2017/04/28/donald-trumps-trade-talk-unnerves-south-korea.html>

**“President Donald Trump's call to rewrite -- or rip up -- a trade agreement with South Korea is alarming some lawmakers and business lobbyists still unnerved by threats earlier this week to pull out of the North American Free Trade Agreement. White House officials said Friday that Mr. Trump is dissatisfied with the five-year-old trade deal with one of America's closest Asian allies. Mr. Trump called it "an unacceptable, horrible deal" in an interview Thursday with Reuters, saying Seoul should come to the table to overhaul the bilateral trade agreement or see the U.S. pull out. He also insisted South Korea pay for a potent antimissile system provided by the U.S. The sudden criticism of a close ally -- and the threat to pull the U.S. out of its second-biggest trade agreement behind Nafta -- triggered a new round of concern among business groups and lawmakers who oversee trade and Asian economic issues. "It's off-the-top-of-the-head reckless, and the effect it will have is destabilizing at a critical moment on the Korean Peninsula," said Rep. Gerry Connolly (D., Va.), co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on Korea. "It's not the right time to start to nickel and dime them about the Korea trade agreement and the defense systems we've encouraged them to accept." "These comments yesterday are going to catch the Koreans off guard, particularly given the situation in North Korea and particularly because they have a presidential election in days," said Wendy Cutler, a former top U.S. trade official who led negotiations on the agreement and current vice president at the Asia Society Policy Institute.”**

**Analysis:** This response allows you to take a step back and look at a more holistic view of what is likely going to cause such instability in the international community. THAAD is only one missile system, it is unlikely it will have as drastic affects as they claim it will.

**Answer:** Trump is pivoting from his campaign and is now saying that alliances are critical to security.

**Warrant:** President Trump has promised South Korea that their alliance is unwavering and the US would stand with South Korea 100 percent.

Rebecca Kneel,, “South Korea: Trump pledged to uphold alliance,” The Hill November 10, 2016. Date Accessed: 8/14/17<http://thehill.com/policy/defense/305388-south-korea-trump-pledged-to-uphold-alliance>

**“President-elect Donald Trump pledged to maintain an “unwavering” alliance with South Korea in a Thursday phone call with the country’s president, Park Geun-hye, according to a statement from her office. “President-elect Trump said he totally agreed with President Park’s ideas, including on the North Korean problem,” the statement said. “Mentioning the heightened instability in the North, he continued to say that the United States would stand shoulder to shoulder with Korea to the end, adding that the alliance would remain unwavering.”** During the presidential campaign, Trump said he would be willing to withdraw U.S. troops stationed in the country if South Korea didn’t pay a bigger share of the cost of the deployment. He also said he’d be willing to let South Korea develop its own nuclear weapons to defend itself from North Korea. **In the 10-minute call, Park told Trump that Seoul and Washington will need to cooperate closely to pressure a North Korean regime that is “abnormally obsessed” with nuclear weapons and missiles, according to the statement.”**

**Warrant:** Trump says that he fully intends to support Japan’s security and that their alliance is unwavering.

CNBC “Trump says US committed to Japan security, in change from campaign rhetoric”, CNBC, February 2017. Date Accessed: 8/14/17  
<https://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/10/trump-says-us-committed-to-japan-security-in-change-from-campaign-rhetoric.html>

**“At a joint news conference with Abe, Trump avoided repeating harsh campaign rhetoric that accused Japan of taking advantage of U.S. security aid and stealing American jobs. It was a welcome affirmation for Japan in the face of challenges such as China's maritime expansion and North Korea's nuclear and missile development. "We are committed to the security of Japan and all areas under its administrative control and to further strengthening our very crucial alliance," Trump said. "The bond between our two nations and the friendship between our two peoples runs very, very deep. This administration is committed to bringing those ties even closer," he added. A joint U.S.-Japanese statement said the U.S. commitment to defend Japan through nuclear and conventional military capabilities is unwavering.”**

**Analysis:** They provide you a snapshot. We provide you a bigger the picture. They are citing evidence that is outdated. Overall Trump has not been giving in the campaign promises on removing necessary security to our allies and instead is giving in to the establishment’s desire to continue supporting our allies at all costs.

**PRO – Non-deployment weakens US-South Korea relations**

**Argument:** The US-South Korea relationship is already on shaky terms with South Korea’s unwillingness to commit to THAAD’s deployment. If the deal is fully reversed, the relationship could end up collapsing.

**Warrant:** US-South Korea relationship in the status quo is riled with miscommunications and tension

Doug Bandow “Does South Korea Really Want These American ‘Friends’?” *The Huffington Post*. 5/31/17. < [www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/does-south-korea-really-want-these-american-friends\\_us\\_592d7216e4b0a7b7b469cd05](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/does-south-korea-really-want-these-american-friends_us_592d7216e4b0a7b7b469cd05)>

What does the president think? He warned that a “major, major conflict” is possible, one which would be fought on South Korea, not American, soil—and by the decision of the U.S., not ROK. Worse, **President Trump has treated Seoul with what appears to be studied contempt.** For instance, in an interview with Reuters before the South’s recent election, he allowed that **he’s thinking of tearing up the free trade agreement with the ROK** since it is “a horrible deal.” (Apparently his definition of a bad commercial arrangement is one under which any American buys any imports from anyone.) **Seoul was caught unawares, with the Trade Ministry “trying to understand what President Trump said exactly and the context of his remarks,”** according to one befuddled official. Cancelling the FTA would disrupt commerce and be a particular boon to the Chinese, who currently trade more with the South than do the U.S. and Japan combined. **The president also announced that he believes the South should pay for the THAAD missile defense system.** Never mind that many South Koreans, including the candidate elected South Korean president shortly thereafter, opposed the system. And the fact that Washington didn’t mention a price tag at the start.

**Warrant:** Reversal of THAAD could lead to breakdown of US-ROK relationship

Scott Snyder “South Korea's Decision To Halt THAAD Carries Hidden Risks.” *Forbes*.  
6/11/17. Print.

Moon's decision also carries another risk. For months, China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea. The way forward The THAAD debate has become overheated and politicized, generating risks of miscalculation and overreaction. **A pause that defuses the political issues surrounding the THAAD deployment would be a good thing, but a pause as prelude to reversal could do great damage to the U.S.-ROK security alliance.** Moon will hold his first summit with Trump in later this month. At that time, the United States and South Korea should reestablish a coordinated strategy for addressing the North Korean problem and focus on South Korean vulnerabilities to North Korean missiles in a comprehensive fashion, while also improving South Korean governmental transparency on these issues.

**Warrant:** Halting of THAAD reminds Americans that SK relationship could become rocky again

Scott Snyder “Is the U.S.-South Korea Alliance in Trouble?” *The National Interest*.  
6/26/17. <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-us-south-korea-alliance-trouble-21323>

Moon's decision also carries another risk. For months, China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea. The way forward The THAAD debate has

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**Warrant:** US-SK relationship is already rocky, with the key sensitive issue being the North Korean nuclearization

Marcus Noland “The Strategic Importance of U.S.-South Korea Economic Relations.”  
*NBR Special Report*. 2003. <[works.bepress.com/marcus\\_noland/13/](http://works.bepress.com/marcus_noland/13/)>

This expansion of bilateral interdependence, however, is not without its irritants. The motor vehicle and steel sectors remain perennial problems. Antidumping practices in the United States and capital channeling in South Korea are also sources of ongoing disputes. **Additionally, Noland describes the declining relative importance of the two countries in each other’s global trade relationships. The net result may well be a relative decoupling of interests that could reinforce the widening strategic differences between the two historic allies, especially if South Koreans come to regard China and Japan as acting more constructively than the United States with regard to North Korea.** In his essay, Taeho Bark points out that the United States is still South Korea’s most important trading partner. But various irritants remain in the economic relationship. Among these are the contentious bilateral trade issues in automotives, steel safeguarding, semiconductors, and IPR. **If any of the bilateral trade conflicts become political, anti-American sentiment in South Korea will quickly rise, which will negatively affect the U.S. position on the North Korean nuclear issue and on other security issues.** Given the fluid international situation in Northeast Asia, South

Korea has become in some ways a fulcrum of the U.S. military presence in the region. Without a presence in Korea, the U.S. presence in Japan could be put into question. Persistent trade friction threatens to poison this strategically vital bilateral partnership.

**Impact:** US-SK alliance is vital to SK's safety from NK attacks

Michael Auslin "Is It Time to Reassess the U.S.-South Korea Alliance?" *The Atlantic*. 6/29/17. < [www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/south-korea-alliance-north-korea-kim-moon-trump/532113/](http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/south-korea-alliance-north-korea-kim-moon-trump/532113/)>

At stake is not just Washington's commitment to Seoul, but, quite possibly, America's larger global standing. **The arguments for maintaining a strong South Korean alliance rest on its deterrent effect against North Korea.** The Kim regime has repeatedly struck out at the South—see the 2010 sinking of the Korean navy vessel Cheonan that killed 46 sailors and the shelling of Yongpyong Island. Yet **the North has refrained from large-scale attacks against either South Korea or Japan**, another target of Pyongyang's ire, despite its significant missile capability and larger military. Washington interprets this as **due**, at least in part, **to the assumption by all parties that a major attack, or full-scale war, would immediately trigger the self-defense clause of the mutual defense treaty between the United States and South Korea.** If that is the case, then the U.S. commitment will be even more important: Only a firm U.S. promise to defend the South will deter the North. But **if**, on the other hand, **the United States decided that the risk to its interests was prohibitively high, abrogating or scaling back the alliance would potentially destabilize Asia and beyond.** It would hand the Kim regime a major strategic victory, removing the single greatest deterrent to its aggression. Pyongyang would be emboldened to continue trying to blackmail the United States, South Korea, and Japan, leading to future crises.

**Impact:** The South would lose a war with the North without the United States, but would win with an upheld alliance

John Power “The Relevance of the South Korea-US Alliance.” *The Diplomat*. 4/14/14. <  
[thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-relevance-of-the-south-korea-us-alliance/](http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-relevance-of-the-south-korea-us-alliance/)>

Despite the now vast development gap between the Koreas, **both Washington and Seoul insist their partnership remains essential.** Marking its 60th anniversary last May, a joint statement described **the relationship** as an “**anchor for stability, security, and prosperity on the Korean Peninsula, in the Asia-Pacific region, and increasingly around the world.**” Kwon Kih-yeon, foreign communications officer at South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense, told *The Diplomat* of the continuing importance of the alliance. “Going beyond the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula, the two countries, through the alliance, are currently fostering the advance of a comprehensive 21st century strategy that is to the benefit of the Asia-Pacific region and international law.” **Bolstering the case for the status quo have been pessimistic assessments by defense officials and analysts of how the South would fare in a one-on-one conflict with the North.** Speaking at a parliamentary audit last November, **Cho Bo-geun, the director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, claimed that Seoul would likely lose such a war.** A study in 2011 by the Korea Economic Research Institute raised **questions even about the security of South Korea with U.S. support,** claiming that “it would not be entirely wrong to say North Korea’s military strength is stronger,” **while adding that the U.S. and South would ultimately prevail.** Yang Uk, a research fellow at private think tank Korea Security and Defense Forum, said that while possessing a strong conventional military, South Korea continues to lack the kind of intelligence and reconnaissance capabilities provided by the U.S.

**Analysis:** The United States and South Korea are not happy with each other right now. That much is obvious. It is apparent that they remain allies not because of a strong historic bond, but rather due to a common strategic goal of calming down North Korea. The Snyder evidence is really good at contextualizing these murky waters with a historical indifference towards South Korea from the American public. If the relationship were to collapse, the impacts could be

disastrous for not only South Korea's stability, but for the entire Asia-Pacific. There is a range of impact chains that could be pursued from here, including, but not limited to North Korea losing a key deterrent that is the US military, North Korea focusing its efforts on attacking South Korea instead of the US, and a major dent to the South Korean economy.

**A2 – Non-deployment weakens US-South Korea relations**

**Answer:** The US-South Korea Alliance hinders South Korea’s ability to fend for itself.

**Warrant:** The reason South Korea doesn’t have its own nuclear deterrent is because of its alliance with the United States

John Power “The Relevance of the South Korea-US Alliance.” *The Diplomat*. 4/14/14. <  
[thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-relevance-of-the-south-korea-us-alliance/](http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-relevance-of-the-south-korea-us-alliance/)>

“If the Korean armed forces is a boxer, we have a strong punch but we don’t have any good eyes, or good movement, like the U.S. What we need is we have to train that much harder,” Yang, who describes the alliance as “crucial,” said. “...The crucial problem of the Korean armed forces today is their intelligence, surveillance and targeting.” But even with vastly improved intelligence and surveillance, Seoul would still lack the North’s ace in the hole: nuclear arms. **Part of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and a signatory to several non-proliferation agreements, South Korea is prohibited from developing its own nuclear deterrent.** “Regarding the rationale for U.S. defense capabilities augmentation to South Korea, I would answer that North’s nuclear threat is the primary reason why both Washington and Seoul have no disagreement on maintaining the robust alliance,” said Nam Chang-hee, an expert in Northeast Asia relations at Inha University in Incheon, about 30 kilometers west of Seoul.

**Warrant:** Collapse of the US-South Korea relationship is impending because of a lack of public support for foreign spending

John Power “The Relevance of the South Korea-US Alliance.” *The Diplomat*. 4/14/14. <  
[thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-relevance-of-the-south-korea-us-alliance/](http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-relevance-of-the-south-korea-us-alliance/)>

**The perception that the U.S. is unfairly burdened with being the world's watchman could have profound implications for the future of the alliance, especially if such weariness were to reach critical mass among the American public. U.S. government budget constraints, too, raise questions about the sustainability of the U.S. commitment to South Korea, despite a massive plan currently under way to modernize its installations in the country. Bandow pointed to these two factors as spelling uncertainty for the future of U.S. involvement in the South's national defense.** “To the extent that Americans realize that they have to make some choices — and those choices include, ‘How much do you spend on the military versus social security, Medicare, Medicaid?’ — my guess is that the American population is more likely to say ‘let our wealthy allies do more, we should do less.’ And that will certainly apply to South Korea.” He added that, in the face of diminishing resources, the Obama administration's much-vaunted “Asia pivot” may ultimately mean nothing more than the region being less affected by an inevitable reduction in military presence worldwide.

**Warrant:** With the election of Moon Jae-In, SK-United States relations hang in the balance

Thomas Maresca “U.S. Relationship at Risk in South Korea's Presidential Election.” *USA Today*. 5/5/17. <[www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/05/05/us-relationship-risk-south-koreas-presidential-election/101330018/](http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/05/05/us-relationship-risk-south-koreas-presidential-election/101330018/)>

**Relations with the United States hang in the balance** when South Koreans head to the polls at a tumultuous political time to elect a new president Tuesday. Human rights lawyer Moon Jae-in, 64, the candidate of the left-leaning Democratic Party of Korea, leads polls by a large margin over his nearest competitor, conservative Hong Joon-pyo. **Moon's stances**, particularly over relations with neighboring North Korea, **could open a rift with the U.S., in contrast to former president, Park Geun-hye**, whose impeachment over corruption charges in March triggered the election. Park had been more hawkish in dealing with North Korea. **Moon has been critical of the U.S. deployment of an anti-ballistic missile defense system known as THAAD** (Terminal

High Altitude Area Defense) in South Korea, a military move Park had endorsed. The U.S. began deploying elements of THAAD in late April on an abandoned golf course outside of Seoul and announced it was operational earlier this week. **Moon argued that the U.S. should have waited for a new president to make the final decision to install the \$1 billion system**, which the Pentagon apparently rushed to make operational for fear Moon might block it if elected. **"We express strong regret over the THAAD (installation) taking place in disregard of the people's will and procedures,"** Park Kwang-on, public relations chief of Moon's election campaign, said at a news briefing on April 26.

**Impact:** Seoul is capable of defending itself if given a chance.

John Power "The Relevance of the South Korea-US Alliance." *The Diplomat*. 4/14/14. <  
[thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-relevance-of-the-south-korea-us-alliance/](http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-relevance-of-the-south-korea-us-alliance/)>

In the U.S., other analysts question the alliance, too, albeit from a very different perspective – that of the non-interventionist right. Their primary concerns are cost and whether the partnership actually serves U.S. interests. Doug Bandow, a senior fellow at the Washington D.C.-based based Cato Institute, is one such observer who objects to the United States' military subsidization of South Korea. **He believes Seoul is capable of defending itself. "I think it would have to make some adjustments in its current force structure and spending, but there's no reason to believe that South Korea, with a much larger economy and population, is not capable of dealing with North Korea,"** said Bandow. "The North is quite decrepit, in terms of its economy and infrastructure, as well as in terms of its reserve capacity." Bandow accepts that **there was a legitimate argument for defending South Korea after the Korean War at a time of communist expansion, but sees no convincing rationale today.** Instead, he sees the alliance as symptomatic of a world in which "everyone wants America to defend it." **The perception that the U.S. is unfairly burdened with being the world's watchman**

could have profound implications for the future of the alliance, especially if such weariness were to reach critical mass among the American public. U.S. government budget constraints, too, raise questions about the sustainability of the U.S. commitment to South Korea, despite a massive plan currently under way to modernize its installations in the country.

**Analysis:** The mutual defense agreement the United States has with South Korea entails that South Korea isn't allowed to pursue its own nuclear deterrent. At this point in South Korea's tensions with the North, it would be in its best interest to develop its own anti-missile systems as well as offensive nuclear machinery to be ready to both deter the North and fight a war with it, in the event of a US withdrawal from the relationship. The Power evidence takes this a step further to say that such a US withdrawal is more than likely, because of waning public interest in sending billions of dollars to support foreign countries.

**Answer:** The United States doesn't have South Korea's best interests in mind when making military decisions and statements.

**Warrant:** The United States doesn't have as much of an intimate stake in a potential Korean conflict as South Korea does

Doug Bandow "Does South Korea Really Want These American 'Friends'?" *The Huffington Post*. 5/31/17. <[www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/does-south-korea-really-want-these-american-friends\\_us\\_592d7216e4b0a7b7b469cd05](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/does-south-korea-really-want-these-american-friends_us_592d7216e4b0a7b7b469cd05)>

However, the ROK preferred to rely on Washington for its defense. Why spend the money if Uncle Sucker was willing to pay the bill? It seemed a good deal for Seoul, since the U.S. was ever ready to deploy ground forces, carrier groups, air wings, nuclear weapons, and whatever else might be needed. **But with potentially growing support in Washington for launching a preventative war against the North, South Koreans could be forgiven for wondering whose interests their**

**supposed American friends have in mind.** For instance, Sen. Lindsey Graham recently appeared on NBC to discuss the challenge posed by Pyongyang. When asked if he favored a military strike against the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Lindsey said yes "If that's what it would take." Unfortunately, almost certainly North Korean leader Kim Jong-un would not supinely accept such an attack. He probably would suspect any military action as the beginning of an attempt at regime change—to which his best response would be to strike quickly and hard. **Sen. Graham acknowledged that the cost of conflict would be high: "It would be bad for the Korean Peninsula. It would be bad for China. It would be bad for Japan, be bad for South Korea. It would be the end of North Korea."** But no big deal for the U.S. After all, "It would be terrible but the war would be over [there], wouldn't be here." **What the conflict "would not do is hit America."**

**Impact:** The alliance may be the reason behind North Korea's aggression and ultimately a roadblock from reunification

John Power "The Relevance of the South Korea-US Alliance." *The Diplomat*. 4/14/14. <  
[thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-relevance-of-the-south-korea-us-alliance/](http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/the-relevance-of-the-south-korea-us-alliance/)>

**For segments of Korea's political left, however, the calculation isn't how necessary the alliance is, but how harmful. Rather than a force for peace and stability, they see a source of tensions and, ultimately, an obstacle to the eventual reunification of the country.** "The current Korea and U.S. alliance only reinforces the partition and confrontation structure between the two Koreas, and hinders the establishment of a peace structure," said Oh Mi-jung, secretary general for Solidarity for Peace and Reunification of Korea, a local civic group. Oh considers the alliance itself to be a violation of the 1953 armistice agreement between the two Koreas, noting, for instance, that the U.S. disregarded a provision prohibiting the deployment of new weaponry on the peninsula, just a few years after its signing. The defense pact, argues Oh, is incompatible with a peace treaty. **"Solidarity for Peace**

**and Reunification of Korea takes the view that the long-held hostile relationship between the U.S .and North Korea has to be eased for the establishment of permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula.** Aiming for this, we insist on the official end of the Korean War and the signing of a peace treaty of mutual nonaggression.”

**Analysis:** The Bandow evidence sets the stage for this response, making it clear that the US, sitting thousands of miles away, doesn't have a real stake in the conflict that may break out between the North and South. This means that any decisions it makes before or during a war with the North, may not line up with the optimal choices for South Korea. The Power evidence contextualizes these bad decisions as possibly the lack of thought behind US escalations of aggression towards North Korea as a lack of foresight, which has ultimately led to the heightened threats from North Korea.

**PRO – THAAD Improves Trilateral Relations**

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**Argument:** THAAD would strengthen the relationship between the United States, South Korea, and Japan. This would help curb North Korean aggression and Chinese expansion.

**Warrant:** President Moon said intelligence from THAAD system could be shared with Japan.

Shim, Elizabeth. “THAAD information may be shared with Japan, Seoul says” UPI, August 4, 2016. Web. Date Accessed: 8/14/17  
[https://www.upi.com/Top\\_News/World-News/2016/08/04/THAAD-information-may-be-shared-with-Japan-Seoul-says/6071470367281/](https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2016/08/04/THAAD-information-may-be-shared-with-Japan-Seoul-says/6071470367281/)

**“Seoul's defense ministry spokesman Moon Sang-kyun told reporters Thursday the radar information from the U.S. anti-missile defense system THAAD could be shared with Japan, local news service Newsis reported.** That response was a departure from a previous statement issued July 19, when Defense Minister Han Min-koo told parliamentarians the information from the THAAD radar would not be shared with Japan. **Moon said Thursday intelligence collected through the THAAD system could be shared with Japan based on a trilateral military information-sharing agreement among South Korea, Japan and the United States.** Kim Dong-yeop, a research professor at the Kyungnam University Institute for Far Eastern Studies said given recent provocations, including the firing of a North Korea ballistic missile into Japanese territorial waters, information sharing is inevitable between Japan and South Korea-based intelligence. Kim also said the deployment of THAAD and its role in a trilateral missile defense system would only strengthen China's opposition to the program.”

**Warrant:** Moon wants an improvement of Japan- South Korea relations

Glosserman. Brad. “Prospects for Japan-South Korea Cooperation Under Moon Jae-in”, Council On Foreign Relations. June 2, 2017. Date Accessed: 8/14/17

<https://www.cfr.org/blog/prospects-japan-south-korea-cooperation-under-moon-jae>

South Korea's new president, Moon Jae-in, has a long list of priorities. Topping the list is restoring faith and credibility in his country's political system and getting the struggling economy on its feet. In foreign policy, chief concerns include ensuring that the alliance with the United States remains strong, getting China to ease up on its campaign of economic intimidation and ending the freeze in North-South relations and imparting momentum into diplomacy to reduce tensions and remove the North Korean nuclear threat. **Another critical issue Moon must manage is relations with Japan.** That task will be complicated by his campaign platform pledges to unwind the December 2015 comfort woman agreement negotiated by his discredited predecessor, Park Geun-hye. In his first conversation with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Moon noted that his fellow South Koreans could not emotionally accept all the items in the agreement. **At the same time, and to his credit, he also appears to have made space for Japan-South Korea relations, noting that they should not be contingent on the resolution of the comfort woman issue. This "two-track" formula could help him avoid the box that Park created for herself over the issue when she took office in 2013.** President Moon is likely to find that a strong relationship with Tokyo will pay important dividends and help him deal with other grave geopolitical challenges.

**Impact:** A strong trilateral alliance is critical to pressuring North Korea.

Willis, Rachel. "South Korea: Moon's trilateral quagmire." Huff Post. 6/18/17. Web.  
Date Accessed: 8/14/17 [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/south-korea-moons-trilateral-quagmire\\_us\\_59537918e4b0f078efd98607](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/south-korea-moons-trilateral-quagmire_us_59537918e4b0f078efd98607)

**"The looming unraveling of the comfort women agreement does not bode well for the effectiveness of the trilateral alliance between the US, Japan and South Korea. Internal squabbles, Trump's misguided withdrawal from the TPP and overall**

**ineptitude, as well as trilateral disagreements have already reduced the alliance’s ability to put pressure on Pyongyang at a crucial moment when North Korea is at its most aggressive.** Seoul’s policy reversal from applying pressure on North Korea under Park, to rapprochement and engagement under Moon, leaves the South Korean administration as the weakest link in the alliance. At such a critical time, Seoul cannot afford to adhere to the naive Sunshine policy 2.0, as it is a dangerous strategic miscalculation that endangers the security of Asia and the world. In the end, it may very well be the Kim regime that emerges stronger than ever before.”

**Impact:** A strong trilateral alliance is crucial to the safety of the region.

Wicker, McDaniel. “SECURITY IN UNITY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, SOUTH KOREA, AND JAPAN” Wilson Center. April 2016. Web. Date Accessed: 8/14/1  
[https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/completing\\_the\\_triangle-mcdaniel\\_wicker.pdf](https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/completing_the_triangle-mcdaniel_wicker.pdf)

**“Missile defense presents another important area of mutual interest given Pyongyang’s large arsenal that contains weapons capable of hitting Korea, Japan, and U.S. territory. Each military already possesses strong capabilities to counter hostile missiles, but combining detection, tracking, and engagement capabilities creates a far stronger defense.** Trilateral missile defense exercises could be easily and realistically planned and executed. Unlike maritime security, however, true integration of efforts requires additional commitment from Japan and Korea. **Having compatible, if not identical, systems is important to effective and efficient missile defense coordination, and Japanese and Korean acquisition of U.S. systems such as AEGIS, AEGIS Ashore, and THAAD would be a middle-term goal of to further strengthen the alliance.”**

**Impact:** US-Japan-South Korean alliance would allow the United States to contain China.

Park, Sungtae. "This is Why China Fears THAAD," The National Interest. March 30, 2016. Date Accessed: 8/14/17 <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-china-fears-thaad-15637?page=show>

**“The Chinese, however, are wary of the fact that deployment of THAAD would integrate the Korean Peninsula-based defense systems with US and Japanese sensors in Northeast Asia. While Washington and Seoul see Beijing’s opposition to THAAD as an attempt to set a precedent for influencing South Korea’s defense decisions, China sees the United States setting its own precedent for US-Japan-ROK military cooperation with the broader goal of forming a trilateral alliance to contain China.** Beijing has historically considered the Korean Peninsula to be critical to China’s security. As a Chinese general wrote in 1592, “Liaodong [a southern coastal part of Manchuria] is an arm to Beijing whereas Chosun is a fence to Liaodong.” During the Korean War, the Chinese lost more than half a million troops to prevent all of Korea from falling within the US orbit. Beijing would consider the emergence of a coherent military bloc that includes South Korea to be a major strategic setback. Beijing’s attempts to capitalize on the difficult state of relations between Japan and South Korea and flourishing economic ties between China and South Korea have very much been about preventing such an alliance from forming. The Chinese, however, are wary of the fact that deployment of THAAD would integrate the Korean Peninsula-based defense systems with US and Japanese sensors in Northeast Asia. While Washington and Seoul see Beijing’s opposition to THAAD as an attempt to set a precedent for influencing South Korea’s defense decisions, China sees the United States setting its own precedent for US-Japan-ROK military cooperation with the broader goal of forming a trilateral alliance to contain China. Beijing has historically considered the Korean Peninsula to be critical to China’s security.”

**Analysis:** This argument allows you to link into arguments about China and North Korea. This could be strategically advantageous as no matter which country the negative's case focuses mostly on, you function as a direct link into weakening both the countries. All you have to do is provide better link weighing and you will gain the upper hand in the round.

## **A2– THAAD Improves Trilateral Relations**

**Answer:** US-South Korea- Japan trilateralism is already taking place in the status quo

**Warrant:** South Korea, Japan, and the United States have already agreed to share information and have defense drills together.

Shuping,Xin. “Is Moon Ready to Take Driver’s Seat?” CHUANSONG 2017. Date Accessed: 8/14/17 <http://chuansong.me/n/1931870552740>

The 16th Asia Security Summit from June 2 to 4, better known as the Shangri-La Dialogue, came right after the Jeju Forum. North Korea became the focus of top defense officials from around the world at the Summit. The South Korean Defense Minister Han Min-koo, expected to be replaced soon in a Cabinet shake-up by his new leader, didn’t give up his last try at this event. Han had bilateral meetings with his American, Japanese, Australian, Indonesian, Canadian and New Zealand counterparts on the sidelines of the conference, and North Korea was also at the top of the agenda in these separate talks. **There was also a trilateral talk of representatives of South Korea, US and Japan. The three regional powers agreed to hold more combined defense drills against North Korea’s military threats and promote related information sharing in their joint press statement.**

**Warrant:** The United States is already pressuring South Korea and Japan to work together for security.

Brunnstorm, David. “U.S. calls for 'urgent' restraint to ease Japan, South Korea tensions” Reuters March 4, 2014. Web. Date Accessed: 8/15/17  
<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-japan-korea-idUSBREA2321Z20140305>

**“The United States appealed to Japan and South Korea on Tuesday to work urgently to reduce the tensions between them, saying its two main allies in Asia could not afford to let their troubled history interfere with ensuring regional security. ”**There is an urgent need to show prudence and restraint in dealing with difficult historical issues. It is important to handle them in a way that promotes healing," Washington's top diplomat for the East Asian region, Daniel Russel, said in prepared testimony for a U.S. Senate hearing. Russel, the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs, said strategic cooperation between the United States, Japan and South Korea was essential for future security in Northeast Asia, given the threat posed by North Korea and other "regional uncertainties," a reference to concerns about an increasingly assertive China.”

**Analysis:** If talks are occurring in the status quo, it is unlikely implementing THAAD would make much of a difference. The ability for these nations to work together may not need to rely on a missile system to be implemented.

**Answer:** Trilateralism is unlikely in the current political climate.

**Warrant:** Asian countries are pivoting towards China, not the United States as Trump’s America first doctrine is unlikely to favor them.

Petty, Martin. “Asian Nations Pulled Into China's Orbit as Trump Puts America First” US News. May 1, 2017. Date Accessed: 8/14/17  
<https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-05-01/asian-nations-pulled-into-chinas-orbit-as-trump-puts-america-first>

**Across Asia, more and more countries are being pulled into Beijing's orbit, with the timid stance adopted by Southeast Asian nations on the South China Sea at a weekend summit a clear sign this fundamental geostrategic shift is gathering momentum. U.S. President Donald Trump's flurry of calls at the weekend to the**

leaders of the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore might cheer those who fear his predecessor Barack Obama's "pivot" to Asia has been abandoned in favor of an "America First" agenda. But White House Chief of Staff Reince Priebus said the conversations were aimed at lining up Asian partners in case tensions over North Korea lead to "nuclear and massive destruction in Asia", and mentioned no broader strategic goal. Southeast Asian nations will need more than that to convince them the United States still has their backs. In the meantime, some are leaning closer to China, soft-peddaling quarrels over the disputed South China Sea and angling for a slice of Beijing's "One Belt, One Road" infrastructure investment program to compensate for the U.S. abandonment of the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact.

**Warrant:** South Korea and Japan's history and rising nationalism end up hurting their ability to cooperate with one another.

Fisher, Max. "Japan and South Korea can't even cooperate over peacekeeping in South Sudan" Washington Post December 26, 2013. Date Accessed: 8/14/17  
[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/12/26/japan-and-south-korea-cant-even-cooperate-over-peacekeeping-in-south-sudan/?utm\\_term=.1d95243c9e8c](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/12/26/japan-and-south-korea-cant-even-cooperate-over-peacekeeping-in-south-sudan/?utm_term=.1d95243c9e8c)

Before we get to the story of how Japan and South Korea came to be feuding over a bit of ammo-sharing between their peacekeeping forces in South Sudan, a bit of background to help you understand why this is all so absurd. South Korea and Japan are arguably two of the most successful countries of the past half-century. They came out of their respective wars deeply impoverished and politically broken, but have since become wealthy and highly entrepreneurial democracies, renowned for their cultural exports and leadership in technological development. **It would make a lot of sense for South Korea and Japan to work closely together. They have similar economies, lots of cultural overlap, defense treaties with the United States, shared concerns about North Korea and a mutual desire to resist China's growing power and influence.** The two countries stand

to gain significantly from working together. **But they are terrible at cooperating with one another -- just terrible. Part of that has to do with rising nationalism in both countries, which can make cooperation with any foreign country difficult. But it has to do mainly with their shared history: Japan brutally colonized Korea in the first half of the 20th century, and then spent the second half becoming decreasingly apologetic, with senior Japanese politicians now treating that dark history as a source of national pride. South Korean politicians are not blameless themselves, playing up disputes and taking the bait at every provocation.**

**Analysis:** Proving the likelihood of cooperation is very low can be very persuasive for both technical and lay judges. This is because lay judges will see you as being knowledgeable of the current world and prepared to answer arguments. It will be difficult to frontline as the affirmative team will require more recent or specific evidence which can help you in front of a technical judge.

**Answer:** THAAD will only worsen tensions in the region

**Warrant:** Because China feels contained in a world where THAAD is deployed, the country will only use the system to justify its aggressive moves.

Crosston, Matt. "THAAD Mad Bad, Part I: US-China Rivalry in the South China Sea."

Modern Diplomacy. Nov. 6 2015. Date Accessed: 8/14/17

[http://moderndiplomacy.eu/index.php?option=com\\_k2&view=item&id=1874:thead-mad-bad-part-i-us-china-rivalry-in-the-south-china-sea](http://moderndiplomacy.eu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=1874:thead-mad-bad-part-i-us-china-rivalry-in-the-south-china-sea)

**This is what remains intensely intriguing over the THAAD/South China Sea issue. It comes across as a strategic-diplomatic chicken-and-egg controversy: the United States feels its positions with THAAD are forced to the forefront because of Chinese initiatives in the South China Sea; China, on the other hand, feels the THAAD deployments have made South China Sea initiatives de facto necessary and logical.**

Regardless of where anyone falls within the debate, it is clear that there are competing narratives facing off against one another within the South China Sea. Mainstream media covers it almost exclusively from a global rivalry perspective, pitting the United States against China. This narrative most certainly exists. But it is not the only one and not necessarily the most pertinent for determining how the region evolves in the coming years.

**Warrant:** A world with THAAD and a trilateral alliance may drive China closer to North Korea

Byon Su, Park. "THAAD deployment in Korea would likely lead to increased tensions in NE Asia." The Hankyorea Feb 1, 2016. Date Accessed: 8/14/17  
[http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english\\_edition/e\\_international/728784.html](http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/728784.html)


Another focus of the THAAD issue is on recent calls in South Korea for independent nuclear armament in response to the nuclear test. In addition to reaffirming its commitment to extended deterrence - the nuclear umbrella - the US may also have sensed the need for some alternative to appease South Korean proponents of nuclear armament, with THAAD offered up as an acceptable substitute. **But Seoul and Washington's strategy of using THAAD to pressure Beijing runs a serious risk of backfiring. China's strategy for the Korean Peninsula is based on on the potential threat of a confrontation with the US, where North Korea remains a crucial buffer. North Korea's geopolitical worth is also poised to grow as trilateral security cooperation by South Korea, the US, and Japan increases in the nuclear test's wake. The attempt by Seoul and Washington to use the THAAD controversy as a pressure tactic could have the effect of pushing North Korea and China closer together instead of driving them apart.**

**Analysis:** By viewing the issue from a different perspective, you can recognize why China may be behaving the way it does, instead of assuming it is always acting irrationally. Doing this will allow you to assess impacts of China exerting further strength.

# Champion Briefs

Sept/Oct 2017

Public Forum Brief



Con Arguments with  
Pro Responses

**CON – A China-South Korea relationship would be beneficial**

**Argument:** If THAAD isn't deployed, the US-South Korea relationship would plunge into a historically rocky limbo. In such a situation, China would look to exert more influence in the Asia-Pacific region and step in to take the place of the United States. This would be beneficial to South Korea because China has a better hand to play when dealing with North Korea, bringing things like reunification and nuclear disarmament to the table.

**Warrant:** Non-deployment of THAAD could lead to reversal of US-ROK relationship

Scott Snyder "South Korea's Decision To Halt THAAD Carries Hidden Risks." Forbes.  
*6/11/17. Print.*

Moon's decision also carries another risk. For months, China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea. The way forward The THAAD debate has become overheated and politicized, generating risks of miscalculation and overreaction.

**A pause that defuses the political issues surrounding the THAAD deployment would be a good thing, but a pause as prelude to reversal could do great damage to the U.S.-ROK security alliance.** Moon will hold his first summit with Trump in later this month. At that time, the United States and South Korea should reestablish a coordinated strategy for addressing the North Korean problem and focus on South Korean vulnerabilities to North Korean missiles in a comprehensive fashion, while also improving South Korean governmental transparency on these issues.

**Warrant:** Halting of THAAD reminds Americans that SK relationship could become rocky again

Scott Snyder “South Korea's Decision To Halt THAAD Carries Hidden Risks.” Forbes.  
*6/11/17. Print.*

Following a decade of convergence between South Korean conservatives and the Obama administration, **American analysts have been bracing for a new round of alliance-shuddering tensions under Donald Trump and Moon Jae-in similar to those that existed a little over a decade ago during the George W. Bush and Roh Moo-hyun administrations.** But this analysis overlooks constraints Moon faces that are likely to keep him on track; instead, South Koreans are holding their breath over the possibility that the greatest risks to the U.S.-ROK alliance could come from uncertainties generated by President Trump himself. Moon served as Roh’s chief-of-staff and his campaign borrowed directly from the Roh administration’s playbook. **Moon’s decision to temporarily halt implementation of the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) U.S. missile defense system due to procedural concerns about transparency and domestic environmental standards have reminded Americans of the prickly challenges that beset alliance relations between Washington and Seoul a decade ago.** But Moon Jae-in faces a dramatically different domestic and international situation as president compared to the one he experienced as chief-of-staff in the Roh Moo-hyun administration.

**Warrant:** Thaad doesn’t really affect US defensive capabilities against China/Russia and they are aware of this

Robert Kelly “The Real Reason China Wants South Korea to Ditch THAAD.” The National Interest. *6/13/17.* < <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-reason-china-wants-south-korea-ditch-thaad-21139>>

THAAD captures this problem well, because China’s objections are almost certainly not technical. **THAAD does not impinge on China’s strategic deterrent against the United States. Its anti-missile rockets do not have the range for that. THAAD also**

does not give America any new intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities to observe China. The United States already has excellent satellite coverage of China and would rapidly detect a Chinese missile launch. THAAD's X-band radar, about which so much fuss has been made, does not point into China. Unlike an I-band radar (the sort one sees at airports or in the movies), the X-band does not rotate 360 degrees, generating imagery of China. Rather it projects northward, as its intended target is North Korea. **Chinese (and Russian) objections that it might then penetrate into northeastern China (or the Russian far east) are also specious.** The curvature of the earth means that the X-band signal begins to peel away from the earth after several hundred miles, so coverage north of North Korea is limited too. As its name implies, THAAD is a defensive system. It is designed to shoot down incoming missiles as they approach a target. **Unless China, or Russia, intend to strike South Korea or Japanese cities, there is no threat to them.** Repeating all this, however, is almost besides the point now. **The Chinese (and the Russians) know this.** Beijing had ample years before the Park deployment decision last summer to raise technical concerns. It forewent all such opportunities. This strongly suggests a political motive, which Moon's transparently phony excuses to drag out deployment only further verify.

**Warrant:** Thaad would reduce SK-China diplomacy

Robert Kelly "The Real Reason China Wants South Korea to Ditch THAAD." The National Interest. 6/13/17. < <http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-reason-china-wants-south-korea-ditch-thaad-21139>>

Beijing's real objection, of course, is the deepening of the South Korea–U.S. alliance, which THAAD represents. THAAD is technically confusing enough that muddying the waters on it masks an open Chinese power-play, but **to those who understand THAAD, Beijing's objections are shallow enough for the real message to come through: that South Korea should not further its military relationship with the United States.** This sort of decision point, or fork, is almost certain to recur with greater frequency for South

Korea. China is growing relative to the United States. As the gap between them diminishes, pressure will rise on China's neighbors. **South Korea's ability to walk between the raindrops—to find political spaces congenial to both the United States and China—will invariably contract.** THAAD and the Moon government's decision to once again get on the deploy-or-not merry-go-round is only the beginning. Tussles like this will become a defining feature of South Korean foreign policy.

**Warrant:** Primary roadblock to improved relations with China is THAAD

Scott Snyder "Is the U.S.-South Korea Alliance in Trouble?" The National Interest. 6/26/17. <<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-reason-china-wants-south-korea-ditch-thaad-21139>>

North Korea under Kim Jong-un has appointed military leaders focused on subversion to handle relations with South Korea and has shown little interest in dialogue. Third, the international context is different. Moon's proposed revitalization of inter-Korean economic engagement will run counter to the Trump administration's pressure campaign and likely violate UN sanctions on North Korea unless Pyongyang returns to denuclearization. Additionally, **Moon administration efforts to improve relations with China have been stymied by increasing pressure from Beijing to undermine the United States and abandon the THAAD deployment.** Given the constraints and risks South Korea faces in the current international environment, Moon is wisely tacking toward pragmatism and alignment with the United States.

**Warrant:** China would step in with its own alliance if the US stepped out

Michael Auslin "Is It Time to Reassess the U.S.-South Korea Alliance?" Wired Magazine. 6/29/17. <[www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/south-korea-alliance-north-korea-kim-moon-trump/532113/](http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/south-korea-alliance-north-korea-kim-moon-trump/532113/)>

Even worse, in the face of a U.S. withdrawal, both Seoul and Tokyo would immediately begin considering developing their own nuclear and missile programs, instigating a nuclear-arms race that would spill over to China, Taiwan, and possibly beyond. **In the event of a reduced American presence in northeast Asia**, China would emerge the big winner. **Beijing almost certainly would offer Seoul an alliance of its own**, further undermining America's regional web of alliances, likely tipping the Philippines and Malaysia fully into the Chinese camp. Japanese government officials I spoke to expressed their fears that, in the event of the collapse of the U.S.-South Korea alliance, Beijing may even base Chinese warships in Busan, the southern port closest to Japan, giving China a foothold on the territory closest to the Japanese home islands—historically, Japan's major geopolitical fear. **Access to the southern Korean coastline would enhance China's ability to control the strategic waterways from the South China Sea through the East China Sea and into the Sea of Japan.** The Japanese would consider this a grave threat. **In response, the U.S. resources diverted from the Korean peninsula might be redeployed to blunt China's expansion**, including a beefing-up of the U.S. Navy in Japan, **which would increase Sino-U.S. tensions and the potential for a maritime confrontation in the narrow, strategic Tsushima Strait.** Even if Trump has decided to embrace the South Korean alliance, there are reasons to be worried about the liabilities that come with it.

**Warrant:** Getting China's support for reunification necessitates a removal of THAAD

Richard Patterson "A Reunified Korea — Can Trump Toss That Hail Mary Pass? - The Boston Globe." The Boston Globe. 5/8/17.

<[www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/05/08/reunified-korea-can-trump-toss-that-hail-mary-pass/AKpMAyuSoJWolwCHPo4EoM/story.html](http://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2017/05/08/reunified-korea-can-trump-toss-that-hail-mary-pass/AKpMAyuSoJWolwCHPo4EoM/story.html)>

Obviously, **North Korea opposes unification except on its totalitarian terms. This demands preemptive diplomacy to compel reunification, in which Chinese participation — that is, the complete reversal of its historic policy — is**

**indispensable.** This unprecedented process, Terry suggests, must start with the United States and South Korea — specifically, “a comprehensive political, diplomatic, economic, and legal strategy for reunification.” Next, the two parties must address Japan’s concerns, economic and political, as a prelude to enlisting it to help reconstruct the North. **The final, daunting task is engaging China in an enterprise that abridges its deepest instincts.** China’s priority has been buttressing the North as buffer against a South Korea that hosts American forces, preserving its version of regional stability. And China deeply resents America’s installation of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, missile defense system in South Korea, which China sees as a direct threat to its security. China has no love for Kim or his arsenal. Yet Chinese support ensures his survival. The collapse of his regime, China fears, would spur an influx of refugees and South Korean intervention in the North. Never has China been prepared to pressure North Korea to give up nuclear weapons, let alone to cease existing. **So how could the United States and South Korea persuade China to reverse course?** First, Terry suggests an arrangement that addresses Chinese security concerns on the peninsula. **This would involve reducing or even withdrawing American troops, along with THAAD, post-unification.** Beyond this, Seoul should assure China that a prosperous and more neutral Korea would make a better trading partner and neighbor than a nuclear North run by Kim Jong Un.

**Warrant:** If the US and SK want China’s help with reunification, they should not only remove THAAD, but all US troops and weaponry

Eric Tucker “US should make removal of Thaad system part of any bargain on Korean reunification” Financial Times. 4/24/17. < [www.ft.com/content/3500b65e-26b0-11e7-8691-d5f7e0cd0a16](http://www.ft.com/content/3500b65e-26b0-11e7-8691-d5f7e0cd0a16)>

Sir, **If**, as James Kynge asserts, **addressing China’s concern regarding “US troops pressed up against the Yalu river” is key to enlisting Chinese efforts to constrain or remove the dangerous North Korean regime,** the US and South Korea would do well

to assure the Chinese that, should the Korean peninsula be reunified, no US forces or weaponry would be moved to the north (“A reckless North Korea remains China’s useful ally”, April 19). **Removing the soon to be operational Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (Thaad) system could also be a part of the bargain.** The US might further suggest that should China modify its policies to dominate the South and East China seas, **the removal of US forces from the entire Korean peninsula could be considered.** As I suggested in my letter to the FT of December 17 2013, a neutral multilateral system for the transparent monitoring of all traffic in these seas could address the security concerns of all parties in and outside the region.

**Warrant:** Benefits of reunifications

Evans Revere “Reunifying Korea: Challenges, Uncertainties, and an Agenda for US-ROK Cooperation.” The Brookings Institution. 2014. *Print.*

Today, the Korean people’s aspiration for reunification seems no closer to fulfillment than before, even though **the benefits that unification would bring to the Korean Peninsula, to Northeast Asia, and to the broader Asia-Pacific region seem more obvious than ever. A peacefully reunified Korea under Seoul’s aegis would remove in a stroke the major challenge to peace and stability in Northeast Asia. No longer would a state with an ideology steeped in threat and provocation undermine efforts to achieve a more harmonious and cooperative regional environment. No more would the peninsula’s neighbors need to be concerned about threats to use weapons of mass destruction, to proliferate nuclear weapons and missile technology, or to turn their cities into “seas of fire.” A united Korea under Seoul’s leadership would be committed to respecting the human rights and needs of its people.** Concentration camps would be closed and a system that has kept 24 million Koreans impoverished, brutalized, isolated, and malnourished for decades would come to an end.

**Warrant:** Interstate dialogue has already led to the creation of a committee for unification

Tom Phillips “Costly and Complicated – Why Many Koreans Can't Face Reunification.”

The Guardian. 10/9/15. < <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/09/why-many-koreans-cant-face-reunification>>.

“We have very heated discussions,” said Ko, a 62-year-old former diplomat and interpreter for Kim Il-sung, who defected in 1991 and is now part of a renewed push that South Korea’s president, Park Geun-hye, says will bring the reunification of the peninsula one step closer. Korea divided – a history in pictures View gallery **Ko and Moon are members of Park’s so-called presidential committee for unification preparation – a year-old initiative that officials in Seoul say should help pave the way for rejoining the two countries after 70 years of separation.** “Issues of reunification have been very divisive in South Korean society between left and right, between progressive and conservative. Perhaps no other issue has been as divisive as the issue of reunification,” Chung Chong-Wook, the vice-chair of the 50-member committee, said at its headquarters near the presidential Blue House in Seoul.

**Warrant:** Withdrawing THAAD could induce China to make the right moves towards reunification

Larry Diamond “There Is a Peaceful Way Out of the North Korea Crisis.” The Atlantic.

4/26/17. < [www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/north-korea-trump-china/524349/](http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/04/north-korea-trump-china/524349/)>.

**What could induce China to take risks for peace?** One irony of having elected a U.S. president who repeatedly threatened a trade war with China is that a retreat from those ill-considered warnings now appears as a conciliatory gesture. But there is something more the U.S. can offer. China’s fear of a sudden collapse of the Kim regime is not just about massive refugee flows. It also dreads a “German-style” reunification, in which South Korea would politically absorb the north and China would then confront a newly

powerful American ally—hosting nearly 30,000 American troops—right on its border. Because the North Korean regime is not irrational, it will probably opt for the above deal under Chinese pressure and American inducements. But should Kim Jong Un balk and his regime then unravel, leading to reunification under a democratic constitution, American troops would no longer be needed to stabilize the Korean peninsula, and they could be withdrawn. Neither should there be a need for the missile defense system (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, THAAD) that is now being deployed in South Korea, over real but misplaced Chinese concerns that the system is aimed partly at them.

**Agreement to withdraw THAAD and American troops following Korean reunification would be huge elements of strategic reassurance for China.**

**Warrant:** THAAD deployment would lead to East Asian instability, making reunification impossible

Scott Snyder “South Korea's Decision To Halt THAAD Carries Hidden Risks.” *Forbes*.  
6/11/17. *Print*.

**THAAD deployment may be the beginning of further militarization of the Korean peninsula, and could lead to broader instability in East Asia** and a renewed confrontation between a US-South Korea alignment and a China-Russia-North Korea alignment, reminiscent of Cold War-era factions. China’s strong reaction against THAAD deployment sparked stronger nationalistic demands for nuclear armament within the Saenuri Party, South Korea’s conservative ruling party, highlighting THAAD’s risk of regional tension and greater militarization. The Saenuri Party argues that in order for South Korea to be independent of foreign powers for its protection, it has to establish a well-organized nationwide missile defense (MD) system. However, it is impossible for South Korea to immediately deploy an extensive MD system throughout its territory because of a lack of technology and available weapons. **South Korea would have to buy more weapons from the United States, resulting in increased dependence on the United States for national defense. For China and Russia,** which have openly

expressed discomfort with the presence of the US military in nearby countries, **an increased US military presence in South Korea could be the perfect reason to unite against the United States and South Korea. This** not only would create acute tension between two separate alignments, but **would also prevent South Korea from achieving peaceful reunification of the two Koreas under democratic rule. China's fierce condemnation of THAAD deployment is the expression of its discomfort with the nearby presence of the US military.**

**Analysis:** This argument can be used strategically either in case, or as an impact turn to the affirmative argument that US-South Korea relations would be harmed with a non-deployment of THAAD. The argument goes that when the US-South Korea relationship crashes and burns, China will see strategic advantage in a potential relationship with South Korea. With their obvious influence over North Korea this would assist South Korea in pursuing their ultimate goal of reunifying with North Korea. This impact can even be weighed against the traditional PF lives impact because South Korea has made it clear it is willing to engage in a war to reunify with North Korea, which would obviously risk lives.

**A2 – A China-South Korea relationship would be beneficial**

**Answer:** Reunification wouldn't happen even if a China-South Korea alliance were established.

**Warrant:** There are other reasons China doesn't want to reunify (1)

John Bolton "Possibilities for Reunifying the Korean Peninsula." The Washington Times. 3/27/17. < <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/27/reunifying-korea-a-possibility/>>

Today, however, younger Chinese leaders understand and talk openly about the ugly piece of baggage the North represents for China itself. Skeptics believe China will reject reunification principally on two grounds. **Beijing dreads with good reason that Pyongyang's collapse could produce a refugee flood across the Yalu River into Manchuria, a humanitarian emergency taxing China's resources and also risking political and economic destabilization. (Seoul fears a similar refugee tide into the Demilitarized Zone.)** In response, Washington and our regional allies should pledge full cooperation with Beijing to avoid massive refugee flows from North Korea as its prison-camp structures dissolve. This will doubtless involve complex, fraught issues like deconflicting intervening foreign forces in the region as the North's regime collapses, and securing its missile facilities and stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction.

**Warrant:** There are other reasons China doesn't want to reunify (2)

John Bolton "Possibilities for Reunifying the Korean Peninsula." The Washington Times. 3/27/17. < <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/mar/27/reunifying-korea-a-possibility/>>

In addition, we need a communications program urging North Korea's population to remain in place, plans for the substantial and expeditious distribution of humanitarian aid,

and other steps to help steady the North's population even before significant refugee flows begin. While there are unquestionably political implications in these issues, they are fundamentally technical, and ultimately manageable. **China's real objection to a managed reunification obviously rests on strategic concerns, namely what America's role in a reunited Korea will be. Most importantly, Beijing does not want U.S. forces along the Yalu River.** China didn't like that movie in 1950, and doesn't like it any better today. Fortunately, Washington doesn't want our troops deployed on the Yalu, either, any more than today it wants them pinned down in the DMZ as a trip wire. Being fixed in essentially indefensible positions is bad tactics and worse strategy, especially given the attractive alternative of redeploying U.S. forces to the southern tip of the Peninsula.

**Warrant:** China allows NK to militarize because it wants a stronger buffer state

Noah Feldman "Why China Tolerates a Nuclear North Korea." The Chicago Tribune. 7/6/17. <[www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-china-north-korea-nuclear-20170706-story.html](http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/opinion/commentary/ct-china-north-korea-nuclear-20170706-story.html) >

China also knows that the U.S. can't realistically attack North Korea because of the loss of South Korean and American lives that would follow. **The result is that China doesn't lose much as North Korea gets stronger. And it gains strategically as its own buffer state becomes still more impregnable.** To understand how this geopolitical game is playing out, start with Trump's efforts thus far. He began by drawing attention to North Korea's aggressive stance, which shouldn't have surprised him. North Korea wants to be noticed. It wants to test the new administration's will. And it wants to teach the new U.S. government the lesson that it can't do much in the face of a nuclear power.

**Warrant:** Reunification is almost inconceivable

Tom Phillips “Costly and Complicated – Why Many Koreans Can't Face Reunification.”

The Guardian. 10/9/15. < <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/09/why-many-koreans-cant-face-reunification>>.

Satellite images have shown hundreds of trucks, armoured vehicles, troops and horses gathering for a massive military parade. There have also been rumours of a possible show of force on the peninsula in the form of a missile launch or even a fourth nuclear test. North Korea prepares for lavish birthday party – in pictures View gallery **The cultural, political and above all economic gulf between North and South is now so great that many experts believe reunification is almost inconceivable.** “There has never been a time when the officially declared goal – peaceful, gradual, negotiated and equally reciprocated unification – was even remotely possible. Never, ever – including now,” said Andrei Lankov, an acclaimed Korea expert from Kookmin University in Seoul.

**Analysis:** These cards give the Aff a two-pronged argument as to why a China-South Korea alliance doesn't necessarily entail reunification. First, China has many more concerns about reunification other than their irk towards THAAD's presence. Second, on a more macroscopic level, the rift between the North and the South has grown so culturally and politically significant that a peaceful coexistence between the two countries is “almost inconceivable” at this point. The Feldman evidence goes a step further to say that China would actually prefer a nuclear North Korea, one that serves as an impregnable border state, separating China from the democratic and capitalist South Korea.

**Answer:** North Korea would need to collapse for there to be reunification.

**Warrant:** A popular uprising to overthrow the regime is highly unlikely

Jenny Lee “Analysis: Is North Korea's Collapse Imminent?” VOA News. 1/30/17.

<[www.huffingtonpost.com/emanuel-pastreich/the-unbearable-sadness-of\\_b\\_11051426.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/emanuel-pastreich/the-unbearable-sadness-of_b_11051426.html)>

Popular uprisings unlikely Gause, director of the International Affairs Group at the Center for Naval Analyses in Arlington, Virginia added that **due to an extensive surveillance network of informants that covers every North Korean citizen, it is highly unlikely that information that could lead to a popular uprising will circulate among ordinary citizens. “If this regime is going to collapse, it will come from destabilization at the top of the regime,” Gause said.** Some experts, however, give weight to Thae's description of Pyongyang's political state. Bruce Klingner, a senior research fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation's Asian Studies Center in Washington, believes the Kim regime is being undermined significantly by disillusionment among North Koreans.

**Warrant:** NK needs to collapse for there to be reunification

Tom Phillips “Costly and Complicated – Why Many Koreans Can't Face Reunification.”

The Guardian. 10/9/15. < <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/09/why-many-koreans-cant-face-reunification>>

Chung admitted there were other government agencies examining the more “sinister” scenarios that might lead to unification, but said his committee was not looking at such possibilities. Still, “whenever it [unification] comes we will have to take it”. **Many believe Pyongyang’s political collapse, perhaps triggered by a rebellion or assassination, now represents the only real prospect for reunification.** “If it is coming at all, it is coming the German way, but it is going to be much more violent, much more bloody, much more hectic than everything we have seen in Europe,” said Lankov, who predicted that North Korea’s elites would fight for their lives if faced with a popular uprising. “I would say it will be a cross between the Syrian crisis and the East German

crisis of 1989/90. If it doesn't sound good it is because it isn't good. It is going to be a very bloody mess" he said, adding that both China and the US would be sucked in.

**Impact:** North Korea's collapse would lead to military instability

Harry Kazianis "Why the Sudden Collapse of North Korea Would Be Hell on Earth."  
*The Week. 3/22/17. Print.*

For our purposes, let us assume an internal event has caused the Kim family dynasty to come to a quick death. There is no central government and allied forces comprised of South Korea and the United States are moving across the 38th parallel to ensure order. What could be so bad? Well, for starters, **there would be immediate concern over who has control over not only of Pyongyang's nuclear and atomic materials, but its perhaps much larger chemical and biological weapons stockpiles as well.** While sometimes an afterthought, **North Korea's chemical and biological weapons might be a much a bigger threat than its nuclear program. Most research points to Pyongyang having large quantities of chemical weapons** — on display recently in the apparent assassination of Kim Jong Nam, the half-brother of Kim Jong Un — **as well as a biological weapons programs capable of killing millions.** U.S. and allied forces would surely need to mount an unprecedented intelligence effort to not only locate almost all of these materials but protect themselves from chemical or biological weapon attacks by forces who could be still vying for power.

**Impact:** North Korea's collapse would lead to a shattered society

Harry Kazianis "Why the Sudden Collapse of North Korea Would Be Hell on Earth."  
*The Week. 3/22/17. Print.*

Allied forces would also need to ensure that no weapons of mass destruction left the country — a non-proliferation nightmare of the worst kind. As if potential loose weapons

of mass destruction were not enough, **there is an even more basic problem — that of a shattered society.** How does one put back together a people broken by almost seven decades of being ruled as if they were slaves? How will the average North Korean, who only knows the Kim family, react to the end of the regime? Would some take up arms against those who would be there to ensure order? Is civil war a possibility? One thing is quite clear: It could take decades, but more likely generations, to wipe away the scars of psychological, emotional, and surely spiritual torture that was suffered. Then there is China. Beijing would obviously be a player in any future of North Korea, especially as its largest trading partner, providing Pyongyang with much of its food and energy needs. In fact, many national security experts in China are quick to point out that the Chinese Communist Party's greatest international worry is the collapse of the North Korean state. They fear a united Korea would become a major player in Northeast Asia, allied with America and armed with Washington's best weapons and troops. **And if millions of refugees started coming across the border into China, President Xi Jinping might send his own forces into North Korea — where a superpower showdown between Washington and Beijing could be in the offing.** And last, **the sheer cost of rebuilding and reintegrating the North back into a united Korea would likely be in the trillions of dollars.**

**Analysis:** Since a popular uprising to overthrow the regime is unlikely, the most likely scenario would be a collapse of the North Korean state. This would lead to a host of negative impacts, not just in South Korea, but in the entire Asia-Pacific, leading to intense disunity and instability that would not be in South Korea's interests.

**CON – Anti-Missile Systems encourage Chinese Aggression**

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**Argument:** If South Korea deploys anti-missile systems, China will view this as an offensive action and thus take offensive action of its own in order to protect itself and reassert its dominance in the region.

**Warrant:** China is afraid of Thaad’s ability to track missiles.

Taylor, Adam. “Analysis | Why China Is so Mad about THAAD, a Missile Defense System Aimed at Deterring North Korea.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 7 Mar. 2017, [www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/07/why-china-is-so-mad-about-thaad-a-missile-defense-system-aimed-at-deterring-north-korea/?utm\\_term=.5eeb14a96ec4](http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/07/why-china-is-so-mad-about-thaad-a-missile-defense-system-aimed-at-deterring-north-korea/?utm_term=.5eeb14a96ec4).

“Instead, many experts argue that **China's anger over THAAD has less to do with the missiles than with the sophisticated radar capabilities included in the system. These radars could be used to track China's own missile systems, potentially giving the United States a major advantage in any future conflict with China.** Some Chinese analysts argue that THAAD itself is of only limited use against North Korea anyway, as it would not be able to take out short-range missiles and artillery that do not reach high altitudes, hinting that the radar may be the real reason for the deployment.”

**Warrant:** China is afraid that thaad will give the United States the upper hand.

Taylor, Adam. “Analysis | Why China Is so Mad about THAAD, a Missile Defense System Aimed at Deterring North Korea.” The Washington Post, WP Company, 7 Mar. 2017, [www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/07/why-](http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/07/why-)

china-is-so-mad-about-thaad-a-missile-defense-system-aimed-at-deterring-north-korea/?utm\_term=.5eeb14a96ec4.

**“More broadly, Beijing is concerned that the United States is hoping to use both South Korea and Japan to contain China in the future. ‘If South Korea insists on becoming a US puppet, China will have to act against it,’ the nationalist state newspaper Global Times wrote in an editorial early this year.”**

**Warrant:** China wants to maintain hegemony over Asia.

“China Seeks Hegemony’.” The Wall Street Journal, Dow Jones & Company, 24 Feb. 2016, [www.wsj.com/articles/china-seeks-hegemony-1456358971](http://www.wsj.com/articles/china-seeks-hegemony-1456358971).

Rarely is a Congressional hearing as clarifying as Tuesday’s appearance of U.S. Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Harris before the Senate Armed Services Committee. Every lawmaker and presidential candidate should study the transcript, but here is a primer. **‘I believe China seeks hegemony in East Asia. Simple as that,’** Admiral Harris told the panel. ‘China is clearly militarizing the South China Sea’ – despite President Xi Jinping’s claims to the contrary – **‘and you’d have to believe in a flat earth to believe otherwise.’”**

**Warrant:** Thaad will make China want to regain power.

Mody, Seema. “China Lashes out as South Korea Puts an American Anti-Missile System in Place.” CNBC, CNBC, 28 Apr. 2017, [www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/thaad-anti-missile-system-makes-china-lash-out-at-south-korea.html](http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/thaad-anti-missile-system-makes-china-lash-out-at-south-korea.html).

“Further complicating the deployment of the anti missile system is China. **Beijing views THAAD as a threat to its own military operations – specifically in the South China**

**Sea. Beijing claims possession of the disputed region, which serves as a channel for half of the world's shipping and which the rest of the world, including the United States, considers international waters. China's claims on the sea stretch thousands of miles from the Chinese mainland."**

**Impact:** Thaad will make China more aggressive in the South China Sea.

Jr., Sydney J. Freedberg. "Will THAAD Deployment Roil Or Calm Troubled Pacific?"  
Breaking Defense, Breaking Defense, 8 Mar. 2017,  
[breakingdefense.com/2017/03/will-thaad-deployment-roil-or-calm-troubled-pacific/](http://breakingdefense.com/2017/03/will-thaad-deployment-roil-or-calm-troubled-pacific/).

**"After a generation of international charm offensives, China has shifted to a much more assertive, even aggressive approach. Beijing's has publicly denounced THAAD and used economic pressure tactics to dissuade Seoul from the deployment. Those attempts at arm-twisting failed to deter the Koreans from deploying THAAD and, at worst, strengthened their resolve to defy China. It's a common pattern for China, trying to bully neighbors (assert PRC rights) and neighbors say no. When China unilaterally claimed jurisdiction over a vast Air Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea in 2013, it included not only islands both the China and Japan claimed, but also territory claimed by South Korea. Not only did China irritate two important neighbors, almost every nation has ignored China's ADIZ. Further south, China's Nine Dash Line claim to most of the South China Sea, and its building and fortifying artificial islets in waters to which the international community says it has no right, has created friction with almost every country in Southeast Asia."**

**Analysis:** This argument is easy to weigh because of its concrete and easy-to-understand impact. Few teams will challenge the notion that Chinese aggression in the South China Sea is dangerous and worth preventing.

This argument also outweighs nuclear war arguments because it has a much higher probability of materializing. Even if the risk of nuclear war increases slightly, the chance was already so very low that it almost doesn't matter. On the other hand, China has been known to be aggressive in instances like this, so increasing the chance of further aggression can be quite problematic.

**A2 - Anti-Missile Systems encourage Chinese Aggression**

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**Answer:** Thaad will not make China more aggressive.

**Warrant:** China already has sanctions on South Korea, so there is no need to be aggressive also.

McGuire, Kristian. "Dealing With Chinese Sanctions: South Korea and Taiwan." The Diplomat, The Diplomat, 12 May 2017, [thediplomat.com/2017/05/dealing-with-chinese-sanctions-south-korea-and-taiwan/](http://thediplomat.com/2017/05/dealing-with-chinese-sanctions-south-korea-and-taiwan/).

**“After South Korea agreed to host the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system last July, reports surfaced that China had begun sanctioning South Korea to pressure Seoul into reversing its decision. Chinese officials have repeatedly denied that there is any validity to such reports. However, evidence that Beijing has restricted Korean pop culture imports, ordered Chinese travel agencies to halt sales of travel packages to South Korea, blocked importation of Korean cosmetics, and leveled a number of other unofficial economic sanctions on South Korea has led the U.S. and South Korea to call China out for its coercive measures. Beijing, though, has shown no intention of lifting its sanctions, causing many inside and outside South Korea to wonder how much longer the country will be subjected to Beijing’s pressure. A look at Taiwan’s similar experience as a victim of China’s coercive tactics indicates that the sanctions might be lifted soon after the new South Korean president settles into office, but could also linger in one form or another for years, depending on the new South Korean administration’s strategic orientation.”**

**Warrant:** China wants to focus on domestic issues instead of aggression.

Taylor, Brendan. "Towards Hegemony? Assessing China's Asian Ambitions." *Security Challenges*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2005, pp. 21–25.,  
[www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/vol1no1Taylor.pdf](http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/vol1no1Taylor.pdf).

**“First, the PRC leadership has been quite explicit about the fact that its central focus over the next two decades is going to be negotiating the domestic political, social and economic difficulties created by the transition China is currently undergoing. This is a period, after all, which has been designated by China’s leaders as one of ‘strategic opportunity’ for national development. This strong domestic focus, in turn, logically points toward continued moderation in Chinese foreign policy.”**

**Warrant:** China is not powerful enough to maintain hegemony.

Taylor, Brendan. "Towards Hegemony? Assessing China's Asian Ambitions." *Security Challenges*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2005, pp. 21–25.,  
[www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/vol1no1Taylor.pdf](http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/vol1no1Taylor.pdf).

**“Finally, China’s capabilities for force projection currently remain limited and are likely to continue to be so into the foreseeable future. As the Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China concedes, the central preoccupation of the PLA at the present time is not the significant improvement of China’s capacity to project significant force beyond its borders but, rather, the development of military options to deter moves by Taiwan toward formal independence, to compel by force (if required) the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland, or to prevent third-party intervention in a Taiwan Straits contingency. In the final analysis, this central preoccupation is hardly the trademark – to borrow from Denny Roy’s oft-cited International Security article of the mid-1990s – of a ‘hegemon on the horizon’.”**

**Warrant:** China is willing to accept U.S. presence.

Taylor, Brendan. "Towards Hegemony? Assessing China's Asian Ambitions." *Security Challenges*, vol. 1, no. 1, 2005, pp. 21–25.,  
[www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/vol1no1Taylor.pdf](http://www.regionalsecurity.org.au/Resources/Files/vol1no1Taylor.pdf).

**“Third, China appears to accept a continuing US presence in Asia and, to some extent, begrudgingly even welcomes it as a necessary evil, particularly in Northeast Asia.** While it is once again easy to dismiss statements which have been made to this effect as mere rhetoric, it is important to recognise the substantial American encroachment into Central Asia and parts of Southeast Asia which has occurred in the period since the September 11 attacks which Beijing (at least until recently in the case of the former) has largely acquiesced to. Similarly, notwithstanding continuing tensions over the lifting of the European Union arms embargo against the PRC and the designation of Taiwan by the US and Japan as a ‘common strategic objective’, **it is also important not to lose sight of the fact that the cooperative elements of the US-Sino relationship currently remain as broad and as deep as they have been at any time since normalisation.**”

**Analysis:** As tempting as it may be to imagine China as a war-mongering hegemonic nation, the reality is that China is pragmatic enough to realize that aggression would not be the best response to South Korea’s deployment of Thaad. If debaters can realize that Chinese aggression is a bad idea, the leaders of China certainly will as well.

## **CON - Anti-Missile Systems embolden South Korean aggression**

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**Argument:** Once South Korea sees it is protected by its anti-missile defense, they may feel more safe to become aggressive since they no longer fear an attack as much.

**Warrant:** Thaad has 100 percent success rate.

Klingner, Bruce. "South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense." The Heritage Foundation, 12 June 2015, [www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense](http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense).

"South Korea's planned indigenous L-SAM would have less altitude and range than THAAD and would not be available for deployment until at least 2023. However, that target date is unlikely since creating a missile defense system is a long, expensive, and difficult process. For example, THAAD took approximately 30 years for the U.S. to fully develop, test, and field. **The THAAD system has already been developed, tested (scoring a 100 percent success rate of 11 for 11 successful intercepts), and deployed.**"

**Warrant:** Thaad is part of a layered missile defense.

Woolf, Christopher. "How Good Is the New Missile Defense System the US Just Deployed in South Korea?" Public Radio International, PRI's the World, 3 May 2017, [www.pri.org/stories/2017-05-03/how-good-new-missile-defense-system-us-just-deployed-south-korea](http://www.pri.org/stories/2017-05-03/how-good-new-missile-defense-system-us-just-deployed-south-korea).

"So THAAD is good, but no panacea. 'And it was never meant to be,' Axe explains. **'THAAD is part of a layered missile defense system. Most countries that try to build missile defense systems, aim for defense in depth. So in addition to THAAD, you**

**might have sea-based Aegis missiles, that fire from warships and can cover other areas and are much more mobile. And then you have shorter-range Patriot missiles. You can connect all of these weapons to the same sensor and command network so you can coordinate your defenses.”**

**Warrant:** Security guarantee of missile defenses make South Korea more likely to challenge other actors in Asia

Seungki, Yoo. “Spotlight: U.S. Activists Stress Need to Build Anti-THAAD Solidarity with S.Koreans.” Spotlight: U.S. Activists Stress Need to Build Anti-THAAD Solidarity with S.Koreans - Xinhua | English.news.cn, 25 July 2017, [news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/25/c\\_136471494.htm](http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/25/c_136471494.htm).

**“The anti-THAAD statement said the U.S. anti-missile system deployment would strain South Korea's relations with China, embolden militaristic and anti-democratic political forces in South Korea and exacerbate tensions between South Korea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).**

Neighboring countries, including China and Russia, have strongly opposed THAAD in South Korea as the AN/TPY-2 radar can peer deeply into the territories of the two countries, breaking the strategic balance in the region and boosting arms race.

According to the statement, the U.S. THAAD deployment in South Korea was part of the U.S. "pivot" to Asia strategy to expand the already significant network of U.S. missile defense systems.

It intensifies regional military tensions, fuels a new arms race and threatens a renewed outbreak of fighting on the Korean Peninsula, the statement noted.”

**Analysis:** This argument is strategic because it allows you to interact with arguments that pertain to China and arguments that pertain to the threat of North Korea. If anyone runs an argument that in anyway makes the point that China will be more likely to help South Korea, you can

easily outweigh it by saying that China would certainly dislike South Korean aggression more than they would appreciate anything else from South Korea. The same can be said for North Korea. If anyone runs an argument that proves that North Korea becomes more docile, you can say that they are now even more emboldened to attack the South than ever.

## **A2 - Anti-Missile Systems embolden South Korean aggression**

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**Answer:** Missile defenses are ineffective

**Warrant:** Barrages of missiles are able to overpower Thaad.

“Even with THAAD Defense, North Korea Missile Barrage Poses Threat to South.”

Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 8 Mar. 2017, [www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-defence-analysis-idUSKBN16F0CT](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-defence-analysis-idUSKBN16F0CT).

**“THAAD's job is to intercept and destroy a ballistic missile in its final phase of flight, either inside or just outside the earth's atmosphere.**

**But with its specifications secret and having never been used in wartime, THAAD's ability to deal with a barrage of missiles at the same time is uncertain.**

‘The use of multiple shots, timed ever-more-closely together, appears destined to rehearse saturating a defensive system by presenting it with an overwhelmingly complex radar picture,’ Joshua Pollack, editor of the U.S.-based Nonproliferation Review, said of Monday's launch.”

**Warrant:** Thaad does not defend against conventional artillery.

Gomez, Eric, et al. “THAAD Won't Save Asia (or America) from North Korea.” The National Interest, The Center for the National Interest, 15 May 2017, [nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-wont-save-asia-or-america-north-korea-20665](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-wont-save-asia-or-america-north-korea-20665).

“THAAD is not able to defend Seoul from North Korean missiles because most of the capital city is just outside the 200 km range of THAAD’s interceptors. While not in a

position to defend Seoul, THAAD could protect several locations that are essential for conducting sustained combat operations against North Korea, such as the port of Busan and Kunsan air base. Moreover, **even if THAAD were deployed closer to Seoul, it would not be able to defend against the conventional artillery threat to the city.**”

**Warrant:** Thaad cannot distinguish between real missiles and decoys.

Cho, Julian, and Hyun Lee. “THAAD Will Not Protect South Korea.” KOREA EXPOSÉ, Zoominkorea, 8 Apr. 2017, [koreaexpose.com/thaad-missile-defense-no-help-korea/](http://koreaexpose.com/thaad-missile-defense-no-help-korea/).

“Postol also notes the THAAD system has not been proven to work. **“The infrared seeker on THAAD interceptors is easily fooled by decoys,” he said. An enemy can launch several fake missiles along with the real one; they would shoot out in different directions to confuse the THAAD system, which would then have a hard time discerning and honing in on the real missile.** According to Postol: ‘The infrared seeker on a THAAD interceptor cannot determine the distance from the target, and the THAAD radar cannot determine the precise azimuth of the target even if the decoys are only about 100 meters away from the real warhead.’”

**Analysis:** If missile defenses are ineffective, it means that South Korea will not feel emboldened to become more aggressive. If high school debaters are able to figure out that North Korea and China will not be stopped by Thaad, then the South Korean government will certainly be able to realize that and will not immediately become more aggressive, which takes out the link to the argument.

**Answer:** South Korean aggression is good because it will allow them to defeat the North Korean threat.

Stilwell, Blake. "Here's Who Would Win in a War between North and South Korea."

Business Insider, 9 Aug. 2017, [www.businessinsider.com/heres-who-would-win-in-a-war-between-north-and-south-korea-2016-4](http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-who-would-win-in-a-war-between-north-and-south-korea-2016-4).

**"In the end, the North, despite some early successes, would lose.** It would be able to inflict massive devastation with conventional weapons in Seoul and near the border areas. The toll on civilians would likely be massive if it used its biological and chemical stockpiles, and even more so if it used the nuclear arsenal. Special forces would likely use their nukes in the border areas for fear of being caught trying to move South. **The US would quickly establish air superiority while ground forces bypassed the heavily defended DMZ area. Once the artillery and missile batteries were taken out, the advanced technology, mobile armor, helicopter support, and airpower would quickly overwhelm the large infantry formations and their associated WWII-era tactics.** The hardest part of subduing North Korea would be unifying the Korean people and taking care of the North's backward and likely starving populace."

**Analysis:** If South Korea became more aggressive toward the North, the United States would step in and help defeat North Korea, ultimately ending the threat they could pose to the South.

**CON - Anti-missile systems provoke North Korean aggression**

**Argument:** Deploying anti-missile systems in South Korea would provoke further aggression from North Korea

**Warrant:** Regional players see the deployment of THAAD missiles as a threat to regional security.

“US Moves Anti-Missile System To South Korean Site.” Tolo News , 26 Apr. 2017,  
[www.tolonews.com/index.php/world/us-moves-anti-missile-system-south-korean-site](http://www.tolonews.com/index.php/world/us-moves-anti-missile-system-south-korean-site).

The earlier-than-expected move prompted protests by hundreds of local residents while a spokesman for Moon Jae-in, a presidential candidate, said the decision "ignored public opinion and due process" and demanded the deployment be suspended until the next administration was in place and had made its policy decision, Reuters reported. **The U.S and South Korea last year agreed to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to counter the threat of missile launches by North Korea. However the move has angered China, which says the advanced system will do little to deter the North while destabilizing the regional security balance.**

**Warrant:** The most likely attack that North Korea could launch would be a tactical strike against South Korea.

Klingner, Bruce. “Increasing Risk of North Korean Tactical Attack on South Korea: What U.S. Needs to Do.” The Heritage Foundation, 27 Mar. 2013,  
[www.heritage.org/asia/report/increasing-risk-north-korean-tactical-attack-south-korea-what-us-needs-do](http://www.heritage.org/asia/report/increasing-risk-north-korean-tactical-attack-south-korea-what-us-needs-do).

**As frightening as these warnings are, North Korea would more likely conduct another tactical-level attack to achieve its objectives rather than risk national suicide through a nuclear strike.** Discerning bluster from actual North Korean intent is always difficult, but recent actions suggest greater potential for another attack—perhaps imminent—on South Korean military and civilian targets. But South Korea is now more likely to strike back after another North Korean assault.

**Warrant:** An attack by North Korea would most likely be in the West Sea, as Pyongyang sees even South Korean military exercises as a military invasion.

Klingner, Bruce. “Increasing Risk of North Korean Tactical Attack on South Korea: What U.S. Needs to Do.” The Heritage Foundation, 27 Mar. 2013, [www.heritage.org/asia/report/increasing-risk-north-korean-tactical-attack-south-korea-what-us-needs-do](http://www.heritage.org/asia/report/increasing-risk-north-korean-tactical-attack-south-korea-what-us-needs-do).

**A North Korean attack would most likely occur in the West Sea, the site of several deadly naval clashes.** In 2010, North Korea sank the South Korean naval corvette *Cheonan* just south of the maritime boundary and attacked Yeonpyeong Island with artillery. Pyongyang claims that allied military exercises—such as those currently underway—are provocations that justify North Korean attacks. Three months before the Yeonpyeong Island attack, **Pyongyang declared that South Korean military exercises were a “military invasion into [our] territorial waters,” so Pyongyang “decisively resolved to repress it with powerful retaliation.”** During the past month, **North Korea nullified the Korean War armistice and all inter-Korean non-aggression agreements and ramped up its threats, particularly against South Korean islands in the West Sea.** Pyongyang deployed long-range artillery and multiple rocket launchers from rear bases in Fourth Corps to front-line units just across from Baengnyeongdo Island. North Korea told the residents of the South Korean islands to evacuate, warning them of “devastating consequences.”

**Warrant:** Additional missile capabilities would make North Korea more volatile and would undermine China's nuclear deterrent in the region.

Sanger, David E. "After North Korea Test, South Korea Pushes to Build Up Its Own Missiles." The New York Times, The New York Times, 29 July 2017, [www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/world/asia/us-south-korea-north-korea-missile-test.html?\\_r=0r](http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/world/asia/us-south-korea-north-korea-missile-test.html?_r=0r).

**Mr. Moon**, considered a dovish leader, also **ordered his government on Saturday to cooperate with the United States to install an advanced American missile defense battery known as Thaad**, whose deployment in South Korea had been suspended since he took office in May. **Mr. Moon's actions signaled that the growing missile threat from North Korea was spurring an arms buildup in Northeast Asia.** Japan earlier said that it was considering buying ballistic missile defense systems from the United States. But China has adamantly opposed installing the Thaad missile defense system in South Korea, arguing that **it would only make tensions with North Korea more volatile and could undermine China's own nuclear deterrent by giving the United States another means to monitor its missiles.** On Saturday, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the resumed deployment of Thaad, in a statement that was in some ways more strongly worded than its statement earlier in the day criticizing North Korea's missile test. "China is gravely concerned with the course of action taken by South Korea," a spokesman for the Foreign Ministry, Geng Shuang, said in the statement. **"Deploying Thaad won't solve South Korea's security concerns, won't solve the related issues on the Korean Peninsula and will only further complicate issues."**

**Warrant:** American-South Korean military incentivize North Korea to hold onto its nuclear capability.

Sanger, David E. "After North Korea Test, South Korea Pushes to Build Up Its Own Missiles." The New York Times, The New York Times, 29 July 2017, [www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/world/asia/us-south-korea-north-korea-missile-test.html?\\_r=0r](http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/world/asia/us-south-korea-north-korea-missile-test.html?_r=0r).

On Sunday, in what the U.S. military called a demonstration of America's "ironclad commitment" to its allies, two American B-1B bombers flew from an air base on Guam to Japan and then South Korea, conducting joint exercises with each of the two countries' air forces. North Korea first tested its ICBM, the Hwasong-14, on July 4, although in that earlier launching, it did not demonstrate the missile's full range. "The U.S. trumpeting about war and extreme sanctions and threat against the D.P.R.K. only emboldens the latter and offers a better excuse for its access to nukes," said Mr. Kim, the North's leader, referring to the country's official name, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, after watching the missile test on Friday.

**Warrant:** Continued military exercises combined with the deployment of anti-missile systems may continue to be met with greater demonstrations of North Korean nuclear power.

Holmes, Oliver. "US and South Korea to Stage Huge Military Exercise despite North Korea Crisis." The Guardian, Guardian News and Media, 11 Aug. 2017, [www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/11/north-korea-us-south-korea-huge-military-exercise](http://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/11/north-korea-us-south-korea-huge-military-exercise).

**US and South Korean militaries will go ahead with massive sea, land and air exercises later this month, despite a spiraling situation in which North Korea has threatened to fire missiles towards a US Pacific territory. Officials in Seoul confirmed on Friday that the scheduled military exercises, which are often met with anger from Pyongyang, are expected to go ahead. Following last year's Ulchi-Freedom Guardian, the North conducted a nuclear test. Last year, the North staged two nuclear bomb tests, and in July it launched two intercontinental ballistic missile tests. Observers are divided on whether the reclusive state yet has the capability to mount a miniaturised nuclear warhead on a missile.**

**Analysis:** This argument draws on two elements of deploying anti-missile systems in South Korea: the most likely tactical response that North Korea would make, as well as the declining level of regional stability in the region as a result of arms buildup. Teams can use this argument

as clear precedent for a North Korean tactical strike against South Korea, given their reaction in the past to military exercises as well as the emerging volatility of the overall stability in the region as the approaches of the U.S., China, and South Korea all seem to clash.

**A2 - Anti-missile systems provoke North Korean aggression**

**Answer:** South Korea considers it in its best interest to fortify existing missile capabilities in order to deter the escalating threat from North Korea.

**Warrant:** Recent escalation of threats from North Korea area prompting a rapid shift in strategy for defense systems in South Korea and Japan.

Kim , Christine. "North Korea Missile Crisis Seen Pushing South Korea to Gun Up."  
Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 11 Aug. 2017, [www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-militarisation-idUSKBN1AR0L8](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-militarisation-idUSKBN1AR0L8).

**The escalating threat arising from nuclear-armed North Korea's recent series of missile tests is prompting South Korea to beef up its military muscle and experts warn it could spur an arms buildup elsewhere in Northeast Asia.** South Korea and Japan are accustomed to the North's frequent threats to attack. But **the war of words between Washington and Pyongyang has raised fears of a sudden clash along the world's most militarised border dividing the two Koreas, which might quickly escalate to all-out war.** After North Korea's second test of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) on July 28, South Korean President Moon Jae-in ordered a speedy deployment of the controversial U.S. THAAD anti-missile defense system, reversing his earlier decision to postpone it pending an environmental review. This week, the U.S. Defence Department said it was "actively" considering revising bilateral ballistic missile guidelines with South Korea to allow Seoul to build more powerful missiles -- at the South's request.

**Warrant:** By threatening U.S. cities, North Korea is pushing to weaken the U.S.'s resolve to intervene on the South's behalf in the event of a war.

Sanger, David E. “After North Korea Test, South Korea Pushes to Build Up Its Own Missiles.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 29 July 2017, [www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/world/asia/us-south-korea-north-korea-missile-test.html?\\_r=0r](http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/world/asia/us-south-korea-north-korea-missile-test.html?_r=0r).

**Missile analysts remain uncertain and even doubtful that North Korea has cleared all the technical hurdles to build a reliable nuclear-tipped ICBM. But the test on Friday night left little doubt that the country, although cut off from most of the global economy and hit with several rounds of United Nations sanctions, was getting closer to its goal of arming itself with long-range missiles that can deliver nuclear warheads to the United States.** South Korea fears that by building nuclear missiles that can reach major American cities, North Korea is trying to weaken the United States’ resolve over whether to intervene on the South’s behalf should war break out on the Korean Peninsula.

**Warrant:** South Korea considers it a diplomatic imperative to deploy anti-missile systems that prevents the split of the United States and its allies in the region.

Sanger, David E. “After North Korea Test, South Korea Pushes to Build Up Its Own Missiles.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 29 July 2017, [www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/world/asia/us-south-korea-north-korea-missile-test.html?\\_r=0r](http://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/world/asia/us-south-korea-north-korea-missile-test.html?_r=0r).

**The South Korean demands reflected growing regional jitters over how the North’s growing missile capabilities may affect Washington’s defense commitment to its allies in the region. On Saturday, Mr. Moon warned that the latest North Korean test could lead to “a fundamental change in the security structure in Northeast Asia.”** “U.S. policy for 21 years has been to prevent this day from coming, and now it has,” said Adam Mount, a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress in Washington, referring to the North’s ICBM test on Friday. “North Korea didn’t test an

ICBM to launch a bolt from the blue against Washington; they're hoping to split the United States from its allies."

**Analysis:** In wake of recent threats from Pyongyang, South Korea sees the deployment of anti-missile systems as its most strategically viable option for the future. Teams can use this answer to point out that if South Korea's main interest is the containment of the threat of Pyongyang, then there are little options forward except for the fortification of their defense systems. Additionally, the escalation of North Korean technology serves to undermine the resolve of the United States to protect South Korea if they come under fire as well, meaning that the deployment of anti-missile systems in South Korea are critical to diplomatic relations between South Korea and the U.S. as well.

**Answer:** THAAD placement in South Korea is an easily achievable strategic success.

**Warrant:** The strategic location of THAAD supports a number of military options.

Newman, Lily Hay. "South Korea's New Missile Defense Tech Isn't a Cure-All For North Korea." *Wired*, 2 June 2017, [www.wired.com/2017/05/south-koreas-new-missile-defense-tech-isnt-cure-north-korea/](http://www.wired.com/2017/05/south-koreas-new-missile-defense-tech-isnt-cure-north-korea/).

**The THAAD's placement, though, still makes strategic sense, especially from the US point of view. Its location would help it defend some key US strongholds in the region, and would protect US troop deployments coming in through the southern tip of the Korean peninsula if South Korea ever needs reinforcements.** "That's the area through which US forces would flow to Korea if they were coming to help the South Koreans defend the country. They would come through Busan, not Seoul," Bennett says. "The US also figured that if South Korea really wants to defend Seoul, they can buy a THAAD battery of their own." The US only had one THAAD to offer so it went to a place that prioritized US interests. President Trump indicated that he thought it would be "appropriate" for South Korea to pay for the installed system, but national security

adviser H.R. McMaster confirmed this week that the US would bear financial responsibility. **In its current placement, the THAAD can defend a number of US military bases, like Camp Walker in Daegu and Kunsan Air Base in Gunsan, along with ports in Busan and the southern tip of South Korea. All of this serves South Korean defensive interests as well,** but experts doubt that South Korea could afford to purchase additional THAADs on its own any time soon.

**Analysis:** This answer proves that the strategic placement of anti-missile systems in South Korea are in the best interest of both Seoul and Washington; not just as anti-missile systems themselves, but as potential support systems for future troop deployment if necessary. The placement of the systems protect important military outposts and areas of strategic importance for potential deployment of U.S. troops. As part of a larger narrative of military structuring, anti-missile systems are an effective fill for gaps in South Korean defensive capabilities in the event of an attack.

**CON - Anti-Missile Systems make China less likely to sanction**

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**Argument:** When South Korea builds Anti-Missile defense systems, China will be less willing to sanction North Korea and cut off their ability to produce harmful nuclear weapons.

**Warrant:** China currently supports North Korea over South Korea

Albert, Eleanor. "What's the Status of North Korea's Nuclear Program?" Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, 9 Aug. 2017, [www.cfr.org/background/north-koreas-military-capabilities](http://www.cfr.org/background/north-koreas-military-capabilities).

**“China regards stability on the Korean peninsula as its primary interest. Its support for North Korea ensures a friendly nation on its northeastern border and provides a buffer between China and the democratic South, which is home to around twenty-nine thousand U.S. troops and marines. ‘Chinese leaders have no love for Kim Jong-un’s regime or its nuclear weapons, but it dislikes even more the prospect of North Korea’s collapse and the unification of the Korean Peninsula with Seoul as the capital,’ writes CFR President Richard N. Haass.”**

**Warrant:** China does not want Thaad to be put in place.

Perlez, Jane. "China Woos South Korea’s New Leader, but the U.S. Left Behind a Spoiler." The New York Times, The New York Times, 31 May 2017, [www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/world/asia/china-south-korea-xi-jinping-moon-jaein-thaad.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/31/world/asia/china-south-korea-xi-jinping-moon-jaein-thaad.html?_r=0).

**“China views Thaad as just one element in an effort to contain its military by building a strategic architecture that would eventually connect South Korea, Japan and the United States. ‘Stopping the deployment of Thaad is the bottom line of China,’ Global Times, a state-run newspaper that often reflects the thinking of the Communist**

**Party leadership, said soon after Mr. Moon's election. 'Seoul needs to make a choice between deploying Thaad and resuming Sino-South Korean relations. It should not hope to have it both ways.'**"

**Warrant:** Taking away American Missile Defenses in South Korea will signal to China that South Korea is no longer allowing American influence to spread.

McLeary, Paul. "In Nod to China, South Korea Halts Deployment of THAAD Missile Defense." *Foreign Policy*, 7 June 2017, [foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/07/in-nod-to-china-south-korea-halts-deployment-of-thaad-missile-defense/](http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/07/in-nod-to-china-south-korea-halts-deployment-of-thaad-missile-defense/).

"There is little indication that the new government is looking to significantly restructure relations with the United States, which is a major trading partner, maintains 23,000 troops in the country, and sells billions of dollars worth of advanced military technology to Seoul.

**Still, the halt on the THAAD deployment can be seen as a new wrinkle in an old relationship, and a significant win for Beijing, which has strongly objected to the radar and missile interceptor system being deployed on the peninsula."**

**Warrant:** Getting rid of Thaad will encourage China to sanction North Korea.

Yoon, Jean. "Exclusive: South Korea President Calls on China's Xi to Do More on North Korea Nuclear Program." *Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 22 June 2017, [www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-politics-moon-exclusive-idUSKBN19D0VR](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-politics-moon-exclusive-idUSKBN19D0VR).

**"South Korean President Moon Jae-in said on Thursday China should do more to rein in North Korea's nuclear program and he would call on President Xi Jinping to lift measures against South Korean companies taken in retaliation against Seoul's decision to host a U.S. anti-missile defense system.**

In an interview with Reuters ahead of his trip to Washington next week for a summit with U.S. President Donald Trump, Moon said 'strong' sanctions should be imposed if North Korea tests an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or conducts a sixth nuclear test.”

**Impact:** Sanctioning North Korea will pressure them to denuclearize.

Snyder, Scott. “North Korea's Denuclearization: Is It Possible?” Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 20 Nov. 2015, [www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2015/11/19/north-koreas-denuclearization-is-it-possible/#6f275ae550ec](http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2015/11/19/north-koreas-denuclearization-is-it-possible/#6f275ae550ec).

The squeezers, who hope that **tougher sanctions will force North Korea to give up its nuclear capabilities**. For instance, Sue Terry, writing for the National Bureau of Asian Research, recommends that the United States ‘double down on sanctions by enforcing against North Korea the kind of sanctions that brought Iran to the negotiating table.’ This approach mirrors the intent of several sanctions bills under consideration in the U.S. Congress.

**Analysis:** This argument can outweigh practically any pro argument because it proves that getting rid of Thaad will result in North Korea’s denuclearization. This is most important because even if Thaad is able to defend South Korea against a possible North Korean attack, the removal of Thaad eliminates that possibility altogether.

## **A2 - Anti-Missile Systems make China less likely to sanction**

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**Answer:** Sanctions do not work.

**Warrant:** Sanctions only provide short term pressure.

Sherman, Wendy, and Evans Revere. "North Korea: 6 Experts on How We Can Solve the Problem." Time, Time, 17 Feb. 2017, [time.com/north-korea-opinion/](http://time.com/north-korea-opinion/).

"The main reason we are where we are today is because North Korea has walked away from every denuclearization agreement ever reached. The regime clearly wants nuclear weapons more than any inducement. And it has not changed its behavior in the face of sanctions."

**Warrant:** Sanctions anger North Korea.

Jaura, Ramesh. "New Sanctions on North Korea May Prove Counterproductive." New Sanctions on North Korea May Prove Counterproductive - Nuclear Abolition News and Analysis, Towards a Nuclear Free World, 3 Mar. 2017, [www.nuclearabolition.info/index.php/648-new-sanctions-on-north-korea-may-prove-counterproductive](http://www.nuclearabolition.info/index.php/648-new-sanctions-on-north-korea-may-prove-counterproductive).

**"But Tariq Rauf, Director, Disarmament, Arms Control & Nonproliferation Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), told IDN the latest UN Security Council Resolution 2270 (2016) 'is ill advised and counterproductive in achieving behaviour change by the North Korean leadership by imposing even stricter sanctions.'**

Rather, the resolution may well propel the DPRK to be even more defiant in continuing with its nuclear and rocket/missile programmes, he noted. He pointed out that sanctions alone have never been successful in reversing States' nuclear weapon programmes."

**Warrant:** North Korea can simply pivot to trade more with Russia instead.

Dorell, Oren. "As China Pulls Trade from North Korea, Russia Gets Cozy with Kim Jong Un." USA Today, Gannett Satellite Information Network, 6 June 2017, [www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/06/05/russia-boosts-trade-north-korea-china-cuts/102389824/](http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2017/06/05/russia-boosts-trade-north-korea-china-cuts/102389824/).

**"As China responds to President Trump's call to pressure North Korea to curb its rogue weapons programs, Russia has stepped in to help the hermit nation stay connected to the rest of the world. Trade between Russia and North Korea increased by 73% during the first two months of 2017 compared to the same period the year before, boosted mostly by increased coal deliveries from Russia, according to Russian state-owned news site Sputnik"**

**Analysis:** As long as there is one way for North Korea to get around Missile Defenses, South Korea might as well not have them at all. These holes in South Korea's missile defense system mean that all North Korea must do to harm South Korea is exploit these dangerous opportunities.

**Answer:** Thaad is not a deal breaker for China.

Blanchard, Ben. "China Is Willing to Put Ties With South Korea Back on Track." Time, Reuters, 18 May 2017, [time.com/4785572/china-south-korea-relations-thaad/](http://time.com/4785572/china-south-korea-relations-thaad/).

**"China wants to put ties with South Korea back on a 'normal track', President Xi Jinping said on Friday, but Beijing also urged Seoul to respect its concerns and resolve tensions over the deployment of a U.S. anti-missile system that it opposes. Relations between Beijing and Seoul, strained by disagreement over South Korea's hosting of the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense ( THAAD ) system, have taken on a more conciliatory tone with the election earlier this month of President Moon Jae-in."**

**Analysis:** China does not want to continue to cooperate with North Korea, and now more than ever they are looking to build a strong relationship with South Korea. Even if the link to the argument is true, which is that China dislikes the deployment of Thaad, this response says that Thaad does not anger China enough to prevent a pivot from North Korea to South Korea.

## CON – Alternative weapons

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**Argument:** If South Korea develops a robust missile defense system that can shoot down North Korea’s current missiles, it will only make North Korea develop more missiles that can circumvent Thaad and deliver even more damage.

**Warrant:** Anti-missile defense can shoot down current North Korean Missiles

Karimi, Faith. “US Tests THAAD System after North Korea Missile Launch.” CNN, Cable News Network, 30 July 2017, [www.cnn.com/2017/07/30/politics/us-military-tests-thaad-system/index.html](http://www.cnn.com/2017/07/30/politics/us-military-tests-thaad-system/index.html).

“We have a responsibility to our allies and our nation to showcase our unwavering commitment while planning for the worst-case scenario. If called upon, we are ready to respond with rapid, lethal, and overwhelming force at a time and place of our choosing,” said Gen. Terrence J. O’Shaughnessy, commander of the Pacific Air Forces.

**The THAAD system is capable of intercepting ballistic missiles inside or outside the atmosphere. It can shoot down short, medium and intermediate ballistic missiles. It uses ‘hit-to-kill technology where kinetic energy destroys the incoming target,’ the US military says.”**

**Warrant:** North Korea wants to maintain power in the region

Chang, Charles. “Nuclear Weapons Are North Korea's 'Poison Pill'.” NewsComAu, 17 Apr. 2017, [www.news.com.au/technology/why-its-so-important-for-north-korea-to-develop-nuclear-weapons/news-story/ae936c8099fdcfb137860260afcee844](http://www.news.com.au/technology/why-its-so-important-for-north-korea-to-develop-nuclear-weapons/news-story/ae936c8099fdcfb137860260afcee844).

**“North Korea sees being a “nuclear state” as a “poison pill” that will ensure its own survival, making a peaceful conclusion to its conflict with the US difficult to achieve. Brad Glosserman, executive director of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in the US, told news.com.au the status of being a nuclear state was so important to North Korea it was enshrined in its constitution in 2012.**

Former leader Kim Jong-il revised the constitution to state that he had ‘transferred the country into an undefeated country with strong political ideology, a nuclear power state, and invincible military power’.”

**Warrant:** North Korea will develop missiles to go around missile defenses and deliver a deadlier attack

Scarborough, Rowan. “North Korea Tests Missiles Designed to Defeat U.S. THAAD Defense System.” The Washington Times, The Washington Times, 3 May 2017, [www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/3/north-korea-missiles-can-defeat-us-defense-systems/](http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/3/north-korea-missiles-can-defeat-us-defense-systems/).

**“North Korea has tailored its spate of ballistic missile tests to defeat the U.S.-stationed defense systems ready to protect the South and Japan from descending warheads, a report to Congress says. The bellicose North regularly flight-tests a panoply of ballistic missiles that could, in war, be capped with miniaturized nuclear warheads and strike its two democratic neighbors and U.S. allies. The U.S. military has matched this threat by first stationing Patriot anti-missile batteries and then announcing that the wider-range, mobile THAAD system is now in place to shoot down incoming warheads. Pyongyang, the North’s capital, has been watching.”**

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**Impact:** North Korea has already tested missiles that can defeat Thaad

Lockie, Alex. "North Korea Just Showed the World It's Serious about Nuclear War - and the US's Response Won't Cut It." Business Insider, Business Insider, 6 Mar. 2017, [www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-thaad-missile-defense-2017-3](http://www.businessinsider.com/north-korea-thaad-missile-defense-2017-3).

**“North Korea launched a salvo of four missiles on Sunday night, potentially telegraphing a ‘saturation attack’ intended to defeat US, South Korean, or Japanese missile defenses.**The missiles sputtered out, landing in the waters close to Japan's coast without doing any damage, and the US and South Korea quickly responded by agreeing to deploy one of the world's best missile defense systems, the Terminal High-Altitude Air Defense.”

**Analysis:** This argument is strategic because it proves that every pro argument is purely short term. If North Korea can and will develop nukes that can swerve around Thaad and other missile defenses, then the security is only short lived. In the end, North Korea will come back with an even deadlier attack, which is ultimately a very compelling reason to negate.

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## A2 – Alternative Weapons

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**Answer:** North Korea would develop its nuclear arsenal anyway

**Warrant:** The North Korean regime is insecure and will be dangerous no matter what.

Ward, Alex. “North Korea's Successful Test of an Intercontinental Missile Is a Test for Trump.” Vox, Vox, 4 July 2017, [www.vox.com/2017/7/4/15919118/north-korea-missile-test-icbm-july-3](http://www.vox.com/2017/7/4/15919118/north-korea-missile-test-icbm-july-3).

**“That isn’t because the country’s supreme leader, 33-year-old Kim Jong Un, is totally irrational — a “crazy fat kid,” as Sen. John McCain once termed him.**

**Instead, it’s that the impoverished North Korean regime is deeply insecure, so worried about its own survival that it is willing to go to dangerously provocative lengths to scare the United States and South Korea out of any potential attack.**

When you combine this insecurity with the opaque nature of the North Korean regime, you have a situation that could easily spiral into outright conflict in the event that one of North Korea’s frequent military provocations (like the missile test) goes awry. Given North Korea’s massive conventional military and unknown number of nuclear weapons, conflict on the Korean Peninsula would cost hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of lives.”

**Warrant:** Even sanctions won’t stop North Korea.

Kim, Soyoung, and Ju-min Park. “North Korea Fires Multiple Missiles, South Korean Military Says.” The Huffington Post, TheHuffingtonPost.com, 8 June 2017, [www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/north-korea-fires\\_us\\_593881d5e4b00610547f2f47](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/north-korea-fires_us_593881d5e4b00610547f2f47).

“North Korea fired what appeared to be several land-to-ship missiles off its east coast on Thursday, South Korea’s military said, a day after the South postponed full deployment of a controversial U.S. anti-missile system designed to deter a North Korean attack. The launches, the latest in a fast-paced series of missile tests defying world pressure to rein in its weapons program, come less than a week after the United Nations Security Council passed fresh sanctions on the reclusive state.”

**Warrant:** North Korea is already doing it

Kim, Christine, and Tom Miles. “North Korea Missile Detected by THAAD, Program Progressing Faster than Expected: South Korea.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 16 May 2017, [www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-usa-idUSKCN18B1V4](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-usa-idUSKCN18B1V4).

“Han Min-koo told South Korea's parliament that Sunday's test had been detected by the controversial U.S. THAAD anti-missile system, which was deployed in South Korea last month, infuriating China. North Korea has defied all calls to rein in its nuclear and missile programs, even from China, its lone major ally, calling them legitimate self-defense. **It has been working to develop a nuclear-tipped missile capable of striking the U.S. mainland, and experts say Sunday's test was another step toward that aim. U.S. President Donald Trump's administration has called for an immediate halt to North Korea's missile and nuclear tests, and U.S. Disarmament Ambassador Robert Wood said on Tuesday that China's leverage was key and Beijing could do more.**”

**Analysis:** If it is true that North Korea wants to establish dominance over East Asia, then they will likely be doing everything they can in order to do so, regardless of what South Korea can accomplish.

**Answer:** South Korea can catch up with North Korean missile technology.

**Warrant:** South Korea will develop new missile defenses to deal with North Korea's stronger missiles.

Rajagopalan, Rajeswari Pillai. "Will North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions Provoke a New Arms Race?" World Economic Forum, 7 July 2017, [www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/07/north-korea-nuclear-arms-race/](http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2017/07/north-korea-nuclear-arms-race/).

"If North Korean nuclear and missile program is not contained, one likely consequence is that all the countries that are threatened will move towards developing defensive capabilities such as missile defences. The issue of ballistic missile defence (BMD) in the context of the US deploying the THAAD system in South Korea, as well as expanding US efforts to develop more capable BMD systems to deal with North Korean missiles, also impacts the deterrence equations between the US and China."

**Analysis:** Even if North Korea is able to develop new swirvey missiles that can circumvent thaad, South Korea and the United States certainly will be able to develop anti-missile defense systems that can now defeat these new missiles.

**CON - Anti-missile systems halt diplomatic dialogue**

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**Argument:** As progress has been seen between North and South Korea in recent years, the deployment of anti-missile systems could halt diplomatic endeavors because North Korea opposes this sort of militarization. This could lead to the breakdown of negotiations that could be a last hope for stopping the conflict from spiraling out of control.

**Warrant:** South Korea and North Korea have made recent attempts to improve diplomatic relations.

Lankov, Andrei. “Why Are North And South Korea Suddenly Seeking to Improve Relations?” Radio Free Asia. January 1, 2015. Web.  
<<http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/parallel-thoughts/relations-01212015135303.html>>

“Recent reports leave little doubt: relations between the two Koreas, so tense for years, now show signs of improvement. **Seoul and Pyongyang have exchanged reconciliatory gestures and expressed their willingness to talk. There is even a rather high probability that the third intra-Korean summit will happen in near future.** But here rises a question: why do North and South want improvement in their relations? No doubt, the politicians themselves will react to such a question in a predictable way, citing the “need for reconciliation” and “desire to maintain peace.” It is all well and good, but why did these laudable and lofty desires, dormant for years, begin to determine policy right now? It goes without saying that political decisions are dictated by the needs of the interested parties, not by some lofty considerations. If this is the case, what are the considerations behind the recent thaw in the hitherto frosty Seoul-Pyongyang relations? As the saying goes, it takes two to tango—and indeed, both sides have valid reasons to improve relations.”

**Warrant:** North Korea needs South Korea for financial support.

Lankov, Andrei. “Why Are North And South Korea Suddenly Seeking to Improve Relations?” Radio Free Asia. January 1, 2015. Web.  
<<http://www.rfa.org/english/commentaries/parallel-thoughts/relations-01212015135303.html>>

“The probability of Russia’s involvement decreased even further when the collapse of world oil prices led to the significant deterioration of Russia’s economic situation. Attempts to improve relations with Japan also ended in naught. The issue of Japanese citizens abducted by North Korea decades ago, the major problem poisoning relations between the two countries, is notoriously difficult to sort out. Moreover, the complicated international situation in Northeast Asia makes Japan reluctant to undertake steps which the United States disapproves of. This means any North Korean negotiations with Japan are stuck. **This leaves North Korean decision makers little choice but to seek engagement with the South. South Korea seems to be the only country which now has both the will and capacity to invest in the North and provide it with considerable economic assistance. Hence, the ‘charm offensive’ of North Korea.**”

**Analysis:** These last two pieces of evidence establish the inherency for the argument. By proving that as of 2015 the two countries were making diplomatic progress and the North needed the South financially, any risk proven by the con that missile defense could jeopardize progress would trigger large impacts.

**Warrant:** North Korea reacts negatively to the deployment of anti-missile systems.

Rosen, Ben. “North Korea promises ‘physical response’ to THAAD deployment.” Christian Science Monitor. Web. July 11, 2016.  
<<https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Asia-Pacific/2016/0711/North-Korea-promises-physical-response-to-THAAD-deployment>>

**“North Korea threatened "physical response measures" including "ruthless retaliatory strikes" on Monday, protesting an announcement from South Korean and US officials who said the countries would deploy an anti-missile system on the peninsula. The warning came hours after Pyongyang said it would end a diplomatic communication channel with the US and hinted at harsher punishments for Americans detained in North Korea,** responses to the US Treasury Department's personal blacklist of North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un for human rights abuses. Though South Korea and the US have maintained the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system is merely to shield them from any attacks from the north, the system has enraged Pyongyang, which has repeatedly threatened to retaliate.”

**Impact:** Military conflict will kill many in South Korea and diplomatic actions, by the U.S., are the best example of a program that has worked to lower the North’s threat.

Hartung, William. “Why diplomacy with North Korea works better than ‘fire and fury’.” The Hill. Web. August 9, 2017. <<http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/international-affairs/345907-why-diplomacy-with-north-korea-works-better-that>>

**“Diplomacy is the only approach that has a chance of making a difference. As U.S. military leaders have long known, even a conventional military attack on North Korea could prompt Pyongyang to launch a massive artillery attack on the South Korean capital, Seoul, potentially causing hundreds of thousands of casualties.** And even at that great cost, there’s no guarantee that a U.S. strike on North Korea could successfully eliminate its nuclear capabilities. A nuclear strike could be even more disastrous, not only for the people of North Korea but also for allies in South Korea and throughout the region. That’s why South Korean President Moon Jae-in is strongly against the Trump administration taking unilateral, preemptive military action against North Korea in response to its nuclear weapons program. **The truth is that diplomacy is**

**the only thing that has ever worked to slow North Korea's nuclear efforts.** The Clinton administration's 1994 framework agreement with North Korea stopped Pyongyang's plutonium production — the surest route to large numbers of nuclear bombs — for nearly a decade. It was only after the George W. Bush administration abandoned this effort — over the initial objections of former Secretary of State Colin Powell — that North Korea's nuclear program resumed in earnest, leading to the situation today, where that country has a small stockpile on nuclear bombs and is making progress on building a missile that can reach U.S. territory.”

**Analysis:** This evidence discusses diplomacy within the context of the U.S. and North Korea, but highlights two important things, even if it is discussing the United States. First, diplomacy is needed to quell tensions because a conflict would endanger Seoul. Second, the United States has only made progress through diplomacy. This proves that the North and South should work together as that is what has worked for other nations dealing with North Korea in the past.

**Analysis:** Overall, this argument offers a solution to the root of the conflict that avoids any sort of violence. This is also a very persuasive argument for all types of judges because discussions of a peaceful solution are generally well received across audiences. The con will have to do a lot of work defending the idea that diplomacy does work, even with a tough actor like North Korea that often lashes out. To prove this point, historical context will be especially useful. Additionally, diplomatic solutions often are long lasting, while military problems can recur. This offers the con a great opportunity to try and outweigh pro arguments on timeframe.

## **A2 - Anti-missile systems halt diplomatic dialogue**

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**Answer:** The breakdown of diplomacy is not unique.

**Warrant:** Communication hotlines between North and South Korea were severed in 2016 for reasons separate from anti-missile systems.

“Seoul calls for reopening of inter-Korean communication hotlines.” EFE. May 17, 2017.  
<<https://www.efe.com/efe/english/portada/seoul-calls-for-reopening-of-inter-korean-communication-hotlines/50000260-3268678>>

**“South Korea Wednesday called for the reopening of communication channels with the North, which were cut off in early 2016 due to strained relations, as the new government looks to improve inter-Korean ties. Pyongyang severed two communication hotlines in Feb 2016 in retaliation for Seoul closing down the jointly run industrial complex Kaesong. South Korea had shut down the industrial park in response to a nuclear test and space rocket launch - widely believed to be a veiled missile test - by the Kim Jong-un regime. ”**The government has kept the stance that the inter-Korean dialogue channel should be reopened. The ministry has been reviewing ways to restore it," South Korean Unification Ministry spokesperson Lee Duk-haeng said at a press briefing. However, Lee added that they were yet to decide what steps to take reactivate the two hotlines, which were set up for the purpose of de-escalation during heightened military tensions.”

**Analysis:** This proves that even if anti-missile systems hurt diplomacy a little, it is largely not a unique impact. This starts to prove that the con argument is weak as they cannot prove how much worse diplomatic prospects can become.

**Answer:** Negotiations will fail.

**Warrant:** The Sunshine Policy, one of diplomatic engagement by South Korea to the North, failed to produce positive policy change.

Popeski, Ronald. "Sunshine Policy failed to change North Korea: report." Reuters. Web. November 17, 2010. <<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-korea-north-sunshine-idUSTRE6AH12520101118>>

**“South Korea's peaceful "Sunshine Policy" toward North Korea failed, a government report has found, saying there have been no positive changes to Pyongyang's behavior despite a decade of mass aid and encouragement. Aid shipped to the North during the administrations of Kim Dae-jung and Roh Moo-hyun from 1998-2008 also failed to make a difference to the lives of destitute North Koreans, said the Unification Ministry white paper, seen by Reuters on Thursday. The policy review by current President Lee Myung-bak's government pointed to North Korea's pursuit of nuclear arms and the sinking of a South Korean navy ship in March that killed 46 sailors as key examples of Pyongyang's deceptive nature. "The attack on the Cheonan proves that despite the qualitative growth in inter-Korea ties, North Korea has not changed," the report said. "There are no positive changes to North Korea's position that correspond to the support and cooperation offered by us." Kim Dae-jung won the Nobel peace prize in 2000 for his Sunshine Policy of engaging the North and initiating dialogue between the rival Koreas, which remain technically at war after signing only a truce to end their 1950-53 conflict.”**

**Warrant:** North Korea has said they will not give up their nukes in negotiations.

Morello, Carol. "North Korea says it won't give up nuclear weapons and that entire U.S. mainland is within firing range." The Washington Post. Web. August 7, 2017. <[https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\\_pacific/north-korea-under-no-circumstances-will-give-up-its-nuclear-weapons/2017/08/07/33b8d319-fbb2-4559-8f7d-25e968913712\\_story.html?utm\\_term=.f65958b2a41e](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/north-korea-under-no-circumstances-will-give-up-its-nuclear-weapons/2017/08/07/33b8d319-fbb2-4559-8f7d-25e968913712_story.html?utm_term=.f65958b2a41e)>

“MANILA — North Korea spurned harsh new U.N. sanctions Monday and threatened to defend itself with nuclear weapons if necessary, as Secretary of State Rex Tillerson repeated an offer to bargain with the outcast nation under the right circumstances. There was no sign at a major Asian security conference here that the sanctions hailed by President Trump as a -foreign policy achievement would succeed where past efforts have failed in trying to persuade the country to give up its nuclear weapons. **North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong Ho told diplomats that his country will never negotiate away what he called a rational “strategic option” against the threat of attack from the United States. “We will, under no circumstances, put the nukes and ballistic rockets” up for negotiation, Ri said in prepared remarks, adding that the entire United States is within range of its missiles.** He dismissed the U.N. Security Council sanctions approved Saturday as illegal, appearing to rule out talks that the Trump administration, in a diplomatic partnership with China and Russia, is offering North Korea as a way out of its economic and diplomatic pariah status.”

**Analysis:** North Korea is not taking any substantial steps during negotiations and therefore any diplomacy impact will not yield significant progress.

**Answer:** Anti-missile systems create better diplomacy.

**Warrant:** Properly using the military for diplomacy can produce a secure environment.

Muthanna, KA. “Military Diplomacy.” Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses. Web. January 2011. <[http://www.idsa.in/system/files/jds\\_5\\_1\\_kamuthanna.pdf](http://www.idsa.in/system/files/jds_5_1_kamuthanna.pdf)>

“The 21st century’s ‘flatter world’ is creating new international dynamics. Any nation that does not deploy all its instruments and resources towards optimising its security environment would be forced to exist and develop sub-optimally. China and India are the best examples of two contrary approaches - with China currently occupying the winner’s

podium. The only saving grace for the Indian model is the democracy factor which counter-balances China's totalitarian regime. **Nations that evolve and adopt a sound approach to military diplomacy can expect to enjoy a benign, if not completely safe, security environment."**

**Analysis:** This evidence concludes that using military diplomacy has the potential to guarantee security. Military diplomacy can include using military tools, like anti-missile systems, as a means of backing up and supporting diplomatic efforts. Deploying anti-missile systems can back up what South Korea has to say with a show of force. This frames the con argument as mislead because the military and diplomatic actions can work optimally together.

**Analysis:** Overall, these responses attack the con arguments on numerous levels. First, it is established that diplomatic efforts were falling apart despite anti-missile systems. Then, the responses prove that traditional diplomacy has failed and that North Korean cooperation will be limited. Finally, the pro argues that they can solve for bad diplomacy by backing it up with force. This not only proves the con solvency fails, but shows the pro can fix what history proves to be a broken method.

**CON - Anti-missile systems encourage a U.S. preventive strike**

**Argument:** The deployment of anti-missile systems makes the United States feel safer. The systems can defend United States troops in the region. This can help push the United States government to be more likely to consider preventively attacking North Korea. This could cause retaliation against South Korea.

**Warrant:** THAAD, the anti-missile defense system in South Korea, protects United States bases.

Gomez, Eric. "THAAD Won't Save Asia (or America) from North Korea." National Interest. Web. May 15, 2017. <<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-wont-save-asia-or-america-north-korea-20665>>

**“While THAAD does reduce the chances of a successful North Korean missile attack against important U.S. military bases and some South Korean cities, it probably won’t do much to cool down the situation on the peninsula. In fact, THAAD could contribute to instability and increase the likelihood of a crisis. While THAAD does reduce the chances of a successful North Korean missile attack against important U.S. military bases and some South Korean cities, it probably won’t do much to cool down the situation on the peninsula. In fact, THAAD could contribute to instability and increase the likelihood of a crisis.”**

**Analysis:** If THAAD protects U.S. military bases, it could be argued that this helps justify a strike against North Korea to preempt any possible bold North Korean military action.

**Warrant:** THAAD could enhance the United States consideration of a pre-emptive strike against North Korea because it helps protect Japan and the U.S.

Mullany, Gerry. "China Warns of Arms Race After U.S. Deploys Missile Defense in South Korea." The New York Times. Web. March 7, 2017.

<<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/asia/thaad-missile-defense-us-south-korea-china.html>>

**"Takashi Kawakami, a professor of international politics and security at Takushoku University in Tokyo, said the deployment of Thaad could put the United States in a stronger position to consider a pre-emptive strike on North Korea. If the United States took such action, he said, "North Korea is going to make a counterattack on the U.S. or Japan or another place, so in this case they will use Thaad" to defend against the North's missiles.** The Japanese prime minister, Shinzo Abe, said he spoke for 25 minutes on Tuesday with Mr. Trump, who reiterated his pledge to stand by Japan "100 percent," according to the public broadcaster NHK. "I appreciate that the United States is showing that all the options are on the table," Mr. Abe said, adding that Japan was "ready to fulfill larger roles and responsibilities" to deter North Korea."

**Warrant:** According to Lindsey Graham, Donald Trump agrees that the U.S. can not allow Kim Jong Un to be able to target the United States despite what that means for other nations.

Friedman, Uri. "Lindsey Graham Reveals the Dark Calculus of Striking North Korea."

The Atlantic. Web. August 1, 2017.

<<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/lindsey-graham-north-korea/535578/>>

**"On a sunny morning show on Tuesday, Lindsey Graham made an exceedingly dark calculation. North Korea's second test of an intercontinental ballistic missile meant that Kim Jong Un is nearly capable of placing a nuclear warhead on a long-range missile and hitting the United States with it, the Republican senator noted on the Today show. And America can't allow such a "madman" to get to that point, at whatever cost to non-Americans. Donald Trump agrees, Graham added, and he**

knows that because he's heard it straight from the president: Trump has "got to choose between homeland security and regional stability," Graham argued. "Japan, South Korea, China would all be in the crosshairs of a war if we started one with North Korea. But if [North Korea gets] a missile they can hit California, maybe other parts of America." If there's going to be a war to stop [Kim Jong Un], it will be over there. If thousands die, they're going to die over there. They're not going to die here. And [Trump's] told me that to my face," Graham said. "That may be provocative, but not really. When you're president of the United States, where does your allegiance lie? To the people of the United States."

**Analysis:** This evidence could be used to add probability to the idea that the United States may use a preventive strike. It also characterizes Trump's decision making as favoring United States lives. Therefore, this supports the narrative that protection of U.S. bases could cause a preventive strike to be more likely.

**Impact:** A U.S. strike on North Korea would drag in other actors and spark North Korean retaliation and could kill thousands or even millions.

Friedman, Uri. "Lindsey Graham Reveals the Dark Calculus of Striking North Korea." The Atlantic. Web. August 1, 2017.  
<<https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/08/lindsey-graham-north-korea/535578/>>

"If the U.S. military were to strike North Korea for the reasons Graham mentioned, it would be the result of a calculation that sparking a real conflict in East Asia is preferable to accepting a theoretical threat to the United States—that it's worth risking the actual deaths of those living in and near North Korea, including American expats and troops stationed in Japan and South Korea, to avert the potential deaths of Americans at home. **When I surveyed experts this spring, they predicted that whatever form U.S. strikes against North Korea take, they could result in thousands or even millions of**

**deaths—as the North Koreans retaliate with conventional, chemical, and perhaps nuclear weapons, and the United States and its allies respond in kind, dragging the region into a spiral of conflict.** The vast range of the casualty estimates spoke to just how much unknown risk U.S. military planners would be assuming.”

**Warrant:** The Department of Defense says a Korean War could mean 200,000 to 300,000 dead US or South Korean military personnel and hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths in the first 30 days.

“Consider legality, morality of military action against North Korea.” St. Louis Today. Web. August 14, 2017. < [http://www.stltoday.com/opinion/mailbag/consider-legality-morality-of-military-action-against-north-korea/article\\_c3146bbb-0e54-59ca-b532-24be5d8a7ff4.html](http://www.stltoday.com/opinion/mailbag/consider-legality-morality-of-military-action-against-north-korea/article_c3146bbb-0e54-59ca-b532-24be5d8a7ff4.html)>

**According to the U.S. Department of Defense, a second Korean War could mean 200,000 to 300,000 South Korean and U.S. military casualties within the first 90 days, in addition to hundreds of thousands of civilian deaths.** A South Korean simulation put the figure as high as 2 million civilian casualties. These are frightening projections. We must ask, will the good we are seeking outweigh the human catastrophe?

**Analysis:** This argument has a very large impact as the United States attack would cause North Korean retaliation that could endanger millions of civilians. This argument could be very strong if debaters work to prove that the protection of United States troops is a major factor preventing a preventive strike on North Korea right now. The con wants to prove that a preventive strike by the United States is probable, but only if the United States troops are secure. This explanation being flushed out clearly in round would really produce a clear and strong link into a major impact for the con.

## A2 - Anti-missile systems will encourage a preventive strike

**Answer:** The situation will not give way to a preventive strike.

**Warrant:** Defense Secretary Mattis says diplomacy is working.

“North Korea: US diplomacy is gaining results, says Mattis.” BBC. Web. August 11, 2017. <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40896236>>

**“Mr Mattis, speaking in California late on Thursday, said it was his job as defence secretary to be ready for conflict. But he said the diplomatic effort, under Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and UN Ambassador Nikki Haley, "has diplomatic traction, it is gaining diplomatic results".** He gave no details. However, the UN Security Council agreed fresh sanctions against North Korea on Saturday. Mr Mattis said: "The tragedy of war is well enough known. It doesn't need another characterisation beyond the fact that it would be catastrophic." When asked about US military plans for a potential conflict, Mr Mattis said the country was ready, but he would not "tell the enemy in advance what I'm going to do".”

**Analysis:** Despite hostile rhetoric between Trump and Kim Jong Un, diplomacy is under way. This helps prove that a preventive strike is not currently on the table and is improbable.

**Warrant:** The White House has been negotiating with North Korea through back channels and they could lay groundwork for meaningful negotiations given that hostile rhetoric is not consistent.

Fredericks, Bob. “White House has quietly engaged in back-channel talks with North Korea.” The New York Post. Web. August 11, 2017.

<<http://nypost.com/2017/08/11/white-house-has-quietly-engaged-in-back-channel-talks-with-north-korea/>>

**“Despite the bellicose rhetoric coming from President Trump, the White House has quietly engaged in back channel diplomacy with North Korea for months, a new report said Friday. The talks focused on Americans imprisoned in the communist dictatorship and fraying relations between the long-time foes, The Associated Press reported. The two sides had discussions to secure the June release of an American university student, who arrived back home in a coma and later died. But it wasn’t known until now that the contacts have continued, or that they have broached matters other than US detainees. People familiar with the contacts told the news service that the interactions have done nothing thus far to quell tensions over North Korea’s nuclear weapons and missile advances, which are now fueling fears of military confrontation. **But they say the behind-the-scenes discussions could still be a foundation for more serious negotiation, including on North Korea’s nuclear weapons, should Trump and North Korean strongman Kim Jong Un put aside the over-the-top threats of recent days and agree to talks.**”**

**Analysis:** This pokes another hole in the probability of a United States preventive strike because it is less likely the Trump administration attacks North Korea now that it is clear they are trying to work with them directly, even if it is behind the scenes.

**Answer:** Missile defense could solve for the need to preventively strike.

**Warrant:** The United States wants more anti-missile defense to protect the homeland against North Korea.

Daniels, Jeff. “North Korean threat leads to flurry of missile defense proposals — including space interceptors.” CNBC. Web. August 3, 2017.

<<https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/03/political-support-growing-for-boosting-missile-defense.html>>

**Amid the rising threat from North Korea, support from politicians is building for more spending on U.S. missile defense** — and not just ground systems but adding a space-based intercept layer. "You have both lawmakers and the Pentagon taking a hard look at the issue," said Cowen defense analyst Roman Schweizer. A measure in the Senate has more than two dozen co-sponsors and would upgrade the current ground-based interceptor system used to protect the homeland and also order concept work on a space-based sensor layer that can track missile threats. Another plan, by Republican Sen. Ted Cruz of Texas, calls for a space-based interceptor system to defeat the nuclear threat from North Korea. On Friday, North Korea tested an intercontinental ballistic missile that some experts believe could put half, if not most, of the continental U.S. at risk. And there have been reports this week the regime may be close to conducting its sixth nuclear test.

**Analysis:** This response discusses how U.S. anti-missile defense is gaining support due to the North Korean threat. This evidence helps prove that there is paranoia in the United States. Therefore, the pro can argue that by lowering that, it will be less likely the United States conducts a preventive strike.

**Analysis:** Overall, these responses can attack the probability of a United States preventive strike, while offering the pro a link into solving any likelihood for the strike. Regarding this topic, many teams will argue about different conflict scenarios. Therefore, determining which scenarios are most likely to occur will be critical to winning rounds. These responses help combat the probability of the United States sparking a war.

**CON - Anti-missile systems will start a regional arms race**

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**Argument:** The deployment of anti-missile systems will cause other countries in East Asia region to feel the need to build up their weaponry. Despite these systems being defensive, other countries will feel the need to build up their offensive capabilities to overcome the defenses and maintain their own powerful military deterrents. Arms races raise tensions and make war more likely, while also making it more dangerous.

**Warrant:** The deployment of an anti-missile defense system, specifically THAAD, would make countries like Russia and China feel insecure and cause an arms race in Northeast Asia.

Suh, JJ. "Missile Defense and the Security Dilemma: THAAD, Japan's "Proactive Peace," and the Arms Race in Northeast Asia." The Asia-Pacific Journal. Web. April 27, 2017. <<http://apjff.org/-JJ-Suh/5033/article.pdf>>

**"Since Seoul and Washington announced "an alliance decision" to deploy a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to South Korea in July 2016, the little-known weapon system** has given rise to intense public protests throughout South Korea while triggering a series of counter-measures by the North as well as China and Russia. THAAD, a missile defense system designed to destroy an incoming enemy missile at a high altitude, **has the potential not only to undermine the strategic balance between the United States and Russia as well as China but also to drive an arms race in Northeast Asia to an unprecedentedly dangerous level.** Japan too is directly contributing to the global and regional strategic instability as it is engaged in operating two THAAD radar units and co-developing a more advanced missile defense system with the U.S. At the same time, Tokyo leverages its participation in the U.S.-led missile defense system to weaken or remove constitutional and legal constraints on its military. THAAD currently serves as a wedge that widens the growing strategic gulf between the continental powers and the pacific alliances led by the U.S. at a time of growing tensions in East Asia and the western Pacific. Tracing the chain of actions and

reactions involving THAAD, I develop an argument that the involved states are caught in a security dilemma.<sup>1</sup> To do that, I first need to distinguish two different paths of the security dilemma. While scholars and practitioners have used the security dilemma concept since John H. Herz first suggested it in his 1950 article, few have explicitly noted two different ways in which it affects international relations. **The dilemma emerges as measures taken by states to meet their security needs have the effect of increasing insecurity for others, who feel in turn compelled to take countermeasures.**”

**Warrant:** China has warned that the United States new anti missile system, THAAD, would cause an atomic arms race.

Mullany, Gerry. “China Warns of Arms Race After U.S. Deploys Missile Defense in South Korea.” The New York Times. Web. March 7, 2017.  
<<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/asia/thaad-missile-defense-us-south-korea-china.html>>

**“The United States said on Tuesday that it had begun deploying an advanced and contentious missile defense system in South Korea, prompting China to warn of a new atomic arms race in a region increasingly on edge over North Korea’s drive to build a nuclear arsenal. The American announcement came a day after the simultaneous launch of four missiles by North Korea into waters off the Japanese coast, which Pyongyang said was a drill for striking American bases in Japan. The feat, footage of which was broadcast on state television, raised concern about the North’s ability to overwhelm the new defense system being deployed.”**

**Warrant:** The deployment of an anti-missile defense system, specifically THAAD, could cause China to speed up weapon modernization.

Mullany, Gerry. “China Warns of Arms Race After U.S. Deploys Missile Defense in South Korea.” The New York Times. Web. March 7, 2017.

<<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/asia/thaad-missile-defense-us-south-korea-china.html>>

“China has long opposed American missile defenses, in part because of fears that they might embolden American decision-makers to consider a first strike to destroy China’s relatively small nuclear arsenal. Chinese strategists warn that the United States might consider such an attack if it was confident a defense system could intercept Chinese weapons that escaped destruction. **China is believed to have already embarked on a program to modernize its arsenal and develop new weapons designed to avoid missile defenses, and analysts said the deployment of Thaad could prompt it to accelerate those efforts.**”

**Impact:** Some argue an arms race can give the military more power in decision making, lower trust, and urge preemption, thus sparking conflict.

Rider, Toby. “Just Part of the Game? Arms Races, Rivalry, and War.” Researchgate. Web. September 2010.

<[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227574713\\_Just\\_Part\\_of\\_the\\_Game\\_Arms\\_Races\\_Rivalry\\_and\\_War](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227574713_Just_Part_of_the_Game_Arms_Races_Rivalry_and_War)>

**Those that argue arms races "cause" war cite a host of connections between the two. These include the claims that arms races increase the influence of the military in decision-making (Noel-Baker, 1958), lower trust (Sample, 1996), exacerbate the urge for preemption (Lambelet, 1975; Morrow, 1989; Weede, 1980), and encourage the use of 4 shortcuts that result in misperception (Jervis, 1976). Yet such explanations are largely post-hoc claims that are not directly subject to testing. Somewhat implicitly,**

**Impact:** Arms races empirically increase the probability of war when dealing with adolescent or mature rivalries between nations.

Rider, Toby. "Just Part of the Game? Arms Races, Rivalry, and War." Researchgate. Web. September 2010.

<[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227574713\\_Just\\_Part\\_of\\_the\\_Game\\_Arms\\_Races\\_Rivalry\\_and\\_War](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/227574713_Just_Part_of_the_Game_Arms_Races_Rivalry_and_War)>

"An adolescent rivalry that has experienced an arms race has a 68% greater probability of war onset over the baseline; a mature rivalry has a 222% increase in the probability of war over the baseline.<sup>14</sup> Furthermore, later phase rivalries that have experienced an arms race have a greater risk of war than similar rivalries that have not experienced an arms race. **The probability of war increases by 147% when moving from an adolescent stage rivalry without an arms race to one with an arms race; a similar change from a mature rivalry without an arms race to one with an arms race increases the probability of war by 331%.**"

**Analysis:** This argument offers the con a link into conflict that is very clear and intuitive. The impact is very large, being that it is full-scale conflict, and empirically supported. It will be important for con teams to express that even though anti-missile systems are defensive, they offset the offensive capabilities of other nations and that makes them want to further arm. The explanation of this intricacy of the argument is key to conveying it to any sort of judge.

## A2 - Anti-missile systems will start a regional arms race

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**Answer:** Arms races do not cause war.

**Warrant:** Weapons will not cause a war if there is no intent in the first place.

Sundstorm, Ian. "An East Asian Arms Race: Does It Even Matter?." The Diplomat. Web. January 16, 2015. <<http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/an-east-asian-arms-race-does-it-even-matter/>>

“Of course, intentions are slippery and can change drastically without warning. That is why military capability is so often discussed. You can count and analyze tanks with some degree of certainty that tomorrow they won’t suddenly become submarines. **Capability, however, is not a substitute for intent and it does not do to study one without the other. Whether an arms race is occurring in Asia or not, it should be remembered that war is not caused by weapons, but by people.** China’s defense spending continues to increase, and its neighbors’ budgets may follow suit, but this does not change anything fundamental about the region’s international relations. Keeping the capability/intent framework in mind allows you to see past the bluster about rising defense budgets and expanding capabilities and focus on what really matters: who wants what, and are they willing to fight for it.”

**Analysis:** This combats the idea that an arms race is inherently bad. The pro must explain in a clear fashion why credibility, the intent to start a war, is a more important factor than the capabilities of nations in causing a war.

**Answer:** Countries in the region building weapons is not unique.

**Warrant:** In 2016, China was modernizing its missiles.

Mcleary, Paul. "Pentagon: Chinese military modernization enters new phase." Foreign Policy. Web. May 13, 2016. <<http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/13/pentagon-chinese-military-modernization-enters-new-phase/>>

"The reforms are rebalancing China's military, making the army smaller while the navy and the air force grow; the report noted that Chinese aviation technology is "rapidly closing the gap with western air forces." **At the same time, China's nuclear and missile forces have been reorganized as an independent service and have been bolstered with a new array of weapons that push China's potential reach farther out into the Pacific.**"

**Warrant:** Modernization, as it occurred in mid-2016, may have been due to the Chinese president trying to prove he has power over Chinese institutions like the military. Therefore, alternate causes may be responsible for Chinese modernization.

Mcleary, Paul. "Pentagon: Chinese military modernization enters new phase." Foreign Policy. Web. May 13, 2016. <<http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/05/13/pentagon-chinese-military-modernization-enters-new-phase/>>

**"The moves come at a time when Xi is widely seen as attempting to consolidate his control over China's institutions. The military has always been seen as a political institution in China, and it exists to protect, and carry out the orders of the Communist party.** Given China's emphasis on being able to operate farther from home — as outlined in last year's defense white paper — the Chinese navy continues to get preferential treatment. The Pentagon report noted that the 300-ship PLAN "now possesses the largest number of vessels in Asia," boasting a growing number of advanced surface ships, new submarines, amphibious ships, and its first aircraft carrier."

**Analysis:** These pieces of evidence show that an arms race in the region is not unique. First, it shows China was building up missiles at an earlier time. Then, the second piece of evidence

hones in on the reason China may have been building up weapons earlier. This allows for a more nuanced way to respond to the argument.

**Answer:** Missile defense could solve for an arms race.

**Warrant:** The North Korean threat itself could drive an arms race in the region, starting with South Korea and Japan.

“U.S. worried North Korea will cause Asian nuclear arms race, Aussie minister says.”

The Japan Times. Web. May 26, 2017.

<<http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2017/05/26/national/politics-diplomacy/u-s-worried-north-korea-will-cause-asian-nuclear-arms-race-aussie-minister-says/#.WYp2sneGNmB>>

“It has carried out two atomic tests since the beginning of last year, insisting it needs nuclear weapons to defend itself against the threat of invasion. **The U.S. is worried that if North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is not stopped, other countries in the region, including Japan and South Korea, would be compelled to seek their own nuclear capability as a defense measure.** Australian Foreign Minister Julie Bishop told The Australian newspaper that this was conveyed to her in New York, where she held meetings with the U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Nikki Haley. “In my discussions with senior officials in both South Korea and the U.S., the view was that should North Korea ever be recognized as a nuclear weapons state, then Japan and (South) Korea would have little option than to develop their own nuclear weapons capability,” she said. “That is why there is such a strong view that North Korea must be denied this capability.””

**Analysis:** This response offers the pro a link into the arms race argument. If the pro proves anti-missile systems provide security for South Korea, they can argue they are limiting an arms race because South Korean paranoia could spark an arms race in the status quo.

**Analysis:** These responses take out the uniqueness of any military modernization and take out the impact of war stemming from an arms race. It also offers a link into the arms race argument for the pro. Together, these arguments thoroughly take down the con arms race argument. However, to be more thorough, pro teams should be wary of the empirical evidence read by the con that is used to prove arms races cause war. Often times, these pieces of evidence look at very old scenarios and show an increase in the probability of war by miniscule amounts. Pro teams must be ready to evaluate this impact evidence brought forth by the con.

**CON - Dependence on the United States**

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**Argument:** Deploying anti-missile systems makes South Korea reliant on the United States for defense. This could be bad because the United States often interferes with South Korean interests.

**Warrant:** A U.S. senator believes that South Korea halting the deployment of the anti-missile system THAAD demonstrates they would rather work with China than the U.S. regarding North Korea.

Gehrke, Joel. "Top senator fears South Korea is choosing China over U.S." The Washington Examiner. Web. June 7, 2017..  
<<http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/top-senator-fears-south-korea-is-choosing-china-over-us/article/2625261>>

**"A top Senate Democrat is worried that South Korea, a major American ally in Southeast Asia, is increasingly looking to "partner" with the Chinese government on their most critical national security concern — North Korea.** That concern is the result of a decision by South Korean President Moon Jae-in to suspend the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system that could protect against the danger of incoming North Korean rockets. China has long protested the deployment of the system over fears that the radar could be used against their military. **"It's my fear that he thinks — I hope I'm wrong — that [Moon] thinks that South Korea has a better chance working with China to contain North Korea than working with the United States,"** Senate Minority Whip Dick Durbin, D-Ill., told the Washington Examiner."

**Analysis:** This evidence highlights that THAAD acts symbolically and that by failing to deploy it, South Korea sends a message to United States officials that they are turning away from the

United States for support in foreign policy. This highlights that the current debate on missile defense is a turning point regarding South Korean dependence on the United States.

**Impact:** The United States controls economic relations with South Korea and leaves South Korean trade uncertain.

Rosenfield, Everett. "Trump tough on South Korea: Threatens to terminate free trade deal, wants payment for THAAD missile defense system." CNBC. Web. April 27, 2017.. <<https://www.cnbc.com/2017/04/27/trump-threatens-to-terminate-free-trade-deal-with-south-korea-says-he-wants-seoul-to-pay-for-thaad.html>>

**"President Donald Trump said that he will either renegotiate or terminate a "horrible" trade deal with South Korea, Reuters reported late Thursday. The president also said he wants South Korea to pay for the \$1 billion THAAD missile defense system, Reuters said. Responses to Trump's comments soon arose, with an official from South Korea's automakers association telling Reuters that the group is now concerned about "the uncertainty" of the free trade agreement."**

**Analysis:** This evidence proves that the United States feels it can use its dominance over South Korea to control economic relations between the two countries.

**Impact:** The South Korean military dependence keep South Korea from focusing on its own direct threats.

Bandow, Doug. "South Korea's Secret Weakness." The American Conservative. Web. February 21, 2013. <<http://www.theamericanconservative.com/articles/south-koreas-secret-weakness-586/>>

**"Apparently South Koreans aren't worried about their defense. Or they assume they can rely on Americans to protect them with whatever force is necessary. Yet**

**America’s foreign-policy community seems oblivious to the perverse incentives of military welfare.** It is widely accepted that generous social welfare in the U.S. long discouraged work, marriage, and education: this realization drove the 1996 federal welfare reform legislation. Washington’s military welfare for foreign nations has a similarly debilitating impact. **Even while relying on America for defense from North Korea, the ROK began fashioning a blue-water navy capable of conducting more distant missions. And Seoul spent a decade actually subsidizing the DPRK, as part of the so-called “Sunshine Policy.”**

**Impact:** South Korea is obligated to back up U.S. foreign policy, regardless of costs.

Bandow, Doug. “South Korea: Forever Dependent on America.” National Interest. Web. July 28, 2014. <<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/south-korea-forever-dependent-america-10959?page=2>>

**“Nevertheless, Seoul pays a price for its dependence. Fearing Nixon administration plans to reduce overseas military commitments, Park Chung-hee’s government sent troops to Vietnam on America’s behalf, resulting in more than 5000 deaths. In recent years, the ROK has similarly backed U.S. efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq, though at a far lower cost. The South’s dependence on America also allows Washington to interfere with ROK defense plans.** In 1993 and 1994, for instance, the Clinton administration considered military action against the North with little concern for the South’s interests. In the 2000s, Washington objected to South Korea’s “Sunshine Policy” of subsidy and accommodation with the North. Since North Korean military attacks in 2010 inflamed South Korea’s willingness to retaliate, the United States has played the pacifist, warning the ROK against precipitous action in response to DPRK provocations. Although older South Koreans generally viewed the loss of sovereignty as a necessary price to pay for U.S. protection, younger South Koreans are more nationalistic and thus more likely to treat the current relationship as an affront to South Korean dignity and pride.”

**Analysis:** This argument is strong as long as the con focuses on proving the uniqueness of the link into dependency. The narrative of the negative team must be that THAAD is a linchpin for the alliance that continues South Korean dependence. If that is argued properly, the con has access to large and unique impacts that go past the usual discussion of conflict.

## A2 - Dependence on the United States

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**Answer:** The South Korean dependence on the United States will exist because the alliance between the nations is not going anywhere.

**Warrant:** It is clear the alliance offers the best sense of counteracting North Korea due to their shared goals.

Snyder, Scott. "A Necessary Alliance: Neither South Korea Nor The U.S. Can Take On North Korea Alone." Forbes. Web. June 29, 2017.

<<https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2017/06/29/a-necessary-alliance-neither-south-korea-nor-the-u-s-can-take-on-north-korea-alone/#28164f6767ca>>

"The massive pressure and engagement strategy adopted by the Trump administration involves an international campaign to make the costs of North Korea's nuclear program prohibitive and, as Pacific Commander Admiral Harry Harris has testified before Congress last April, "to bring Kim Jong Un to his senses, not to his knees." Likewise, efforts to secure greater cooperation from Beijing will only work to the extent that China recognizes that the US-ROK alliance is regarded as essential in thwarting North Korean aims. **Given the shared U.S.-ROK objective of ending this common threat, there is ample ground for the U.S. and South Korea to build common purpose through a stronger alliance that should deflect North Korean challenges while outweighing the South Korean impulse for autonomy or any American impulse for unilateralism.**"

**Warrant:** President Moon and Trump hosting a summit proves the alliance is recognized by both as vital.

Snyder, Scott. "A Necessary Alliance: Neither South Korea Nor The U.S. Can Take On North Korea Alone." Forbes. Web. June 29, 2017.

<<https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2017/06/29/a-necessary-alliance-neither-south-korea-nor-the-u-s-can-take-on-north-korea-alone/#28164f6767ca>>

**“Both Trump and Moon may dream of alternatives to the alliance, but in choosing to hold an early summit, both men are also admitting that as a practical matter when it comes to North Korea, there is no viable alternative to cooperation through the U.S.-ROK alliance.”**

**Warrant:** The U.S. Defense Secretary has reaffirmed security assurances for South Korea.

“U.S. Defense Secretary Jim Mattis reassures Japan, South Korea.” The Chicago Tribune. Web. February 3, 2017. <<http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-mattis-japan-korea-20170203-story.html>>

**“Earlier in the day, in Seoul, with his South Korean counterpart, Han Min Koo, at his side, Mattis said, "the United States stands by its commitments, and we stand with our allies, the South Korean people." He also explicitly warned North Korea against using a nuclear weapon, saying such an act would be met with a response that is "effective and overwhelming." These were the only two stops on Mattis's first overseas trip since taking office Jan. 20. He said he chose to go to Japan and South Korea first in order to demonstrate that nothing will weaken the U.S. security promises.”**

**Analysis:** This answer offers a strategic way to chip away at the probability of the alliance, which is what causes military dependence, falling apart. These responses prove the reason why the alliance will not fall apart and back this up through the actions of the leaders of South Korea and the United States.

**Answer:** The dependence of South Korea on the United States provides optimal security.

**Warrant:** The alliance between the two countries is ready to defend against North Korea.

Daniels, Jeff. "Top US military officer says alliance capabilities in place to defend against North Korea." CNBC. Web. August 14, 2017.

<<https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/14/top-us-general-says-alliance-ready-to-defend-against-north-korea.html>>

**"Military capabilities already in place with the U.S.-South Korean alliance are enough to defend against a strike from North Korea, America's highest-ranking military officer said Monday.** Marine Corps Gen. Joseph Dunford, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said the alliance is "seeking peaceful resolution to the crisis right now." Army Gen. Vincent Brooks, the alliance commander in Korea, confirmed the Ulchi-Freedom Guardian joint military exercises will go forward, although the annual event usually generates anger from North Korea."

**Warrant:** The U.S. sends powerful messages to North Korea through exercises with South Korea, alongside Japan.

Lendon, Brad. "US, South Korea, Japan start drills off North Korea." CNN. March 14, 2017. Web. <<http://www.cnn.com/2017/03/14/asia/us-south-korea-japan-aegis-missile-defense-ship-exercises/index.html>>

**"The US, Japan and South Korea sent a pointed message to North Korea on Tuesday, dispatching high-tech missile defense ships to the same area where Pyongyang fired four missiles just eight days ago.** Aegis warships from the US, South Korea and Japan began exercises Tuesday to improve their capability to shoot down enemy ballistic missiles, the US Navy said in a statement."

**Analysis:** This answer proves that even if the con proves that THAAD is needed to hold the alliance together, the alliance is a great way to protect against a North Korean threat. This offers

the pro a clear route to the ballot based on the idea of THAAD bolstering the U.S. alliance with South Korea.

**CON - The Kill Chain protocol could spark conflict.**

**Argument:** Deploying anti-missile systems would include the implementation of the Kill Chain protocol. This system of defense that would be implemented by South Korea would be exceptionally dangerous because it encourages risky behavior by South Korea that could spark conflict.

**Warrant:** The Kill Chain protocol, part of a discussed strategy for taking out North Korean missiles and warheads, is South Korea's preemptive strike against North Korea relying on satellite surveillance.

Nesbit, Jeff. "Could 'Kill Chain' Kill Any Chance at Peace?" US News. Web. June 30, 2017. <<https://www.usnews.com/news/at-the-edge/articles/2017-06-30/south-korea-with-kill-chain-wants-to-up-its-guard-against-north-korea>>

**“"Kill Chain" is the first pillar of the new, pre-emptive military strategy designed to meet North Korea's nuclear missile ambitions that was first referenced in a South Korean government strategy paper released late last year. It involves using satellite reconnaissance to identify when and where North Korea is manufacturing missiles and nuclear warheads, and a pre-emptive strike capability to destroy those facilities before they go operational.”**

**Warrant:** Tools for Kill Chain are being developed now.

Mizokami, Kyle. "This Is How South Korea Plans to Stop a Nuclear Attack from North Korea." National Interest. Web. July 10, 2017. <<http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-south-korea-plans-stop-nuclear-attack-north-korea-21472>>

**“South Korea is assembling a strike force of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, air power and marines to neutralize the North Korean threat. Designed to kill or incapacitate the country’s leadership—particularly Kim Jong-un—in the crisis before war, the so-called Kill Chain and Korea Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMPR) plans are like something out of a military techno-thriller, with hundreds of precision-guided missiles and commandos engaged in a race against time to stop a nuclear attack. What are Kill Chain and KMPR, and could they work in heading off a nuclear war? As a nonnuclear power, South Korea has limited options in dealing with North Korea’s nuclear-weapons program. Instead of building its own nuclear arsenal as a direct deterrent, Seoul is assembling its own arsenal of unique conventional capabilities, consisting of Global Hawk high-altitude surveillance drones, other intelligence/surveillance/reconnaissance assets, special operations forces, and cruise and ballistic missiles.”**

**Warrant:** South Korea advanced the time table on the program.

Nesbit, Jeff. “Could 'Kill Chain' Kill Any Chance at Peace?” US News. Web. June 30, 2017. <<https://www.usnews.com/news/at-the-edge/articles/2017-06-30/south-korea-with-kill-chain-wants-to-up-its-guard-against-north-korea>>

“South Korea had originally planned to develop the scientific and technical expertise necessary to successfully implement a "Kill Chain" effort by the mid 2020s. **But when North Korea claimed it had tested a miniaturized nuclear warhead in 2016, South Korea accelerated its timetable and began to see if it could lease satellite time from Israel or other countries. It wants to monitor activity inside its northern neighbor, according to Korea Times.** But after Trump won and he started tweeting his threats to North Korea, South Korea announced it was moving forward aggressively with a three-pronged military strategy to respond to a North Korean nuclear strike. The government considered a huge increase to its military budget built around the three pillars approach. All three of South Korea's military pillars were built to be deployed a decade from now.

But in its December 2016 military budget, South Korean leaders proposed new levels of spending that accelerated their military plans by at least two years, and offered a much larger military budget designed to acquire dozens of cruise missiles. More importantly, they began to ask other countries whether they could share reconnaissance satellite time in order to determine the actual state of North Korea's missile and nuclear facilities.”

**Analysis:** This proves that South Korea has a clear interest in implementing this anti-missile system. By proving they are moving ahead aggressively with the program, the con proves this as a probable interpretation of what is going to be implemented under the resolution.

**Warrant:** Moon plans to deploy Kill Chain.

Kim, Cynthia. “Factbox: South Korean President-elect Moon's main policy pledges.”  
Reuters. Web. May 19, 2017. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-election-moon-policies-fac-idUSKBN1851M4>>

Moon said the new administration should make a final decision on the deployment of a U.S. anti-missile system known as Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD). Moon will also seek a summit with China to resolve a dispute over the system, which China sees as a threat to its security. **He has also vowed to enhance a self-reliant defense capability. Plans include the transfer of wartime operational control of the South Korean military from the United States during his presidency and the early deployment of a pre-emptive strike system "Kill Chain", and a homegrown missile defense system called Korea Air and Missile Defense.**

**Impact:** Kill Chain, a preemptive strike, will lead to war that likely goes nuclear.

Nesbit, Jeff. "Could 'Kill Chain' Kill Any Chance at Peace?" US News. Web. June 30, 2017. <<https://www.usnews.com/news/at-the-edge/articles/2017-06-30/south-korea-with-kill-chain-wants-to-up-its-guard-against-north-korea>>

“The second and third prongs of South Korea's defense strategy include missile defense and retaliatory strikes from aircraft in the event North Korea launches a missile. They include the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, and the Korean Massive Punishment and Retaliation (KMRR) plan. KAMD is a controversial plan to develop a system to intercept short-range missiles. KMRR is a concept for destroying Pyongyang in the event of a North Korean nuclear first strike. **But it is the first and most dangerous part of the new military strategy – the "Kill Chain" – that has diplomatic observers worried. Such a pre-emptive strike would almost certainly lead to war – and not just any war, but regional nuclear war.**”

**Analysis:** This argument offers the con to talk about a different kind of missile defense system from the norm (the THAAD system). This offers a unique strategy that views missile defense systems as a preemptive strike itself. The impact is quite large which will help the con as well. If South Korea attacks the nuclear armed North, the result will almost certainly be perilous warfare.

**A2 - The Kill Chain protocol could spark conflict.**

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**Answer:** Kill Chain is unlikely.

**Warrant:** The South Korean president has urged for peaceful solutions to the conflict.

Park, Ju-min. "South Korea urges 'parallel' talks, sanctions to rein in North." Reuters. Web. May 11, 2017. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-politics-idUSKBN1870G1>>

**“South Korea's new president launched international efforts to defuse tension over North Korea's weapons development on Thursday, urging both dialogue and sanctions while also aiming to ease China's anger about a U.S. anti-missile system.** Moon Jae-in, a liberal former human rights lawyer, was sworn in on Wednesday and said in his first speech as president he would immediately address security tensions that have raised fears of war on the Korean Peninsula. Moon first spoke to Chinese President Xi Jinping and later to Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. The conversations were dominated by how to respond to North Korea's rapidly developing nuclear and ballistic missile programs, which are in violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions.”

**Warrant:** South Korean people want a peaceful solution to be utilized.

Ahn, Christine. "Americans and South Koreans Want Peace. Will Trump Listen?" Common Dreams. Web. June 30, 2017. <<https://www.commondreams.org/views/2017/06/30/americans-and-south-koreans-want-peace-will-trump-listen>>

“Unlike other parts of the world, democracy is alive and well in South Korea, and the public are wildly supportive of Moon and his pro-engagement policies. According to a just released South Korean poll, **80 percent of South Koreans want inter-Korean**

**dialogue with North Koreans.** While the overwhelming majority of South Korean people and their president may be aligned in this wish, their efforts for reviving the “sunshine policy” — that is, a posture of engagement toward the north — will be hamstrung by Washington’s hardline policy and UN Security Council sanctions. But Moon should be reminded of the international community’s abhorrence of Donald Trump. After all, Trump’s inauguration was welcomed by the historic women’s march, where 5 million women in 673 cities worldwide took to the streets to protest his incoming presidency, in fact the largest protests in U.S. history. From Germany’s Angela Merkel to France’s Emmanuel Macron, Trump has angered many historic U.S. allies. Moon doesn’t have to try to please Washington the way his predecessors have.”

**Analysis:** By proving that Kill Chain will never be used, the pro takes away the viability of the argument. They must argue that even though it is being developed, the technology will not be used because of Moon’s goals for peaceful solutions to the conflict.

**Answer:** Kill Chain could save lives.

**Warrant:** There is not enough surveillance on North Korea now.

Sanger, David. “Tiny Satellites From Silicon Valley May Help Track North Korea Missiles.” The New York Times. Web. July 6, 2017.  
<<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/world/asia/pentagon-spy-satellites-north-korea-missiles.html>>

The timeline for getting the satellites in orbit, which defense officials have never discussed publicly, reflects the urgency of the problem. The missile launch by North Korea on Tuesday was initiated from a new site, a mobile launcher at the Pang Hyon Aircraft Factory. Capt. Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman, said the missile “is not one we have seen before.” That mobility is the problem that the new satellites, with wide coverage using radar sensors that work at night and during storms, are designed to

address. **Less than one-third of North Korea is under spy satellite coverage at a given moment.**

**Warrant:** Satellites developed for Kill Chain could give warning that saves lives.

Sanger, David. "Tiny Satellites From Silicon Valley May Help Track North Korea Missiles." The New York Times. Web. July 6, 2017.

<<https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/06/world/asia/pentagon-spy-satellites-north-korea-missiles.html>>

“Some in the Pentagon accustomed to relying on highly classified, multibillion-dollar satellites, which take years to develop, resisted the move. But as North Korea’s missile program progressed, American officials laid out an ambitious schedule for the first of the small satellites to go up at the end of this year, or the beginning of next. **Launched in clusters, some staying in orbit just a year or two, the satellites would provide coverage necessary to execute a new military contingency plan called “Kill Chain.” It is the first step in a new strategy to use satellite imagery to identify North Korean launch sites, nuclear facilities and manufacturing capability and destroy them preemptively if a conflict seems imminent. Even a few extra minutes of warning might save the lives of tens of thousands of Americans — and millions of South Koreans and Japanese who already live within range of the North’s missiles.**”

**Analysis:** This response focuses on the idea that the Kill Chain protocol is not activated until a strike is deemed imminent. This means that no unique war is being started, but instead millions could be saved by stopping a strike. This response highlights an overlooked benefit of the intelligence based system.

**CON - Anti-missile systems provoke pressure from China**

**Argument:** China sees the implementation of anti-missile systems in South Korea as an adversarial move, resulting in economic pressure that leads to drastic losses for the country.

**Warrant:** The anti-missile system in South Korea, THAAD, intercepts ballistic missiles.

Mody, Seema. “China Lashes out as South Korea Puts an American Anti-Missile System in Place.” CNBC, CNBC, 28 Apr. 2017, [www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/thaad-anti-missile-system-makes-china-lash-out-at-south-korea.html](http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/thaad-anti-missile-system-makes-china-lash-out-at-south-korea.html).

A powerful U.S. anti-missile system designed to protect South Korea is sparking regional anxiety that's begun hitting one of Asia's most important economies. The system, known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD, is designed to defend South Korea and Japan from missile attack. North Korea and its unpredictable leader Kim Jong Un possess nuclear weapons and make a habit of regularly threatening neighbors. **THAAD, which could be operational as soon as summer 2017, uses radar to track when a ballistic missile is launched and then intercepts and destroys the missile before it descends onto its target.**

**Warrant:** China views anti-missile systems in South Korea as a threat to its own military operations.

Mody, Seema. “China Lashes out as South Korea Puts an American Anti-Missile System in Place.” CNBC, CNBC, 28 Apr. 2017, [www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/thaad-anti-missile-system-makes-china-lash-out-at-south-korea.html](http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/thaad-anti-missile-system-makes-china-lash-out-at-south-korea.html).

Further complicating the deployment of the anti-missile system is China. **Beijing views THAAD as a threat to its own military operations** — specifically in the South China Sea. Beijing claims possession of the disputed region, which serves as a channel for half of the world's shipping and which the rest of the world, including the United States,

considers international waters. China's claims on the sea stretch thousands of miles from the Chinese mainland. In early March, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang told reporters that, **"Our position on THAAD is very clear. We are firmly opposed to the deployment of THAAD" in South Korea. "This position is very firm."**

**Warrant:** China has engaged in government-sanctioned boycotts against South Korea to prevent THAAD deployment.

Mody, Seema. "China Lashes out as South Korea Puts an American Anti-Missile System in Place." CNBC, CNBC, 28 Apr. 2017, [www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/thaad-anti-missile-system-makes-china-lash-out-at-south-korea.html](http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/thaad-anti-missile-system-makes-china-lash-out-at-south-korea.html).

Experts on the region, including former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Hubbard, and Richard Weitz, director of the Hudson Institute's Center for Political-Military Analysis, told CNBC that a warming trend between South Korea and China was put to an end by the THAAD issue. China is South Korea's largest trading partner. **"China has already engaged in one of its most assertive influence campaigns in recent history to prevent the THAAD deployment, encompassing threatening leadership speeches, alarming media commentary, and most recently coercive economic pressure that has included government-sanctioned trade boycotts,"** Weitz said. Think tank Eurasia Group told CNBC that **China's retaliation against the anti-missile system is becoming a threat to South Korea's economy.**

**Warrant:** Chinese pressure could amount to a reduction in travel to South Korea by 70%.

Mody, Seema. "China Lashes out as South Korea Puts an American Anti-Missile System in Place." CNBC, CNBC, 28 Apr. 2017, [www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/thaad-anti-missile-system-makes-china-lash-out-at-south-korea.html](http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/thaad-anti-missile-system-makes-china-lash-out-at-south-korea.html)

**China has in recent weeks begun alleging code violations against South Korean firms as an excuse to shut down some of South Korean company Lotte's retail facilities in China, and it has blocked online trade in South Korean goods. China has lashed out at high-profile Korean firms in entertainment, consumer goods, travel and the like. Lotte did not immediately return a CNBC request for comment. Also this month, Beijing began impeding tourist travel from China to South Korea, a popular destination for Chinese citizens. "Some estimates suggest that Beijing's travel ban could reduce the number of Chinese visitors to South Korea by up to 70 percent, resulting in billions of dollars in lost tourism-related revenue,"** Scott Seaman, director of Asia at the Eurasia Group.

**Warrant:** Chinese retaliation against South Korea manifests as economic pressure and diplomatic weaponization.

Wang, Yue. "How China's South Korea Boycott Will Play Out, Politically And Economically." Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 20 Mar. 2017, [www.forbes.com/sites/ywang/2017/03/20/how-chinas-south-korea-boycott-will-play-out-politically-and-economically/#a7ecc0f2c23a](http://www.forbes.com/sites/ywang/2017/03/20/how-chinas-south-korea-boycott-will-play-out-politically-and-economically/#a7ecc0f2c23a)

**The retaliation against South Korea, which U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said should stop during his Asia tour in March, is another example of Beijing using nationalism as a diplomatic weapon - albeit to a far greater degree.** In 2012, China encouraged people to boycott Japanese products following Tokyo's control of disputed islands in the possibly resource-rich East China Sea. But this time, **the country's anger could last much longer, according to analysts, as authorities seek to use this opportunity to bend the will of the next South Korea president following Park Geun-hye's ouster earlier this month.**

**Warrant:** The travel ban could lead to a 20% decline in GDP growth in South Korea.

Wang, Yue. "How China's South Korea Boycott Will Play Out, Politically And Economically." Forbes, Forbes Magazine, 20 Mar. 2017, [www.forbes.com/sites/ywang/2017/03/20/how-chinas-south-korea-boycott-will-play-out-politically-and-economically/#a7ecc0f2c23a](http://www.forbes.com/sites/ywang/2017/03/20/how-chinas-south-korea-boycott-will-play-out-politically-and-economically/#a7ecc0f2c23a)

The result is that, **in addition to extensive store closures and huge economic losses for Lotte, Chinese authorities have gone so far as to also deny visas to South Korean pop stars, removed South Korean television dramas broadcasts and ordered all of the countries' online travel agencies to stop selling South Korea-related tours.** Now, a search on popular Chinese travel agencies Ctrip and Tuniu for the keyword "South Korea" returns no results. A Tuniu spokeswoman said the company took down South Korea-related products because customer demand had been sharply reduced following the THAAD agreement. The measures will bite hard. Last year, Chinese travelers accounted for half of all visitors to the country in 2016, according to the Korea Tourism Organization. **The travel ban, if left in place, could lead to a 20% decline in Korea's GDP growth this year, according to Credit Suisse. The bank currently forecasts Korea to grow at 2.5%.**

**Analysis:** Teams can use this argument to demonstrate how South Korea would have to balance its intent and ambition to attain an anti-missile system with its economic interests. In order to weigh this argument, teams can impact out how South Korea's interests in its own economic stability will always outweigh marginal effects on security that a THAAD system may provide, especially if the scenario comes with the loss of a strategic ally in China to balance North Korea's nuclear ambitions.

## A2 -Anti-missile systems provoke pressure from China

**Answer:** Economic pressure on South Korea is not a long-term viable foreign policy option for China.

**Warrant:** Retaliatory measures against South Korea will hurt Chinese economic development in the long term.

Huang, Cary. “Why China's Economic Jabs at South Korea Are Self-Defeating.” South China Morning Post, South China Morning Post, 2 Apr. 2017, [www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2083166/opinion-why-chinas-shadow-boycott-south-korea-self-defeating](http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2083166/opinion-why-chinas-shadow-boycott-south-korea-self-defeating).

Every country is self-serving, and designs a foreign policy to suit its own best interests. But **China’s repeated use of retaliatory trade practises will not, in the end, serve its objectives.** First, **China’s retaliatory measures against Seoul could also disrupt Beijing’s aspirations to win market-economy status from the WTO,** which would exempt China from being subject to high anti-dumping duties. Second, while retaliation could inflict considerable economic harm on a targeted country, it serves as a double-edged sword – **foreign trade restrictions are sure to hurt domestic exporters as well.** Third, **nations targeted for economic retaliation will be forced to reorient their economies toward alternative suppliers and markets, which will in the end hurt China’s development.** Fourth, the frequent use of such tools will undermine China’s investment environment. **Punishments will scare away foreign investors as they take into account the uncertainty and risk of dealing with China.** Fifth, **Beijing’s unstable and unpredictable foreign policy will make other nations rethink their future ties with China.** Finally, hostile actions will sow the seeds of ill will, if not hatred.

**Warrant:** Protecting diplomatic relations between China and South Korea will always be prioritized over short term economic quips.

Lee, Jong-Wha. "The China-South Korea Trade War Must End." The Japan Times. N.p., 26 Mar. 2017. Web. 17 Aug. 2017.

<<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/03/26/commentary/world-commentary/china-south-korea-trade-war-must-end/#.WZXbs9PyvEY>>.

**China and South Korea should protect the diplomatic relationship that they have maintained since 1992.** But that requires China to recognize that South Korea's next president is unlikely to cancel the THAAD deployment, given the threat North Korea poses. **If China continues to apply pressure for a concession on THAAD, the only result will be an increase in anti-Chinese sentiment in South Korea.** The good news is that the Chinese authorities seem to recognize these risks, the clearest sign being their apparent containment of anti-South Korea protests. China's leaders know that realizing their global leadership ambitions requires them to adhere to global norms and accept greater responsibility. In this context, South Korea's move to involve the WTO — and the risk to China's international reputation that a formal dispute would imply — may have focused Chinese leaders' minds concerning the risks of escalation.

**Analysis:** Teams can argue that there are multiple reasons why China's retaliatory economic stance towards South Korea isn't a sustainable foreign policy relative to its own economic interests. If China seeks market-economy status from the World Trade Organization, its policies towards South Korea will have to fall back in line with its regional alliance. Beijing also has an added incentive to not scare off potential future investors that may see retaliation towards South Korea as a sign of economic volatility.

**Answer:** Chinese economic undermining of South Korea is already showing signs of coming to an end.

**Warrant:** It is not economically viable for China to keep its current pressure on South Korea.

Lee, Jong-Wha. "The China-South Korea Trade War Must End." The Japan Times. N.p., 26 Mar. 2017. Web. 17 Aug. 2017.

<<https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2017/03/26/commentary/world-commentary/china-south-korea-trade-war-must-end/#.WZXbs9PyvEY>>.

China is eager to take advantage of its position as South Korea's largest trading partner, accounting for nearly one-quarter of its external trade, and main source of foreign tourism. (Chinese tourists accounted for half the total number of foreign visitors to South Korea last year — more than eight million people.) But it is hardly a one-sided relationship. South Korea is China's fourth-largest trading partner, providing key intermediate inputs on which many Chinese firms rely. Indeed, intermediate and capital goods comprised more than 70 percent of South Korea's exports to China last year, including key inputs such as semiconductors (20 percent) and display panels (11 percent). South Korea is also the number one source of foreign tourists to China. Given these dynamics, if the dispute over the THAAD system escalates into a full-fledged trade war, both China and South Korea will suffer. As we have seen in the recent past, protracted tensions — for example, the territorial disputes between China and Japan over the Senkaku Islands in 2012 — can severely damage economic and diplomatic relations. Already, South Korea is considering bringing the Chinese sanctions to the World Trade Organization (WTO) for adjudication, and the authorities are reviewing whether China has violated relevant clauses of the two countries' bilateral free-trade agreement.

**Warrant:** There are already signals of relaxing strict economic penalties on South Korea.

Ide, William, and Saibal Dasgupta. "Hopes Growing China May Ease Informal South Korea Sanctions." VOA. VOA News, 23 May 2017. Web. 17 Aug. 2017.  
<<https://www.voanews.com/a/hopes-growing-china-may-ease-informal-south-korean-sanctions/3866996.html>>.

**South Korea's recent election of liberal politician Moon Jae-in as the country's new president has triggered a shift in China's approach to relations with Seoul.** After months of harsh criticism of South Korea's decision to deploy a U.S.-made missile defense system and the enactment of harsh economic sanctions, **Beijing appears to be**

**changing its tact. And some see signs that China is already beginning to loosen its ban on the import of South Korean cultural products such as television shows and entertainment performances, as well as group travel by Chinese tourists to the country. Over the past few days, reports in the Chinese state media have noted signals that the ice-breaking may have already begun.** Two South Korean musicals already have performance dates in Beijing and Shanghai.

**Analysis:** Teams can answer this argument by pointing out two assumptions that the Negative makes: 1) that economic pressure on South Korea is a sustainable option for China in the long term and 2) that economic pressure on South Korea is more beneficial than harmful for China. These answers strike down both of those assumptions. Not only is it not in China's interest to be seen as an economic adversary in the region, thereby decimating investor confidence, but South Korea remains an important trading partner to China's powerful economy. Teams can weigh these answers by pointing out that the status quo harms to South Korea's economy result in no long term viability for either side; China will have to relax economic pressure in the near future (and have already begun to do so) because such policies stand against their own interests in the long term.

**CON - Chinese weapons development**

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**Argument:** China views the deployment of anti-missile systems in South Korea as an interference with its own military actions in the region, prompting a buildup and threatening political realignment against South Korea and the United States.

**Warrant:** Deployment of an anti-missile system in South Korea will evoke a strategic military response from China.

Armstrong, Ian. “Why the U.S.-South Korea Missile Shield Could Provoke China to Develop Advanced Weaponry.” The Huffington Post, TheHuffingtonPost.com, 16 Aug. 2016, [www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-armstrong/us-korea-missile\\_b\\_11532232.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-armstrong/us-korea-missile_b_11532232.html).

The United States and South Korea’s recent decision to counter North Korean missile capabilities with **an advanced system on the Korean peninsula left China “deeply dissatisfied” and ready to take “necessary measures,”** a defense ministry spokesman said at the end of July. How, then, will China respond? As Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi recently stated, **THAAD is “not a simple technical issue, but an out-and-out strategic one” — and a strategic military problem will evoke a strategic military response. Countering a powerful missile defense system means more advanced Chinese missiles, with more aggressive deployment.**

**Warrant:** China will be motivated to bolster two existing missile programs in response to the deployment of anti-missile systems.

Armstrong, Ian. “Why the U.S.-South Korea Missile Shield Could Provoke China to Develop Advanced Weaponry.” The Huffington Post, TheHuffingtonPost.com, 16 Aug. 2016, [www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-armstrong/us-korea-missile\\_b\\_11532232.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ian-armstrong/us-korea-missile_b_11532232.html).

Little analysis has considered how the THAAD deployment will shape the Chinese military, and media outlets have mischaracterized the impact of the deployment from the Chinese perspective by focusing on the missile-intercepting aspects of the system. This assumption does not account for another major THAAD component — the AN/TPY-2 radar, which identifies and communicates the location of missile targets to the interceptor. **In reality, China’s largest concerns come not from the interception component of THAAD, but rather the detection capability provided by the AN/TPY-2. Regardless of the Pentagon’s intentions, the Chinese perceive the agreement on THAAD as a demonstration that the United States does not value strategic stability with China.** Beijing will be motivated to restore its nuclear and ballistic credibility by developing missile technologies that make the AN/TPY-2’s early warning potential irrelevant. In countering the THAAD deployment to South Korea, **two existing Chinese missile programs are likely contenders for accelerated development — hypersonic glide vehicles and multiple, independently targetable re-entry vehicles known as MIRVs.**

**Warrant:** China sees the deployment of THAAD systems in South Korea as a threat to its relations with both South Korea and the US.

Mullany, Gerry. “China Warns of Arms Race After U.S. Deploys Missile Defense in South Korea.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 7 Mar. 2017, [www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/asia/thaad-missile-defense-us-south-korea-china.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/asia/thaad-missile-defense-us-south-korea-china.html).

A spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geng Shuang, denounced the United States’ decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, or Thaad, and **vowed that Beijing would “take the necessary steps to safeguard our own security interests.”** “The consequences will be shouldered by the United States and South Korea,” Mr. Geng added, warning that the two countries should not “go further and further down the wrong road.” **For days, the official Chinese news media has warned that deployment of Thaad could lead to a “de facto” break in relations with South**

**Korea and urged consumers to boycott South Korean products. The Chinese authorities recently forced the closing of 23 stores owned by Lotte, a South Korean conglomerate that agreed to turn over land that it owned for use in the Thaad deployment, and hundreds of Chinese protested at Lotte stores over the weekend, some holding banners that read, “Get out of China.” Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, warned that Thaad “will bring an arms race in the region,” likening the defensive system to a shield that would prompt the development of new spears. “More missile shields of one side inevitably bring more nuclear missiles of the opposing side that can break through the missile shield,” it said.**

**Warrant:** Chinese officials see the possibility of expanded US military presence in the region as a challenge to their authority.

Mullany, Gerry. “China Warns of Arms Race After U.S. Deploys Missile Defense in South Korea.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 7 Mar. 2017, [www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/asia/thaad-missile-defense-us-south-korea-china.html](http://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/asia/thaad-missile-defense-us-south-korea-china.html).

Yang Xiyu, a former senior Chinese official who once oversaw talks with North Korea, said **China was worried that the deployment of the system would open the door to a broader American network of antimissile systems in the region, possibly in places like Japan and the Philippines, to counter China’s growing military as much as North Korea.**

**Warrant:** Chinese militarization can lead to problematic political realignment in the region.

Lee, Brianni. “THAAD Deployment in South Korea: Militarism Leading To Political Regression.” Harvard International Review, 17 Feb. 2017, [hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=14503](http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=14503).

**THAAD deployment may be the beginning of further militarization of the Korean peninsula**, and could lead to broader instability in East Asia and a **renewed confrontation between a US-South Korea alignment and a China-Russia-North Korea alignment, reminiscent of Cold War-era factions. China's strong reaction against THAAD deployment sparked stronger nationalistic demands for nuclear armament** within the Saenuri Party, South Korea's conservative ruling party, highlighting THAAD's risk of regional tension and greater militarization. The Saenuri Party argues that in order for South Korea to be independent of foreign powers for its protection, it has to establish a well-organized nationwide missile defense (MD) system.

**Warrant:** China will have an indefinite incentive to protect its military actions from US interference in the region.

Lee, Brianni. "THAAD Deployment in South Korea: Militarism Leading To Political Regression" Harvard International Review , 17 Feb. 2017, [hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=14503](http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=14503).

**China's fierce condemnation of THAAD deployment is the expression of its discomfort with the nearby presence of the US military.** While the United States argues that the deployment of THAAD has a purely defensive purpose, China assumes that THAAD deployment creates a potential threat of US intervention against Chinese military action. China also accuses the South Korean government of supporting US military interests and willingly taking the role of the United States' "puppet state."

**Warrant:** China views U.S. military presence through THAAD deployment as a direct threat to its own military capabilities.

Lee, Brianni. "THAAD Deployment in South Korea: Militarism Leading To Political Regression" Harvard International Review , 17 Feb. 2017, [hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=14503](http://hir.harvard.edu/article/?a=14503)

China has two main arguments against THAAD deployment. First, China argues that THAAD is unnecessary for protecting South Korea. THAAD is designed to detect and shoot down ballistic missiles in their reentry phase, thereby preventing longer-distance missiles from exploding on land. Because the distance between Pyongyang and Seoul is merely 194 kilometers, China has claimed that THAAD is not suited for protecting South Korea. Second, **THAAD's radar can detect China's military actions and interfere with Chinese interests. Because THAAD has to detect missile action as soon as possible, it must constantly collect data from areas within a 1,000 kilometer range, which includes Chinese and Russian territory. THAAD deployment in South Korea seems unlikely to improve relations with North Korea since compromised relations with China, one of few countries with significant influence over North Korea, will likely further damage relations on the peninsula.**

**Analysis:** This argument demonstrates how China's military actions are caught up in the narrative of regional security at play when it comes to missile systems in South Korea. China's position as an arbiter between North Korea and the rest of the world make its reaction to possible policy positions taken up against the isolated regime critical. If China sees the deployment of anti-missile systems in South Korea as a challenge to its defense capabilities, and then militarizes in return, this not only risks regional stability but also the precarious position that the United States is in currently as a protector of South Korea.

## A2 - Chinese weapons development

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**Answer:** The evolving threat of North Korea the focus of Chinese defense policy away from militarization.

**Warrant:** Beijing's handling of the brinkmanship of North Korea is its current top priority.

Drehle, David Von. "Failing the North Korea Test Would Set China Back for Decades."  
The Washington Post, WP Company, 12 Aug. 2017,  
[www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-north-korea-test-will-determine-chinas-future/2017/08/12/edd75164-7f8a-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed\\_story.html?utm\\_term](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-north-korea-test-will-determine-chinas-future/2017/08/12/edd75164-7f8a-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html?utm_term=).

All eyes are on President Trump in the showdown with North Korea, but this is very much China's moment. **How Beijing handles the brinkmanship of Kim Jong Un is the most important test the Chinese have yet faced in their decades-long effort to take a place in the first rank of world powers. The crisis is first a measure of China's reliability. If it is to achieve its goal of becoming a dominant force in the Asian Pacific, other powerful nations in the region must feel a degree of confidence that Beijing can make sound decisions and carry them out wisely.** North Korea's existence is the oldest foreign policy decision of the Chinese Communist government. The Red Army's intervention in the Korean War in 1950, which drove back the American-led U.N. forces and compelled a cease-fire, was the birth of a divided Korean Peninsula.

**Warrant:** China's economic reliability is contingent on de-escalating tensions with North Korea.

Drehle, David Von. "Failing the North Korea Test Would Set China Back for Decades."  
The Washington Post, WP Company, 12 Aug. 2017,  
[www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-north-korea-test-will-](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/the-north-korea-test-will-determine-chinas-future/2017/08/12/edd75164-7f8a-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html?utm_term=)

determine-chinas-future/2017/08/12/edd75164-7f8a-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed\_story.html?utm\_term.

**The crisis is also a measure of Chinese strength. So far during its rise, Beijing has been graded solely on its economy.** That performance has been impressive, but translating economic muscle into hegemony is no easy matter. Germany, Japan and South Korea have all enjoyed periods of explosive growth as low-cost manufacturers, yet none of them has risen above the second tier of global influence. **Kim's behavior has clearly become a net negative for China, massively undercutting Beijing's efforts to close the American umbrella in the East. If China cannot settle a situation that is so plainly adverse to its interests, it will be revealed as a paper tiger.**

**Analysis:** Teams can use this answer to demonstrate that in the wake of policy actions taken up to balance North Korea in recent weeks, China's reaction to South Korea's missiles have taken a backseat to their actual negotiations with Pyongyang.

**Answer:** Anti-missile systems in South Korea don't pose a direct threat to China.

**Warrant:** South Korean defense capabilities are less focused on deployment and more on shifting future guidelines.

Kim, Christine. "North Korea Missile Crisis Seen Pushing South Korea to Gun Up." Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 11 Aug. 2017, [www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-militarisation-idUSKBN1AR0L8](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-militarisation-idUSKBN1AR0L8).

**For now, officials are instead focused on changing the missile guidelines,** which allow Seoul to have ballistic missiles with a flight range capped at 800 km (497 miles), topped with a maximum 500 kg (1,102 pounds) warhead. **South Korea is less focused on increasing the flight range, as that could face opposition from neighbors including China, Russia and Japan, and the 800-km range limit covers all of North Korea in any case, senior government officials said.**

**Analysis:** This answer could be used as a quick overview about why anti-missile systems in South Korea particularly fail to pose a threat to China. Insofar as defense capabilities in South Korea are incredibly behind regional allies, and that their focus now is bureaucratic in nature via changing ballistic guidelines, teams can begin to cast doubt early on about the argument that THAAD systems threaten China.

**CON - Anti-missile systems damage diplomatic relations**

**Argument:** China and Russia both firmly oppose the deployment of THAAD systems in South Korea and consider any move towards it a direct challenge to their overall tone of de-escalation in the region.

**Warrant:** Both Russia and China oppose an extension of U.S. military presence in South Korea.

Reals, Tucker. "Why THAAD Is Controversial in South Korea, China and Russia." CBS News. CBS Interactive, 02 May 2017. Web. 16 Aug. 2017.  
<<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-thaad-is-controversial-in-south-korea-china-and-russia/>>.

**Like China** -- and recently, to an even greater degree -- **Russia has shielded North Korea from harsher sanctions by wielding its veto power on the United Nations Security Council.** "Relevant countries shouldn't use Pyongyang's acts as a pretext to increase their military presence on the Korean Peninsula," Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said in April 2016. **Russia's objection, like China's, is rooted in the country's role as a geopolitical adversary to the U.S. -- Moscow is just as reluctant as Beijing to have a powerful U.S. military radar system sitting just hundreds of miles from its territory. Russia and China are also allies, and the Kremlin has repeatedly voiced its concern that the THAAD deployment could further "destabilize" the region.**

**Warrant:** Deploying THAAD becomes a question of protecting South Korea and the tradeoff of utile diplomatic negotiations with regional actors.

Reals, Tucker. "Why THAAD Is Controversial in South Korea, China and Russia." CBS News. CBS Interactive, 02 May 2017. Web. 16 Aug. 2017.

<<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-thaad-is-controversial-in-south-korea-china-and-russia/>>.

Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Gennady Gatilov said at the end of last month that the anti-missile system posed a threat to "the existing military balance in the region." "It is not only we who perceived this step very negatively. We are once again urging both the United States and the Republic of Korea (South Korea) to reconsider its expediency and other regional states not to yield to the temptation of joining such destabilizing efforts," Gatilov was quoted as saying by Russian media. **In short, the controversy over the U.S. THAAD deployment in South Korea boils down to whether the system's limited capability to defend Americans and American allies is worth the potential impact to the political process aimed at ensuring it is never needed.**

**Warrant:** Chinese and Russian disapproval of THAAD may provoke individual or joint responses in the region.

Kim, Christine, and Yeganeh Torbati. "North Korea Delays Guam Missile Firing; U.S. Says Dialogue up to Kim." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 13 Aug. 2017. Web. 16 Aug. 2017. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-idUSKCN1AU04U>>.

**Chinese President Xi Jinping set off on a visit to Russia on Monday stressing the grave threat a U.S. anti-missile system in South Korea poses to both Chinese and Russian interests.** China has repeatedly stated its opposition to the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and has called for its deployment to stopped, and the missiles already installed to be removed. **"The U.S. deployment of an advanced anti-missile system in South Korea gravely harms the strategic security interests of China, Russia and other countries in the region,"** China's state Xinhua news agency cited Xi as saying. **China and Russia have maintained close communication and coordination on the issue and held very similar views on it, Xi said in an interview with Russian media.** "Beijing and Moscow are steadfastly opposed

to the THAAD deployment and seriously suggest that relevant countries stop and cancel the installation," Xinhua cited xi as saying. **China and Russia would take "necessary measures", either together or independently, to protect their interests, Xi said, without elaborating, according to Xinhua.**

**Warrant:** Russia opposes escalation of any military power in the region and insists that talks with the United States are necessary to reason their position out.

Shim, Elizabeth. "Russia Opposes THAAD Defense System in Korea." UPI. UPI, 29 Mar. 2017. Web. 16 Aug. 2017. <[https://www.upi.com/Top\\_News/World-News/2017/03/29/Russia-opposes-THAAD-defense-system-in-Korea/6261490799614/](https://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2017/03/29/Russia-opposes-THAAD-defense-system-in-Korea/6261490799614/)>.

Russia's top diplomat in Seoul said Wednesday **Moscow can have it both ways: stand in opposition to the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system on the Korean peninsula while developing better ties with Washington.** Ambassador Alexander Timonin told South Korean reporters the THAAD system is part of the United States' global missile defense system, or a means to expand the U.S. presence in Asia, South Korean news service Money Today reported. "The North continues to pursue nuclear and missile tests despite the [United Nations Security Council] resolutions and warnings from its neighboring countries. **The United States and South Korea are also holding joint military drills aiming to practice an attack on Pyongyang, while the deployment of THAAD, a part of the U.S. global missile defense, is under way on the Korean peninsula,**" Timonin said. **Russia is opposed to THAAD and wants all relevant countries to work to ease tensions in Northeast Asia, he added.**

**Warrant:** Russia sees THAAD deployment as an incentive to engage in excessive military buildup in the region.

Shim, Elizabeth. "Russia, China: THAAD Was Deployed in South Korea under Pretext." UPI. UPI, 26 May 2017. Web. 16 Aug. 2017. <<https://www.upi.com/Russia-China-THAAD-was-deployed-in-South-Korea-under-pretext/3681495854230/>>.

Russia and China agreed the deployment of a U.S. missile defense system in South Korea increases tensions on the peninsula, although THAAD may already be operational and tracking North Korean missiles. During a meeting between Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Moscow on Friday, the two sides agreed they stand opposed to actions that encourage tensions on the peninsula. In his statement to reporters in Moscow, **Lavrov referred to recent remarks from U.S. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, while agreeing "the use of force to resolve the Korean peninsula program would be fatal and catastrophic." Lavrov also said, "North Korea's actions must not be used as a reason to engage in excessive military buildup, such as the U.S. deployment of the THAAD system," according to South Korean news agency Yonhap.**

**Warrant:** Russia would use the deployment of anti-missile systems as a reason to build up its own forces.

Pinchuk, Denis, and Andrew Osborn. "Putin Says U.S. Missile Systems in Alaska, South Korea Challenge Russia." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 01 June 2017. Web. 16 Aug. 2017. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-economic-forum-putin-idUSKBN18S4NS>>.

**Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday that elements of a U.S. anti-missile system in Alaska and South Korea were a challenge to Russia and that Moscow had no choice but to build up its own forces in response.** Putin, speaking at an economic forum in St Petersburg, **said Russia could not stand idly by and watch while others increased their military capabilities along its borders in the Far East in the same way as he said had been done in Europe.** He said Moscow was **particularly**

**alarmed by the deployment of the U.S. THAAD anti-missile system to South Korea** to counter a North Korean missile threat and to reported U.S. plans to beef up Fort Greely in Alaska, a launch site for anti-ballistic missiles. "This destroys the strategic balance in the world," Putin told a meeting with international media, the start of which was broadcast on state TV.

**Warrant:** Russia has already discussed moving new missile defense systems to the Kurile Islands in response to US expansion.

Pinchuk, Denis, and Andrew Osborn. "Putin Says U.S. Missile Systems in Alaska, South Korea Challenge Russia." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 01 June 2017. Web. 16 Aug. 2017. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-economic-forum-putin-idUSKBN18S4NS>>.

**Washington was using North Korea as a pretext to expand its military infrastructure in Asia** in the same way it had used Iran as a pretext to develop a missile shield in Europe, charged Putin. Putin said the Kurile Islands, a chain of islands in the Far East where Moscow and Tokyo have rival territorial claims, were "quite a convenient place" to deploy Russian military hardware to respond to such threats. **Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu said last year Russia planned to deploy some of its newest missile defence systems and drones to the islands, part of a drive to rearm military units already stationed there. He has also spoken of Russia building a military base there.**

**Warrant:** Russia and China have proposed a plan to de-escalate the entire region.

"Russia and China Tell North Korea, U.S. and South Korea to Embrace De-escalation Plan." Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 04 July 2017. Web. 16 Aug. 2017. <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-china-xi-northkorea-idUSKBN19P1Q7>>.

**Russia and China joined diplomatic forces on Tuesday and called on North Korea, South Korea and the United States to sign up to a Chinese de-escalation plan designed to defuse tensions around Pyongyang's missile program.** The plan would see **North Korea suspend its ballistic missile program and the United States and South Korea simultaneously call a moratorium on large-scale missile exercises, both moves aimed at paving the way for multilateral talks.** The initiative was set out in a joint statement from the Russian and Chinese foreign ministries issued shortly after President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping held wide-ranging talks in the Kremlin. "The situation in the region affects the national interests of both countries," the joint statement said. **"Russia and China will work in close coordination to advance a solution to the complex problem of the Korean Peninsula in every possible way."**

**Analysis:** This argument outlines how key players in the evolving security issue may arrive at the same conclusions about a policy for different reasons. China opposes THAAD system deployment in South Korea because it fears for its own security and legitimacy of military capabilities. Russia opposes the system because it believes it is an extension of U.S. military power in a region that it borders. Russia and China's introduction to de-escalate the region by striking a deal with North Korea in exchange for the halting of large scale U.S.-South Korea military exercises points out how THAAD deployment directly challenges this notion of de-escalation. Teams can argue that in order to maintain the strategic interests of China and Russia on the side of South Korea while also breaking down the nuclear ambitions of North Korea, cooperation through de-escalation is necessary.

**A2 - Anti-missile systems damage diplomatic relations**

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**Answer:** Russian opposition is inevitable and non-unique to anti-missile systems in South Korea.

**Warrant:** Russian officials spin THAAD capabilities as offensively targeted with no evidence to support such statements.

Panda, Ankit. "Why China and Russia Continue to Oppose THAAD." The Diplomat. The Diplomat, 04 June 2017. Web. 17 Aug. 2017.  
<<http://thediplomat.com/2017/06/why-china-and-russia-continue-to-oppose-thaad/>>.

On Sunday, at the final plenary session of this year's Dialogue, Russian Deputy Defense Minister Lt. Gen. Alexander Fomin addressed Moscow's opposition to THAAD as well. During his speech to the plenary session, Fomin stated that Russia had concerns about the THAAD deployment, which he said would negatively affect Russian security. **During the question-and-answer portion, when asked to go into more detail about why specifically Russia opposed the THAAD deployment, Fomin, instead of discussing the plausible reach of the X-band radar in forward-basing mode, said that THAAD was a "dual use" system and could fire "attack missiles." (No publicly available information supports Fomin's assertion that THAAD can be operated as an offensive system.)**

**Warrant:** Russia isn't concerned with how THAAD deployments may affect strategic stability in the region.

Panda, Ankit. "Why China and Russia Continue to Oppose THAAD." The Diplomat. The Diplomat, 04 June 2017. Web. 17 Aug. 2017.

<<http://thediplomat.com/2017/06/why-china-and-russia-continue-to-oppose-thaad/>>.

Fomin also added that Russia opposed the deployment of further theater ballistic missile assets in Japan. Tokyo is considering its own THAAD batteries amid an intensifying North Korean challenge. Fomin cited the proximity of a potential THAAD system in Japan to the disputed Kuril Islands as a cause for concern. **Fomin, however, did not express any concerns about Northeast Asian THAAD emplacements negatively affected strategic stability between the United States and either China or Russia. For now, Russia and China appear to each be pursuing different cases against the deployment of THAAD in the region.**

**Warrant:** Russia will always prefer a political solution to tensions on the Korean peninsula rather than a military or defensive one.

Ramani, Samuel. "Russia's Korea Strategy." The Diplomat. The Diplomat, 15 July 2017. Web. 16 Aug. 2017. <<http://thediplomat.com/2017/07/russias-korea-strategy/>>.

The recent intensification of tensions between Russia and the United States over North Korea can be explained by two factors. First, **Russia's preferred strategy to combat the North Korean threat contrasts markedly with Washington's use of coercive diplomacy. Moscow has emphasized the importance of promoting inter-Korean diplomacy and has urged South Korea to desist from participation in U.S.-led security measures on the Korean peninsula, which antagonize North Korea.** Second, Russia is expanding its stake in the North Korean crisis to strengthen its increasingly important strategic partnership with China. **Since North Korea accelerated the pace of its nuclear and ballistic missile tests in early 2016, Russia has emerged as the leading international advocate of a political solution to the Korean Peninsula crisis. In contrast to Washington's focus on denuclearizing North Korea by any means**

**necessary, Russia's strategy has focused on containing North Korean aggression through targeted diplomacy.**

**Analysis:** This answer basically argues that Russian disapproval of THAAD deployment in South Korea isn't a unique issue to this particular scenario of resolving an intensifying security threat; Russia has long been (and will probably continue to be) and advocate of political talks between North Korea and its regional adversaries rather than stepping up military defense capabilities. Anti-missile systems will most likely not be the tipping point for Russia to suddenly start fortifying its own military installations in the region or the cutting off of diplomatic relations.

**Answer:** China and Russia will never facilitate effective diplomatic solutions on the peninsula since they both still protect and fund North Korea.

**Warrant:** Chinese and Russian investments in North Korea have inadvertently funded Pyongyang's weapons programs.

Hall, Kevin G. "China, Russia Keep North Korea's Nuclear Program Funded." Miami Herald. Miami Herald News, 15 Aug. 2017. Web. 16 Aug. 2017.  
<<http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/article167337082.html>>.

**Lost in all the attention paid to President Donald Trump's threat of unleashing "fire and fury" on North Korea is his promise to bring the country to heel with tough sanctions. It hasn't worked so far, because of Russia, China and shadowy middlemen tied to both nations.** Trump's threat makes him the fourth consecutive U.S. president to promise that he'd change North Korea's behavior by blocking its access to the global financial system. **But China and Russia have both long eased any pain to North Korea caused by the economic clampdown through a series of investments that have allowed Pyongyang to direct its cash into weapons programs.**

**Warrant:** Russian and Chinese economic lifelines undermine sanction efficacy on North Korea.

Hall, Kevin G. "China, Russia Keep North Korea's Nuclear Program Funded." Miami Herald. Miami Herald News, 15 Aug. 2017. Web. 16 Aug. 2017.  
<<http://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/article167337082.html>>.

**Russia, for instance, enjoys a long-term lease at a terminal in North Korea's relatively new port of Rajin on the Sea of Japan, and there is a new ferry service connecting the two countries. China has boosted railroad infrastructure near Dandong, its border chokepoint for trade with North Korea. Plus, both Russia and China give North Korea a trading lifeline.** China's General Administration of Customs said in April that trade with North Korea had expanded more than 37 percent in the first three months of 2017, despite tighter global sanctions. Over the weekend, China pledged to halt imports of iron, lead and coal from North Korea. Russia appears to be backfilling what China pulls back, especially North Korean coal, according to reports citing the Russian state-owned news site Sputnik. **Indeed, despite years of sanctions, Pyongyang shows no sign of a financial squeeze.**

**Warrant:** Alignment between China and Russia only serves to beat back American strategic influence rather than serving South Korean interests.

Williams, Katie Bo. "China-Russia Alignment on North Korea Raises Eyebrows." TheHill. N.p., 09 July 2017. Web. 17 Aug. 2017.  
<<http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/341050-china-russia-alignment-on-north-korea-raises-eyebrows>>.

**In a coordinated response to the launch, Beijing and Moscow issued a joint statement on Tuesday calling for a mutual freeze on Pyongyang's nuclear program and U.S.-South Korean military maneuvers in the region.** Chinese President Xi Jinping told Russian media that relations between the two countries were currently in their "best time in history" and that China and Russia were one another's "most trustworthy strategic partners." The proposal, and the strategic alignment between the

two one-time rivals, raised some eyebrows amongst regional watchers. Russia has often backed China in U.N. Security Council negotiations, but during the Obama administration it was far less engaged on North Korea than China was. Xi's government, meanwhile, had appeared prepared to begin taking a more assertive stance on the reclusive nation. **The recalibration serves a common goal that regional experts say is central to both Russian and Chinese foreign policy — loosening American alliances around the globe.**

**Analysis:** This answer targets the main assumption of the argument about worsening diplomatic relations with China and Russia as a result of anti-missile system deployment; if both countries were determined to find a diplomatic solution to the problem of escalating tensions on the Korean peninsula, they would cut off all financial interactions with North Korea. Not only have both countries indirectly supported their weapons development, but their opposition to missile systems remain purely a political tactic to oppose U.S. influence in the region. This means that South Korea's interests are immaterial to both countries.

**CON - THAAD anti-missile systems are ineffective**

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**Argument:** The military force structure of the THAAD anti-missile system is not only ineffective against an armed strike from North Korea, but provokes regional allies and risks the depreciation of diplomatic cooperation.

**Warrant:** The location of THAAD missile systems would not protect half of South Korea's population.

"What the THAAD Missile Defense System Can—and Can't—Do in South Korea."

World Politics Review. N.p., 11 May 2017. Web. 15 Aug. 2017.

<<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/22128/what-the-thaad-missile-defense-system-can-and-can-t-do-in-south-korea>>.

Joshua Pollack: THAAD stands for “terminal high-altitude area defense,” a name that helpfully distinguishes it from other ballistic-missile defense (BMD) systems. Like the shorter-range Patriot systems, **THAAD intercepts missiles in the “terminal” phase of their trajectories, while they are descending toward their targets. But THAAD can perform intercepts at a higher altitude than Patriot can, at the top of the atmosphere or even above it. This high-altitude intercept capability allows THAAD to protect an area of roughly 200 kilometers, or 125 miles, in radius from attacks with short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) like Scuds or medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) like North Korea’s Nodong or Polaris missiles.** The current generation of Patriot BMD systems is meant to stop the same sorts of missiles, but a Patriot battery can only protect a single facility at a time. U.S. Forces Korea already operates several Patriot batteries, defending airbases and other facilities in South Korea that it would need in a conflict with North Korea. Although THAAD batteries are mobile, **basing one at Seongju, near the southern end of the Korean Peninsula, makes it optimally positioned to provide an added “layer” of defense** for a number of crucial military and logistical facilities, including the Port of Busan. **But this southerly location**

**also means that THAAD would not afford much protection, if any, to the Seoul area, where about half of South Korea's population is concentrated.** Thus, it primarily meets military needs.

**Warrant:** THAAD has no defense capabilities against intercontinental ballistic missiles.

"What the THAAD Missile Defense System Can—and Can't—Do in South Korea."

World Politics Review. N.p., 11 May 2017. Web. 15 Aug. 2017.

<<http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/22128/what-the-thaad-missile-defense-system-can-and-can-t-do-in-south-korea>>.

Pollack: **THAAD has not yet been demonstrated against intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs), the sort of weapons that would be used to target Guam from the mainland of Asia.** The ship-based Aegis BMD system, versions of which are operated by the U.S., Japanese and South Korean navies, are expected to be more capable against longer-range threats of this type, and to address them along with short- and medium-range threats. **THAAD has no role at all against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), the sort of weapons that would be used to target Hawaii or the mainland United States from Asia.** The Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, whose interceptors are mostly located in Alaska, with a few in California, is meant to address this threat.

**Warrant:** THAAD missile systems would fail to protect 25 million people living in Seoul from an artillery attack launched by North Korea.

Padden, Brian. "THAAD Remains Contentious Issue for US-South Korea Summit."

VOA, VOA News, 27 June 2017, [www.voanews.com/a/thaad-remains-contentious-issues-for-us-south-korea-summit/3917723.html](http://www.voanews.com/a/thaad-remains-contentious-issues-for-us-south-korea-summit/3917723.html).

Over the weekend, anti-THAAD demonstrators peacefully marched outside the American Embassy in central Seoul. Organizers say over 3,000 protesters participated. Some

THAAD opponents in South Korea argue it is not worth provoking Beijing and Pyongyang. **Analysts say the high altitude missile defense system would be essentially ineffective against a massive North Korea artillery attack that could target 25 million people living in Seoul and other areas in near the border.** Others living near the deployment site are concerned the radar system could cause health and environmental problems.

**Warrant:** The ineffective structure of THAAD systems against North Korea provokes China into believing the system is meant to undermine their military capabilities.

Why China Is Wrong to Be Furious about THAAD.” The Economist, The Economist, 23 May 2017, [www.economist.com/news/asia/21719485-deployment-american-anti-missile-system-south-korea-does-not-threaten-chinas-nuclear](http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21719485-deployment-american-anti-missile-system-south-korea-does-not-threaten-chinas-nuclear).

**China has expressed two related criticisms of THAAD**, which stands for Terminal High Altitude Area Defence. The first is that **the powerful radar that THAAD** uses to track and hit targets has the capability of “seeing” far into China and thus **could be used to undermine the effectiveness of China’s own nuclear arsenal**. The second is that the system, which is designed to intercept and destroy short- and intermediate-range ballistic missiles during their descent (terminal) phase, at altitudes of 40-150km, **would not be effective because Seoul is so close to North Korean missile launchers. The implication, again, is that China is the real target.**

**Analysis:** Teams can use this argument to demonstrate that the most probable anti-missile systems to be deployed in South Korea, THAAD systems, have ineffective military force structure in protecting populations from an armed North Korean attack. While this inefficacy is a harm in of itself, teams can take it a step further by arguing that the relative inefficacy of the system makes regional allies like China nervous for the implications of American sponsored military presence in the region. This can amount to less cooperation between security allies in confronting the nuclear threat from North Korea.

**A2 -THAAD anti-missile systems are ineffective**

**Answer:** THAAD deployment fills gaps in current South Korean defense capabilities and creates an effective multilayered shield.

**Warrant:** South Korea’s current missile defense systems put it at higher risk for catastrophe.

Klingner, Bruce. “South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense.” The Heritage Foundation, 12 June 2015, [www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense](http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense).

**A basic precept of air and missile defense is “mass and mix”—having sufficient interceptors from different systems** so that any one system’s vulnerabilities are offset by the capabilities of another system. Instead, **South Korea insists on relying on only lower-altitude interceptors, resulting in smaller protected zones, gaps of coverage that leave fewer citizens protected, and minimal time to intercept a missile—all of which contribute to a greater potential for catastrophic failure.** Successfully destroying a high-speed inbound missile requires intercepting it sufficiently far away from the target. **The higher the altitude and range of the interceptor, the greater the likelihood of success.** At low altitude, even a “successful” interception of a nuclear, chemical, or biological warhead could result in the populace still being harmed.

**Warrant:** THAAD deployment would create the multilayered defensive system South Korea needs.

Klingner, Bruce. “South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense.” The Heritage Foundation, 12 June 2015, [www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense](http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense).

**The THAAD system is designed to intercept short-range, medium-range, and some intermediate-range ballistic missiles' trajectories at endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric altitudes in their terminal phase. In conjunction with the Patriot missile system, THAAD would create an essential multilayered defensive shield for South Korea. THAAD's large-area defense capability with 72 interceptors per battery would complement Patriot's point defense and enable defense of more military forces, population centers, and critical targets. South Korea's Hannam University conducted a computer simulation that showed a PAC-2/3 low-altitude missile defense system would have only one second to intercept a North Korean missile at a range of 12–15 kilometers (km), while a THAAD medium-range system would have 45 seconds to intercept a missile at 40–150 km.**

**Warrant:** Studies of THAAD deployment reveal promising capabilities in shielding most of South Korea.

Klingner, Bruce. "South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense." The Heritage Foundation, 12 June 2015, [www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense](http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense).

**A Lockheed Martin simulation showed that a single THAAD battery could defend most of South Korea against a North Korean missile attack, while two batteries would protect all of Korea except the southeast and provide greater protection against multiple missile attacks. Three batteries would cover all of South Korea. The four most recent senior U.S. commanders in Korea have recommended that South Korea should deploy the THAAD system and join the allied missile defense network. Similarly, the two most recent South Korean Defense Ministers Han Min Koo and Kim Kwan-jin have assessed that THAAD would improve the country's defense.**

**Analysis:** This answer provides two warrants as to why THAAD systems would be effective at protecting South Korea-the first is that intercepting missiles at higher altitudes is necessary to protect the population from fallout, and the second is that THAAD deployment alongside current

Patriot systems in the region provide the best shot at a multilayered defense for the country. Teams should weigh these two warrants extensively when answering arguments about anti-missile system efficacy since they both convincingly answer the question ‘why’ South Korea defense would be comparatively better with THAAD deployment.

**Answer:** China’s opposition to THAAD systems have less to do with their effectiveness at stopping ICBMS or collecting intel on Chinese military structures than with its relative geopolitical strength in the region.

**Warrant:** Anti-missile systems in placed in East Asia have similar radar capabilities to THAAD, making Chinese fears of surveillance are non-unique.

Denmark, Abraham M. “China’s Fear of U.S. Missile Defense Is Disingenuous.” Foreign Policy, 20 Mar. 2017, [foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/20/chinas-fear-of-u-s-missile-defense-is-disingenuous-north-korea-trump-united-states-tillerson-thaad/](https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/20/chinas-fear-of-u-s-missile-defense-is-disingenuous-north-korea-trump-united-states-tillerson-thaad/).

In reality, however, these fears are baseless. THAAD in the Korean Peninsula will be able to conduct only one mission: defend South Korea against a ballistic missile attack from North Korea. The only way that THAAD in the Korean Peninsula could defend against Chinese missiles would be if China decided to strike South Korea — a highly unlikely scenario. Moreover, **deploying an AN/TPY-2 radar in South Korea would not substantially enhance the ability of the United States to “see” Chinese ballistic missiles. The United States has already installed the same radar three times in East Asia — once in Guam and twice in Japan.**

**Warrant:** Current radar techniques and marginal advantages to interception mean THAAD systems post no tangible threat to China.

Why China Is Wrong to Be Furious about THAAD.” The Economist, The Economist, 23 May 2017, [www.economist.com/news/asia/21719485-deployment-american-anti-missile-system-south-korea-does-not-threaten-chinas-nuclear](https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21719485-deployment-american-anti-missile-system-south-korea-does-not-threaten-chinas-nuclear).

Neither of these arguments is convincing. In the first place, **there are already two THAAD radars in Japan, which can see into China**, albeit not quite as far as the radar going into South Korea. Michael Elleman, a missile-defence expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, says that the **THAAD radar in South Korea might pick up Chinese missiles bound for the West Coast of America in their boost phase, but the advantage it would give would be “quite marginal”**. **THAAD interceptors in South Korea cannot be used to hit Chinese missiles in their launch or boost phase and are in the wrong place to hit missiles attacking America in their terminal phase. Moreover, the radar in South Korea will be configured in “terminal” rather than “look” mode**. It takes a software change and about five hours to switch modes, but doing so would render THAAD useless against North Korean missiles, which pose a grave and immediate threat to the 28,500 American troops in South Korea.

**Warrant:** China’s opposition to THAAD missiles are less of a technical concern than a geopolitical one.

Denmark, Abraham M. “China’s Fear of U.S. Missile Defense Is Disingenuous.” *Foreign Policy*, 20 Mar. 2017, [foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/20/chinas-fear-of-u-s-missile-defense-is-disingenuous-north-korea-trump-united-states-tillerson-thaad/](https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/20/chinas-fear-of-u-s-missile-defense-is-disingenuous-north-korea-trump-united-states-tillerson-thaad/).

Finally, the disingenuousness of China’s claimed fear of THAAD’s radar is demonstrated by China’s actions since the decision to deploy THAAD to South Korea. **After announcing the decision, the United States sought to allay China’s concerns by repeatedly offering to brief Beijing about the technical capabilities of THAAD’s radar. China refused these briefings. If Beijing were genuinely concerned about this radar, it would stand to reason that it would want to know as much about it as possible. Repeatedly refusing briefings on the subject strongly suggests that Beijing knows about the radar and what it does, and especially what it does not do.** Indeed,

when the United States initially offered to brief China about THAAD in 2016, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying admitted that THAAD was “certainly not a simple technology issue” for China. I agree. China’s strong opposition to deploying THAAD to the Korean Peninsula is not technical, but geopolitical.

**Warrant:** Opposition from China revolves around geopolitical strength rather than legitimate threats to its security.

Denmark, Abraham M. “China’s Fear of U.S. Missile Defense Is Disingenuous.” Foreign Policy, 20 Mar. 2017, [foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/20/chinas-fear-of-u-s-missile-defense-is-disingenuous-north-korea-trump-united-states-tillerson-thaad/](https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/03/20/chinas-fear-of-u-s-missile-defense-is-disingenuous-north-korea-trump-united-states-tillerson-thaad/).

**China’s broader strategic objective is to gradually establish itself as the dominant power in the Asia-Pacific that has the ability to drive all major decisions of consequence in the region. A critical aspect of this strategy is to circumscribe the ability of the United States to drive regional dynamics, especially in the military realm.** This is especially true on the Korean Peninsula, which represents a close American alliance in very close proximity to China’s borders. Through this lens, **THAAD would be perceived not as a tactical military deployment designed to respond to a real military threat, but rather as a symbol of America’s continued strength in China’s backyard. This is why China has pushed South Korea so strongly over a military deployment that does not significantly affect China in any way.** For Beijing, THAAD represents a persistent rebuke to China’s broader strategic ambitions for regional dominance.

**Analysis:** Teams can use these responses to beat back any arguments about how THAAD is perceived as a threat to China since it isn’t necessarily militarily effective at fending off large scale armed attacks from North Korea. If teams can point out that China’s motivations to oppose the systems are political rather than technical, then the concerns over THAAD’s military effectiveness as a anti-missile system is not the link into the impact scenario of Chinese opposition in the region.